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
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
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


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
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



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Those included in this volume deal, from the Japanese side, with the period of hostilities up to, and including, the battle of the Sha Ho.

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„ „ Russian rear guard action with 2nd Japanese Division on 28th August 1904 - -	3
„ „ 30th and 31st August 1904 - - -	4
„ „ scene of the turning movement of the 12th and 2nd Japanese Divisions, north of the Tai-tzu Ho - - -	5
Battle of the Sha Ho, view from Yen-tai coal mine - - -	6
„ „ „ the extreme right of the Japanese position -	7

SKETCHES.

(Bound in text.)

Action at Sai-ma-chi - - - - -	to face page	136
„ Ai-yang-cheng - - - - -	„ „	140

NOTE ON MANCHURIAN PLACE NAMES.

The Manchurian place names mentioned in this volume are given in nearly every case in Chinese: transliterated on the Wade system, but without its aspirates or accents. The Chinese syllables forming the names have been divided by hyphens. On the other hand, the Korean place names, and a few Japanese forms which it was thought desirable to preserve, are printed in one word, *e.g.*, in Chiao-tou (Kyoto), the first name is Chinese, and that in brackets the Japanese form. A few geographical terms, however, which constantly form the terminal words of place names, have been printed in the Chinese rendering unconnected by a hyphen and with an initial capital letter, *e.g.*, Shan (hill), Ling (pass, or mountain), Ho (river); and in the Japanese transliteration separated by a hyphen, *e.g.*, Okasaki-yama (General Okasaki's hill), Yoshi-rei (Yoshi Pass). There is an apparent exception to this rule where such words form the integral part of a place name as in Tieh-ling, "Iron-mount" (*cf.* Red Hill and Redhill). Adjectives and points of the compass which serve to distinguish villages of similar name have also been printed as separate words to assist the eye, *e.g.*, Tung (east) Pa-li-chuang, Hsi (west) Pa-li-chuang, Ta (great) Hsi-kou, Hsiao (little) Hsi-kou.

The names of Chinese villages are very frequently taken from the surname of the principal family residing in them, *e.g.*, Yang-chia-tun, "Yang family village"; Chin-chia-wo-peng, "Chin family huts"; or from some natural or artificial feature, as: Tuan-shan-chi, "Round-top hill hamlet"; Ta-shih-chiao, "Great stone bridge." Combinations of good omen, like Fu-shun, "Peace and harmony," Ping-tai-tzu, "Peace and eminence," are also common. Size is sometimes indicated, as in Ssu-chia-tun, "Four house village"; Ta-tien-tzu, "Large inn village"; Chiu-lien-cheng, "Nine part city"; or distance from some large town, as Pa-li-chuang, "Eight mile village"; Shih-li-ho, "Ten mile stream." Descriptive names are naturally common, *e.g.*, Chi-kuan Shan, "Cockscomb Hill"; Yu-tai Shan, "Beautiful Hill"; Lien-tao-wan, "Connected-island bend" (on the Tai-tzu River).

In some, however, the origin of the name is less obvious, as in Tai-tzu Ho, "Emperor's Son river"; Liao Ho, "Distant river"; Hai-cheng, the "City on the Sea" (which is 30 miles off); Feng-huang-cheng, "Male phoenix and female phoenix city."

The following are the significations of some of the other names which occur most frequently in the reports:—

Hei-kou-tai	-	-	Black ravine eminence.
Hun Ho	-	-	Muddy river.
Liao-yang	-	-	Distant light or sun.
Mo-tien Ling	-	-	Touch heaven pass.
Nan Shan	-	-	South Mountain.
Niu-chuang	-	-	Cattle farm.
Pen-hsi-hu	-	-	Source stream lake.
Pi-tzu-wo	-	-	Fox cub den.
Sha Ho	-	-	Sandy river.
Shou-shan pu	-	-	Chief hill village.
Ta-lien Wan	-	-	Great connected bay.
Te-li-ssu	-	-	Obtain advantage temple.
Tien-shui-tien	-	-	Sweet water village.
Ya-lu	-	-	Wild duck.
Yen-tai	-	-	Opium eminence.
Ying-kou	-	-	Camp mouth.

Mukden is a Manchu form, meaning "Flourishing City"; in Chinese it is called Feng-tien Fu or Shen-ching, "Heaven Born" or "Affluent City."

The most constantly recurring syllables have the attached meanings :—

Chia -	-	-	a family or house.
Pu -	-	-	a police post or small village.
Tun -	-	-	a village.
Tzu -	-	-	a diminutive or suffix without special meaning.
Wo-peng -	-	-	a collection of huts.

The following appear frequently—

(a) at the beginning of place names :—

Ta -	-	-	great.	Hsiao -	-	-	little.
Pei -	-	-	north.	Nan -	-	-	south.
Tung -	-	-	east.	Hsi -	-	-	west.
Shang -	-	-	upper.	Hsia -	-	-	lower.
Chien -	-	-	front.	Hou -	-	-	back.
Yu -	-	-	right hand.	Tso -	-	-	left hand.
Chung -	-	-	middle.				

(b) at the end of names :—

Shan -	-	-	mountain.	Ling -	-	-	pass.
Ho -	-	-	river.	Kou -	-	-	ravine, mouth, &c.
Chuang -	-	-	village.	Chiao -	-	-	bridge.
Kuang -	-	-	village in a village.	Fang -	-	-	house.
Tan -	-	-	village.	Lou -	-	-	tower.
Tien -	-	-	village with inn.	Miao -	-	-	temple.
Tsun -	-	-	village.	Ssu -	-	-	„
Tai -	-	-	eminence.				

The colours are—

Hei -	-	-	black.	Pai -	-	-	white.
Lan -	-	-	blue.	Hung -	-	-	red.
Huang -	-	-	yellow.				

The numerals—

Yi -	-	-	one.	Liu -	-	-	six.
Erh -	-	-	two.	Chi -	-	-	seven.
San -	-	-	three.	Pa -	-	-	eight.
Ssu -	-	-	four.	Chiu -	-	-	nine.
Wu -	-	-	five.	Shih -	-	-	ten.

A list of the commoner Chinese words in geographical use is given below in the hope that the meanings may aid the memory in retaining the names of localities. It must, however, be understood that these syllables have the meaning attached to them only when they represent the ideograms by which the words would be written by a Chinaman, or are pronounced in the exact "tone" by which they are distinguished when spoken, e.g., Feng, which is translated "a mountain peak," "wind," and "phoenix," is represented by three separate Chinese ideograms, and there are many other *feng* in the language. The aspirants and accents have been inserted to make the list more generally useful.

<i>Ai</i> or <i>yai</i> , a bank.	<i>Chia</i> , a family, a surname.
<i>An</i> , peace, or peaceful.	<i>Chiang</i> , a river, a surname.
<i>Cha</i> , a canal lock.	<i>Chiao</i> , a bridge.
<i>Ch'a</i> , tea, a fork.	<i>Chieh</i> , a boundary, a street.
<i>Chai</i> , a small fort or post, a walled enclosure.	<i>Chien</i> , a mountain stream, a ravine.
<i>Chan</i> , a stage or halting-place, to divide.	<i>Ch'ien</i> , front, money, a surname.
<i>Chang</i> , a common surname.	<i>Ch'i</i> , seven, a village, ridge.
<i>Ch'ang</i> , long, joyful, a plain.	<i>Ch'ih</i> , a small pond, often artificial, reddish.
<i>Chao</i> , shining, illuminating, a surname.	<i>Chin</i> , gold, near, a ford.
<i>Ch'ao</i> , the tide.	<i>Ch'ing</i> , clear, pure, grey, or dark-green.
<i>Ch'en</i> , a market town or village.	<i>Ching</i> , a thorn bush, a well.
<i>Cheng</i> , a walled city.	<i>Chiu</i> , wine, nine.
	<i>Chou</i> , a district city, a surname.

- Chu, a pig, bamboo.
 Chuan, a spring.
 Chuang, a village.
 Chung, middle.
 Erh, two, a diminutive particle of sound.
 Fang, a house, a region.
 Fei, a goddess.
 Fên, dividing, grave.
 Fêng, a mountain peak, wind, phoenix.
 Fu, a prefectural city, happiness, a surname.
 Hai, the sea.
 Hei, black.
 Ho, a river.
 Hou, back, behind.
 Hsi, west, good luck, stream.
 Hsia, below, a surname.
 Hsiang, a scent, a bye-street or lane.
 Hsiao, small.
 Hsien, a district or district city, thread.
 Hsin, new.
 Hu, a large lake, a tiger.
 Hua, flowers, words, or language.
 Huai, a tree like the ash.
 Huang, yellow.
 Hui, beauty, a society, ashes, to return or come back.
 Hun, dull or muddy.
 Hung, red.
 Jih, sun or day, post station.
 Kao, high, a surname.
 Kou, a ditch or drain, canal, ravine, valley or nullah, dog.
 K'ou, a mouth, a mountain pass, a bay, a place where two roads cross.
 Ku, a drum, a girl, ancient, poor, a valley, grain, a surname.
 K'u, bitter, dried-up, to weep.
 Kuan, a barrier, a mountain pass, an officer or official.
 K'uang, a village in a valley, a basket.
 Kung, a duke.
 K'ung, empty, a surname.
 La, wax, wax-tree.
 Lai, to come, a surname.
 Lan, blue.
 Lang, a wolf, a wave.
 Lao, old, difficult.
 Li, a plum or pear, inside, a surname, the Chinese measure of distance—one third of a mile.
 Lia, two.
 Liang, two, cool, a surname.
 Liao, distant.
 Lien, joined or connected, the lotus.
 Lin, a grove of trees, near to.
 Ling, a mountain, a mountain pass, a tomb.
 Liu, six, flowing, a common surname.
 Lo, joy or happiness, to lower or let fall.
 Lou, a tower.
 Lu, a road or way.
 Lü, donkey.
 Lung, a dragon.
 Ma, a horse, a surname.
 Mai, wheat, to buy, to sell, to bury.
 Mao, a cat, an anchor, a surname.
 Ma-t'ou, (horse-head) a pier or jetty.
 Mei, coal, plums, a surname.
 Mên, a door, gate, or entrance.
 Miao, a temple, a surname.
 Mien, flour, face or side.
 Ming, bright.
 Mo, a mill.
 Mu, mother, a surname.
 Nan, south, difficult.
 Ni, mud.
 Ning, peace, safety or tranquility, a surname.
 Nin, a cow.
 Nü, a woman.
 Pa, eight.
 Pai, white.
 Pan, half, a board or plank.
 Pang, a surname.
 Pao, to protect.
 Pei, north.
 Pên, a source.
 Pêng, a shed.
 P'ing, level, peace or peaceful.
 Po, a small lake, a gate.
 P'u, a police post or station, a shop or small village.
 San, three.
 Sang, the mulberry.
 Sha, sand.
 Shan, hill or mountain.
 Shang, over or upon, trade or commerce.
 Shên, a god or spirit.
 Shih, ten, stone.
 Shou, life-long, a hand.
 Shu, a tree, a book.
 Shuang, a pear.
 Shui, water.
 So, a place, a lock.
 Ssü, a temple, four.
 Sung, fir or pine.
 Ta, large.
 T'a, pagoda, otter.
 Tai, a terrace, an eminence.
 Tan, single.
 T'an, a village, a waterfall, rapids.
 Tang, a dry river bed wet in rain, a spring, a pond, sugar.
 Tao, an island or promontory, a road.
 T'ao, a peach.
 Tê, virtue.
 Ti, embankment, earth.
 T'ieh, iron.

Tien, an inn, a village.	Wang, king, a common surname, to hope, a net.
T'ien, heaven, sun, day, a field, a surname.	Wei, a small sea-side fortified post, a tail, a surname.
Ting, a nail, a summit, a departmental city.	Wên, warm, literature, classical.
T'o, a camel.	Wo, a nest or collection, a cave.
Tou, a bean, a surname.	Wu, five, military, a surname.
T'ou, head.	Ya, a tooth.
Tsang, a granary.	Yai or ai, a bank.
Tsao, a date (fruit).	Yao, a brick or other kiln.
Ts'ao, straw or grass.	Yang, the ocean, the poplar tree, a surname, a sheep,
Tso, left-hand.	Yeh, wild.
Tsui, a beak, very, exceedingly.	Yen, salt, smoke, tobacco, a swallow, a wild goose.
Ts'un, a village.	Yi, one.
Tu, a ferry, a surname.	Yin, shade.
T'u, a hare.	Ying, a "camp," military unit or barrack, a grave or graveyard.
T'un, a village.	Yu, right-hand.
Tung, east.	Yü, fish or rain.
Tzû, marshy ground, a son, a diminutive particle of sound.	Yuan, a spring, a yard or garden, far-off, a surname.
Wa, a tile, a swamp or marsh, a hamlet, a depression.	Yün, clouds or cloudy.
Wan, a bay, a bend in road or river.	

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE JAPANESE FORCES.

IN JAPAN.

Commander-in-Chief	-	-	-	H.M. the Emperor.
Chief of Staff at General Head-Quarters	-	-	-	Field-Marshal Marquis Yamagata.
Sub-Chief of Staff at General Head-Quarters	-	-	-	Major-General Nagaoka.

IN MANCHURIA.

Commander-in-Chief	-	-	-	Field-Marshal Marquis Oyama.
Chief of Staff	-	-	-	General Baron Kodama.

FIRST ARMY.

General Baron Kuroki.

Guard Division.

2nd „

12th „

After the battle of the Ya-lu it was joined by the Guard Mixed Reserve Brigade.

SECOND ARMY.

General Baron Oku.

At Nan Shan this Army consisted of the—

1st Division.

3rd „

4th „

At Te-li-ssu of the—

3rd Division.

4th „

5th „

At Ta-shih-chiao of the—

3rd Division.

4th "

5th "

6th "

At Liao-yang and the Sha Ho of the—

3rd Division.

4th "

6th "

At Mukden of the—

3rd Division.

4th "

5th "

8th "

Various reserve units were also at different times attached to the Army.

THIRD ARMY.

General Baron Nogi.

This Army at first consisted of—

1st Division.

11th "

A reserve brigade.

A naval "

It was joined in July 1904 by—

9th Division.

A reserve brigade.

And in November 1904 by the—

7th Division.

On the conclusion of the siege of Port Arthur the 11th Division was transferred to the Fifth or Ya-lu Army.

FOURTH ARMY.

General Count Nodzu.

This at first consisted only of the—

10th Division.

It was joined in July 1904 by—

5th Division (from the Second Army).

A reserve brigade.

At the battle of Mukden it consisted of the—

6th Division.

10th "

FIFTH (OR YA-LU) ARMY.

General Kawamura.

This Army, which was formed during the winter of 1904-5, consisted of the—

11th Division.

A reserve division.

THE DIVISIONS.

Guard Division (General Baron Hashegawa, succeeded by Lieut.-General N. Asada) :—

1st Guard Infantry Brigade (Major-General N. Asada, succeeded by Major-General Izaki).

1st Guard Infantry Regiment.

2nd "

2nd Guard Infantry Brigade (Major-General A. Watanabe).

3rd Guard Infantry Regiment.

4th "

Guard Cavalry Regiment. "

" Artillery "

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

1st Division (Lieut.-General Prince Fushimi, succeeded by Lieut.-General M. Matsumura) :—

1st Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Matsumura, succeeded by Major-General Osako).

1st Infantry Regiment.

15th "

2nd Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Nakamura).

2nd Infantry Regiment.

3rd "

1st Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery "

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

2nd Division (General Baron Nishi, succeeded by Lieut.-General S. Nishijima) :—

3rd Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Matsunaga).

4th Infantry Regiment.

39th "

15th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Okasaki).

16th Infantry Regiment.

30th "

2nd Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery "

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

3rd Division (Lieut.-General Baron Y. Oshima) :—

5th Infantry Brigade (Major-General K. Yamaguchi).

6th Infantry Regiment.

33rd "

17th Infantry Brigade (Major-General J. Kodama).

18th Infantry Regiment.

34th "

3rd Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery "

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

4th Division (Lieut.-General Baron Ogawa, succeeded by Lieut.-General K. Tsukamoto) :—

7th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Nishijima, succeeded by Lieut.-General K. Tsukamoto).

8th Infantry Regiment.

37th "

19th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Ando, succeeded by Major-General Hayashi).

9th Infantry Regiment.

38th "

4th Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery "

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

5th Division (Lieut.-General Ueda, succeeded by Major-General Kigoshi) :—

9th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Yamada, succeeded by Major-General Surizawa).

11th Infantry Regiment.

41st

21st Infantry Brigade (Major-General K. Tsukamoto, succeeded by Major-General Murayama).

21st Infantry Regiment.

42nd

5th Cavalry Regiment.

„ Artillery „ (mountain guns).

„ Engineer Battalion, &c.

6th Division (Lieut.-General Okubo) :—

11th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Iida).

13th Infantry Regiment.

45th

24th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Y. Kigoshi, succeeded by Major-General Koidzume).

23rd Infantry Regiment.

48th

6th Cavalry Regiment.

„ Artillery „

„ Engineer Battalion, &c.

7th Division (Lieut.-General Tsameshima) :—

13th Infantry Brigade (Major-General S. Yoshida).

25th Infantry Regiment.

26th

14th Infantry Brigade (Major-General T. Saito).

27th Infantry Regiment.

28th

7th Cavalry Regiment.

„ Artillery „ *

„ Engineer Battalion, &c.

8th Division (Lieut.-General Baron Tatsumi) :—

4th Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Tanabe).

5th Infantry Regiment.

31st

16th Infantry Brigade (Major-General A. Kimura).

17th Infantry Regiment.

32nd

8th Cavalry Regiment.

„ Artillery „ (mountain guns).

„ Engineer Battalion.

„ Train Battalion, &c.

9th Division (Lieut.-General Baron H. Oshima) :—

6th Infantry Brigade (Major General H. Ichinohe).

7th Infantry Regiment.

35th

18th Infantry Brigade (Major-General Hirata).

19th Infantry Regiment.

36th

9th Cavalry Regiment.

„ Artillery „ (mountain guns).

„ Engineer Battalion, &c.

10th Division (Lieut.-General Baron Kawamura, succeeded by Lieut.-General S. Ando) :—

8th Infantry Brigade (Major-General H. Tojo).

10th Infantry Regiment.

40th

„ „

* This Regiment contained only four batteries, two field and two mountain.

10th Division—cont.

20th Infantry Brigade (Major-General M. Marni).

20th Infantry Regiment.

39th " "

10th Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery " (mountain guns).

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

11th Division (Lient.-General Baron Tsuchiya):—

22nd Infantry Brigade (Major-General T. Kamiso).

12th Infantry Regiment.

43rd " "

10th Infantry Brigade (Major-General N. Yamanaka).

22nd Infantry Regiment.

44th " "

11th Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery " (mountain guns).

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

12th Division (Lient.-General Baron Inouye):—

12th Infantry Brigade (Major-General N. Sasaki, succeeded by Shimamura).

14th Infantry Regiment.

47th " "

23rd Infantry Brigade (Major-General Kigoshi, succeeded by Imamura).

24th Infantry Regiment.

46th " "

12th Cavalry Regiment.

" Artillery " (mountain guns).

" Engineer Battalion, &c.

The 13th and 14th Divisions were formed in April 1905, and the 15th and 16th Divisions in July 1905; they were in the process of being sent to the left of the Japanese line when the war came to an end.

INDEPENDENT CAVALRY.

1st Cavalry Brigade (Major-General Akiyama):—

13th Cavalry Regiment.

14th " "

2nd Cavalry Brigade (Major-General Prince Kannin, succeeded by Major-General Tamura):—

15th Cavalry Regiment.

16th " "

Each regiment consisted of 4 squadrons.

INDEPENDENT ARTILLERY.

1st Artillery Brigade:—

13th Artillery Regiment.

14th " "

15th " "

2nd Artillery Brigade:—

16th Artillery Regiment.

17th " "

18th " "

Each regiment was formed of 2 battalions of 3 field batteries each.

RESERVE FORMATIONS.

In a certain number of divisional districts reserve brigades were formed and sent to the front; some of these were mixed brigades, others consisted of infantry only.

DIARY OF THE WAR.*

1904.

5 February.—Diplomatic relations broken off by the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg.

8 February.—Japanese Squadron under Admiral Uriu, escorting three transports with four infantry battalions, arrives at Chemulpo.

8 February.—Attack by Japanese Squadron under Admiral Togo on Port Arthur. Two Russian battleships and one cruiser torpedoed.

9 February.—Naval attack at Port Arthur renewed. One Russian battleship and three cruisers injured.

Japanese destroy Russian cruiser "Variag" and gunboat "Koretz" at Chemulpo.

14 February.—Attack on Port Arthur by Japanese destroyers. Russian cruiser torpedoed.

16 February.—The Japanese cruisers "Nisshin" and "Kasuga" arrive at Yokosuka from Genoa.

12th Division commences to disembark at Chemulpo.

17 February.—Admiral Makarov appointed to supersede Admiral Starck.

21 February.—General Kuropatkin appointed Commander-in-Chief of Russian forces in Manchuria.

24 February.—First attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

27 February.—12th Division completes its disembarkation at Chemulpo.

28 February.—Japanese and Russians in touch near Pingyang.

29 February.—Japanese take possession of Hai-yun Tao, one of the Elliot Islands.

4 March.—Guard and 2nd Divisions complete their mobilization and concentrate at Hiroshima.

6 March.—Admiral Kamimura bombards Vladivostok.

12 March.—General Kuropatkin leaves St. Petersburg.

13 March.—Disembarkation of the Guard and 2nd Divisions at Chinampo commences.

21-22 March.—Naval bombardment of Port Arthur. Russian Fleet takes up a position at the entrance of the harbour.

27 March.—Second attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur. General Kuropatkin reaches Harbin.

28 March.—Guard and 2nd Divisions complete disembarkation at Chinampo.

1 April.—1st and 3rd Divisions concentrated at Hiroshima.

4th Division completes mobilization at Osaka.

13 April.—Asada Detachment of the First Army reaches Wiju.

Admiral Makarov comes out from Port Arthur. On the return of the Russian Squadron the "Petropavlovsk" is sunk by a mine, and Admiral Makarov drowned.

15 April.—The cruisers "Kasuga" and "Nisshin" bombard Port Arthur by high-angle fire from Pigeon Bay.

20 April.—Sasaki Detachment arrives on the Ya-lu, 15 miles east of Wiju.

21 April.—First Army concentrated at Wiju.

26 April.—Japanese transport "Kinshu Maru" sunk by two Russian torpedo boats.

* First Army, 1st Division, &c., refer to the Japanese Forces.

27 April.—Third attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

30 April and 1 May.—Battle of the Ya-lu. The First Army, under Kuroki, defeats Russians under Zasulich.

1 May.—Japanese renew their attempts to block entrance to Port Arthur.

4 May.—Second Army (1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions) sails from Chinampo.

5 May.—Second Army commences landing near Pi-tzu-wo.

6 May.—First Army occupies Feng-huang-cheng.

8 May.—Second Army cuts the railway at Pu-lan-tien.

10 May.—Cossacks unsuccessfully attack Anju.

11 May.—Greater part of fighting troops of Second Army and first relie transport complete landing.

12 May.—Japanese Fleet, under Admiral Kataoka, bombards Ta-lien-wan.

14 May.—Japanese occupy Pu-lan-tien.

15 May.—The cruiser "Yoshino" sunk in collision with cruiser "Kasuga." The battleship "Hatsuse" sunk by a mine near Port Arthur. 5th Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade commence landing near Pi-tzu-wo.

16 May.—Second Army moves on Chin-chou.

19 May.—10th Division Fourth Army commences landing at Ta-ku-shan.

21 May.—11th Division commences landing at Yen-ta-wan, 18 miles east of Chin-chou.

27 May.—Battle of Nan Shan. Admiral Togo establishes blockade of south end of Liao-tung Peninsula.

30 May.—Japanese occupy Dalny. Stakelberg's corps despatched to relieve Port Arthur, in touch with Japanese at Wa-fang-kou.

7 June.—First Army begins to advance from Feng-huang-cheng. Action at Sai-ma-chi.

8 June.—Japanese occupy Hsin-yen.

11 June.—Japanese blockade Ying-kou.

13 June.—6th Division commences landing at Kerr Bay (next bay east of Ta-lien Bay).

14-15 June.—Battle of Te-li-ssu. Russians retire on Kai-ping with a loss of 7,000 men and 16 guns.

15 June.—Vladivostok squadron sinks two Japanese transports, "Hitachi Maru" and the "Sado Maru."

20 June.—General Kuropatkin arrives at Kai-ping and inspects General Stakelberg's troops.

21 June.—Second Army occupies Hsiung-yueh-cheng, 30 miles north of Te-li-ssu.

22 June.—Action at Ai-yang-cheng.

23 June.—The Russian Fleet comes out of Port Arthur, but is driven back again with loss by Togo. Kuropatkin takes command of the Russian Army in person.

26 June.—The two armies face to face, Russians holding the line Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, Liao-yang; Japanese: south of Kai-ping, Lien-shan-kuan, Sai-ma-chi.

Third Army approaches Port Arthur from the land side and captures Chien Shan.

27 June.—First Army seizes the Mo-tien Ling and Fourth Army captures the Fen-shui Ling.

3, 4, 5 July.—At Port Arthur General Stessel attempts to recapture the Chien Shan line.

6 July.—Marshal Oyama, Commander-in-Chief, leaves Tokio for the front.

9 July.—Second Army occupies Kai-ping.

9th Division begins to arrive at Dalny from Japan.

13 July.—British ss. "Malacca" stopped by "Peterburg" in Red Sea, and taken back to Suez.

17 July.—Unsuccessful attack by General Count Keller on the Mo-tien Ling position.

25-26 July.—Battle of Ta-shih-chiao.—Second Army after failure by day drives the Russians back from their entrenched positions on Ta-shih-chiao by a night attack. Japanese occupy Ying-kou.

26-30 July.—At Port Arthur the Third Army capture Ta-po Shan—An-tzu Ling line, and General Stessel falls back towards Port Arthur.

31 July.—General advance of First, Second, and Fourth Armies. Japanese drive Russians back all along the line, on Yu-shu-lin-tzu, Yang-tzu Ling, Hsi-mu-cheng, and Hai-cheng. Investment of Port Arthur begun.

3 August.—Second Army occupies Hai-cheng and Niu-chuang town. Russians at Port Arthur driven back on to the forts.

8 August.—Combined land and sea attack on Port Arthur ends in capture of Ta Ku Shan and Hsiao Ku Shan.

10 August.—Sortie of the Port Arthur fleet. Admiral Togo attacks and disperses them. Some Russian vessels take refuge in the neutral ports of Shang-hai, Chifu, and Kiaochow, but the majority are driven back into Port Arthur.

12 August.—Japanese board and capture Russian destroyer "Reshitelni" in Chifu harbour.

13 August.—Admiral Rojestvenski assumes command of Baltic Fleet.

14 August.—Admiral Kamimura engages Vladivostok squadron 40 miles north-east of Tsu-shima and sinks cruiser "Rurik."

19-24 August.—First Assault of Port Arthur.

22 August.—Port Arthur, East and West Pan-lung Shan Forts captured.

23 August.—General Kuroki's left column, the Guard Division, commences the movement on Liao-yang.

24 August.—Failure of first general attack on Port Arthur.

25 August-4 September.—Battle of Liao-yang.

25 August.—General Japanese advance on Liao-yang begun.

25-26 August.—Kuroki's right column, the 12th Division, carries Russian position at Hung-sha Ling. Second and Fourth Armies arrive at the An-shan-tien position.

28 August.—Russians, having lost all advanced positions, fall back upon Liao-yang. Kuroki gains right bank of Tang Ho and effects junction with Second and Fourth Armies.

29-30 August.—Japanese attack Liao-yang position, but make no material impression on the defence.

31 August.—Second and Fourth Armies resume their attack on Liao-yang position, and make progress in the direction of Hsin-li-tun and Shou-shan-pu.

1 September.—Russian right and centre fall back towards second line of defences round Liao-yang. First Army captures Manju-yama.

2-3 September.—First, Second, and Fourth Armies continue their attacks on Liao-yang.

3 September.—General retreat of the Russians from Liao-yang.

4 September.—Russian rear guard, after delaying Japanese for two days, finally evacuates Liao-yang.

The Japanese enter Liao-yang at 3 a.m.

4-5 September.—The Russian army in retreat fights rear guard actions with the First Army, which occupies Yen-tai coal mines.

7 September.—Kuropatkin arrives at Mukden.

19-20 September.—Port Arthur: Capture of Fort Kuropatkin and the Shui-shih-ying redoubts.

20 September.—Port Arthur: Capture of Namako-yama.

21 September.—Port Arthur: Japanese obtain a footing on 203 Metre Hill, but are subsequently obliged to retire.

25 September.—General Gripenberg appointed to command Second Manchurian Army.

26 September.—Circum-Baikal Railway opened.

29 September.—Service in the Japanese Second Reserve increased from 5 to 10 years.

2 October.—Publication of Kuropatkin's order of the day, declaring the Manchurian Army to be strong enough to begin a forward movement.

9-14 October.—Battle of the Sha Ho.

9 October.—Russians cross Tai-tzu Ho and attack the Japanese First Army.

8th Division commences disembarkation at Dalny.

10-11 October.—First Army attacked at Ming Shan, Shih Shan, and Ta Ling, near Pen-hsi-hu.

12, 13, 14 October.—Russians are gradually driven back over the Sha Ho.

15 October.—Baltic Fleet leaves Libau.

16 October.—Port Arthur: Japanese capture Hachimaki-yama (near Erh-lung Shan).

21-22 October.—Baltic Fleet at midnight fires on Hull fishing fleet.

26 October.—Port Arthur: Japanese seize advanced trenches in front of Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan.

30 October.—Second Assault, on northern half of the eastern defences of Port Arthur.

31 October.—Port Arthur: Japanese gain possession of the glacis crests of Erh-lung Shan, Sung-shu Shan, and the North Fort of East Chi-kuan Shan.

5 November.—General Lenevich appointed to command First and General Kaulbars appointed to command Third Manchurian Army.

16 November.—7th Division commences arriving at Dalny from Japan.

26 November.—Port Arthur: Assault on Erh-lung Shan and Sung-shu Shan fails.

30 November.—Capture of 203 Metre Hill.

6 December.—Port Arthur: Japanese occupy Akasaka-yama.

18 December.—Port Arthur: East Chi-kuan Shan Fort taken.

28 December.—Port Arthur: Capture of Erh-lung Shan.

31 December.—Port Arthur: Capture of Sung-shu Shan.

1905.

1 January.—General Stessel proposes surrender of Port Arthur.

Rojestvenski arrives at Ile Sainte Marie, off Madagascar.

2 January.—Port Arthur capitulation agreement signed.

3 January.—Admiral Fölkersam arrives at Passandava Bay, Madagascar.

5 January.—Meeting of Nogi and Stessel.

Official report by General Nogi, reckoning the surrendered garrison at 32,207 prisoners and over 15,000 sick and wounded.

11-12 January.—General Mishchenko makes a raid to the south, attacks old Niu-chuang and cuts railway line, but is forced to retire.

13 January.—Baltic Fleet at Diego Suarez.

25-29 January.—Battle of Hei-kou-tai. Russians cross the Hun Ho and attack Japanese left wing. Heavy fighting, at the conclusion of which Russians are forced to retire.

15 February.—Third Baltic Squadron (Admiral Nebogatov) leaves Libau.

23 February.—Ya-lu Army (right wing) opens the Battle of Mukden.

24 February.—First Army (right centre) begins to operate.

27 February.—Fourth Army (centre) begins three days' bombardment of the Russian positions.

28 February.—Second Army (left centre) begins to advance.

Ya-lu Army occupies Ma-chun-tun.

1 March.—Third Army (left wing) enters Hsin-min-tun.

2-6 March.—Fourth Army dislodges Russians from outworks south of the Sha Ho.

5 March.—First Army forces the left of the Russian entrenchments on the Sha Ho.

6 March.—Progress of Second Army checked.

7 March.—Kuropatkin orders a retreat.

8 March.—Third Army cuts the railway north of Mukden.

10 March.—First Army carries Fu-shun position.

Japanese enter Mukden.

16 March.—Japanese enter Tieh-ling.

17 March.—Kuropatkin is relieved of his command, and succeeded by Lenevich.

Baltic Fleet leaves Nossi Bé.

19 March.—Japanese occupy Kai-yuen.

Kuropatkin assumes command of First Russian Army under Lenevich.

21 March.—Japanese occupy Chang-tu Fu.

24 March.—Admiral Nebogatov at Port Said.

2 April.—Japanese driven out of Hai-hsin-kou, 33 miles N.E. of Kai-yuen.

3-4 April.—Russian force driven out of Tzu-lu-shu, 20 miles north of Chang-tu.

8 April.—Baltic Fleet sighted off Singapore.

12 April.—Russian force defeated at Erh-lo-hu by Japanese advancing on Hai-lung line.

12-14 April.—Rojestvenski arrives in Kamranh Bay.

15 April.—Japanese occupy Tung-hua, 50 miles east of Sheng-keng.

22 April.—Rojestvenski leaves Kamranh Bay.

24 April.—Russian attack on Chang-tu and Kai-yuen repulsed. Rojestvenski returns to Kamranh Bay.

26 April.—Rojestvenski again leaves Kamranh Bay.

27 April.—Nebogatov reported off Penang.

- 1 May.—Japanese reach Tiao-yu-tai, 28 miles north of Tung-hua.
2 May.—Russian Fleet reported at Honkohe Bay.
5 May.—Nebogatov passes Singapore.
9 May.—Rojestvenski leaves Honkohe Bay.
Nebogatov off Cape St. James.
Russians repulsed at Ying-pien-mun.
12 May.—Rojestvenski returns to Honkohe Bay.
14 May.—The Baltic Fleet leaves Honkohe Bay for the north.
27-28 May.—Battle of the Sea of Japan begins at about 2 p.m. on
27 May. On that day and the next Togo destroys the Baltic Fleet.
8 June.—President Roosevelt sends identic despatch to Japanese and
Russian Governments urging them to negotiate for peace.
8 July.—Japanese land on Saghalien.
9 August.—First Session of the Peace Conference.
29 August.—Final Session of the Peace Conference.
5 September.—Treaty of peace signed.
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THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

(1) First Japanese Army.—The Disembarkation of the 12th Division at Chemulpo, February 1904.*

REPORTS by Commander E. W. WEMYSS, R.N., Lieutenant H. EDWARDS, R.N., and Lieutenant A. C. BARNBY, R.M.L.I., of H.M.S. Talbot. Chemulpo, 3rd March 1904.

Plate.

Sketch map of the theatre of war - - Map 1.

Report by Commander E. W. Wemyss, R.N.

A Japanese fleet having arrived off Chemulpo at 4 p.m. on Monday, 8th February 1904, and having stopped the Russian gunboat "Korietz" from sailing, there came into harbour three second-class cruisers, four torpedo boats, and three transports, all of which anchored. During the evening 3,000 men were landed from these.

On Saturday, 13th February 1904, Japanese transports began to arrive, and with the first of them came a number of artificers, who at once put up a shed on the beach, in which they erected forges and commenced to build two landing stages, the materials for which were brought with them already cut to the requisite lengths. The work was completed in one night. They have since erected a third pier, but it is of stronger proportions, with a view, I should suppose, of landing guns.

The organization for the landing of about 21,000 men was, I consider, most perfect. Each transport had its own sampans† for landing the men, and all other lighters and sampans and the tugs sent over were employed. The men landed at the rate of forty in a sampan, and marched away at once to their stations without any further direction. All the houses in the Japanese quarter were told off for billeting soldiers, and the work was carried out in the most orderly and quiet manner; every sampan or lighter landing stores or troops had a distinguishing flag, and was directed where to go alongside the piers on shore by a man holding up a similar flag on a bamboo at the place it was to come to. The arrangements made for landing the troops were so good that nothing had to be borrowed or purchased from the

* Printed by permission of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

† Native flat-bottom boats, with sharp bow and broad stern; they are propelled by a junk lug-sail and by sculling with single oars fixed on pins at either side near the stern.

shore. Everything I saw pointed to the fact that all preparations had been made weeks beforehand. The transport and cavalry ponies struck me as being of a very inferior quality. The hospital arrangements and the machines brought by the bicycle corps appeared to be of the very best and newest pattern. The small guns landed were so light as to be easily man-handled.

Points I should like to bring to notice are:—

(1) The perfect organization of the landing.

(a) Boats specially provided for the landing of the troops, with steam boats to tow.

(b) Arrangements made beforehand on shore for billeting the troops, or fires lighted in the streets for them to encamp round.

(c) Absence of noise and orders, every man seeming to know at once on landing where he had to go, and going there.

(f) Gear for building piers brought over all ready cut to proper lengths, allowing them to be constructed in a night.

(g) All ponies freshly shod.

(h) The excellent arrangements for the carriage of provisions by coolies, all packages being strapped up so that a load was put on like a waistcoat.

(i) The kit of the men seemed to be excellent, though the boots appeared to be rather thin in the sole, but every man carried a spare pair.

(j) The fitting of the hospital ship "Hakuai Maru" seemed excellent.

Report by Lieutenant H. Edwards, R.N.

The landing commenced on the 8th February shortly after 5 p.m., when three transports arrived under convoy; by 8 a.m. on the 9th these transports had landed 2,500 men, a few horses, and a number of coolies; this landing was a preliminary to the general landing which commenced on the 16th February. On the 13th February two large transports arrived carrying large numbers of coolies, pontoons for landing, several steam-boats, sampans, materials for temporary barracks, and a small number of troops as a beach guard.

The transports commenced arriving on the 16th February, and continued to arrive until noon on the 27th, after which only one store and one hospital ship came in up to the 3rd March. The total number of transports arriving between the 8th February and the 3rd March was 76, with a nett register tonnage of 134,850 tons. There were 53 different transports employed on this work, many making two trips. The steamers carrying the troops and horses were all fitted the same, having

the well decks covered in with rough wooden sheds, which formed horse boxes and shelters for the men. Practically the whole of the troops and horses, and most of the stores were landed in sampans holding 35 soldiers, or 5 horses and 10 men; there were also three very large iron lighters, but they were not much used owing, I believe, to their unwieldiness and it being impossible to use them when the tide was at all low. The placing of the troops in the boats was as follows:—As each sampan was loaded she dropped astern of the ship, making fast to each other two abreast; when ready the train, often consisting of over twenty boats, was towed on shore by a steam launch; each train carried a flag which enabled the beach master to direct it to its proper landing. The stores landed were of every description, including rice, barley, medical stores, stretchers, tent poles, horseshoes, wood, materials for field telegraphs, pack saddles, 130 small iron pontoons, 34 small mountain guns (about 9-prs.), 100 gun-wheels, and four balloons. The bright red colour of the blankets supplied to the troops was very noticeable.

Report by Lieutenant A. C. Barnby, R.M.L.I.

The landing was carried out with great quickness. The total absence of noise and trouble on the part of the coolies and soldiers employed was remarked upon by everyone. The whole operations were in charge of an engineer officer, who as commandant of the port had also two battalions of infantry under his command. His staff consisted of ten or twelve officers and a large number of military clerks, all of whom wore as a distinguishing mark a band of red cloth round their left arms. The head-quarters were established in the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which were occupied as soon as all the Russians had left the port. The work of landing stores, ponies, &c., was carried out by the troops themselves and by a coolie corps of army reservists. During the last week of the work Korean coolies were also called in to help, but I am told that they received good wages, which is probably true, as they worked very willingly. The business of the port was interfered with as little as possible by the Japanese, and any stores taken over by them were paid for, good prices being given.

The foreign residents were unanimous in praising the behaviour of the Japanese, and I saw no case of drunkenness, or bullying by the troops. Stores and men were landed at five points on the bund, the one wooden pier being specially widened and two piers improvised from sampans. On the arrival of the garrison, which was formed by one battalion of the 46th Infantry and one of the 47th, piquets were placed in the town and sentries over all the stores, which were stacked on the bund and covered by tarpaulins.

The work of entraining troops for Seoul was also entrusted to the commandant of the port, and at first caused a great deal of inconvenience to passengers. After the first two weeks everything was in working order, three trains a day, up and down, being run for civilians. In addition, permission was given for English officers and men to travel by the troop trains. The infantry went up in ordinary passenger cars, the horses and troopers in specially prepared luggage vans, eight horses and men to each van. All available rolling stock was used and, in addition, all that belonging to the Fusan-Seoul Railway. The troops detrained at the South Gate Station two or three miles from the city, and were marched out to the Japanese quarter. At first they were sent to the Japanese Barracks,* where there is accommodation for some 1,500 men, but subsequently, as the number of men increased, they were billeted on the Japanese residents. Finally, they occupied the Korean Government Offices, which was, I believe, done with the approval of the Korean Government, as it was carried out systematically and with the aid of Korean guides.

As soon as the transports arrived the telegraph offices, both at Seoul and Chemulpo, were formally taken over, although they had been under Japanese control for a considerable time before. A mild form of censorship was also instituted, Japanese military telegrams taking precedence of all others. In transporting troops, stores, &c., the railway was in nearly every case employed, one column of pack ponies, about 800 in number, being sent up by road. On or about the 15th February a large temporary camp for men and ponies was commenced at Yongsan, a village some six miles from the city of Seoul, with accommodation for 6,000 ponies and 8,000 men. By the 23rd the stables were occupied, and large quantities of forage were brought up and stored near by. By the 30th of the month the barracks were completed, but had not been occupied. At Yongtongpo, a place some eight miles from Seoul on the line to Chemulpo, there were large quantities of railway stores, rails, sleepers, girders for bridges, and building material for stations belonging to the Fusan Railway, and later utilized to prolong the existing line from Chemulpo northwards towards Pingyang and the Ya-lu River.

Every man disembarked and entrained in marching order.†

* * * * *

Of the stores landed the food consisted chiefly of dried fish and rice. The dried fish was simply tied up in bundles about 2 feet square, while rice was packed in matting packages 3 feet by 2 feet by 10 inches.

* By a Convention Japan had the right to maintain two companies of infantry—a company not to exceed 200 men—at Seoul.

† A description of the Japanese uniform and kit has been omitted.

Large quantities of *sake** were landed in wooden tubs, very much the shape of acid carboys.

Planks and shaped timber were also landed and used in making the barracks at Yongsan and the piers at Chemulpo. Considerable quantities of Russian petroleum for lighting and demolition, medical stores, tents, railway material, and field telegraphs were stored on the bund at Chemulpo.

* The Japanese native spirit.

**(2) First Japanese Army.—The disembarkation of
the Guard Division at Chinampo, 14th to 18th
March 1904.**

NOTES by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery, Pingyang,
19th March 1904.

Plate.

Sketch map of north-west corner of Korea* - Map 2.

Chinampo is situated about 22 miles up the Pingyang inlet, which is three miles wide opposite the town. The rise and fall of spring tide is about 20 feet, the shore is deep mud, ice and frozen snow.

From fifteen to twenty transports appeared to be disembarking troops and material at the same time.

The landing stages were the same which were in use at Chemulpo, four in number, each about 150 yards in length with a plank roadway 10 feet broad, supported on sampans of various sizes which rest on the mud at low and float at high tide, and with 3-foot rail at each side.

The end of a stage 3 feet above water, and it can be used at any state of the tide.

Each transport brings sampans in the place of some of the ordinary ship's boats. Steam launches tow five or six sampans to the landing stages, or cast them off near the shore, when they are sculled in by two men on each boat. These men live and sleep in the covered sterns of the boats. The boats carry 30 to 60 men or about 12 ponies. Even when thus loaded the boats only draw a foot or two of water.

The ponies have to jump on to the end of the landing stage from the bottom of the boat 3 feet below. This is managed, apparently, without accident.

At the end of each landing stage different coloured flags are placed, presumably so that there should be no mistake as to which of the four stages any particular body of troops is to go.

The infantry march after landing straight away to their appointed billets in the Korean town, all of which has been taken over for the accommodation of troops.

The cavalry pickets its horses to the trees in a wood close by, then returns for saddles and kits.

Fatigue parties help to unload the stores and baggage.

* It has not been found possible to verify the transliteration of the Korean place names on this map.

Each ship carries a large number of the small two-wheeled carts as well as stores. The carts are brought ashore with the wheels packed on top of the body of the cart, so that they take up very little room on board. On being landed they are put together and used at once to convey rice bags, &c. to the depôts; three or four men pull each cart.

On the 17th March a large number of pontoons were landed. They are of steel, in three sections, 3 feet long, 3 feet wide, $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep. On landing they are at once put together and placed bottom upwards on a four-wheeled trolley, pulled by one horse or half-a-dozen men.

Korean coolies are extensively employed at good wages, but most of the work is done by the soldiers themselves, who work with a will. In the China campaign of 1894-95 coolies alone were employed.

Each infantry soldier is provided with a long brown blanket cloak with sheepskin collar. He also carries his ordinary blue cloak, one red blanket, knapsack, haversack, water-bottle, entrenching tool, spare boots, straw sandals, small basket for cooked rice, cooking-pot, rifle, pouches, and bayonet. The cavalry horses are overloaded in proportion.

18th March.—The American Mining Co. convoy arrived here from the north (Unsan mines). Some Russians were at Anju on the 12th and 1,300 were passed at Paksan. A few skirmishes between cavalry scouts had been heard of. The Americans estimated the number of Japanese in Pingyang on the 16th, at about 6,000, but accommodation for 100,000 is being prepared.

The block on the road from Chinampo to Pingyang is bad, the two-wheeled transport carts travelling only about half a mile an hour.

The Russian cavalry seen by the mining party was very well mounted on Mongolian ponies and carried very little kit:—thick cloak, blanket under saddle, carbine, cartridge belt, 3-foot straight sword, blade 2 inches wide, no saddle bags or wallets. These swords are said to fit on to the ends of the carbines.

I leave with the mining convoy to-morrow, the 19th, for Pingyang, and shall go with it as far as possible, provided the Japanese authorities have no objection.

(3) First Japanese Army.—Summary of events in Korea, 8th March to 3rd April 1904.

NOTES by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery, Pingyang,
28th March to 3rd April 1904.

One company of Japanese infantry reached Pingyang 21st February from Haiju, where it had landed. This, together with local civilians, held the city until reinforcements arrived 27th February.

On 28th February an advanced party of Russian cavalry came to within three miles of the city and sent its scouts forward. These were fired at from the walls, two horses are said to have been shot, and the Russians retreated towards Anju.

By 15th March, probably all the 12th Division (Lieut.-General Inouye), which had landed at Chemulpo, was in or north of Pingyang.

I am informed that about 22,000 men, inclusive of the 12th Division and "military coolies," landed at Chemulpo.

Chinampo was open on or about 7th March, and on 9th March two hundred reservists of the Guard Division landed there. The first transport containing part of the Guard Division arrived there on 13th March.

At Pingyang a bridge of boats was laid across the ice on the Taitong River, but on the 13th the ice began to break up. On the 14th the Japanese crossed in two places by ferry boats pulled by relays of soldiers. By 17th March the river was free from ice up to Pingyang.

According to the Japanese official report, a cavalry regiment reached Anju without opposition on 10th March, a battalion of the 14th Regiment on 11th March. Also one battalion left Pingyang for the north on 16th March, and one (of the 14th Regiment) on 17th March.

About this time the Chechen River at Anju became the boundary between the Japanese and Russians. In two affairs of patrols one Japanese was killed, and the Koreans report two Russians wounded.

The distance from Seoul to Pingyang measured by a cyclometer is 161 miles.

A column consisting of three battalions 24th Regiment, a pontoon troop, and 200 horses left Seoul on 1st March, reaching Pingyang on the 14th.

General Baron Kuroki, Commanding the First Army, and staff arrived at Pingyang 21st March. On that date the

Japanese commenced landing stores at Majandai, 9 miles below Pingyang on the Taitong. Steam launches drawing 6 feet can go up to Pingyang.

The population of Pingyang is from 65,000 to 70,000. There is a bridge of boats 210 yards long from the landing stage, 30 yards from the city wall, to the sands, which extend for another 300 yards beyond the bridge. The river is 500 yards broad in the rains.

Much has been said about the Japanese having sent over troops to Korea in civilian clothes before the outbreak of hostilities. This is true to some extent, for the 12th Division was mobilized in Seoul and the reservists were sent over in advance.

* * * *

On the 16th March the Guard Division, Lieut.-General Hasagawa,

1st Brigade, Major-General Asada,
2nd Brigade, Major-General Watanabe,

commenced arriving at Pingyang from Chinampo.

The cavalry went by the direct road to Anju, *viâ* Sunan and Choktchon.

20th March.—On my way from Chinampo (41 miles) I passed one regiment of the Guard and one brigade of field artillery, one pontoon train, and several columns of pack horses and hand-carts.

The road is on an average 10 feet wide, unmetalled, and in very bad order. Apparently little attempt had been made by the Japanese to repair it. There were numerous blocks. Little attention seemed to be paid to intervals, carts and pack animals running on top of one another at the frequent checks.

"The military coolies," who were all dressed in ordinary Guard infantry uniform, but unarmed, worked with a will. There were three men to each cart, one in the shafts and two pulling. It was often necessary to double-man them when going over bad ground.

The baggage trains are under the command of military gendarmes.

21st March.—A battalion of the Guard marched in and the Head-Quarter Staff arrived.

The battalion halted for food outside the gate by the river. It formed up in a sort of assembly formation: half battalions in column of sections (three sections to a company), and piled arms with fixed bayonets.

22nd March.—On the night of 18th March the thermometer read 6° Fahr., on the night of 19th–20th, 18° Fahr.; the weather is now quite spring-like.

The ice on the Chechen River at Anju is said to be breaking up. A pontoon bridge cannot yet be made over it. Missionaries say that pontoon bridges will not stand the flood season in July and August.

23rd March.—A large force started northwards, including the 1st Guard Brigade, three Guard field batteries, three mountain batteries of the 12th Division, eighty pontoons, and a large supply column.

24th March.—Several battalions and one battery of the 12th Division marched north. These are probably the end of the 12th Division, with the exception of a few details left in Pingyang.

The last of the Guard infantry reached Pingyang from Chinampo.

25th March.—A large supply column started north and one battery of Guard field artillery. The road was muddy but not deeper than the felloes of the wheels. Before the battery had gone a few hundred yards it got hopelessly involved. The teams (six ponies in each carriage) seemed far too weak to drag even the guns, while the wagons, and especially the forge, stuck hopelessly. The horses were cruelly ill-treated, and neither officers nor men appeared to know how to overcome the ordinary difficulties of artillery on the march. One wagon-body upset, but the ammunition trays were not taken out, hand-spikes were not used, and drag-ropes were only brought into requisition after the horses had been severely punished. This, combined with other exhibitions of the same sort frequently witnessed, convinced me that the field artillery horses are far too weak and over-loaded, and will last a very short time on service; manœuvring across country is out of the question. The drivers are big, heavy men. Large wallets, a roll of blanket, &c. behind the saddle, sabre, shoe pockets, are too much to expect the riding horse to carry. The off horses have large feed bags strapped to the pads. The teams apparently have not been taught to start or pull together, and the consequence is a series of jerks by individual horses, which is trying to the harness and breaks the horses' hearts. If such difficulties occur on fairly good and level roads, what will happen when the roads get really bad, as north of Anju?

The horse question will be a very serious one for the Japanese, as they appear to have no idea of how to look after horses on the march or in camp.

Their cavalry is also very weak, so they will have to depend almost entirely on the infantry, which has the reputation of being very good.

A Russian officer at Syenchyon stated recently that the Russian intention is to retire slowly, delaying the enemy up to the Ya-lu, and even then they may not offer any resistance if the reinforcements they are hoping for do not arrive. He added

that the Russians had had bad news from Poland, Finland, and Port Arthur.

A good authority states that a Russian cavalry patrol of thirty men returned to Syonchyon from the south on 20th March and was making preparations there for the commanding officer and five or six hundred men expected from the south next day.

A courier reported that about 21st March, some 600 Russians were in Tiessu, and he also met others 12 miles further south. He also met some Japanese beyond the Paksan River.

I was informed on 23rd March, that the Japanese do not expect much resistance before reaching the Ya-lu; that their patrols are beyond the Paksan River; and also that the 2nd Division was beginning to disembark at Chinampo:—

Commanding 2nd Division, Lieut.-General Nishi.

3rd Brigade, Major-General Matsunaga.

15th Brigade, Major-General Okasaki.

* * * *

The transport used by the Japanese consists of:—

- (1) Ponies, and occasionally mules and donkeys.
- (2) "Military coolies" and hand-carts (3 men to each).
The carts carry about 200 lbs.

- (3) One-horse two-wheeled carts with a box seat (never used). These are principally used for ammunition. Each cart carries 4 boxes containing 10 rounds each of field gun ammunition, *i.e.*, 40 rounds to one horse, whereas the ordinary battery wagon only takes 80 rounds and requires 6 horses.

- (4) Korean coolies carrying bundles of fifty to sixty lbs. on their backs. This form of transport is the least trouble of any. The leader of each party of twenty or thirty coolies carries a flag stuck in his load and sets the pace (about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour).

- (5) A few bulls carrying four or five rice bags (about 300 lbs.).

- (6) Bulls in native carts (rarely).

With regard to the pack transport there is invariably one soldier to each horse, whether when marching or leading the horses from camp to water.

As most of the Japanese horses are stallions, they are difficult to look after, and the amount of biting and squealing at a halt or in camp is considerable. Many have their heads tied down in a manner which does not allow the muscles of the neck fair play.

So far the movements of the Russians in Korea have been characterized by want of vigour and enterprise. They might have pushed down a small cavalry force after the outbreak of hostilities, have taken Pingyang, destroyed the Japanese stores there, and have hampered the landing at Chinampo, if not also at Chemulpo.

Considering the Russian superiority in cavalry it is incomprehensible that they do not utilize the natural advantages of Northern Korea to seriously delay the Japanese advance. In fact, this retiring policy seems to point to the fact that the Russians must be experiencing grave difficulties with the Chinese in Manchuria and in the matter of supplies. According to the missionaries the Russians have already "lost face" with the Koreans.

On the other hand the impression created by the Japanese so far is good, and their action in this country has been characterized by deliberation and confidence. It was a bold action to push up one company to hold Pingyang, and only one regiment of cavalry to occupy Anju. The Japanese also seem to be well served by spies.

Up to date the weather has been most favourable to the Japanese advance. Rain would make the roads almost impassable for wheeled transport.

28th March.—The whole Guard Division except part of the 4th Regiment and details has gone north. The 2nd Division has not yet begun to arrive. Posts have been established at three places between Chinampo and Pingyang.

An officer of the Head-Quarters Staff stated to-day that there might be a battle up north in a month's time. Also that half the 2nd Division would go by the direct road to Anju and half by Pingyang.

The missionaries state that the chief trouble in the city and country round comes from Japanese civilians, who pass themselves off as officials, enforce the sale of cattle, &c. at half price, and then sell them to the military authorities at a profit.

29th March.—Visited Majandai, a small Korean village, 7 miles S.W. of Pingyang on the north bank of the Taitong River. Boats drawing 11 feet can get up as far as this, whereas boats drawing 6 feet have difficulty in reaching Pingyang.

The Japanese have formed a large dépôt here. There were huge stacks of rice and barley bags, boxes of tinned meat and fruit which were being re-shipped in small native boats for Pingyang.

There were 2 small piers, 30 feet long, and 5 small landing stages.

The road from Pingyang was in good order, but the numerous small culverts constructed by the Japanese are only about 4 feet wide and too narrow for field artillery.

An officer at the dépôt stated that—

Stores only and no troops are being landed there.

Each bag of rice weighs 8 *kan* (1 *kan* = 8·2817 lbs. avoirdupois) and is enough for 3 meals (one day) for 100 men. The rice is cooked the night before issue, large pots being carried for the purpose.

The barley bags weigh 6 *kan* and are distinguished from the rice by a red ring. All the rice and barley is produce of Japan so far.

Korean coolies get about 50 *sen* a day (1s.).

Some 500 "military coolies" are employed at this *dépôt*.

These men, who are being used to such a large extent in the transport service of the army, are this year's rejections for height. They are otherwise medically fit and are chosen from among the country people who are used to pulling carts; their average height seems to be about 5 feet 1 inch.

A courier stated that the Russians were at Syonchyon on 26th March, 750 strong, and were making litters as if meaning to push on for a fight.

The Japanese cavalry were at Tiessu on 26th March, and infantry about 40 *li* (13 miles) behind. Tiessu is the strongest place on the road. About 700 Japanese infantry were at Kasan. At Kushun* the courier met 20 Russians going towards Wiju. He crossed the river at Anju by wading up to his middle; there was no ice. The Russians' whole time is taken up in foraging for themselves and horses; they have no baggage.

30th March.—Letters from Syonchyon say that about 800 Russians there have received orders to fight.

The Japanese main army is moving by the north road from Anju to Kangkyei.*

I was informed by a staff officer to-day that "there had been a fight (whereabouts secret) between 600 Russian cavalry and 300 Japanese cavalry supported by infantry. The Russians retreated, carrying away their dead." This probably took place near Koksan.

To-day I walked through part of the sick horse lines here. In one stable were about 50 horses, nearly all with bad fistulous withers.

The horseshoes are the German pattern, with 7 nail holes on each side.

Twenty-four men of the 3rd Regiment, 1st Division, are attached to the First Army Head-Quarters Staff as guard.

31st March.—Nos. 1 and 2 Battalions of the 4th Regiment, 2nd Division, marched in at 4 p.m. They are the first of this division to arrive; the majority of it is marching from Chinampo by the direct road to Anju.

An American mining party was allowed to proceed to Unsan to-day.

Long transport columns left for the north. The roads are in a very bad condition.

2nd April.—Having received a telegram requesting me to return to Seoul, I rode back along the Chinampo road. I passed two companies of the 4th Regiment and several one-horse cart

* Not on Map 2; not identified.

columns; owing to the impassable state of the road in several places the baggage had to be piled up by the side of the road, the carts proceeding empty across the fields. Some of this baggage was being carried by the drivers. In three or four places hand-carts were parked as if unable to proceed.

Attempts had been made to patch the road by strewing branches and straw along it. In one place a gang of Korean coolies were ladling more mud into the ruts. The road wherever it crosses the plains is now nothing but a quagmire and impassable for wheeled transport.

The whole of the 2nd Division, with the exception of the above-mentioned infantry of the 4th Regiment, has apparently gone by the westerly road to Anju.

3rd April.—Nine transports and one hospital ship were lying at Chinampo. Two small steamers were preparing to take troops to some landing place north of Anju next day.

Very few troops have been landed during the last three days. I saw about a battalion of the 14th Regiment (12th Division) landing, also a few hundred men of the 1st and 2nd Guard Infantry. Six or seven large store-houses, some huts and stables, have been lately erected. As water is scarce, every transport brings large storage tanks which are landed full of water.

Luckily the main road from Pingyang to the north through Anju to Wiju is better than that from Chinampo to Pingyang, still the transport difficulties in front of the Japanese are very great, and their progress will be slow unless they can effect a landing north of Anju.

(4) First Japanese Army.—Battle of the Ya-lu
(Chiu-lien-cheng), 30th April and 1st May 1904.

LECTURE given by Japanese General Staff Officer; reported, with the description of the country, and NOTES, by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, An-tung, 13th May 1904, and REMARKS by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., An-tung, 13th May 1904.

Plate.

Battle of the Ya-lu - - - Map 3.

Lecture on the Fighting on the 30th April and 1st May 1904, and, on the Passage of the Ya-lu by the Japanese Forces, by a Japanese General Staff Officer.

1. At 4 a.m., on the 30th, part of the Guard Divisional Artillery was in position south of the bridge leading on to Kyuri Island (G 3), and the rest on a hill between Genkado (F/G 4) and Wiju (F 4). **30th April.**

The artillery of the 2nd Division (six batteries) was in position among the trees on Kintei Island (E 5), west of the bridges, while on its right, echeloned 100 yards to its rear, stood the five howitzer batteries, the whole being west of the bridges.

2. At 10 a.m. some twenty or thirty infantry of the 2nd Division were ferried across to Chukodai (E 4) with the object of reconnoitring Hu Shan (Tiger Hill) (E/F 3/4) from the north, and drew fire from the Russian guns near Chiu-lien-cheng (E 4). These were the first shots fired on the 30th. Just after 10 a.m. all our guns opened fire, and the Russians answered from their three artillery positions. At first the Russians shot very well with shrapnel, and very fast, and I thought they were superior to us, but after some minutes our guns found the range, and the Russian fire became weaker and weaker, until after one and a half hours' firing their guns became silent.

3. Towards 1.30 p.m. the Russian batteries opened again, those north and north-west of Chiu-lien-cheng firing at the batteries of the 2nd Division, and those on the left firing at our bridge to Kyuri Island, and also at Genkado, where our guns were. All the Guard Divisional Artillery answered the latter's fire, while the 2nd Divisional Artillery and the howitzers replied to the enemy's fire from about Chiu-lien-cheng. About 2 p.m.

the Russian guns ceased firing, but from this hour until dusk our howitzers fired at the hills about Chiu-lien-cheng.

4. During this duel the engineers of the Guard and 2nd Divisions were building two bridges from Kyuri to Oseki Island. The engineers of the Guard used the regulation bridging materials, but the 2nd Division only local materials. The two bridges were to have been ready by 8 p.m., but only that of the Guard Division was ready in time, so the two divisions had to use the one bridge.

5. The two divisions began crossing at 8 p.m., 2nd Division leading. The latter was over by 10.30 p.m., and then the Guard followed; the 2nd Division led, as it had further to go towards the left. This was a very anxious time for the Guard Division, as it lost two and half hours of precious time and did not know whether it would be able to get to the appointed rendezvous in time.

6. Both divisions then crossed, in the same order, a bridge over the main stream to Hu Shan (Tiger Hill), which bridge had been previously thrown across under cover of the hill after the Russians had evacuated it.

1st May.

7. At 2.30 a.m. the 2nd Division crossed this bridge and forded the next stream to Chukodai Island (E 4); and by 5 a.m. the Guard Division was over also, and, fording another stream, took up a position nearer Hu Shan. Both divisions entrenched themselves in the open within about 2,000 yards of the Russian position. At the same time three batteries of the 2nd Divisional Artillery crossed from their position on Kintei Island and took up a position with their left on the village of Chukodai; they crossed in boats.

8. All the above were in position soon after 5 a.m., and at daybreak the artillery fight began. Then the 12th Division, with its mountain batteries, came into position on the right of, and a bit north of the Guard.

9. About 8 a.m. the infantry advance began, the 2nd Division moving off first, then the Guard, then the 12th. The Guard Division began its actual attack at 8.30, and its firing line reached the enemy's trenches at 10.30, at which time there was only a handful of the enemy left, the remainder having withdrawn. Twenty minutes later the G.O.C. Guard Division came up, and the Staff produced some bottles of champagne, which they drank in the trenches. The Guard Divisional Staff stayed there till about noon, and during this interval the whole infantry line advanced in pursuit of the enemy across the hills. We had often heard the enemy's Maxims, and towards 2 p.m. Russian guns again opened fire against our pursuing troops from near Ha-ma-tang (B 4).

10. The leading troops in the pursuit were the Guard cavalry, followed by the 4th Guard Infantry Regiment, both having been

in reserve till then. The 2nd Division pursued along the main road towards An-tung (C 6), their guns following them, but the 30th Regiment heard the firing at Ha-ma-tang and came up round the left of the Guards. At the same time the 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment came up on the left of the 4th, and the 24th Regiment of the 12th Division came up round their right. The Russians retreating along the road from Chiu-lien-cheng to Feng-huang-cheng found themselves with the 24th Regiment in their front, the 30th Regiment in their rear, and the 3rd and 4th Guards coming over the hills between these two. They took up a position in a hollow, infantry with 12 guns and 8 Maxims, and there they fought till, finding further resistance useless, they put up the white flag. Guns, carts, &c. fell into the hands of the Japanese.

The Staff Officer finished his narrative by informing us that **2nd May.** on the 2nd May the Russians had a fight all to themselves. The story came from Chinese sources. The Russians who had first retired on the 1st, took up a position at Kao-li-men, north of Tang-shan-cheng.* The last to retire arrived there on the night of the 1st and took the first for Japanese who had got round them, as they were fired at from the position. A four-hours' fight ensued, in which the northern force proved victorious and advanced at daybreak with the bayonet. On discovering the mistake the two forces proceeded northwards together. There were over a hundred casualties.

A Description of the Country and Notes obtained from various sources, by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.

The Ya-lu valley at Wiju is about 6,000 yards across, measuring from Wiju to Chiu-lien-cheng. The river bed is a vast sandy plain broken up into islands by the branches of the Ya-lu and the Ai. The only cover obtainable in crossing the valley is to be found in depressions in the sand and under the banks of the rivers, except on Oseki and Kintei Islands, where there are low trees and scrub, in parts very thick. With the exception of the above the whole valley in front of the Russian position was an open book to them for several thousands of yards in every direction. Tiger Hill is an isolated rock about 200 feet high, the other hills being spurs running down towards the river from higher ranges in rear. These spurs often end in knolls from 160 to 200 feet above the river, to which they slope steeply down; they are red and stony, and mostly covered with scrubby bush, though some are bare.

Wiju lies in a depression in some high ground which rises about 100 feet above the river, the hills to the east of it being low and isolated from the main range.

* Not on Plate 3; Kao-li-men is 28 miles and Tang-shan-cheng 15 miles north-west of An-tung.

The Ya-lu runs in two streams, the main one being that running along the northern edges of the islands of Kyuri, Oseki, Kintei, and Kanshi. On the Wiju-Chiu-lien-cheng road the width of the streams is as follows:—The southern stream 260 yards, the main stream 380 yards, both unfordable; the stream of the Ai Ho, on the same road, is 90 yards wide and 5 feet deep, but is fordable half a mile up stream. These are dry-weather observations; in the rains there must be at least a 10 feet rise.

Japanese Entrenchments.—The Japanese artillery positions on Kintei Island were very thoroughly prepared and entrenched, the entrenchments being made in the very soft, sandy soil. Every advantage was taken of nullahs and any slightly rising ground, and everything possible done to conceal and disguise the trenches and pits with branches, trees, &c. The shelter trenches used were about four feet square in section; the ground was very easy to work. The position of the three batteries east of Chukodai village was very exposed, the gun-pits being dug on open flat ground with no attempt at concealment.

Russian Position and Entrenchments.—The Russian position consisted of four artillery positions (1) on the long sloping spur west and north-west of Chiu-lien-cheng and (2), (3) and (4) on the knolls "Conical Hill (240)," Ma-kou, and Yu-shu-kou. The only gun entrenchments used were in No. 1 position, where pits were made for 12 guns. Infantry entrenchments ran round the foot of "Conical Hill" and Ma-kou knolls and across the valleys between the knolls, but on Yu-shu-kou knoll the infantry trenches ran round the crest and were well refused on the extreme left. The infantry trench consisted of a trench about three feet square in section with a high parapet revetted with branches. It was more in the nature of a breast-work and, as there was no attempt at concealment, was very visible. There were no infantry trenches on (1) spur. In the skirmishing previous to the battle, the Russians had made trenches along the south edge of Chukodai (E 4/5) by the village. They had also dug trenches on Hu Shan, which was occupied by a small Russian force until the morning of the 30th.

Japanese Artillery Fire.—The fire of the Japanese guns and howitzers from Kintei Island was very effective. This is not only the report of the Japanese themselves, but also that of the war correspondents, and is an opinion formed from observations on the Russian position. "Conical Hill" seemed a favourite target, the crest, top, and rear crest being pitted with shell marks, most of them apparently made by howitzer shells. Eight fell on the extreme top, a small platform fifteen yards each way. The range was about 3,500 or 4,000 yards. The invariable reply to the inquiry as to how the Japanese infantry managed to cross bare ground and ford a bad river in the face of infantry fire from trenches only 800 to 1,000 yards

away is "our shrapnel helped them to do it." The Russian casualties from artillery fire are, however, not reported to be very numerous.

Bridges.—The attachés have not yet had an opportunity of seeing the Japanese military bridging materials or pontoons. The bridges we have seen are, with one exception, trestle bridges. The trestles are generally made of fir trunks of suitable thickness, bound together with straw rope and telegraph wire, and bolted together with iron dogs. They are placed nine or ten feet apart and on them is laid a plank roadway eight or nine feet wide, resting on fir transoms, or in some cases square wooden ones. The planks are kept in their place by spars bolted down to the transoms. A good many nails, dogs, and bolts are used where we should employ lashings. The bridge from the left bank of the Ya-lu to Kintei Island was made thus and was 260 yards long, that across the Ai Ho was 90 yards long. The abutments are of sandbags.

The above-mentioned exception was the bridge over the main Ya-lu channel. This bridge was 380 yards long; at each end was a length of trestle bridge, 70 yards long on the left bank and 40 yards long on the right, ending in sandbag abutments. The centre portion was a bridge of boats, some of them large local ones, and some of them of the military pattern carried by troopships. The former were on an average 50 feet long and 10 feet wide, the latter 30 feet long and 7 feet wide. These boats were anchored 8 to 10 feet apart, the larger ones being placed where the current was strongest. The roadway was the same as in the trestle bridges and many bolts and dogs were again used.

Russian Losses.—The attachés were informed that the total Russian losses up to the 12th May were as follow :—

Unwounded prisoners	-	-	147	} 500
Wounded	"	-	353	
Killed and wounded	-	-	-	1,384
Total				- 1,884

The Russian papers further report that 800 wounded were taken away in the retreat, and the commandant at An-tung reports that occasional prisoners who had been cut off are still being brought in. This makes the total about 2,700.

The Japanese further captured twenty-eight Q.F. field guns and eight Maxims. Of the former only six are serviceable, and four are being formed into a battery for use in the field, horsed with captured and Canadian horses.

The Japanese Losses.—The total Japanese losses on the 1st May are reported to be 889 killed and wounded.

The Ha-ma-tang Fight.—At the fight at Ha-ma-tang, the Russians, who fought to the last, were a portion (two battalions)

of the general reserves which had been kept at An-tung. They were, however, augmented by troops retiring from the position. The pursuit on the 1st May was continued 2 miles beyond Ha-ma-tang.

Feng-huang-cheng.—On reaching Feng-huang-cheng the Japanese found 350 shells and many stores and munitions of war.

*Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B.,
D.S.O.*

1. The account of the fighting is very incomplete and possibly also inaccurate, but it may be regarded as being in some measure authoritative. It was taken down practically verbatim from the lips of a staff officer, who spoke by express permission.

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2. The fighting on the 30th April and 1st May has no doubt been described at length by journalists who had the great advantage of being personally present, but it may nevertheless be useful if I make one or two observations from the professional standpoint, although, on the other hand, I have not yet sufficient knowledge of the facts (not having yet even seen the battle orders) to make any lengthy or exhaustive comment.

3. I have spent the best part of two days on the battle-field, and I have never seen a stronger position than that from Chiu-lien-cheng to Wu-tung-lin-tzu (D 1), supposing always it was to be held *à outrance*. If not to be so held, it had the disadvantage that it was a bad line to get away from, the lateral communications being difficult and there being only one road available for retreat. If then a retreat was in the programme, it was essential it should have been thought out in all its detail and have been begun in good time.

4. The accompanying notes give a very good description of the *terrain*. To my mind the Russian position bore some considerable resemblance to the Boer position at Colenso. There was the same flat plain out of which the steep hills rose quite abruptly: the same difficult river to cross in face of fire from those hills, the same absence of cover of any description—only in the case of the Ya-lu position all these points of strength were accentuated. Thus, the hills were better adapted to entrenchment; the river was broader and swifter; whilst the ground over which an enemy must advance was so flat that there did not exist an undulation capable of giving cover to a mouse for at least two thousand yards from the front of the Russian trenches. How, under such circumstances, it may be asked, was it possible for the Japanese Guard to advance upon

the position in formations which were comparatively close* ; to cross the river under rifle fire and to actually enter the trenches whilst a few of the Russians still occupied them ? The Japanese claim that their artillery fire was so deadly that the Russians could not hold their heads up. There may be something in this, because (1) they had a numerous artillery well-posted and well-handled ; (2) the Russian trenches were a very conspicuous mark, differing in that respect widely from the British and Boer trenches in South Africa ; (3) they had no sort of head-cover in the shape of loopholes. Still, having seen the ground, I cannot accept that suggestion as affording a sufficient explanation, unless to it is added (*a*) that the Russians did not mean to fight to the last, and were dwindling in numbers steadily from the commencement of the attack ; (*b*) that the Russians shot very badly.

5. As regards the capture of twelve guns and eight Maxims, and the rounding up of the two reserve battalions and a number of other stragglers at Ha-ma-tang, I have been to the ground and have put myself into a position to write more fully on the subject when I get authentic information on some points of detail which are not at present clear. Briefly, it appears that whilst the rear guard (to whose assistance two battalions of the reserve from An-tung had gone) were retiring down a narrow valley of five to eight hundred yards wide, with steep hills of eight hundred to one thousand feet on either side, their exit northwards was blocked by the 24th Regiment of the 12th Division. At this moment the Japanese 4th Regiment of the Guard appeared on the top of the hill to their immediate right flank at five or six hundred yards distance, whilst the 30th Regiment of the 2nd Division opened fire at 1,200 yards to their south or rear. The position was hopeless—absolutely hopeless—but with a courage which compels admiration, the Russians formed up in a ring at the bottom of the hill, and made a gallant fight for some considerable time.

The only observations I will make on this at present are that I cannot understand any educated officer taking guns through a defile, such as I have described, without sending some companies to crown the hill to the east. Had this been done, a few hundred yards would have brought the rear guard out of the defile, and it is at least possible that they might have cut their way through the 24th Regiment of the 12th Division which must by this period have been considerably exhausted.†

6. I hope it will be understood that this covering letter has had to be written in haste at night after a long day spent in going over ground. There is a chance of sending a mail away to-morrow, and I thought even a hurried communication now

* According to information up to date, under two paces interval.—Ian H.

† This criticism is withdrawn on page 47, para. 8.

would be better than something more elaborate at an indefinitely later date when, doubtless, many new subjects will present themselves for consideration.

7. I cannot better illustrate the difference between Boer and Russian tactics than by saying that if Botha had been handed over the Russian position with its admirably constructed entrenchments he would not have put any number of men into them. He would have left them to draw the enemy's fire and would have concealed his men in numerous rifle pits on other parts of the slopes or at the base of the hills. The Russians appear to have no idea of these small deceptions which are, nevertheless, so invaluable to the troops. On the contrary, the Japanese are fully alive to the importance of such methods. They thoroughly realize that war is a reversion in part at least to primitive conditions. As an instance, I may mention the road along which their army descended from the high ground on the south to occupy Wiju. It was a winding road exposed in spots to the observation of the enemy from across the river. At all these spots a close avenue of fir trees were stuck into the ground with great labour, thus preventing batteries and battalions being counted as they came down the hill. In many other respects I have noticed the clever artifices of the Japanese—artifices the use of which are too apt to be lost sight of in the routine peace training of a regular European army.

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(5) First Japanese Army.—The Battle of the Ya-lu (Chiu-lien-cheng), and the events leading to it.

LECTURE on the OPERATIONS of the First Japanese Army from 1st March 1904 to 1st May 1904, by a Japanese General Staff Officer; reported by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, 25th May 1904; with Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., 24th May 1904.

(See Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4.)

Lecture on the Operations of the First Army by a Japanese General Staff Officer; reported by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.

(1)—1st March to 20th April.

The transport of the Guard and the 2nd Divisions of the **1st March.** First Army by sea began on the 1st March, though before that date Seoul had been occupied by the 12th Division of that Army.

At Hiroshima,* previous to embarkation, General Kuroki received information to the following effect: that the main force of the enemy was concentrating near Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng; that the enemy's scouts had appeared north of Pingyang;† that a small detachment of the 12th Division reached the latter place on the 28th February; that a mixed force should occupy it by the 5th March; and that the whole 12th Division should be concentrated there by the middle of the month; that nothing definite was known of the strength, in Korea, of the enemy's forces, though it was supposed that he had a strong force in the Chechen valley; and that nothing was known of the enemy north of Anju.

The point of disembarkation of the Guard and 2nd Divisions was Chinampo at the mouth of the Pingyang river, the Taitong. The 12th Division at Pingyang was to cover the landing, but the road up from Seoul was so bad that it was quite possible that the division might not arrive at Pingyang in time to perform this duty.

It was therefore most important to land some advanced troops to gain touch with the enemy in case of the non-arrival of the 12th Division; further, we knew that the roads leading from Chinampo (1) to Pingyang and (2) along the coast to Choktchon were very bad and would need repairs before being

* See Map 1.

† See Map 2.

13th
March.

fit for troops; also it was very desirable that telegraphic communication should be established between the landing place and the 12th Division. General Kuroki therefore detailed an independent force of six squadrons of cavalry and one battalion of infantry, which landed on the 13th March and marched towards Anju. This force was followed by two battalions of engineers who were needed to repair the roads, two field telegraph companies, and two battalions of infantry, the last to act as support to the remainder. The six squadrons cavalry and one battalion of infantry reached Anju on the 18th March.

18th
March.

The 12th Division had, however, reached Pingyang in good time and had sent out a detachment to a place between Anju and Kaichon (18 miles north-east of Anju). Therefore by the 18th March we had near Anju a force of eight squadrons of cavalry and five battalions of infantry; and under cover of this the First Army was to land and take up a line south and south-east of Anju.

We expected some fighting in the Anju valley, and therefore it was necessary the Army should be on a broad front, while for tactical reasons concentration should be easy to effect, and the quartering area of a division should not be too extensive. For this reason it was necessary that we should have serviceable roads, but the season of thaw was at hand. When the engineers began working, the roads were still frozen hard and the picks were useless; still, with much labour they made the roads practicable. The coast road was very bad and had almost to be re-made. On the 14th or 15th the thaw began, and the roads we had repaired were destroyed. They had no foundation, and the wheels sank so deep that it seemed hopeless to repair them again. Marches were sometimes only one or two *ri* ($2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles) a day.

In spite of all this the Army eventually took up the required line south and south-east of Anju. No enemy was found near Anju; he remained on the right bank of the Chechen River and would not take the offensive, having no supports in rear. We were therefore able to assign to each division a more extended area in which to find quarters than we should otherwise have been able to do. So to the 12th Division was assigned the Syonchyon road, to the Guards the Sunan-Anju road, and to the 2nd Division the coast road for the advance.*

Army Head-Quarters reached Chinampo on the 18th March, ignorant of what had been going on during their four days' voyage. The Vice-Chief of the Army Staff and a few officers had, however, preceded the Staff to Chinampo to collect information, and they had found out that the enemy's cavalry,

* The Japanese carry no tents, but take up their quarters in the villages and houses.—C. V. H.

1,500 to 2,000 strong, was at Paksan on the right bank of the Chechen River. There did not appear to be any more of them between Paksan and Wiju. A battery of eight guns had also been reported and the report afterwards denied, and it was subsequently found that a battery had actually been sent as far down as Syonchyon and then withdrawn again.

The general first decided that it was necessary to cross the two rivers north of Anju (the Chechen and the Taning), drive back the hostile cavalry at Paksan and occupy a line extending from Kasan on the left, through Paksan to a point south of Yongpyon. After due consideration he came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to wait till the Army had taken up the prescribed line south and south-east of Anju, before undertaking the above operation, and he therefore detached a force to carry it out and to bridge the two rivers between Anju and Paksan. This advanced detachment was composed of seven squadrons of cavalry, five battalions of infantry, one pontoon troop, two batteries of mountain artillery, one company of engineers, and half a medical company.

On the 25th March this detachment arrived at Anju, and the cavalry and infantry crossed to the right bank of the Chechen River. After driving away the enemy they occupied Kasan, Paksan, and a place still further east. The enemy retired by the roads leading to Wiju and Unsan, and by a third road between the two, keeping touch with our force. **25th March.**

The Chechen River was not frozen, and the crossing was effected by means of a pontoon ferry. Two engineer companies of the 12th Division, followed by a pontoon troop, then set to work to bridge the river, and the bridge, built of local materials, was finished on the 27th March. The second bridge, over the Taning, was built by the Guard (whose engineer battalion had been despatched with the covering detachment first landed at Chinampo), and was made with the regulation materials (pontoons). The whole detachment occupied the line from Kasan to, and east of, Paksan on the 27th March. **27th March.**

The main army was ready in its prescribed position, south and south-east of Anju, on the 4th April.

Three roads lead from Anju to Wiju and the Ya-lu:— (1) the left or main road nearest the coast; (2) the road through Kijo; and (3) the road to Chyangsyong. The general naturally wished to use the three roads, but our information was to the effect that the centre road (2) was unfit for troops. We therefore reconnoitred the roads ourselves and found that the main road alone (1) was fit for the movement of large bodies of troops. We further thought that it would be unwise to use the three roads as there were no lateral communications between them, and also because the front on which our Army would arrive at the Ya-lu would be no less than 40 miles long, that being the distance between Wiju and Chyangsyong.

It was therefore determined to march the bulk of the Army along the main road (1) sending only a detachment along (3). Three divisions had therefore to use one indifferent road.

Transport by land was a great difficulty, as to keep the Army supplied the train would have to work day and night. We therefore made use of other points of the coast at which to land stores, but as the sea was still frozen about the middle of March, we had to wait for the thaw before deciding on what points landing would be practicable early in April. We knew the mouth of the Chechen River was difficult, but we also knew that Rikaho, the port of Chelsan, was practicable, from our experience in 1894. The points at which stores were eventually landed were:—(1) Risiaho at the mouth of the Chechen River, with a depôt at Anju; (2) Koksan, with a depôt at Tiessu; (3) a point due east of Chelsan, with a depôt at Syonchyon; (4) Rikaho, with a depôt at Chyaryonkoan (north of Chelsan on the main road); and (5) Riugampo, a point north of (4), with a depôt between Chyaryonkoan and Wiju.

To cover the formation of these coast bases and the organization of the lines of communication between them and the Army, an advanced detachment was formed from the previous advanced detachment. It was composed of five squadrons of cavalry, three battalions of infantry, two battalions of mountain artillery, one company of engineers, and half a medical company. This was the advanced guard.

As, however, the enemy, about a thousand strong, was still in the neighbourhood of Unsan, a flank guard, consisting of one squadron of cavalry, three battalions of infantry, two brigades of artillery, and the necessary transport, was placed at Yongpyon. Its orders were to stay there until the main Army was clear of Anju and receiving supplies from some point further north on the coast, or till no attack from the north-east was to be feared; it was then to march to Chyangsyong on the Ya-lu and cover the concentration of the main Army at Wiju, protecting it from the east.

1st April.

The advanced guard left Kasan on the 1st April and proceeded along the main road. On the 28th March the Guard cavalry had had an engagement with a force five times its own strength at Tiessu; the details of this fight have already been reported. The advanced guard reached Chyaryonkoan, and simultaneously the landing of stores at Rikaho began. Supplies thus being available, the Army was able to move on the 7th April, on which day the advanced guard left Chyaryonkoan.

The 12th Division, forming the advance, was to leave Anju on the 1st April, in two columns, each column complete with train, &c., the columns to be one day's march apart. The Guard was to leave Choktchon on the 7th April in the same formation. The 2nd Division was to leave its quarters at the

mouth of the Chechen River on the 11th April, also in two columns. There were to be two days' march between the rear of the 12th and the head of the Guard Division, and three days' march between the rear of the Guard and the head of the 2nd Division.

On the 8th and 9th April there was a severe storm, and on the 9th the bridge over the Taning River was completely swept away, the two columns of the Guard Division thus becoming separated. Sixteen pontoons were sunk and lost, and there was no material available for repairs.

On the afternoon of the 9th the water rose over the bridge across the Chechen River, and the abutments were swept away. **9th April.**

Fortunately the centre stood, though two feet under water. The engineers, assisted by infantry and men of the train, worked all night in ice-cold water up to their necks, and by weighting the bridge with stones saved it. This was the greatest difficulty we encountered, and harder than any of the Ya-lu bridging. Next day the water fell. There was another pontoon company near Anju, but it could not be got up to re-bridge the Taning owing to the broken bridge over the Chechen River. **10th April.**

By 3 p.m. on the 10th, however, the latter was repaired, and the pontoon company passed over and threw another bridge over the second river by 7 a.m. on the 11th April. **11th April.** The two columns of the Guard were thus re-united, and owing to the interval between that division and the 2nd, the march of the latter was not interfered with.

Our cavalry patrols entered Wiju and Yongampo on the 4th April, and the advanced guard occupied Wiju on the 8th. On the 20th the concentration of the main Army south of Wiju was complete, and our lines of communication almost completely established. **20th April.**

The flank guard on the right also reached Chyangsyong about the 20th. The front of the Army was then safe on the Ya-lu, the south bank of which is very defensible, and its right protected by the detachment at Chyangsyong. It could, therefore, draw its supplies from Rikaho and Chelsan, a short safe line.

The next thing was to cross the Ya-lu.

(2) 20th to 28th April.

On the 20th April the 12th Division was south-east of Wiju, the Guard behind Wiju, and the 2nd Division south-west of the town. On the arrival of the Army the detachment that had formed the advanced guard was broken up, and the troops forming it sent back to their divisions.

The bank of the river was divided into three sections, and to each division was assigned the defence of one of them. The

outpost line occupied the main left bank, *i.e.*, the left bank of the south channel.

Everybody wants to have a look at an enemy, but our sentries were always kept concealed, and no one was allowed to surmount the high ground along the bank for the purpose of taking a look round. The advanced guard had made and planted screens along the road over the high ground south of Wiju, as many parts on it were exposed to the view of the enemy, who could thus have conned our approach. On the other hand, there were always many of the enemy watching us from their hills on the right bank; they even watered their horses between 2 and 4 p.m. at the Ai Ho, and exercised their horses on the sandy flats in the river bed. This was tempting to our artillery, but we were not to be drawn to show our hand.

From the 4th April we had been busy getting all possible information by means of spies and uniforms, badges, brass numerals, and other articles left about or found on the dead and wounded, captured letters and telegrams, officers' and other patrols, &c., and we arrived at the conclusion that the Russian force in our front consisted of troops of the 3rd Army Corps (3rd and 6th Divisions), and that their cavalry was the 1st Chichinski Regiment, under General Mishchenko, which had been in Korea, with the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment and 1st Argunski Regiment of Cossacks, and some mounted infantry. Total, two divisions.

The Crossing of the Ya-lu.*

The crossing of the river may be divided into two important periods—(1) the period of preparation, and (2) the actual passage and attack.

The period of preparation included the reconnaissance of the enemy and his position; the reconnaissance of the river; the collection of bridging materials; the construction of roads behind Wiju; and the preparation of positions for counter-attack.

On the 12th April, at 7.30 a.m., about fifty Russians approached close to Wiju and tried to cross the stream near the town by boat. One company of our infantry fired at and repulsed them with the loss of one officer, one non commissioned officer, and one man killed. The officer who made this gallant attempt was Lieutenant Demidrovich of the 12th Regiment, and on him was found a written order telling him to pass through our sentry line and reconnoitre south of Wiju. He did his best, but failed, and we sympathised much with him.

* See Map 3.

By the 22nd our information about the enemy was as **22nd April.** follows:—They must have about 15,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 60 guns, distributed as follows:—

- (1) 4,000 to 5,000 infantry near Chiu-lien-cheng (D 4), with 24 guns on the hill north of that place (the number of guns must be about right, as we had had an officer posted on the hill north of Wiju with a telescope since the 20th);
- (2) At An-tung, 3,000 to 4,000 infantry with 20 guns, of which we had seen 8;
- (3) At Tzu-tao-kou (B 7), south of An-tung, 8 guns and some men of the other arms;
- (4) At Ta-tung-kou,* near the mouth of the Ya-lu, 200 to 300 cavalry;
- (5) Between Ta-ku-shan* and Ta-tung-kou, about 1,000 of all arms;
- (6) At Ta-ku-shan,* at least 300 cavalry;
- (7) At Ha-ma-tang (B 4), at least 1,000 infantry;
- (8) At Feng-huang-cheng,* about 3,000 infantry, who were marching on Chiu-lien-cheng;
- (9) Twelve light guns (probably Maxims) drawn by one horse each, accompanying (8);
- (10) At Hu Shan (Tiger Hill), 1,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 6 guns;
- (11) At Tang-shan-cheng* (south of Feng-huang-cheng), 2,000 cavalry and 8 guns;
- (12) At Pan-ta-kou (B 6), north-west of An-tung, 2,000 infantry and 8 guns;
- (13) At An-ping-ho, above Suikuchin (north-east corner of Map 3), 100 cavalry;
- (14) At Fu-ka-ko (above 13), 400 cavalry;
- (15) At Ko-ko, near (14), about 100 cavalry;
- (16) At Chosan,* on the left bank of the Ya-lu (80 miles above Wiju), 400 to 500 cavalry;
- (17) Between Kuan-tien-shan* and the Ya-lu, 1,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and several guns.

This was our information up to the 24th. The enemy had made strong entrenchments round the foot of the hills near Chiu-lien-cheng, while on Conical Hill (D 4) we could see three lines of trenches; also after our arrival some trenches were made round the left of the Russian position. There were also strong entrenchments about An-tung. We knew the general line of the entrenchments, but no details.

On the 24th we still had no definite knowledge of the river, **24th April.** as the channels change from year to year. We thought at first that the reconnaissance would have been easy, as we had crossed the river at the same place in 1894, but the changes had been

* On Map 2.

too great. Our carefully prepared map was useless, as channels had changed; spots where fords had existed required bridging, and points out of range of the right bank were now within range of it, so our labour and money had been wasted.

The first difficulty that presented itself was the want of boats for bridging purposes. There were but few in the river, as the Russians had taken them, and so our engineers had to build some. We also wanted many anchors for such a strong current, and had to make extemporized ones. Also material for many bridges had to be collected locally, not only timber, but ropes, pickets, and sawyers' dogs. These we had to make. Fortunately we found much iron and several forges, anvils, &c., left by the enemy at Yongampo. We picked out three smiths from among our men, and obtained three from the navy, and used the armourers of regiments. We also got some of the materials made in and about Wiju, and some we had brought with us, but they were difficult to improvise and there was no local supply or assistance. By the 25th all the materials were ready, but the reconnaissance of the main stream and Ai Ho could not be completed owing to the presence of the enemy on the right bank. The small stream nearest the left bank opposite Kyuri Island had been thoroughly surveyed. There are two streams between the left bank and that island.

In order to reconnoitre the main channel and to bridge the above small stream it was necessary to obtain possession of Kyuri, Oseki, and Kintei islands.

25th April.

This was to be undertaken on the night of the 25th-26th April, the Guard to expel the Russians from Kyuri, the 2nd Division to seize Kintei. At 4 a.m. on the 26th, one battalion of the Guard crossed the small stream from the left bank and attacked the Russian outposts on Kyuri Island. The troops crossed by pontoon ferry, and were discovered while the boats were still in mid-stream and fired on, but they held on, got across, and expelled the enemy.

The Russians on this occasion made use of an ingenious plan to protect their sentries. Each sentry had at his post a straw torch stuck upright in the ground. When attacked, the torch was lit and it illuminated the ground over which our men advanced, while the sentry, retiring a short distance, was in darkness. These torches bothered us much, but we succeeded in our object and drove the Russians away. We thus obtained possession of the two islands, and the enemy in the vicinity of Tiger Hill retired in consequence. No casualties occurred in the 2nd Division.

We could now advance our outpost line to the left bank of the main stream, though the enemy still held Chukodai, a village opposite Kintei, where there is a Chinese Customs House. We, however, left him alone there. Now we were

able to reconnoitre the main channel, and as the enemy had also retired the bulk of his force from the vicinity of Tiger Hill we could also reconnoitre the river higher up. The examination was made by officers and men, some of whom swam over, while some crossed in boats; then we got ropes across, and engineer officers made detailed surveys.

Another advantage that the possession of the islands gave us was that we were able to bridge the first channel to Kintei Island. The bridges were made there. The collection of materials for the first bridge began on the 25th, and the construction of the bridge began on the 26th. About 9.30 a.m. on the 26th, four Russian guns appeared on Conical Hill, and about 10.25 they opened fire, sending the first shells of the campaign at the bridge. An hour later four more guns appeared further south, and from these two positions about fifty shrapnel were fired at the bridge. When the first shells were fired the men would not leave their work, but shouted "*Banzai*," and went on hammering in piles, but eventually the officers ordered them away from the bridge, under cover. The bridge was completed on the 27th. It was a trestle bridge 258 yards long, built entirely of local materials, no pontoons being used. Owing to the shelling it took 45 hours to construct. This unfortunate bridge was fired at every day until the 30th, when the Russian guns were silenced, but it proved very useful to us as a means of ascertaining the skill of the Russian gunners. We knew the calibre and range of their guns, but did not know much about the personnel. No Japanese soldier, however, crossed this bridge during the attack, the bridge having been constructed, obviously, as a blind.

Just below the first bridge we built another to Kintei Island for the guns; it was completed on the night of the 27th-28th and took eight hours to construct. It was another trestle bridge 88 yards long.

Over the small stream above Wiju we built two bridges side by side; one was 33 yards long and was finished in four hours on the 26th, the other 37 yards long was built in nine hours on the 28th. In prolongation of these latter we built two more bridges to Kyuri Island; one 118 yards long took 13 hours to complete, the other 123 yards long took 16 hours to complete and was ready on the night of the 27th. These bridges had occasional shots fired at them (indirect fire) from the hill east of Ma-kou (D 3). These four bridges played a very important part in the general attack. They were doubled to enable convoys and stores to come and go simultaneously, and also with the object of having one bridge over a stream available should the enemy succeed in destroying the other. Not a single bridge was ever destroyed by the Russian guns as reported in the press. To have done so would have been difficult, as only shrapnel was used. The first bridge constructed to Kintei Island is still standing; the others have been broken up.

Another important duty was to reconnoitre the hilly country between the Ai Ho and Ya-lu, north of Wiju. In view of the attack to be made on the Russian position, it was very important to know whether it was practicable for troops to advance through this district. The enemy were still in occupation of it, with sentries posted along the right bank of the Ya-lu. The general had been exercised in his mind on this point ever since leaving Tokio, but the country, when actually viewed from Wiju, did not look nearly so difficult as it appeared to be from the map.

The Intelligence Staff of the Army proceeded to get hold of the Chinese inhabitants of the district in question, who gave them much good information, and further information was obtained by gallant officers who climbed the hills. From the information thus obtained it appeared that the country, though difficult, was not impassable, but that the troops to cross it must be lightly equipped.* With this information the general was satisfied, and the next question was where was the best point to cross the river. At Suikuchin, 8 miles north-east of Wiju, the river runs in two channels, of which the further should, according to precedent, have been the deeper. This, however, was not the case, the further channel being only a shallow one. There was a certain amount of fairly level ground on the right bank, and the site of the bridge was out of effective rifle range of the Russian sentries on that bank; therefore, with guns to cover it from the left bank, it would be unnecessary to effect the passage of the river before constructing the bridge. This point, therefore, was selected as a suitable one for the bridge.

In order to deliver a combined attack of the three divisions, the division to cross at Suikuchin must do so one day previous to that on which the other two divisions crossed. One-third of the Army would thus be divided from the remainder by a broad river, but it was necessary to incur the risk while taking all precautions to support the isolated division should necessity arise.

Acting on intelligence received, and on account of the topography of the country, the general resolved to attack along a front from Lang-tzu-kou (E 1) on the right to Chukodai (E 4) on the left.

To conceal our plan and to draw our enemy's attention towards the west, the assistance of the navy was called in. We had expelled the enemy from the islands on the 25th, and at the same time two shallow-draught gunboats, two torpedo boats, and two armed launches (afterwards increased to four) came up the river. About 5 p.m. on the 25th they entered the estuary and were fired at from the right bank, but reached Yongampo.† In order to get up as near the Army as possible they had to survey the river as they went, and they sounded under fire during the 26th April.

* The 12th Division had only mountain artillery.—C. V. H.

† On Map 2.

At 8 a.m. on the 26th a number of junks laden with timber and anchors entered the estuary. This material had been collected at Rikaho* for the construction of the bridge over the main stream at Chukodai, but the appearance of the junks in the river made the enemy think we intended crossing at An-tung. We heard afterwards that the opinion prevailed in the Russian Staff that such was our intention, and that they therefore did not dare to place their reserves behind Chiu-lien-cheng but kept them north-west of An-tung, where they were useless on the 1st May. **26th April.**

(3)—*28th April to 1st May.*

At 10 a.m. on the 28th, the general issued orders for the Army to cross the Ya-lu on 1st May. The Army had had nothing to do with the fixture of this date. It had had to work up to it, and in order to render the passage of the river feasible on the 1st May it had had to work hard. During the last stage of the operation even infantry and men of the military train had been employed bringing up bridging materials, &c., from Rikaho.* I am not at liberty to tell you now why this date was fixed. **28th April.**

Without going into details the main points in the orders were as follows:—

- (1) The 12th Division to cross the Ya-lu at Suikuchin (J 1) on the night of the 29th and occupy the ridge running north and south-eastwards of Hsia-ling-lao-kou (E/F 1) and Li-tzu-yüan (E/F 2); left to rest on hill 955 (F 2/3). A detachment to march down the right bank of the river and occupy hill 630 (F 3). The duty of the 12th Division is to cover the passage of the main Army. A further detachment from the division to be sent round the right by Chiao-chia-kou (C/D 1) to threaten the enemy's left and rear. Continuing its march, the 12th to occupy the line Lang-tzu-kou (E 1) to "K" (E 2) on the 1st May.
- (2) The 2nd Division to rendezvous near Shasando (east of Wiju) by 10 a.m. on the 30th, and starting at midnight to march *viâ* bridges "C," "A," "E," "F," and occupy a line on Chukodai Island before dawn on the 1st May. The artillery of the division to be in position on Kintei Island, opposite Chukodai, ready to open fire at daybreak on the 30th.
- (3) The Guard to rendezvous between Wiju and Hibokudo by 10 a.m. on the 30th; the division was to follow the 2nd Division over the same bridges and take up a line between that division and the 12th.

* On Map 2, 25 miles south-east of the Ya-lu estuary.

- (4) The howitzers to take up a position on Kintei Island on the night of the 29th.
- (5) The reserves, five battalions and five squadrons, to rendezvous on Kyuri Island by 4 a.m. on the 1st May, with the exception of one battalion which was to be stationed on the left of the howitzer position to protect the artillery on Kintei Island.

The reasons why the 2nd and Guard Divisions had to follow the same road were that the main stream, which had to be bridged, was a broad one and close to the enemy, and for the rapid construction of bridges over it, it was, therefore, necessary to use the regulation materials, of which there was no great supply. It was also necessary for the 2nd Division to precede the Guard as it had to be in position before daybreak, while the Guard need not necessarily be in such a hurry; moreover the 2nd Division had somewhat farther to go.

These orders for the attack were, as previously stated, issued on the 28th April, and though there were a few small changes in the situation subsequent to their issue, they did not affect the general plan.

There was, however, one contretemps at Tiger Hill. When the enemy retired from Kyuri on the 26th, he also, as previously mentioned, evacuated Tiger Hill, and we had to occupy it as soon as possible to reconnoitre sites for bridges, artillery positions, &c. One company of infantry was therefore sent from the Guard outposts and occupied the hill. At that time the enemy was still visible about Li-tzu-yüan (E F 2). Under cover of the company on Tiger Hill, the Guard reconnoitred the position they were to take up on 1st May. They had also to fix the situation of the bridges and artillery positions. We shall see how they fared.

The 12th Division was to cross at Suikuchin on the 29th, and was therefore ordered to concentrate there on the evening of the 28th and to prepare to bridge the river. Three batteries of mountain artillery were placed in a position near Chukyuri (H 2) with some infantry, while the engineers collected the bridging materials. The bridging began on the early morning of the 29th. At about 11 a.m. a party of the enemy (forty or fifty cavalry and two guns) appeared opposite Suikuchin. The enemy's sentries still occupied the island opposite that place, so our infantry opened on the latter and the guns on the cavalry. Both the enemy's sentries and cavalry party retired. At noon a covering party of one regiment of infantry was sent across the river on pontoons; they were fired at while crossing, and our guns and infantry replied. A battalion reached the opposite bank at 2 p.m. and occupied a covering position, whereupon the enemy retired altogether. The actual construction of the bridge began at 2 p.m. It took a long time to build, as the depth of the river was 24 feet, and its velocity 5.9 feet

29th April.

per second; many anchors were therefore required, and, moreover, the regulation bridging materials being insufficient, they had to be supplemented locally. The bridge was 290 yards long, and was finished by 3 a.m. on the 30th.

At 3 a.m. the 12th Division began to cross this bridge, and from the right bank it marched in three columns to take up its allotted positions; two of the columns took parallel routes through the hills; the third marched along the right bank and then climbed the hills towards point 955. A detachment from the third column was also sent to point 630 as arranged. The 12th Division therefore carried out its task, though it proved a very difficult one.

Before this the contretemps above referred to occurred. About 4 p.m. on the 29th a battalion of Russian infantry with four guns crossed the Ai Ho valley from opposite Li-tzu-yüan, and began to attack the company of the Guard on Tiger Hill. The company retired in good order to Kyuri Island, with some casualties, and the enemy reoccupied Tiger Hill. So we were unable to make bridge "E" on the night of the 29th as intended, though materials for it were collected below Genkado. The artillery of the Guard Division was in position on the hills north-east of Wiju and west of Genkado, but as the enemy on Tiger Hill did not show, they only fired a very few shells to cover the retirement of the company. The loss of Tiger Hill did not affect the general plan, as we had arranged for the engineers to carry out their bridging operations on the assumption that the enemy was in possession of that point. Nothing further occurred on the 29th.

We now come to the events of the 30th April. On the 30th the 12th Division was to occupy the line of rocky hills as already stated, but in order to enable it to do this it was necessary that it should be supported from the left bank. This task was allotted to the artillery on Kintei Island. The artillery of the 2nd Division and the howitzers (5 batteries of four guns each) had taken up their positions on the island on the night of the 29th, as ordered, and they received instructions that if the enemy opened fire, or if good targets presented themselves, they were to open fire at once. On the right, the Russians at Tiger Hill were observed at an early hour digging trenches, whereupon the artillery of the Guard began firing, but after a few shells the enemy withdrew. Hitherto the enemy's guns had opened fire on us daily at about 7 a.m., but on the 30th they remained silent and did not fire from the positions east of Conical Hill, as before. As usual, however, many men appeared on Conical Hill and on the hills above Chiu-lien-cheng.

At 10 a.m. some of our engineers, in two or three boats, began surveying the main river opposite Chukodai, and at 10.30 a.m. the Russian guns began to fire at them. At that

moment the artillery of the 2nd Division and the howitzers opened fire, and an artillery duel began, and from 10.40 the fire on both sides was intense, our guns even mowing down the trees on the hills north of Chiu-lien-cheng. After twelve minutes the enemy's fire, which had been very accurate, slackened, and his aim became erratic, he seemed to concentrate his fire on the left of the field gun position, where the only artillery casualties occurred. No fire was directed against the howitzers, which, probably from their carefully prepared screens, were as safe as at manœuvres. The duel continued for thirty minutes, after which the Russian guns became silent.

About 11 a.m. six or eight guns appeared on the knoll east of Ma-kou (D 3) and opened fire, but were silent after a few rounds of percussion shrapnel from three batteries of Guard artillery which had that morning advanced on to Kyuri Island, and taken up a position there.

During the artillery fight the 12th Division had taken up its allotted position in safety.

The bridging of the main stream at "E" and "G" began at noon, a few Russians left on Tiger Hill leaving that place in confusion at the same hour, owing to the presence of the 12th Division. The hill was then reoccupied by a battalion of the Guard, followed by a second battalion whose duty it was to prepare a road across the islands for the guns.

Bridge "E" was made with military material (pontoons) and "G" with local material (timber). At the same time bridge "F" near Tiger Hill was begun. The bridge at "E" was 259 yards long, at "G" 329 yards, and at "F" 99 yards; "E" and "F" were completed by 8 p.m., "G" somewhat later; "G" was a reserve bridge and not used for the passage of troops, only some pontoons for the possible repair of "F" being sent over it.*

It was very important to find out whether the Ai Ho was fordable. We had been reconnoitring it for several days, and collecting information about it, but though a single point fit for bridging is a thing that can be found in a night, a reach fit for the passage of an extended infantry line requires some finding. We got hold of and examined many natives, but they, of course, only knew the actual fords, and not the state of the river on either side of them, which is what we wanted to know. All that we had to go on was that we had crossed the river in 1894, and that it was probably falling, judging from daily measurements made in the Ya-lu since 4th April, when our cavalry first entered Wiju. Anyhow, it would have to be crossed, and, if unfordable, would have to be bridged, so materials for the purpose were collected. As regards fords, we knew we could cross it on the road to Chiu-lien-cheng, and on the night of the 29th some of our scouts, three officers

* Compare account on page 16, para. (4).

and several men, examined the river and found there were several more places where it was fordable along the front of the position. So the general decided that the attacking troops should try to ford, but, as this might prove impracticable, materials for a bridge should be carried. Fortunately bridging was unnecessary, or we could not have carried out the attack in one day.

Another important matter was—How to get the 2nd Division artillery across the main stream of the Ya-lu to support the infantry attack? The river was 547 yards wide and we could not bridge it, so pontoon ferries were constructed below Genkado (F/G 4) to be floated down to Kintei Island. Twenty-one of these ferries were used on the night of the 30th, but although the whole of the 2nd Division artillery had to cross, only half of it, three batteries and the escort, a battalion of infantry, had got over to Chukodai Island before daybreak on the 1st May.

The guns on Conical Hill would have interfered very much with our attack on the 1st May, so we hoped to silence them on the 30th, and by the general's orders sixty shell were fired at them alone. We had also established two observation stations (F 5/6 and F 6) south of Wiju, whence we could see into the low valley west of Chiu-lien-cheng, where the enemy's tents were, and where much movement of troops was going on. This valley we divided into imaginary squares, controlling the fire of the howitzers and directing it into particular squares by means of telephones at the observation stations. In this manner we fired slowly till 5 p.m., having first silenced the guns on Conical Hill.

Daybreak on the 1st May found all three divisions in their allotted positions. Many patrols had been sent forward to the Ai Ho, and many men had swum the river dressed only in their belts. Many plans had been proposed among the troops for crossing if the river proved unfordable: ropes were to be taken over by good swimmers and stretched across to help those who could not swim: timber floats on empty *saké* tubs were to be carried by the men, &c., &c. Fortunately the river proved only between waist and chest deep. Some of the men who had reconnoitred the river on the night of the 30th, dressed only in their belts, fought in the same kit on the 1st May.

The artillery positions on the 1st May were as follows:—

- (1) The Guard Division artillery (36 guns), north of Tiger Hill.
- (2) The 12th Division (36 mountain guns), north of Li-tzu-yüan.
- (3) The 2nd Division—18 guns on the north side of Chukodai village, the escort battalion on the south side; the remaining 18 guns crossed during the morning and advanced in support of the infantry attack.

- (4) The howitzers remained on Kintei Island, but half of them were moved to the position relinquished by the 2nd Division guns, which gave them a somewhat shorter range to fire at.

The forward movement of the infantry began at 7 a.m., but the batteries on Conical Hill and the hill to the north of it did not fire at us. The six or eight guns near Ma-kou appeared in action north-east of the village, and opened fire. The whole of the Guard artillery replied and silenced them in a few minutes. The enemy then remained silent and we thought he might have withdrawn in the night. Our infantry line approached the enemy's position without opposition until the Ai Ho was reached, when a heavy fire was opened on us. We advanced, stopped, and advanced again to the Ai Ho under continuous rifle fire. Our field artillery fired at the enemy's trenches and infantry; the howitzers continued indirect fire as on the 30th. Covered by our guns the infantry advanced and plunged into the Ai Ho. In crossing the river, formation was to some extent lost, as the regulation eighty metre (88 yards) rushes could not be kept up, and many of our losses occurred here, while some of the wounded were drowned, though most of them were pulled out by their comrades. In many books on tactics men are told to march on and leave their wounded comrades, but in a case of this sort we do not consider that efficiency suffers by helping them.

The strongest opposition came from the foot of Conical Hill, and it was here that the assault began. According to the rules of war, the presence of our out-flanking party on our right should have first made itself felt, but the fire from Conical Hill and Chiu-lien-cheng was so intense that we could not wait, and the only alternative was to assault. The enemy's infantry east of Conical Hill only retired when the 2nd Division had assaulted and surmounted the west side of that hill.

Then the whole line moved on and the Russian position was occupied, the enemy retiring westwards and northwards. This was about 9 a.m. The Russians from the left of the position near Hsi-cheng (D 1) retreated south to Ha-ma-tang, and south-west to the Feng-huang-cheng road.

Our reserves had been ordered to march at 8 a.m. on Conical Hill.

The Russians tried to cover their retreat from a hill due west of Chiu-lien-cheng, and from the left of their position three Maxims kept firing at us.

Guns from the 2nd Division artillery had been brought up to near Chiu-lien-cheng, but could not cross the stream in their front owing to quicksands, so a bridge 37 yards long was begun at once and soon finished. Two of these batteries were ordered to Conical Hill to co-operate with the reserves.

The Guard and 12th Divisions were very tired and hungry, while the reserves on the contrary had been eagerly waiting for the order to advance, and came on quickly to Conical Hill. Until midday the enemy retired disputing the ground, but at that hour he also began to evacuate the covering position west of Chiu-lien-cheng; so the reserves were launched against him and a general pursuit ordered.

The 2nd Division was to pursue towards An-tung; the Guard and 12th Divisions to continue in the directions they had hitherto followed and pursue towards Ha-ma-tang and Lao-ku-kou (A 3); the reserves to extend the line on the left of the Guard and march on the Feng-huang-cheng road.

At 2 p.m. the line moved on a short way. Then a company of infantry (5/24th Regiment, 12th Division) got close to Ha-ma-tang on the north, and engaged the Russians there at two hundred to three hundred yards.* The captain commanding the company was shot, and a lieutenant assumed the command. He also was shot and another subaltern took command. About half the men of the company were killed and wounded and all their ammunition expended, but not a man flinched. At this moment the other companies of the regiment came up and shot down some three hundred of the Russians who had just begun a bayonet charge. The 5th Company of the 24th Regiment is now famous in the Army.

During this fight the Russians had been held and they now found themselves hemmed in on all three sides, men, horses, and wagons all mixed up. We were ready to charge with the bayonet, and mountain guns from the 12th Division had come up on the north-east. The two field batteries from Conical Hill had also come up, having crossed the river with very great difficulty owing to quicksands, but not being able to find a position or move off the road had remained on it. Fighting went on, and we were just about to charge when the enemy waved white handkerchiefs, and in two or three minutes our firing ceased. Among our captures here were fifteen field guns, eight Maxims, and many wagons. The Ha-ma-tang fight is hard to realize and understand. The Russian officers fought like heroes.

When the guns which had appeared east of Ma-kou had been silenced by the Guard artillery earlier in the day, they had attempted to withdraw, but the leading gun-team was shot, and the guns halting under fire were destroyed by our artillery, and six guns were found abandoned here. This brought the total number of field guns captured by us up to 21, and in addition we captured 8 Maxims, many wagons and small-arm ammunition wagons, 35,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition, and over 1,000 rifles.

* See Map 4.

Note by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. Hume, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.

A few notes of interest which were obtained subsequent to the lecture are added.

The general's anxiety as to the country on the right bank of the Ya-lu above Tiger Hill cannot have been lessened by the recollection that in 1894 the comparatively small Japanese army had been attacked in this ground by a vastly superior force of Chinese advancing from what, on the 1st May, was the Russian left.

The detachment sent from the 12th Division round by the Russian left, *via* Chiao-chia-kou, consisted of one battalion and one squadron. It made a very wide sweep, and on the morning of the 2nd May was close to Tang-shan-cheng,* 16 miles from Feng-huang-cheng on the Mandarin road. There were many Russians in the place and others passing through northwards, but it was clear of the enemy about midday, and the detachment then entered it.

The guns brought up to near Chiu-lien-cheng could not see the Russian covering position west of that place, but fired some eighteen rounds, indirect fire, at the battery trying to get away from Ma-kou at a range of some 5,000 yards.

The way the 5th Company of the 24th Regiment got to Ha-ma-tang was as follows:—The 24th Regiment was on the left of the attacking line of the 12th Division. The division was opposed on its right but not on its left, with the result that in advancing it "brought its left shoulder up." When therefore, pursuit was ordered, the 24th Regiment was as near Ha-ma-tang as any other part of the line, probably nearer.

The mountain guns of the 12th Division fired only a very few rounds at Ha-ma-tang.

The 30th Regiment (2nd Division) and two battalions of the 4th Regiment of the Guard composed the infantry portion of the general reserve. The three squadrons of the 2nd Regiment of cavalry (2nd Division) were also in the general reserve

(b) Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton.

In continuation of my report,† written from An-tung and dated 13th May 1904, I now beg to submit a second and much fuller report, with map, which deals not only with the operations on the Ya-lu, but also embraces the preparatory movements and arrangements of the First Army leading up to these operations.

* On Map 2.

† See Page 15.

2. In forwarding this information I would first invite attention to the manner in which it was communicated to us. The officer who delivered the lecture—a copy of which I enclose—is one of the three officers on the Great General Staff who are charged with operations. It was natural that one of the Operations Staff should be selected to lecture to us, but it was also, I thought, very characteristic of the clear division of work and responsibility which prevails on this Army staff, that whenever any question was asked relative to the strength or composition of the Russian forces, he never attempted to answer, although he probably was well able to do so, but always referred the matter to the head of the Intelligence Branch. It is also, I think, worthy of note in connection with the General Staff, that although the present is a trying and a critical time, the Chief of Staff, the Head of the Intelligence Branch, the Vice-Chief of the Staff, and several heads of sections, not only attended the whole of the lecture, but appeared as if they had no more serious trouble or work in the world than to explain things and advise us as to how we should make our notes.

3. Owing to the kindness of the commander of the 12th Division, his chief of the staff, and several other officers, I am enabled to supplement the general statements regarding dispositions which were given us in the lecture by the following detail. Commencing on the Japanese right, as it formed for attack on the morning of the 1st May, the 12th Division had the 47th Regiment, the 46th Regiment, and the 24th Regiment in first line. At first the 46th Regiment was behind the others on account of the ground, but soon after the commencement it came up into line, thus :—

24

46


47

These regiments formed their own supports and reserves as well as brigade reserves, and the divisional reserve was the 44th Regiment, with one battalion of engineers. The whole of these troops were extended from the outset, excepting only the divisional reserve.

To the left of the 12th Division stood the Guard Division, the 1st Brigade consisting of the 1st and 2nd Regiments; the 2nd Brigade consisting of the 3rd Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment. The 1st Regiment furnished two companies as regimental reserve, two companies as brigade reserve; the 2nd Regiment furnished one company as regimental reserve, plus one battalion as divisional reserve. The 3rd Regiment furnished two companies as regimental reserve and one battalion

as divisional reserve and escort to the artillery. The 4th Regiment gave nothing to the reserve, as it was represented by only one battalion, the others being with the Army reserve of five battalions and five squadrons on Kyuri Island. Besides these two battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment the whole of the 30th Regiment 2nd Division was in reserve. The formations of the 2nd Division on the left were very similar to those of the Guard.


The cavalry was as follows—supposing the line A to represent the three divisions formed for attack :—



The artillery positions are so fully described in the lecture, and so clearly shown on the map, that it is unnecessary to refer to them further.

4. No doubt accurate accounts of the Russian dispositions will find their way to India from the military attachés with that army. It must nevertheless be of interest to know how they appeared to the Japanese Intelligence Department before the battle. On the 24th April it was known that the Russian line stretched from Chosan* over Wiju to Ta-ku-shan. The main concentrations at that time were at An-tung and Chiu-lien-

* See Map 2.



cheng. It was also known that the main reserve was at Ha-ma-tang, and that the largest body of the enemy collected together in any one spot was 5,000 men marching down from Feng-huang-cheng. On the 30th April the Russians had concentrated to the following extent, beginning on the extreme left of their line. On the left, refused, near Hsi-cheng (D 1)*, two companies of the 22nd Regiment and one battery of horse artillery. Along the bank of the Ai Ho from Yu-shu-kou to the south, the remainder of the 22nd Regiment. (I would remark here that some officers in the Intelligence would substitute for 22nd Regiment in this connection, 22nd and 29th Regiments. As, however, the 29th Regiment forms part of the Vladivostok garrison I think this must be a mistake, and I therefore only give the 22nd.)

On the right of the 22nd Regiment and round the foot of Conical Hill (or Suribachi-yama), as far as Chiu-lien-cheng came the 12th East Siberian Rifles and one battalion of the 11th East Siberian Rifles. On the high ground to the north of An-tung was the 10th Regiment with 16 guns. South-east of Pu-tzu-kou (A 5) was the Russian main reserve, consisting of the 9th Regiment and two battalions of the 11th Regiment with one battery of field artillery and one company of engineers.

Coming to the artillery, there was one group of eight guns north-east of Ma-kou, which same group reappeared on the 1st May, reduced in number to six guns, to the south and east of Ma-kou. On Conical Hill was a group of four guns and yet another group of twelve guns on the hill north of Chiu-lien-cheng.

The position must be considered somewhat extended, namely, four miles, to be held by seven battalions, especially in view of the facts that the lateral communications were exceedingly rough and bad as well as searched by fire from the river bed, and that there was practically no reserve. For I refuse to consider the troops at An-tung as constituting an available source of reinforcement during the actual fighting for the passage of the Ya-lu. The position was one of length without depth. Taken section by section it was exceedingly strong (although as I shall show hereafter, the most was not made of that strength), but if any section were to give way, there was no possibility of remedying the disaster which must then almost inevitably ensue.

5. After having been over the battlefield, and after having discussed the subject very fully with many officers, I have come to the conclusion that the most important lesson to be learnt by European armies from this conflict lies in the contrast afforded by—

- (1) The entire absence on the Russian side of any of those ruses or artifices which have from time immemorial played such an important part in battles.

* See Map 3.

- (2) The eager adoption by the Japanese of any ingenious device which might hoodwink their enemies, and thus afford their troops a better chance in the impending conflict.

Thus the Russians crowded the hill-tops, letting the extent of their lines be easily inferred, and even watered and exercised their horses opposite their camps in full view of the enemy in broad daylight.

Per contra the Japanese had the most stringent orders forbidding man or beast to show themselves. As before related, they planted a forest of pines to conceal their march from the plateau down upon Wiju and hung branches on strings between uprights to cover their gun-pits from observation. In planting trees in front of their batteries they were careful to select trees growing directly in front or directly behind the spot they wished to conceal. Thus next morning the landscape appeared precisely the same to the Russians four thousand yards distant; as the fact that a tree of a particular shape or appearance had advanced or retired a couple of hundred yards during the night was naturally imperceptible at such a range. Again, the Russian guns were naked and unprotected on the open hill-side, except north of Chiu-lien-cheng, where the gun emplacements gave some shelter it is true, but also afforded a most famous mark for Japanese target practice. As to the infantry trenches they were glaringly conspicuous, and no artillery could have desired a better mark to fire at. Nor did they compensate for this worse of all defects, in my opinion, by strength. That is to say, they were sufficiently solid as a breastwork to give full protection to the bodies of those who held them, but there was no head-cover, no bombproof, no loopholes for the infantry marksmen. Nor was there barbed wire or other obstacle to delay the enemy's assaulting infantry at a suitable distance from the front.

On the other hand, the Japanese gun-pits, concealed as before described, were so protected thereby that no Russian shell fell even in the vicinity of the howitzers, whose detachments were thus enabled to aim and fire as coolly and accurately as they would have done in peace practice. Being the attackers the Japanese had no occasion to employ barbed wire or other entanglements or loopholes, but they fully profited by the enemy's carelessness, and whenever they could invent another misleading device, such as building a bridge which was never intended to be used or getting their fleet to simulate a movement on An-tung, they promptly availed themselves of it. During a long peace European armies are apt to forget what an elementary affair war is still, notwithstanding its numerous highly scientific adjuncts. In such cases drill tends to degenerate into a stagnant and unintelligent formality, and professional studies into red tape and routine.

In the British army I have known generals who would consider such a *ruse de guerre* as building dummy bridges or dummy fortifications, merely to draw the enemy's fire, as highly irregular and undignified.

No doubt the South African war has improved matters in these respects for the present generation of soldiers, but I think this battle of the Ya-lu is useful as furnishing us with a reminder. All such elementary yet clever devices seem to come quite naturally to the Japanese.

6. Another marked contrast between the two armies was in their musketry. The Russians mainly used volleys, even in the confused struggle at Ha-ma-tang; the Japanese, individual fire. It was thought that the experiences gained in the South African war had given its quietus to volley firing, but there is no doubt as to the fact, which I have had from the mouth of a divisional general, as well as from numerous junior officers. Moreover, I have satisfied myself that, whereas the artillery practice of the Russians was good as long as it lasted, the musketry was inaccurate to an extent not entirely explicable by the fact that they were attempting to fire volleys in face of combined shrapnel and individual rifle fire. This is specially interesting on account of the different principles underlying the musketry training of the respective armies.

The regulations and conduct of Russian musketry practice have been dominated for the past few years by a school of thought which is not unknown in our army. It is urged by these officers that the most practical method of instructing a battalion is to cause it to expend the greater part of its annual allowance of ball cartridge at field firing at unknown distances in the open country, because it is "just like the real thing." Their opponents, whilst admitting that a little field firing may be useful, protest that as far as instruction in marksmanship is concerned, a soldier might just as well fire blank cartridge if he does not know where his bullet has struck, or what faults he has committed in elevation or direction. As in most technical and theoretical disputes there has been much to say on either side. Now, however, we have the Russian army, which expends a large proportion of its rounds in field firing, meeting the Japanese army, which expends all but a very small proportion of its ammunition on the rifle range, in the careful individual instruction of each soldier at target shooting. The Russian infantry shot badly, the Japanese infantry shot excellently.

7. In a previous paragraph I stated that the Russian artillery shot well until it was overwhelmed, but with regard to several other points, it forces itself upon the mind of any visitor to the scene of action that, difficult as their situation was, they did not make the best of it. A lesson we very soon learnt from the Boers in South Africa was that guns which are overmatched in the preliminary artillery duel should be prompt to recognise the fact and withdraw before they are put definitely

hors de combat. The historical instance is the 3rd July 1863, in the attack on Cemetery Hill at Gettysberg. Hunt, the commander of the Federal Artillery, withdrew his guns when overmatched. The Confederates thought he was crushed, and launched Pickett's Virginian Division at the hill. The guns were run forward again, and the division was destroyed. If it was impossible in South Africa to withdraw the guns, the gunners, at any rate, were withdrawn to adjacent cover to reserve themselves for the decisive moment when the attack was definitely launched. The Russians acted otherwise. They fought on until they were crushed, and then the Japanese infantry were able next morning to advance against a position stripped of its guns. The destruction of this Russian artillery, which refused even temporarily to bow before the overwhelming shell storm, is easily understood by anyone who has seen how conspicuously the Russian guns were posted to combat the invisible howitzers and field guns of the Japanese, or who remembers the proportionate numbers or the immense superiority of a heavier against a lighter gun. Two points, however, still remain inexplicable to me, despite of all inquiries.

(a) How were the guns silenced so rapidly? For instance, six guns opened fire east of Ma-kou, on the morning of the 1st May, and, as the lecturer put it, "Of course they were "silenced in two or three minutes." I cannot understand this very rapid destruction of the guns and *moral* of a battery. It seems to me that the Japanese artillery shoot much better than our own artillery, which I had always supposed to be the best in the world, or else that the Russian gunners did not do their duty. For, on this occasion, the infantry were advancing to the attack, and unless they were repulsed the guns would be inevitably lost, as indeed they were.

(b) If the bulk of the artillery was not fit to resume the fight on the morning of the 1st May, why were they not altogether withdrawn during the previous night? I hope to be able to clear up both these points in due course. At present it seems impossible.

8. In the last paragraph of my report, of the 13th inst.,* from An-tung, I spoke of the Russians having permitted themselves to be caught in a defile through not having occupied the heights to the east of their line of retreat with infantry. The information upon which I based this criticism was incorrect. The Russians were posted in great strength on the very hills in question, and were fairly driven off them by the Guard after they had become entangled in their fight with the 5th Company of the 24th Regiment. Their position then became absolutely hopeless—how hopeless it is impossible to explain, unless the actual ground could be shown, notwithstanding which they continued to resist very courageously for some considerable time.

(c) *Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson.*

I forward the appended valuable report for information.

As regards paragraph (2), I would remark that the assignment of specific functions to subordinate officers of the General Staff is the system in force in all well-organized armies, and there seems nothing unusual in one set of staff officers being employed to deal with operations against the enemy and another set to deal with the collection of intelligence regarding the enemy's strength, dispositions, and movements. The former, however, are dependent upon the latter for the information on which their plans are based, and both work naturally under one head, namely, the local Chief of the General Staff.

(6) First Japanese Army.—The Artillery at the Battle of the Ya-lu (Chiu-lien-cheng).

REPORT by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery, with
COVERING REMARKS of Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON,
K.C.B., D.S.O., 5th June 1904, and of Lieut.-General Sir
W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B., Tokio, 20th June 1904.

(See Maps 3 and 4.)

*Covering Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson,
K.C.B.*

The accompanying report, dated 1st June 1904, by Captain B. Vincent, R.A., on Artillery at the Battle of the Ya-lu, is submitted for information.

I would invite attention to Captain Vincent's remarks on the use of high-explosive common shell.

Covering Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton.

I have the honour to submit a memorandum on the Artillery at the Battle of the Ya-lu, by Captain Vincent, which seems to me to contain some valuable information and comment.

I may add that I also have been struck by the fact referred to by him, that whereas superior officers have most frequently spoken of the Russian artillery fire as being rapid and accurate as long as it lasted, regimental officers whom I have chanced to encounter have several times referred to shrapnel bursting at such a height as to be harmless.

Report by Captain B. Vincent, Royal Artillery.

By the 20th April the Japanese First Army, consisting of three divisions, had concentrated in the neighbourhood of Wiju, after having overcome the many difficulties of the road and rivers on its march from the south. Thanks to the co-operation of the navy and the transport service, it had been supplied from the sea at five different points on the coast between Anju and the mouth of the Ya-lu, which obviated the necessity of dragging food stuff over the miserable roads of North Korea.

The Army was now very well placed on the southern bank of the Ya-lu, with a secure base at Chelsan and a short line of communications to the sea. It was therefore able to devote the

whole of its energy to the bridging and crossing of the various channels and sandy flats of which the basin of the Ya-lu is composed.

As this letter is mainly connected with artillery, I will not dwell on the preliminary operations before the battle of the 30th April and the 1st May. Suffice it to say that the difficulty of reconnoitring a wide river like the Ya-lu, the depth and fordability of which is constantly changing, in the face of an entrenched enemy, necessitated a considerable amount of enterprise on the part of the Japanese. Still more so the reconnaissance of the mountainous district north of Wiju between the Ai and Ya-lu Rivers, through which a flanking movement to turn the Russian position at Chiu-lien-cheng would alone be possible.

From Wiju the bed of the river appears to be a large sandy plain some 6,000 yards wide, with a few low trees scattered here and there, bounded on all sides by hills and mountains. The small town of Chiu-lien-cheng can be plainly seen in the distance with a series of low hills stretching away on either side, which were held by the Russians. By far the most conspicuous feature of the landscape is Tiger Hill, a precipitous rock about half a mile long and 450 feet high, which appears to be an island in the middle of the river bed, but is really joined to the western bank by a narrow neck of land. This hill, which played an important part in the operations in masking artillery fire and shielding bridge construction from view, may be said to be the apex of the triangle, two sides of which are formed by the Ai and Ya-lu Rivers.

From information gathered from various sources, it was supposed by the Japanese that the Russian force in front consisted of about two divisions. After the battle, however, it was discovered that their numbers and disposition were as follows:—

The 10th Regiment, East Siberian Rifles (3 battalions), and sixteen field guns on the hills close to the river bank north-west of An-tung, twelve guns on a low hill behind Chiu-lien-cheng, four guns on Conical Hill, just north of the latter place.

The 1st Battalion, 11th East Siberian Rifles, and the 12th Regiment, East Siberian Rifles, entrenched along the base of the hills north of Chiu-lien-cheng.

Fourteen guns and the 22nd East Siberian Rifles along the bank of the Ai Ho near Ma-kou.

One horse artillery battery (6 guns) and two companies, 22nd East Siberian Rifles, on the extreme left of the Russian position, near Hsi-cheng.

Now each division of the Japanese army includes one regiment of field or mountain artillery, divided into two "battalions" of three batteries of six guns each, so that to oppose the sixty

Russian guns on the north bank of the Ya-lu the Japanese were able to bring up two regiments of 7.5-cm. (2.95-inch) field guns (72 guns), one regiment (12th Division) of 7.5 cm. mountain guns (36 guns), and an extra regiment of 12-cm. (4.7-inch) Krupp field howitzers (20 howitzers).

A very interesting point is, that in this campaign the Japanese field artillery carry a small proportion (about 20 per cent.) of high-explosive common shell. These projectiles were extensively used at the battle of the Ya-lu.

The first shells of the campaign were fired on 26th April at 9.30 a.m. by the Russian guns on Conical Hill at the first Japanese bridge which was being constructed over the channel nearest to Wiju. An hour later, four more guns appeared further south, and about fifty shells were fired at this bridge. The Japanese engineers would not at first leave their work, but continued driving in piles and shouting "*Banzai*" as each shrapnel burst over their heads; but, finally, the Russian fire became so accurate that the Japanese officers ordered their men to get under cover.

This unfortunate bridge was fired at every day until the 30th, when the Russian guns were silenced; but it proved very useful to the Japanese as a means of ascertaining the Russian artillery positions, of forming an estimate of the skill of their gunners, and as a blind while a second bridge was being constructed a little further up the river.

The two pairs of bridges leading to Kyuri Island, over which the main army crossed on 30th April, were also shelled by the Russians from the hill just east of Ma-kou by means of indirect fire, but sustained no damage.

In fact, not a single one of the many bridges constructed by the Japanese in the Ya-lu basin was destroyed or even damaged by Russian artillery fire. This can easily be accounted for by the fact that nothing but shrapnel was fired at them.

The greatest care had been taken by the Japanese commander to prevent the Russians from estimating the number of Japanese troops in and around Wiju. Portions of the roads exposed to the enemy's view had been carefully screened with trees. Nobody was permitted to climb the hills, and not a shell was fired at the Russians, however tempting a target they offered when watering horses or exercising along the sands.

In order to conceal the plan of attacking from Wiju, the assistance of the navy was called in and a demonstration was made off the mouth of the Ya-lu as if an attempt to cross at An-tung was intended.

On the evening of the 25th, two shallow-draught gunboats, two torpedo boats, and two armed launches came up the river to Yongampo without answering the fire of the Russian guns along the northern shore. Early on the 26th, a fleet of junks laden with timber and bridging material entered the estuary, and doubtless helped to mystify the Russians as to what the

Japanese intention really was. In fact, it was heard afterwards from captured Russian officers that a Japanese attempt to cross at An-tung was expected.

This accounts for the fact that on the 1st May the Russian reserves were too far south-west of Chiu-lien-cheng to enable them to take part in the battle, and that sixteen Russian guns were in position on the hills just to the north of An-tung.

The main points of the orders for the attack on 1st May, which were issued early on 28th April, have been already reported.*

In order to cover the 12th Division bridging operations at Suikuchin on the 28th, three batteries of mountain artillery were placed in position at Chukyuri (H 2), and these succeeded in driving off a small force of Russians with two guns, which put in an appearance on the opposite bank.

On the 29th the Guard artillery on the hills just north of Wiju fired a few shells at a force of Russians which, having recrossed the Ai Ho, had driven back a company of Guard infantry and re-taken Tiger Hill.

On the night of the 29th, the field artillery of the 2nd Division and the Howitzer Regiment took up their position on Kintei Island, with orders to open fire at daybreak in response to the Russian guns if good targets presented themselves, and to cover the occupation of the rocky hills between the Ai Ho and Ya-lu by the 12th Division.

At an early hour on the 30th, the Russians on Tiger Hill were observed digging trenches, but after a few rounds from the Guard artillery they retired.

Hitherto the Russian guns had opened fire daily at about 7 a.m., but on the 20th they remained silent till 10 a.m., when they began firing at some Japanese engineers in two or three boats, who were surveying the main channel opposite Chukodai. This was a signal for the artillery duel to commence.

The howitzers and field guns of the 2nd Division immediately opened fire, and at 10.40 a.m. the fire on both sides became intense. A Japanese artillery officer stated afterwards that his first impression was that the Russian fire was superior, but the Japanese soon found their ranges, and after about twelve minutes the Russian fire, which had been very accurate, became weaker and the aim more erratic. The Russians seemed to concentrate their fire on the left of the 2nd Division field artillery position, where the only Japanese artillery casualties took place. As those of the whole regiment only amounted to twenty-eight killed and wounded, eight being the most in any one battery, the statements of other artillery officers that the Russian shrapnel burst too short and high are probably true.

The duel continued for about thirty minutes, after which the Russian guns became almost silent.

About 11 a.m., six or eight Russian guns appeared on the knoll east of Ma-kou, and opened fire, but were silent after a few rounds from three batteries of Guard artillery which had that morning advanced on to Kyuri Island. This same Russian battery again opened fire on 1st May, but was again quickly silenced by the Guard batteries. When retiring in column of route a shell (probably high-explosive) struck the limber of the leading gun, and exploded it, thereby causing the battery to halt under fire. In a few minutes it was annihilated and the guns afterwards captured. I saw some photographs taken by the Head-Quarters Staff photographer, which depicted a scene of the mangled remains of men, horses, limbers, and carriages mixed up together in horrible confusion, and a good example of what damage a few rounds of well-directed "rapid fire" can do to a battery limbered up.

Whether the destruction of this Russian battery was effected by high-explosive or shrapnel shell, it is difficult to say. Probably by both, as a colonel of artillery stated that very often, when firing at guns, both kinds of shell are used simultaneously, the shrapnel against the personnel and the common shell against the material of the battery.

From an artillery point of view, by far the most interesting feature of this battle was the employment of field howitzers by the Japanese.

Before the war, the fact that the Japanese Government had invested in several batteries of Krupp 12-cm. (4.7-inch) field howitzers had been kept a profound secret. Their departure from Japan, and disembarkation at Rikaho,* near Chelsan, had also been carried out with the perfect secrecy which is such an admirable characteristic of Japanese military and naval procedure.

From Rikaho to Wiju, a distance of about forty miles the rough country road had been repaired as far as possible to facilitate their movement to the front. During the night of 29th April, about a week after landing, the Howitzer Regiment dug itself carefully into the sand of Kintei Island, using every artifice to conceal its position. The heavy baulks of timber which are floated down the Ya-lu during the summer months from the wild forest regions near the "Ever White Mountain," and were found scattered about the islands, were utilized as roofs for bombproof shelters and other purposes. Some were stuck up on end in the sand some little distance in front of the howitzers, with branches fixed between them to act as screens.

The pits and epaulments, which were grouped in fours, were connected by trenches, and judging by the number of covered ways to the river bank, water was largely employed as a means of laying the dust. Thus perfectly screened from view from the Russian position, the howitzers were connected by telephone with two observation stations on the high ground, some three

* On Map 2; on the coast, south-east of Wiju.

or four thousand yards in rear, whence the fire was directed on any particular part of the Russian position by a system of numbered squares. Platforms were also erected in trees on the flank of the batteries, whence officers could observe some of the effect of their fire. The captain of one of the howitzer batteries told me afterwards that not a single missile of any sort came near their position all day, and that their practice was carried out as if they had been at manœuvres.

When we examined the trenches some days after the battle most of the bombproof shelters and valuable baulks of timber had been burnt.

During the artillery duel of 30th April, the howitzers, of course, took a prominent part, and the hits made by their high explosive shells which we saw round the Russian position north of Chiu-lien-cheng testified to the accuracy of their fire at a range of about four thousand yards. On the apex of Conical Hill, a space fifteen yards by fourteen yards, we counted eight shell holes. After silencing the Russian guns an intermittent fire was directed by means of the telephone on various parts of the Russian position till dusk.

On 1st May the Japanese artillery positions were as follows:—

- (1) The Guard field artillery (36 guns) north of Tiger Hill.
- (2) The 12th Division mountain artillery (36 guns) north of Li-tzu-yüan.
- (3) The 2nd Division had 18 guns north of Chukodai village; the remaining 18 crossed the main channel during the morning by boat and advanced in support of the infantry.
- (4) The howitzers remained on Kintei Island but half were moved later on to the position relinquished by the 2nd Division field guns, whence a better view could be obtained at a somewhat shorter range.

The forward movement of the infantry attack began about 7 a.m. on 1st May, but except by the previously mentioned Russian battery at Ma-kou, which was soon silenced, no artillery fire was brought to bear on the attacking infantry.

It was thought at first that the Russians had retired during the previous night, but as the Japanese firing line reached the Ai Ho a heavy rifle fire was opened upon it from the trenches along the foot of the hills. The whole of the Japanese field artillery fire was then directed on these trenches and helped considerably to keep down the fire. Thus covered by its artillery the Japanese infantry waded the Ai Ho, assaulted and took the position.

At the final stand of the Russians at Ha-ma-tang, the Japanese guns did not play a very important part. The mountain batteries of the 12th Division and two field batteries

of the 2nd Division arrived just before the surrender, but the latter were unable to come into action on the steep slopes each side of the Chiu-lien-cheng road, and the former only fired a few shells.

Finally, about 5.30 p.m. on this eventful 1st May, the Russian force at Ha-ma-tang, huddled up as they were at the bottom of the valley under a murderous fire from the heights surrounding them, with no chance of escape, tied white handkerchiefs on their bayonets and surrendered. Here 15 field guns and 8 Maxims were captured, which together with the 6 field guns at Ma-kou, made up a total of 21 field pieces and 8 Maxims.

To us here at the front, away from newspaper and telegraphic reports, it still remains a mystery why the Russians after the bombardment from superior numbers which they received on 30th April, did not retire their guns that night. It can only be supposed that the Russians underestimated the attacking power of their enemy.

Many of the senior Japanese officers speak very highly of the accuracy of the Russian artillery fire, but others—and especially the junior officers—say that the Russian time fuzes were, as a rule, set too short and that the shells burst “like fireworks in the air.” They do not think very highly of the Russian fuze, and talk of shells burying themselves in the sand without exploding.

It seems to be the general opinion that the Russians would have done far more damage if they had had some common shell, and all agree that a small proportion of this form of projectile is a necessity for field artillery.

The Russian defences were of a most primitive order. The gun positions on the hills just north of Chiu-lien-cheng can hardly be said to have been protected at all. A little earth was heaped round the guns, but there were no pits or any cover of any sort for the detachments. The infantry trenches along the base of the hills were plain breastworks of sods cut close at hand, revetted with branches, with no attempt whatever at concealment, no obstacles in front, no head-cover, and offering little protection from shrapnel fire.

As regards the effect of the Japanese shrapnel fire, there is little to guide one in forming an opinion. The Japanese claim that it was due to the intensity and accuracy of their shrapnel fire on the Russian trenches, that their infantry were enabled to advance over the bare open sands of the islands and to wade the river during the attack on the position with comparatively little loss. At the same time it is stated that a very small proportion of the wounded Russian prisoners had been hit by shrapnel bullets.

An officer of the 12th Division said that the little 7.5-cm. (2.95-inch) mountain guns of this division were naturally completely outranged by the Russian field artillery.

Just as the Japanese infantry reached the Russian trenches at the foot of Conical Hill, one of those mishaps occurred which are bound to happen occasionally on any modern battlefield when it is necessary to keep up artillery fire till the last moment before the position is reached: a couple of shells from their own guns fell plump into the middle of the assaulting infantry, and caused several casualties.

(7) First Japanese Army.—The Battle of the Ya-lu
(Chiu-lien-cheng). Supplementary.

REPORT by Lieut-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
5th June 1904.

Plate.

The attack on Ha-ma-tang - - - Map 4.

In common, I believe, with everyone else, including even officers in the Japanese General Staff, I have experienced the greatest difficulty in getting any clear idea of the exact course of events between the period when the first position of the Russians was carried, and that when the final surrender took place. Having studied the ground in person and heard all that the general who received the surrender had to tell me, the story was still contradictory and obscure, but from later information which I have received I am enabled to put forward the following account as reliable and clear.

It may be remembered that in the original account given by the General Staff and forwarded with my report, it was stated* that the Army reserves were ordered to march at 8 a.m. upon Conical Hill, also that the Guard and 12th Divisions were very weary and hungry, and that the enemy continued to fight a rear guard action, until at midday he began to evacuate his covering position west of Chiu-lien-cheng. This covering position is marked in Map 3, and lies about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles outside, and to the east of the centre of the large scale map sent herewith (Map 4).

As a matter of fact, however, it appears that the enemy did not evacuate the position west of Chiu-lien-cheng until much later. To explain fully what happened I must go back a little into the history of the action. It had originally been intended that the 12th Division movement should have been a turning one, but owing to the presence of the Russians at Hsi-cheng their attack became a frontal one. On occupying the position, therefore, the whole army found itself in line, more or less, and, being very tired and hungry, halted to feed.

After an indeterminate period, but probably at about 11.30 a.m., Marshal Kuroki ordered the 2nd Division to move towards An-tung, preceded by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and

directed four reserve battalions, two of the Guard and two of the 30th Regiment, preceded by the Guard cavalry, to pursue along the road to Feng-huang-cheng *via* Ha-ma-tang (the Mandarin Road). In the meantime the covering position west of Chiu-lien-cheng was still held by the enemy, apparently consisting of two battalions of the Russian reserve from An-tung and three Maxims. About midday, Lieut.-General Baron Nishi, commanding 2nd Division, came up to Conical Hill and reported that he could only carry out his orders and proceed to An-tung by incurring heavy loss, as the Russians from their position completely commanded the only practicable road. He would, therefore, have to make a frontal attack without the aid of artillery, as the howitzers could not be brought up for a long time, and there was no position from which the 2nd Division artillery could be brought into action against the enemy.

General Kuroki then determined that, as he had carried the main position, it was not desirable to impose further heavy sacrifices on the troops by a direct attack and pursuit, and he authorised Lieut.-General Baron Nishi to stand by, pending further orders. Meanwhile the four reserve battalions were also unable to make much progress, but the 12th Division was only impeded in its movement in a southerly direction by the fatigue of the men and difficult nature of the country. Nevertheless, it was the threat of this continued advance which caused the Russians about 2 p.m. to commence to evacuate the covering position, and to retire on Ha-ma-tang. Orders were then given to the whole of the Army to advance and pursue.

The first troops to get into close touch with the enemy were the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th Guards, and the 1st Battalion, 30th Regiment. About the same time the 5th Company of the 24th Regiment threatened his retreat and distracted his attention from the position on which it is shown in the map.* Whilst endeavouring to shake off this famous company, the Russians took up the following position to resist the troops directly pressing upon their rear. Their left rested on the point marked in the map 11/3, following fairly closely the red blocks along this ridge as far as 11/4, which was where their right appears to have rested. At about 3 p.m. Major-General Watanabe appeared on the scene with the 1st Battalion of the 4th Guards and took command. Shortly before 4 p.m., the general ordered the 30th Regiment to attack in front, whilst the 10th Company 4th Guards was ordered to turn the Russian right flank. This turning movement was successful, and the Russian right retired across the narrow valley and climbed up on to the long, bare, Razor-back Hill† with its eastern slope at 45°, on which it is actually shown on the sketch.

* Shown as 5/24.

† The ridge on the south-west side of the map with summits marked 508 and 500.

During this retrograde movement the main Russian position to the east continued to be held by them. Before long, however, the 10th Company of the 4th Guards, following the enemy's retreat, effected a lodgment on the southern extremity of Razor-back Hill, from which they could fire with deadly effect into any Russians in the hollow, and, at less than one mile's range, into the backs of the Russians on the hill to the east. This, together with renewed frontal attacks, brought the Russians down from their main position into the valley, and the height they had taken was quickly occupied by the 30th Regiment and 3rd Guards, as shown in the sketch. All the hills surrounding the enemy were thus occupied at 4.40 p.m. and Major-General Watanabe, and all, thought the fighting was over. Nevertheless, the Russians went on resisting from the end of Razor-back Hill, from the hollow and from the point shown on the map opposite Razor-back Hill. The results of this were disastrous to the Russians, who were in a regular trap, and at 5.10 p.m. the general determined to end the fight, and with that object ordered the 10th Company of the 4th Guards to attack Hamatang with the bayonet. At this moment the white flag went up.

I should add that shortly before the end the remaining battalions of the 24th were ranging up alongside the 5th Company of their regiment, and that some of the 12th Division mountain guns were coming into action behind them.

An interesting point is, that during the actual fighting the Russians had dug themselves in under cover in the valley to such an extent, that when the white flag was put up the Japanese had to make them scramble out one by one and throw down their arms.

Finally, I may say that all the Japanese officers I have spoken to seem surprised at the inactivity of the Cossack Brigade on the Russian right flank, which apparently took no part whatever in the fighting.

(8) Second Japanese Army.—Operations from the Concentration at Chinampo to the 28th May 1904, including the Battle of Nan Shan.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff. Second Army Head-Quarters, 18th July 1905.

Appendices.

Japanese order of battle at Nan Shan	-	Appendix 1
" casualties at Nan Shan	-	" 2
Russian	"	" 3
Japanese expenditure of ammunition at Nan Shan	- - - -	" 4

Plates.

General map of country in the vicinity of Chin-chou	- - - -	Map 5
Map of the battle of Nan Shan*	-	" 6

Covering Letter.

I have the honour to submit an account of the operations of the Second Army in Manchuria for the greater part of May 1904, which contains all information collected regarding that period.

1. In the battle of Nan Shan the men of the Second Japanese Army, for the first time in their existence, found themselves opposed to barbed wire and machine guns, and in almost every succeeding engagement the main difficulty to be overcome has arisen from the presence of these two creations of modern war. No entirely satisfactory method of destroying either has yet been discovered, though artillery has, on rare occasions, been pushed sufficiently near to silence machine guns, and it is stated that bombs charged with dynamite are effective locally in breaking down wire entanglements. The matter is still engaging the earnest attention of the Japanese, and is no doubt receiving due consideration in England and India.

* * * * *

2. The same tactics were pursued at Nan Shan as in the later battles: an enveloping attack in practically equal force

* The positions of the troops are approximately correct, portions of them being further forward and other portions further to the rear than shown, at the hours of the different phases.—A.H.

at all points ; but from the Russian position, which overlooked every square yard of ground on the plain below, any attempt to mass in a particular direction would have at once been seen and met. The capture of the position was mainly due to the manner in which the 1st and 3rd Divisions contained the Russians opposite them, thus inducing them to reinforce their right, and thereby greatly facilitating the turning movement against their left.

3. It will be observed that the whole of the artillery, being spread over a comparatively small area, was placed under the command of a general officer. The only other occasion—so far as is known—where a course somewhat similar was followed was in the attack on La-ma-tun, at the battle of the Sha Ho. At Nan Shan it is understood that this system of command did not produce the desired effect.

An escort for the artillery was used on this occasion, a precaution rarely, if ever, found necessary in other engagements.

4. Perhaps the most notable point in the action is the persistency with which the Japanese went on attacking until they learnt the Russians' breaking strain, a knowledge which has served the Army in good stead in many other hard-fought fights, although that strain, if anything, increased rather than diminished.

Narrative.

The victory of the First Japanese Army at the battle of the Ya-lu, an event which took place on the 1st May 1904, was the signal for a great movement of troops by sea, a movement which was to be the precursor of land battles of the highest importance. During the period that General Kuroki's Army was preparing to cross the borders of Korea into Manchuria, pursuing a policy closely resembling that which had been followed ten years earlier, a fleet of one hundred and three transports had been quietly collecting at Chinampo. On board these vessels, whose moorings along the banks of the Taitong River occupied some eighteen miles, were the troops of the Second Army under General Baron Oku, consisting at that time of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions and the 1st Artillery Brigade.* From various centres in Japan these units had assembled at the points of embarkation, and the transit thence to the point of rendezvous, though unescorted, was accomplished without interference from a naval descent such as that which happened two months later. The initial destination of this force, which was to form the left wing of the concentric movement on Liao-yang, was a point on the coast line at no great distance from Port Arthur, and in determining the exact locality of the landing-place, questions of weather and of safeguarding the operation, which would cover

* 108 guns.

several days, were the main factors involved. As regards the first of these, the coast line in the region extending from Ta-lien Bay* to Ta-ku-shan, within which zone, in accordance with the strategic plan, the landing must be made, is ill-suited for such an operation, being very shoal and possessing no sheltered anchorage at a convenient distance from the objective, while as regards the second, though the nearer to Port Arthur the greater the danger of attack by sea, the future movements of the Second Army would be much facilitated by a close approach to that place. Other considerations favoured a disembarkation in the western rather than in the eastern section of the coast line chosen, since the foreshore towards Ta-lien Bay is better, the currents weaker, and the rise and fall of the tide less than in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan. Moreover, and this was a point of great importance, in proceeding from the mouth of the Ya-lu towards Port Arthur several groups of islands, some suitable as points of assembly for transports, are passed and these localities are more numerous towards the west than towards the east. Everything pointed to a landing near Pi-tzu-wo, where the Japanese 1st Division had disembarked in 1894; but that place suffers from the usual disadvantage of the south Manchurian coast, having "a shoal foreshore and extensive flats at low water," and for these reasons Hou-tu-shih (F/G 2),† near the mouth of the Ta-sha River, where the water is deeper, was selected. Thither on the 4th May, after a delay on account of boisterous weather, guarded by gun and torpedo boats and preceded by a naval landing party, whose duty was to cover the disembarkation of the leading troops, the first group of twenty transports proceeded. On reaching the vicinity of Hou-tu-shih a few mounted Cossacks were seen, but their presence did not betoken greater force, and neither by land nor sea did the Russians offer any opposition.

5th May.

On the 5th May bad weather prevailed, and no transfer of troops from ship to shore was possible. On the 6th the naval landing party disembarked, and as soon as it had occupied some rising ground a short distance inland, from which the operation was to be covered, a battalion of infantry was put on shore and took its place, on which it was withdrawn. As more troops of the 3rd Division, which led the movement, reached the beach, infantry and cavalry were added to the covering force, and soon

7th May.

after the 7th, when the 1st Division began to disembark, two divisions occupied a line stretching along the Pi-tzu-wo (G 1)-Chin-chou (B 4) high road from the Ta-sha River to the Shou-yi

8th May.

River (E 2). On the 8th General Oku and Head-Quarters of the Second Army left their transport, and on the 10th the 4th Division began to land, and assembled at Ma-chia-tun (F 2). Despite the fact that a strong south-west wind was blowing and that the sea ran high, the work of disembarkation was carried

* See Map 1.

† See Map 5.

on day and night, the transports after delivering their freight returning independently of each other to Japan for more.

While the invading army was busily engaged upon the coast, the Russian position was as follows. One portion of the army, after its defeat upon the Ya-lu, was falling back north-westwards before General Kuroki's troops; another portion allotted to the defence of Port Arthur, and computed at from 30,000 to 40,000 strong, was holding that place and a strong position two miles south of Chin-chou city, and the main army was reported to be in the vicinity and south of Liao-yang. The intention of its commander appears to have been to move to the relief of Port Arthur, now in danger of isolation, but the Japanese, aware that such an operation was in progress, or foreseeing it as a probable contingency, determined forthwith to interrupt the Russian line of communication by cutting the railway line. This was effected at Pu-lan-tien (D 1), on the 6th May, when a force of divisional cavalry, supported by one-and-a-half battalions of infantry and some engineers of the 3rd Division, destroyed the line and telegraph wire at that place. The force arrived at its destination in time to see the last train from Port Arthur—possibly carrying the Viceroy Alexeiev—steaming north. Perceiving the Japanese, who had opened fire upon it, the train stopped, and the flag of the Geneva Convention was raised, on which the cavalry ceased fire and allowed the train to pass. After effecting its purpose the force fell back to the covering line, as it was deemed inadvisable to remain unsupported astride the Russian line of communication. On the same day a battalion and some engineers of the 3rd Division, in co-operation with the navy, occupied Pi-tzu-wo, on which a hostile force which had held that place fell back north-west towards Wa-fang-tien.*

Two days later the railway line and telegraph wires at Lung-kou (C 2), midway from Pu-lan-tien to Chin-chou, were cut by the 3rd Division. As General Oku's intention was first of all to disperse the enemy at Shih-san-li-tai (B 3), north of Chin-chou, the 1st Division, with the 7th Brigade of the 4th Division and the 13th Artillery Regiment, was sent thither, and on the 15th and 16th took the heights west of the former place, those east of Chin-chou, and in the neighbourhood of Mount Sampson (C 4). For the time being the 7th Brigade remained under the command of Prince Fushimi, the General Commanding the 1st Division, and a battalion of the 2nd Regiment with some cavalry was sent to occupy Sai-tzu-ho (C 4) and guard the left flank of the Army. The general situation on shore was now as follows. The 1st Division faced the enemy in the Chin-chou—Nan Shan direction, guarding against any threat that might come from the south, while the 3rd Division, with part of the 4th, held Pu-lan-tien and the line of the Ta-sha Ho, well placed to meet any possible danger coming from the north.

* 40 miles north-east of Chin-chou, on the railway line.

15th May.

The landing near the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho had been found to be unsatisfactory, owing to the prevalence of bad weather from the south, which on two occasions had caused a loss of many small boats and several landing stages, and, on this account, the place of disembarkation was shifted about the 15th May to a point some miles further to the west. The anchorage there, however, also suffered from exposure to the south wind, and night work was, for that and the following reason, discontinued. When the tide ebbs it leaves a muddy foreshore a quarter of a mile to two miles wide, over which all stores landed from the ships must be transported on men's shoulders. This would have made night work a matter of great difficulty, but now that three divisions were on shore, and were sufficiently strong to repel any force that might be brought against them, the necessity for labour after dark had ceased. Such would have called for the burning of lights, and these might have betrayed the presence of the transports and led to a hostile raid, for which reason the flotilla was anchored nightly, covered by a boom, at the naval base in the Elliot Islands.*

The second group of transports from Japan, bringing the 5th Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, began to arrive on the 15th, and by the 23rd the last ship of the group had come up. The position of the Second Army was thus materially strengthened, and the plan to move against the enemy in the Chin-chou neighbourhood, and occupy the coast line up to Ta-lien Bay (B 5), could now be put in force.

21st May.

At 10 a.m., on the 21st, Army Head-Quarters, then being at Tzu-chia-tun (E 2), General Oku issued the following orders:—

1. The 3rd Division will move on the 22nd from Chih-chia-fang (E 2) so as to arrive on the 23rd at Sai-tzu-ho (C 4), proceeding thither through Erh-la-ping-tun (D/E 3). It will replace the detachment of the 1st Division at Sai-tzu-ho. 1 regiment of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry (less 1 squadron), and a battalion of artillery will remain under the command of the General Officer Commanding, 5th Division.
2. The 4th Division will move on the 22nd by the Pu-lan-tien-Chin-chou road so as to arrive at Shih-san-li-tai (C 3) on the 23rd. On reaching that place it will find there the 7th Brigade and the 13th Artillery Regiment, and will hold the heights to the west of the village. 1 battalion of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry (less 1 squadron) will be left under the command of the General Officer Commanding 5th Division at Pu-lan-tien.
3. The 1st Division will occupy by the 23rd a line from Chin-chou to Lao-hu Shan (Mount Sampson (B/C 4)),

* Situated about 15 miles south-east of Pi-tzu-wo.

and will maintain connection with the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

4. The 1st Artillery Brigade—less the 13th Regiment—will advance on the 22nd from Tzu-chia-tun through Lung-ko-tien (D 3) to Tung-tao-chia-kao (C/D 4).

At the same time the General Officer Commanding 5th Division received the following order :—

“The General Officer Commanding 5th Division, with the detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions allotted to him, the force now landing, and the Cavalry Brigade, will occupy the line from Pu-lan-tien along the Ta-sha Ho so as to protect the Second Army in its southerly movement.”

In accordance with these orders, the several groups named occupied the assigned positions on the 23rd; Army Head-Quarters arriving at Liu-chia-kou (C 3/4) on the 22nd. 23rd May.

About this time the condition of the Russian forces with which the Second Army might be brought in contact was as follows :—While the disembarkation was in progress, some one thousand five hundred troops were known to be in the neighbourhood of Ta-shih-chiao,* holding all important points on the railway to the south. Wa-fang-tien† was apparently the centre at which the greater number of these railway guards was concentrated, and thence reconnoitring parties were occasionally pushed towards Pu-lan-tien, but no indications of a movement in force against the Second Army from that direction was observed. From Chin-chou reconnaissances were sent out by the small garrison of that place. At Shih-san-li-tai (B/C 3) part of the 4th Siberian Rifle Division and the whole of the 5th Regiment of Siberian Rifles had been met, and when forced to retire, had fallen back, part on Chin-chou and part on the position at Nan Shan, where works were being made with great assiduity.

The positions which the Second Army now held placed it within a few miles of the spot where the Liao-tung and Kuantung peninsulas are connected by an isthmus which at the same time separates an arm of the Ta-lien Bay on the east from that of Chin-chou on the west. This isthmus is an important strategical point covering the roads to Dalny and Port Arthur and the junction of the Ta-lien-wan,‡ and Dalny branches with the main southern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Measured from high-water mark east to west, its extreme breadth is 4,400 yards, but on both sides is a muddy foreshore extending seaward, according to the condition of the tide, some 1,500 to 2,000 yards. Situated on this isthmus is a group of hills stretching almost from sea to sea, and rising at their greatest height to 333 feet. It was here that the Russians had resolved

* See Map 1. Ta-shih-chiao is 120 miles N.E. of Chin-chou.

† 40 miles north-east of Chin-chou.

‡ The old Chinese name for the town of Ta-lien-wan is Liu-shu-tun, and is thus shown on Map 5.

to bar the Japanese incursion to the south, and postpone, if not prevent, the investment of Port Arthur. The ground which they decided to hold for this purpose, known as the Nan Shan position,* may be described as a hill or a group of hills forming a rough circle rather over a mile in diameter, and presenting to the north three marked salients, each of which is separated from its neighbour by deep precipitous ravines. The central and eastern spurs are, however, linked together at several points by cols. Viewed from the north these three features appear to form as it were a single salient, due partly to the inclination of the outer ones towards that in the centre and partly to their lying with regard to one another somewhat in echelon. In spite of this defect, nature and art had made this side of the position well-nigh impregnable, for its slopes are bare and glacis-like, the field of fire is extensive, and on the day of battle a network of barbed wire fronted the assailant as he rushed to the attack. The eastern side, with a double border of wire and mines, was specially strong, for while its slopes were favourable for rifle fire, its defenders would be less exposed to hostile guns, and on the 26th were to be aided by an improvised Russian gun-ship in the bay. Moreover, the position of the defences on this flank seems to show that a turning movement had been foreseen and guarded against. The western face, however, was but slightly screened by artificial obstacles; and though the muddy foreshore extends here further seaward, and may have been regarded as impassable, the result proves that the possibility of exposure to enfilade fire and the practicability of a flanking movement had not been sufficiently considered. Such enfilade fire was provided by the presence during some hours of the battle of Japanese gunboats in Chin-chou Bay, detached from the blockading squadron at Port Arthur. One feature common to all sides of the position is the multiplicity of narrow ravines taking their origin in the upper re-entrants, and growing deeper till they reach the level of the plain.

The appearance of the numerous works, and the labour which must have been expended upon them, prove that the Russians had for several weeks prior to the attack elaborated the system of defence which is now almost the sole mark that remains to indicate the historic scene of the 26th May.

The defences took the form of gun-redoubts placed upon the higher and more commanding points, and of shelter trenches on the hill sides in two and three, and in places even in four tiers. Whether all these tiers were utilized for firing on the attackers it is impossible to say, as some bear the appearance of having been constructed rather as cover for supports or reserves than for firing purposes. Within the gun-redoubts, which communicated with one another by telephone, were splinterproofs, blindages and traverses; and a dynamo, still

* See Map 6.

gauntly erect behind the highest battery, supplied power to the search-lights that swept the front by night. A few communication roads exist, but these were meant to facilitate rather the mounting of the artillery than the passage of reinforcing troops, who would have been greatly exposed in using them. There is no water supply on the position, a defect which was remedied by the provision of large metal tanks. It may perhaps be assumed that this position would require for its defence a force of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and, if the troops at Port Arthur numbered from 30,000 to 40,000, there is no apparent reason why such a force should not have been forthcoming.

In some respects the position was defective; the defences lacked concealment, and were in certain places exposed to reverse and enfilade fire; on the west flank sufficient precautions were not taken against a turning movement, communications were bad, and the ground for counter-attack was unfavourable. Every movement of the attack was clearly visible to the defenders, and that at several miles' distance; the defenders had a magnificent target, while they themselves were hidden from view and generally protected from fire, and had the earth-works been less conspicuous the assailants would have found it difficult to ascertain the exact distribution of the Russian troops and guns.

Such was the obstacle which intervened between the Japanese and Port Arthur, one which the iron-like resolution of their general and their undaunted valour overcame.

In front of the position the Russians held the walls of Chin-chou city as an advanced post, the east, west, and north gates being barricaded.

On the 24th, when all the divisions were in position and awaiting the order to attack, a message was received from Admiral Togo to the effect that the gunboats *Tsukushi*, *Heiyei*, *Akagi*, and *Chokai*, with a flotilla of torpedo boats, would cannonade the Russian position on the 25th and 26th in order to assist the attack of the Second Army. Thereupon General Oku decided to attack next day, and at 1 p.m. issued the following orders:—

1. The 1st Division (less one regiment of infantry), taking advantage and keeping east of the Fu-chou—Chin-chou road, but maintaining with a detachment touch with the 4th Division, will occupy by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th a line stretching from a point 500 yards north-east of Chin-chou, through Hsiao-chin Shan to Tang-wang-tun. Part of its artillery will take such a position by that hour as to be able to fire on Chin-chou without interruption from the enemy's guns. The main body of the division will occupy a covered position and make all preparations for attack.

2. The 4th Division, taking advantage of darkness and using the Fu-chou—Chin-chou highway and the ground to the west thereof, will keep touch of the 1st Division's right, and by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th occupy a line westward to Lung-wang-miao. Part of its artillery will take position so as to fire on Chin-chou without interference from the Russian artillery, and the main body of the division will take a covered position and make all preparations for attack.
3. The 3rd Division, taking advantage of darkness, will advance to the district south of Lao-hu Shan and occupy Wang-chia-tun by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th. The main body of the division will take up a covered position and prepare for attack. Two companies of infantry will be attached to the Artillery Brigade.
4. The 1st Artillery Brigade (less the 13th Regiment) will follow the line of march of the 3rd Division and take position in the neighbourhood of Sai-tzu-ho and prepare for action. Two companies of infantry of the 3rd Division will be attached to the brigade.

25th May. Although the intention was to attack Nan Shan on the 25th, two causes arose to prevent the plan to do so from being put into effect. As arranged, the troops moved into the positions ordered before daylight, and head-quarters reached the hill near Shih-san-li-tai at 8 a.m. At 5.50 a.m., portions of the artillery of the 1st, 4th, and 13th Regiments fired deliberately on the defenders of Chin-chou, while the enemy, whose point of vantage on Nan Shan enabled him to ascertain the position of the Japanese guns, turned his own against them. Although the infantry of the 4th Division at Lung-wang-miao, as well as the artillery, suffered little loss, its troops on this day showed nothing of that dash which they displayed upon the morrow, and night came with the enemy still holding Chin-chou walls. By 3 p.m. no gunboats had appeared in Chin-chou Bay, for the day was somewhat foggy,* and at half-past three General Oku decided to postpone the attack till the 26th, and then, if need be, engage upon it unassisted by the naval guns. At that hour, therefore, he issued the following orders†:—

1. The 1st Division will keep its present line and at 4.30 a.m. to-morrow attack the enemy between a line stretching from the east of Chin-chou to the north-east point of the hill of Nan Shan, and a line from Pa-li-chuang to Yen-chia-tun (on the railway line).

* It had been arranged that the gunboats were not to be expected should the weather be thick. Amongst other details that had been agreed upon, the Second Army was to hoist the flag of the Rising Sun on Nan Shan heights as soon as they were taken, so that the ships' guns might not fire on their own countrymen.—A. H.

† These orders are not verbatim, but contain the substance of those actually issued.—A. H.

2. The 4th Division, connecting with the 1st Division, will move at 4.30 a.m. to the nameless stream near the south gate of Chin-chou, and will attack Nan Shan on its south-west side as if to surround it in that direction. Chin-chou will, if possible, be occupied by midnight to-night.
3. The 3rd Division, connecting with the 1st Division, will move from its present position at 4.30 a.m. and try to reach a line from Yen-chia-tun to Yao-chia-tun and attack the eastern face of Nan Shan as if to surround it.
4. The whole of the artillery of the Army will be under the command of the General of the Artillery Brigade,* and from positions decided upon by him will open fire at 4.30 a.m., and assist the infantry advance.
5. The reserve of the Army will assemble at Chin-chia-tun† and march so as to reach Hsiao-chin Shan by 4.30 a.m.

At 7 p.m., three torpedo boats, as it was thought, were seen entering Chin-chou Bay, but the thickness of the weather left some doubt as to the nature of the vessels.

The twenty-four hours which followed, during the greater part of which what is regarded by the Second Army as its most obstinate struggle in the campaign against Russia, may be divided into three periods of attack.

1st Period.—The Night March and Occupation of Chin-chou (up to 5.20 a.m.).

4th Division.—The capture of Chin-chou was a mere preliminary to the attack on the Russian position behind it, and for that reason General Oku had directed that it should, if possible, be secured by midnight, but at 11 p.m. a thunderstorm began which both helped and yet impeded the operation. To carry out his orders the commander of the division ordered the 19th Brigade (less two battalions) to make the assault, but the enemy's resistance was too much for these troops, and at day-break the city was still in Russian hands. In consequence the artillery of the division and the 13th Regiment could not occupy the intended positions, and remained on the heights north of Chin-chou, while the infantry of the 7th and 19th Brigades fell back to the high ground east of Lung-wang-miao. No combined attack had been ordered—considering the smallness of the garrison a scarcely necessary measure—which would probably have led to its speedy evacuation, but Prince Fushimi, who had divided his troops into two columns—the right consisting of the 1st Brigade (less two battalions), the left of the 2nd Brigade (less the 3rd Regiment)—knowing that the 4th Division had not succeeded, sent part of his main body against the place. At 5.20 a.m., his men forced an entrance through the

* This, it appears, was Major-General Saisho, commanding the artillery of the Second Army.—A. H.

† North-east corner of Map 6.

eastern gate, and the enemy, some three hundred in all, fled back to Nan Shan. The delay caused by this diversion on the right of the 1st Division prevented its columns from occupying the allotted position till 6 a.m.

3rd Division.—Forming his troops into two columns, the right consisting of the 5th Brigade (less one battalion), the left of the 18th Regiment (less two companies), General Oshima moved off at 11 p.m. and occupied the designated line, whereon some entrenchments were thrown up.

At 4 a.m. General Oku was on the hill near Chao-yang-tsz, and at 10.30 a.m. moved to Hsiao-chin Shan.

2nd Period.—Bombardment and Infantry Attack.

The artillery, most of which was posted along the lower slopes of Mount Sampson, formed an arc stretching from bay to bay, and, together with the guns of the vessels of the Japanese fleet* which were now in Chin-chou Bay (6 a.m.), encircled three sides of the Russian position, upon which its fire was concentrated. The cannonade could not, as intended, begin at 4.30 a.m., for until 5.10 a.m. the morning was foggy, and only then could the summit of the Nan Shan be seen, but twenty minutes later the 1st Artillery Regiment opened on No. 6 Redoubt, and soon the thunder of every gun was heard. From fifty guns of varying calibre the enemy replied, the marksmanship of his heavy, and more especially of his field artillery, being good. At first the Japanese seemed to make no impression, but gradually their great superiority† began to tell, and by 6.50 a.m. the Russian fire showed signs of slackening.

4th Division.—Meanwhile the 4th Division, deploying at the hill east of Lung-wang-miao, pushed forward west of Chin-chou city, the first line of the 19th Brigade on the left reaching the vicinity of Kao-chia-kou at 7.10 a.m. On the right considerably in rear was the 7th Brigade, for the narrow front of the attack forced the greater part of its troops to cross the

Name.	Draught.	Armament.
* <i>Akagi</i> -	10 feet	1 8·2, or 1 5·9, or 2 guns under 15 cwt., 2 machine guns.
<i>Heiyeu</i> -	16 „	1 10·2 (Krupp), 2 5·9, and 6 machine guns.
<i>Toukushi</i> -	15 „	2 10-inch, 4 4·7 guns, 2 under 15 cwt., 4 machine guns.
<i>Chokai</i> -	(Training ship, no details in Brassey's Annual).	
Torpedo flotilla. Probably one or two 3-prs. each.		
As the tide fell the <i>Heiyeu</i> and <i>Toukushi</i> were obliged to withdraw.		
† 1st Artillery Brigade -	-	- 108 guns.
1st Division -	-	- 36 „
3rd Division -	-	- 18 „
4th Division -	-	- 36 „
		<hr/> 198 guns.

sandy beach from which the tide was now receding, and a heavy fire was brought to bear upon them. The advance of the infantry allowed the 4th and 13th Artillery Regiments to move forward, and at 7.10 a.m. they came up on the western side of Chin-chou and joined in the bombardment from closer range. The Russians, seeing that an attempt to turn their left was threatening, withdrew four field guns from Nan Shan, and posting them upon the high ground south of Ssu-chia-tun opened upon the advancing infantry. By half-past eight, despite the heavy fire of guns and rifles, the leading troops had reached as far as an old barrack which stood midway between the enemy's entanglements and the hamlet of Kao-chia-kou. Fifty minutes later two batteries of field artillery retired from Nan Shan in a south-westerly direction, with the view of coming into action elsewhere with greater effect. By 9 a.m., with few exceptions, the Russian guns were silenced, on which the artillery with the 4th Division advanced again and took position south-west of Hsi-kuan-wai, where they were better placed to support the infantry attack. But although the guns on the main position ceased to trouble the advance, the two batteries that had fallen back soon opened from Nan-kuan-ling, and their fire and that of the infantry before it now caused the right of the 4th Division its heaviest loss. After a short interval the gunboats turned their attention against the offending batteries that swept the ground on the Russian left, and directing part of their broadsides upon them, delivered the rest against the main position.

1st Division.—To the left the 1st Division, which at 6 a.m. had arrived upon the appointed line, was forced to wait until the troops of the 3rd and 4th Divisions, and especially those of the latter division, had come abreast of it. The enemy's fire during this time was very heavy, but the men used their light entrenching tools, and the slight cover they were able to throw up made the losses small. At 8.20 a.m. the thunder of the guns on the hill above grew less and less, and the opportunity seemed to have arrived for penetrating the line of mines and barbed wire that barred the way. Supported by the divisional artillery at Hsiao-chin Shan, and the guns of the 4th Artillery Regiment at Chi-li-chuang, a determined effort was made to close with the enemy. The first line, crouching behind its slender cover, rose and rushed to the front, but before a point from three hundred to four hundred yards from the opposing entrenchments was attained many men fell victims to the deadly fire that showered upon them from machine gun and rifle. Soon the condition of the division grew serious, for the enemy, doubtless conceiving that its presence at so short a distance from his works imperilled his tenure of the hill, concentrated his efforts against it. At half-past ten the 1st and 14th Artillery Regiments moved forward, and in some degree helped to mitigate the danger, and at the same hour General Oku sent up two

battalions of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, which took post on the right.

3rd Division.—The 3rd Division, which had occupied its appointed line before daylight, remained concealed till the opposing artillery fire seemed feebler, and at 7.50 a.m. General Oshima ordered the first line to advance. The ground to be passed over was here, as elsewhere, very open, and, moreover, the nearer the enemy's position would be approached, the more the enfilade fire from infantry at Chi-chia-tun,* and guns placed south of Ta-fang-shen* would become effective. Little by little the men pushed forward, and as losses grew, reserves of units filled the gaps, and by 9 a.m. the line, except a portion on the left, was west of the railway line and on the verge of the line of obstacles. The Russians now reinforced their right, and half an hour later a battery of field guns came into action south of Ta-fang-shen, and a gun vessel coming into Hand Bay, south of Huang-tu-ai, harassed the left and rear of the division. To advance further was then impossible, and nothing remained but to wait till the supporting artillery should so shake the enemy as to make it possible to break into the position.

At 11 a.m. the remaining battalion (less one company) of the 3rd Regiment was sent up by the Army Commander, and later an attempt made by a force of Russians, carried on three steam launches, to land near Huang-tu-ai was driven off.

Throughout the day forward and backward swept the tide of battle, charge after charge was made, and as often driven back, but the tenacious assailants, though foiled in their desperate efforts, clung to the ground they had so far won. Many attempts were made by groups here and there to cleave a path through the pitiless barbed wire, and officer after officer, man after man, nobly but vainly sacrificed themselves. Report followed report to Head-Quarters, each telling how great was the peril of the first line, but no reserves remained to give fresh vigour to the attack, now at a standstill. The aspect of affairs began to wear a hopeless look, but when victory seems most remote it often lies within the grasp, and General Oku knew his men, and did not despair. Each division, still eager to advance, only waited on its neighbour to give a lead.

3rd Period.—The Capture of Nan Shan.

By 5 p.m. the position of affairs had not improved, and that of the 3rd Division, whose left was partially enveloped by the enemy's infantry and artillery on the high ground east of Nan-kuan-ling, was growing worse. As evening advanced ammunition began to fail, and though commanders of units everywhere tried to push forward, success seemed scarcely possible. The 1st Division called for volunteers, who attempted

* On the railway about 2½ miles south of Chin-chou.

several times to cut the wire, and a battery of artillery was brought up close to try therewith to silence the deadly machine gun fire.

The sun was almost setting when the fire of the 4th and 13th Artillery Regiments, coupled with that from the Japanese war vessels in the bay, gave an opening for the 4th Division, which had before tried to turn the Russian left, but had been held back by the destructive enfilade fire. Making their way breast-high through the waves at a greater distance from the position than in their earlier attempt, they enfiladed a trench which ran directly towards the sea, then, fronting to the enemy, forced their way into the ravines and assailed redoubts Nos. 8 and 9, capturing the latter first. Other successes followed on this flank, and the 1st and 3rd Divisions, who were before this pushing to the front, forced the line of obstacles. The Russians, driven back from point to point, retired towards Port Arthur, and at 7.20 p.m. the flag of the Rising Sun, the standard of Japan, floated upon the summit of the hard-won hill. Some of the guns came up, and those of the 4th Division, advancing over the level ground before them, opened fire on the disordered crowd that hurried south.

At 8 p.m. General Oku issued the following order :—

“The 4th Division will hold the ground from the observation post on Nan Shan to the bay on the west; the 1st Division from the former point will extend to the eastern foot of the hill; and the 3rd Division will occupy the space thence to the seashore. All the artillery will pass the night in the positions now occupied.”

The battle had lasted fifteen hours, and during all that time—brief when compared with battles yet to come—the Japanese soldiers had lain in the open under a terrific fire, but their losses, 4,504 killed and wounded,* were not excessive. To the resolution of the General Commanding the Second Army, who refused to accept defeat, backed by the determined bravery of his troops, the superiority of the Japanese artillery, and the inability of the Russians to quit their attitude of passive defence, may be attributed this brilliant victory. The repeated failure of the attack in this the first action in which the Second Army was engaged was calculated to daunt the stoutest heart, but General Oku never for a moment doubted his ability to win, and, knowing his men, “pounded longest.”

Nan Shan exemplifies well what determination on the part of the commander and self-sacrificing bravery on the part of the troops can do. To all intents and purposes the battle was lost at 5 p.m., but the fine qualities of the general and those who carried his orders turned defeat into victory. The attack of each division was a frontal one, for even after the 4th Division

* See Appendix 2.—A. H.

had partially turned the Russian left it had to assault the position directly to its front.

Having forced the outer barrier of Port Arthur, General Oku was not destined to be the instrument whereby the inner portal of that place should fall, for the Second Army, after a brief space, was to seek other fields and earn fresh laurels in the north.

27th May.

On the day following the battle the 1st Division marched to Nan-kuan-ling, while the remainder of the troops assembled in the vicinity of Nan Shan. The enemy who had held that place consisted of the 4th Siberian Rifle Division, the 5th Siberian Rifle Regiment, some sharpshooters and marines, fortress and field artillery, the latter amounting to about two batteries. The main body fell back direct to Port Arthur, while a portion crossed in boats to Dalny, which place was occupied on the 28th.

APPENDIX 1.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

General Officer Commanding, General Baron Oku.

1st Division (H.I.H. Lieut.-General Prince Fushimi):

1st Brigade, 1st and 15th Regiments.

2nd Brigade, 2nd and 3rd Regiments. (The
3rd Regiment was with the Army reserve.)

1st Cavalry Regiment.

1st Artillery Regiment.

1st Engineer Battalion.

3rd Division (Lieut.-General Oshima):

5th Brigade, 6th and 33rd Regiments.

17th Brigade, 18th Regiment (less 2 companies
with Artillery Brigade; and 34th Regiment
with the 5th Division).

3rd Cavalry Regiment (less 1 squadron with
5th Division).

3rd Artillery Regiment (less 1 battalion with
5th Division).

3rd Engineer Battalion.

4th Division (Lieut.-General Ogawa) :

7th Brigade, 8th and 37th Regiments. (The 3rd Battalion of the 37th Regiment was in Korea.)

19th Brigade, 9th and 38th Regiments. (The 2nd Battalion of 38th Regiment was with the 5th Division.)

4th Cavalry Regiment. 1 squadron (remainder with 5th Division).

4th Artillery Regiment.

4th Engineer Battalion.

1st Artillery Brigade, 13th, 14th, and 15th Regiments (escort 2 companies 18th Regiment). 5th Engineer Battalion—from 5th Division—less 1 company, was attached to the brigade.

Army reserve, 3rd Infantry Regiment of 1st Division.

Guns of 4 gunboats and 4 torpedo boats.

APPENDIX 2.

CASUALTIES OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

	Officers.		Rank and File.		Horses.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
1st Division - -	14	41	202	1,102	—	14
3rd „ - -	6	32	161	1,222	6	0
4th „ - -	8	38	298	1,303	1	0
1st Artillery Brigade	0	5	15	43	11	5
5th Engineer Battalion.	1	0	5	8	0	0
Totals -	29	116	681	3,678	18	19

Grand total all ranks, 4,504 killed and wounded.

APPENDIX 3.

CASUALTIES OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE.

Russian Loss.—Unknown, but a Japanese officer detailed to count the dead found 700.

Estimate of Russian Strength.—10,000 combatants.

Prisoners, &c.—Prisoners 23 (including officers). Rifles, 365; guns, 92 (heavy 30, light 52, machine guns, 10); 4 ammunition wagons for guns, and 4 for rifle ammunition; rifle ammunition, 416,650 rounds; shells, 8,996; 1 dynamo; and 52 mines and 4 search-light machines.

APPENDIX 4.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED BY THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY.

	H.E. Shells.	Shrapnel Shell.	Small Arm Ammunition.
1st Division - - -	450	6,015	667,000
3rd „ - - -	462	3,249	425,148
4th „ - - -	806	5,000	1,110,886
1st Artillery Brigade - -	2,029	16,036	—
5th Engineer Battalion - -	—	—	62
Total - - -	3,747	30,300	2,203,096

(9) Second Japanese Army.—A visit to the Battlefield of Nan Shan (Chin-chou), fought the 26th May 1904.

REPORT by Colonel W. APSLEY SMITH, C.B., Royal Field Artillery, before Port Arthur, 10th September 1904.

(See Map 6.)

Visit to Nan Shan (or Chin-chou) battlefield by attachés to Third Japanese Army, on 7th August 1904. No officer was available who knew the ground, or had been present at the battle of 26th May 1904; the two interpreters told off to the attachés practically neither speak nor understand any language except Japanese, the attachés were therefore dependent on the very good French of the officer in charge of them. But, on 5th September 1904, their knowledge was supplemented by a lecture given to them by a general staff officer of the 1st Division, who was present at the battle.

The opposing forces were:—

Japanese.—1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions, complete in artillery, cavalry, and details, but, owing to losses and to units not up or employed elsewhere, not numbering more than 30,000 to 31,000 bayonets.

Corps artillery—two regiments, *i.e.*, 72 guns, no howitzers. All guns, corps and divisional, 7·5-cm. (2·95-inch) Arisaka, latest pattern field, not really Q.F. but *tir accéléré*. Total of guns, 180.

Russian:

13th and 14th Regiments of 4th Siberian Division.

28th Regiment of 7th Siberian Division.

5th „ of Sharpshooters.

A reserve (details unknown), some marines, &c. 80 to 90 guns, mainly position, but with at least two Q.F. field batteries besides machine guns. Approximate numbers, 16,000 to 18,000.

The Russian position was naturally very strong; excellent command (hills 250 feet to 350 feet in height). All ground to the north within effective field-gun range lies low—flanks resting on sea (3,300 yards from east to west coasts), ground within 600 yards a good deal broken; deep twisting ravines lead in places directly towards position, and underfeatures such as banks and terraced slopes afford cover to attacking infantry. Entire foreground now disguised by standing crops

of millet, &c., in May it was bare; good road and telephonic communications; two fairly good, but of course unmetalled roads, and the railway by which to retreat. No second line prepared, although Nan-kuan Ling, a hill 3,000 to 4,000 yards to the south, appeared to offer facilities.

Guns in semi-permanent works *en barbette*, with splinter proof and ammunition recesses, platforms, stone and sandbag revetments.

All works, even advanced works, closed all round by shelter trenches.

Shelter trenches, 5 feet deep, two or three tiers in places, revetted sandbag loopholes, traversed, zigzag communications, but in many cases too wide for their depth, insufficiently flanked and traversed, and affording slight cover to distant oblique artillery fire. Very few, however, appeared to have been much damaged, though the pit-marks caused by the Japanese artillery testified to the accuracy of their fire. The size of the craters were also some proof of the effectiveness of their high-explosive common shell. Front and flanks of position, a network of barbed wire entanglements, with a number of mines (naval pattern). No facilities which we could detect for counter-attack.

Two searchlights. A number of machine guns which were shifted as required.

Previous to 25th May, there was a little, but unimportant, fighting. The Commander-in-Chief, General Oku, had arranged for a naval flotilla to shell position on 25th May, but bad weather rendered this impossible. Therefore General Oku decided to dispense with it, and ordered a general advance on the afternoon and evening of 25th, as follows:—

4th Division to move on Chin-chou,* attack it at midnight and occupy south face of town down to the sea at Chin-chou Bay.

1st Division in the centre to occupy a line from south-east angle of Chin-chou to Chi-li-chuang, with its guns in rear of right flank, and its divisional reserve at Tang-wang-tun.

3rd Division to be by daylight on the 26th May on a line from Chi-li-chuang to Hsin-chia-tun, with its guns in rear of its left flank.

During the whole night, 25th–26th, a furious storm raged, which prevented the 4th Division from occupying Chin-chou as ordered. The 1st Division could not place its guns in position owing to musketry fire from ramparts of town. It, therefore, towards dawn, itself attacked and carried Chin-chou by the southern and eastern gates. It was only occupied by a detachment of Russians. By daylight the three divisions were approximately in the positions ordered, with the Corps Artillery massed near the 3rd Division right at Chiu-li-chuang, at a

* See Map 6.

distance of 3,500 to 4,000 yards (or even 4,500 yards) from the north salient of the Russian position.

General Oku had intended that all guns should open fire at 4.30 a.m. on 26th, but this was impossible owing to rain and fog. General objective for all guns:—the Russian batteries and the above north salient. At 5.30 a.m. fire was opened, and by 8.30 a.m. the Russian guns appeared to have been silenced, with the exception of some on their left (west) flank.

At 9 a.m. the infantry of all three divisions advanced, and by 11.30 a.m. had pushed up to the foot of the slopes of the position, encircling it on three sides. Here they remained until 3 p.m.

The 4th Division artillery remained in their position—due west of Chin-chou.

The 1st Division artillery changed position to south-west of Chi-li-chuang; objective, as before, the north salient; range, 3,100 yards.

The 3rd Division artillery and a reserve brigade moved to east of Ying-chia-tun.

The Corps Artillery did not move.

About 10 a.m. four gunboats arrived and shelled the Russian left from Chin-chou Bay; also a Russian gunboat shelled the left flank of the 3rd Division from Hand Bay.

At 3 p.m. the infantry positions were—

4th Division, Liu-chia-tun to the sea.

1st Division, Liu-chia-tun to the railway.

3rd Division, the railway to Ma-chia-tun.

At about this hour, two Russian Q.F. batteries retired to Nan-kuan Ling, whence they considerably harassed the left of the 3rd Division.

After half an hour's preparatory fire, at 3.30 p.m. a general attack was made by all three divisions.

In the case of the 1st Division, the objective was the above-mentioned advanced work at north salient; engineers were sent in front to cut the wire entanglements, and three separate attempts were made to push the assault home, but without success. At 5 p.m. two batteries of the 1st Division were sent north-west to a knoll due east of Liu-chia-tun, to shell a portion of the advanced work, which they had not hitherto been able to see. The 3rd and 4th Divisions made practically no progress. At 6 p.m. the positions of the 1st and 3rd Divisions were practically unchanged, but the 4th Division, greatly aided by fire of two shallow-draught gunboats, had pushed closer to and somewhat round the Russian right, their objective being Work No. 8 and Work No. 10.

Towards 7 p.m. the 4th Division gained Work No. 8, a small portion of it entering Work No. 10 simultaneously. This gave the necessary impetus, and by 7.20 p.m. all three divisions were in the enemy's position.

The cavalry regiment of 1st Division was ordered, soon after 7 p.m., to move from east of Chin-chou round the Japanese left, but the very rough broken ground rendered any charge impossible, and darkness stopped any pursuit.

General Oku remained throughout the day on a knoll east of Chin-chou, and 4,000 yards north of the Russian position.

Japanese losses, 4,400.

Russian losses unknown, but 700 buried.

(a) Russian rifle fire first seriously felt at 1,200 yards. Japanese did not reply until within 600 to 700 yards. Authority for this—the G.O.C. 1st Division.

(b) Mines were “observation”—naval pattern.

Fougasses were “mechanical.” Wire said to have been cut in one or more instances. We neither heard of any losses caused by either, nor did we see any craters.

(c) Barbed wire entanglements said to have been very difficult to break through. High-explosive shell practically useless against them. Japanese wire cutters are very strong and about three feet long.

(d) Japanese flotilla said to have produced great material as well as moral effect. Two gunboats of shallow-draught enfiladed Russian left at some 2,000 yards.

Russian gunboat too far off, on account of shallow-water, but produced some moral effect on 3rd Division.

(e) The Russian left was undoubtedly their weakest point. The trenches were of slighter profile, and there was no effective flanking support except from the two Q.F. batteries near Nankuan Ling. These two batteries could and did support both the Russian flanks.

(f) The loss of Work No. 10 enabled the Japanese to command the lines of retreat, and made the entire position untenable.

(g) The battle was a hard one. The Japanese infantry reached fairly easily to within three hundred to six hundred yards of their objectives, but repeated attempts could carry them no further. About 5 p.m., gun ammunition temporarily ran short, and the result hung in the balance to the very end.

(10) Second Japanese Army.—Operations from the
29th May to the 15th June 1904, including
the Battle of Te-li-ssu.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff.
Head-Quarters Second Japanese Army, 14th September
1905.

Appendix.

Order of battle of the Second Japanese Army.

Plates.

General map to show advance of Second Army	-	Map 7.
Battle of Te-li-ssu. Position of Second Army on afternoon and night of 14th June 1904	- -	" 8.
Battle of Te-li-ssu, 5.30 a.m. to 6 p.m., 15th June 1904	- -	" 9.
Panorama of Te-li-ssu	- - - -	Panorama 1.

On the 20th May the Fourth Army, under General Baron Nodzu, consisting of the 10th Division, landed at Ta-ku-shan,* and this small force, which was strengthened by a mixed brigade of the Guard Division from the First Army in time to take part with it in the capture of Hsiu-yen, was to be the link between the First Army at Feng-huang-cheng and the Second at Chin-chou, at that time about 240 miles apart by road, or 160 miles as the crow flies.† The general advance to the north, however, which was about to begin, would bring the Second Army to Kai-ping, and the Fourth to Hsiu-yen, when the distance between the former and the First Army, still remaining at Feng-huang-cheng, would be reduced by more than half.

It is evident that the line, on which the greatest opposition to this converging movement towards Liao-yang might be expected, lay along the railway, which was that to be followed by the Second Army, for reconnaissances showed that the Russians were on their way to meet General Oku, and had detailed a force towards Te-li-ssu from those troops, which at this time were assembling at Liao-yang and An-shan-tien. If,

* See Map 1.

† For account of these operations, see Report 12, page 106.

1st June.

then, the northern exits from the defiles leading to the Hsiung-yueh-cheng plain, which stretches from the vicinity of Ta-shih-chiao northward, were to be secured before the Russians could come up in greater strength, no time was to be lost in moving against them, and driving them from such positions as they had already taken up. Under these conditions the Second Army broke camp, and on the 1st June the 4th Division, followed by the Artillery Brigade, marched to Pu-lan-tien (B 6),* which place was reached by nightfall on the 2nd. As the 11th Division had by this time disembarked, it and the 1st were left before Port Arthur, and the 3rd Division, now free to join the northward movement, came up east of Pu-lan-tien and on the right of the 5th Division. Strong defensive works were now constructed by the Second Army in this locality, whose breadth from sea to sea is under twenty miles, and these were completed by the 10th, the easternmost section being held by a naval contingent with six guns.

12th June.

Meantime the Cavalry Brigade had twice measured strength with the Russian mounted troops, on both occasions with success, and had given warning of the continued arrival of troops by rail at Te-li-ssu (C 3), south of which place, near Ssu-chia-tun (B/C 4), was the Russian advanced guard, with detachments thrown forward to Yüan-tai-shan (B 4/5) and Liu-chia-kou (C 4). After carrying out this service the brigade had been withdrawn southward to the left bank of the Ta-sha River (C 6). By the 12th June the supply trains of General Oku's force, which were not on shore at the time of the battle of Nan Shan, had come up, and on the 13th the northward movement was resumed. On that date, marching in three columns—the 3rd Division on the right, the 5th in the centre, and the 4th on the left—and repulsing small hostile forces, the Second Army occupied a line extending from Tai-ping-chuang (C 5) through Kuan-chia-tun (C 5), and La-tzu-shan (B 5) to Wu-chia-tun (B 5) on the Fu-chou road, while Head-Quarters reached Wu-chia-tun (C 6) from Chin-chia-tun (C 7), and issued the following orders at 7 p.m. :—

- (1) The Army will advance to-morrow with the object of repulsing the enemy on the line Ssu-chia-tun (C 4 N.E.), Liu-chia-kou (B 3 south).†
- (2) The 3rd Division (less one regiment) leaving the line Tou-chia-tun (C 4 S.E.)—Yen-chia-tun (C 5 north) at 5 a.m., and keeping to the east of Yen-chia-tun—Chuang-hsiao-fang (C 4)—Ssu-chia-tun (B/C 4), will advance to the line Ssu-chia-tun (C 4 N.E.)—Lung-wang-miao (C 3/4).

* See Map 7.

† Note that there are several villages bearing the same names on Map 7.

- (3) The 1st Artillery Brigade (less one regiment) will be attached to the 3rd Division, and will assemble by 5 a.m. at Kuan-chia-tun (C 5).
- (4) The 5th Division (less two sections of cavalry and one regiment of infantry) will leave the line Ho-chia-tun (C 5)-San-chia-kou (B 5) at 5 a.m., and keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division, will advance to Ssu-chia-tun (B/C 4) and try to occupy a line from Lung-wang-miao (C 3/4) to Liu-chia-kou (B 3 south).
- (5) The 4th Division will move from Wu-chia-tun (B 5) at dawn, and, keeping in the district west of the line of villages Wu-chia-tun, Liu-chia-kou (B 4), and Liu-chia-kou (B 3 south), march to the Fu-chou River (C. 3) Arrived there it will halt and be prepared to operate against the enemy's right flank and rear, keeping a careful look-out to the north.
- (6) One regiment of the Artillery Brigade will leave Kuei-ma-chiao (B 5 S.E.) and join the 4th Division by the Fu-chou road.
- (7) The 6th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion), and the 11th Infantry Regiment and two sections of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, will form the Army reserve, and will assemble by 5.30 a.m. at Liu-chia-tun (B C 5).

The several divisions moved as ordered, the 3rd and 5th keeping touch, while the 4th Division struck north-west in the direction of the Fu-chou River; at 5 a.m., General Oku left his quarters of the previous night and came to Liu-chia-tun (B/C 5), in the neighbourhood of which place the reserve of the Army had assembled. Here he received a report from the G.O.C. the 6th Division, stating that some troops had disembarked at the landing place west of the mouth of the Ta-sha River (D 7), and orders were forthwith sent for them to march without delay to La-tzu-shan (B 5). 13th June.

Meanwhile the 3rd and 5th Divisions had driven back some small parties of the enemy and by noon came in touch with the main body of his advanced guard, in strength about one mixed brigade. This detachment, which was entrenched on rising ground east of the railway* overlooking the valley up which the Japanese were advancing, finding itself opposed to superior forces, retired round the eastern slopes of a range of hills in rear, and two hours later the first gun was fired from the centre of the Russian position at Lung-wang-miao (J/K 3). This led to a heavy artillery fire on both sides, during which the enemy's position from Ta-fang-shen (H 3) to Lung-wang-miao was reconnoitred and his strength ascertained to be under three divisions. At 3 p.m., the cannonade was at its height, the

* See Map 8.

enemy disclosing the position of nearly all his guns, while only those of the 3rd Division* were in action, and the commander of the 5th Division sent a detachment of infantry and artillery† which occupied the hill north-west of Lin-chia-tun (J 4). A little after 4 p.m., the 13th and 15th Regiments of the Artillery Brigade came up and opened fire, but their efforts and those of the infantry achieved no definite result before sunset, when the two divisions held a line running generally from Ssu-chia-chou (K/L 4) through Lin-chia-tun to Wu-chia-tun (G/H 5). During the day Head-Quarters had moved to South Wa-fang-tien (H 7), which was reached at half-past three, and the Cavalry Brigade, on the extreme right, to which was attached a battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain guns, marched from Wang-chia-tun‡ on the left bank of the Ta-sha River through Tsai-men-tien-miao§ to Sha-pao-tzu||. On the other flank the 4th Division had marched at 4.30 a.m. and by noon had assembled on the left bank of the Fu-chou River near Lin-chia-tun (J 4), where, covered by a line of outposts posted on the high ground across the river, it halted for the night. Its cavalry and a detachment of infantry had occupied Fu-chou city¶ during the day, and expelled therefrom a company of Russian infantry which formed the garrison.

Some information had reached General Oku regarding the enemy, and by 11 p.m. it was known that he held a defensive position in the neighbourhood of Te-li-ssu (K 1), and that reinforcements were continually arriving at that place by rail while a somewhat strong force of cavalry in the lower valley of the Fu-chou River gave the Japanese commander some grounds for anxiety in that direction. It was decided, however, to attack upon the morrow, as every hour was adding fresh strength to

* The advanced guard of the 3rd Division consisted of one regiment of infantry and two battalions of artillery under a general officer. The guns were fired on by the enemy before they could take position, and men and horses had to be temporarily withdrawn and put under cover. The divisional commander, being annoyed at this proceeding, sent a general staff officer to make enquiries. He found the officer commanding the batteries in high spirits behind a Chinese house, and was told to report that he had been obliged to put his men under cover to avoid unnecessary loss. Soon after, the rest of the guns of the division and those of the artillery brigade came into action, and the gunners of the two batteries under cover were able to serve their guns. The enemy fired heavily on the temporarily deserted guns, showing up his positions. This incident apparently gave rise to the statement, which has been read, that the Russians captured two Japanese batteries, but lost them again.—A. H.

† The 5th Division is armed with mountain artillery.—A. H.

‡ D 5 on Map 7.

§ D 4 on Map 7.

|| D 4 on Map 7 and south-east corner of Map 8. A distance of 18 to 20 miles. It must be remembered that the Japanese cavalry neither moves fast nor covers great distances, and is rarely seen out of a walk, so that the infantry and mountain artillery were able to keep up with it.—A. H.

¶ A 3 on Map 7.

the force which must be coped with, and at 11 p.m. the following orders were issued :—

- (1) The 5th Division will advance to-morrow before dawn from the neighbourhood of Wu-chia-tun (G/H 5) and attack the enemy at Ta-fang-shen (H 3), but will delay its further movement up the Fu-chou valley.*
- (2) The 3rd Division, keeping touch with the 5th Division, will advance so soon as the latter has begun its attack.

To the Commander of the 4th Division the following order was despatched† :—

“As no danger is to be anticipated from the direction of the valley of the Fu-chou River, you will detach a force of at least one brigade of infantry to-morrow, which will attack the enemy's right flank and help the advance of the other divisions.”

Advancing northwards from the bivouac of the Second Army and following the road which skirts the railway and the Hou-tou River (H 7), a line of hills, or, as it might be termed, a barrier range from 600 to 1,000 feet in height, blocks the view. Beyond it, and about two thousand yards north of the crest line, lies the ground selected by the Russian general for a trial of strength with the victorious Second Army.‡ This range of hills stands like a screen before the position, almost entirely hiding movements made behind it. Two peaks rise from it, steep and bare, and between them is a gap—that through which the railway, road, and river pass; its breadth at both its exits is half a mile, its length the same, and its width in the centre about a quarter of a mile. The hills on either side are inaccessible for field artillery. To the west and at the extremity of the range is another gap of greater width, through which the Fu-chou River takes its course. Directly fronting the former of these gaps—the railway gap—and 2,000 yards from its central point is a long spur called Lung-wang-miao, which juts out westward towards the river, and in front of it are villages among trees. On this spur—the Russian main gun position—were twenty gun pits, and below them infantry trenches. Looking north-eastward from the hill east of the railway gap, which is itself an outlying feature of the main range, the position followed in a curve a line of more or less commanding points to Fei-chia-tun (M 3). Along this front trenches were prepared for infantry, and pits for eight more

* The 5th Division was apparently to await the arrival of the 4th Division.—A. H.

† The 4th Division was at this time about 13 miles distant from Army Head-Quarters, and the order was sent off at 11 p.m. General Oku was anxious that it should not fail to be delivered, and therefore directed two officers of the Adjutant Staff to carry it, proceeding by different roads. It reached its destination at 5 a.m. 15th June.—A.H.

‡ See Panorama I.

guns, some of the former facing east and north to guard against a flank attack. After passing through the railway gap and turning to the north-west, it is seen that the valley through which the Fu-chou River flows is flat, open, and heavily cultivated. For about two miles north it continues so, but gradually narrows towards the little village of Te-li-ssu which gave its name to the battle. A short distance north of the point where the river disappears into the western gap is the village of Ta-fang-shen (H 3), situated at the southern extremity of a lofty feature thrust out from the range which flanks the valley on the western side. This village and the hill above were held by the Russians, but the main position of their right was one and a half miles further back, across the range, and followed a well-marked feature. Here were placed twenty gun pits, while infantry, separated from them by a deep ravine, held a somewhat similar line in front; and in the valley, between the right and the artillery on Lung-wang-miao, were pits for twenty guns and more infantry entrenchments.

From right to left the position measured about eight and a half miles, and was held by two and a half divisions, whose reserve was posted in a thick wood some two thousand yards behind the centre.

The plan of the Japanese commander was to assail the Russians with the 3rd Division, which was to operate against their left and left centre, and, with the 5th Division and part of the 4th, turn their right, while the Cavalry Brigade was to sweep round by the east and cut the line of retreat.

*1st Period, Artillery Combat.**

15th June.

The morning of the 15th June was ushered in by a heavy fog, obscuring movement and allowing the Japanese infantry, which had begun to move shortly after midnight, to approach close to the Russian position. At 5.25 a.m. the weather cleared, and the 3rd Artillery Regiment at Wang-chia-tun (H 7) opened fire, to which the Russian guns replied. The 13th Artillery Regiment took position on the left of the 3rd, directing its efforts against Lu-chia-kou (F 5) and Lung-wang-miao (H 5), and the 15th, posted further to the south, fired on the latter place and To-fang-shen (F/G 5). At this time the infantry of the 3rd Division were occupying a line from Ching-chia-hsin-nan-tun (L 6) through Ssu-chia-chou (J/K 6) to Chang-tien Shan (J 6), waiting until the bombardment on their left had taken effect, and while in this state of inaction the enemy's line before them increased, and a series of attacks was begun against their right flank. So determined was the Russian attitude that General Oshima's troops were forced to remain in the rough shelter trenches which had been thrown up since midnight on the rocky ground they held.

* See Map 9.

By 7 a.m. the 5th Division, whose guns had crossed to the right bank of the Fu-chou River, occupied a line from Yang-chia-tun (E/F 5) to Wang-chia-tun (E 4), driving in the enemy's outposts, which retired, some north-westward and others towards the north.

2nd Period.

At this time the commander of the 5th Division was ignorant of the exact position held in front of his men, but as the firing in the direction of the 3rd Division was intense and its position reported to be dangerous, he resolved to press forward and assail the enemy's right flank. Prolonging his line well to the west, the hill north of Lu-chia-kou (F 5) was taken at 9.20 a.m., and the ground east of it attacked, and, about 10 a.m., the enemy was forced to relinquish Ta-fang-shen (G 5) and the height commanding it. The guns of the division, following behind the advancing troops, came into action on the height just taken and engaged the enemy's artillery at Lung-wang-miao (H 5) and on the high ground west of Li-chia-tun (J 3), which was delaying the forward movement of the infantry. The 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments soon came up in support of the mountain guns and took position east and south-west of Wang-chia-tun (G 6), and their combined efforts caused the fire of the guns on Lung-wang-miao to slacken. The Russians were now seen to be holding a position on the high ground which curves south-eastward from Tung-lung-kou (G 4) to the river, and by noon the 5th Division held a line parallel to and distant from them about one thousand yards, whence it was observed that more troops were coming up to join others already in position on the high ground west of Li-chia-tun (J 3). By this time the 4th Division had come up on the left, for the order sent to its commander on the previous night had reached him at Hsiao Ssu-chia-tun (A 7) at 5 a.m., in sufficient time to allow of its materially helping in the battle. At 6 a.m. a squadron of cavalry, a company of engineers, a battalion of artillery, and the 19th Infantry Brigade, the whole under Major-General Ando, left Pan-chia-tun (B 5), and, after a stiff march through a hilly region, arrived at Yang-chia-tun (E 5) at 9 a.m. Here they came into communication with the left of the 5th Division, and half-an-hour later reached the heights south-west of Ma-chia-fang-hsin (F/G 4), at a time when the Russians opposite that division at Sung-chia-tun (G 4) were beginning to fall back. As no precautions appeared to have been taken by the enemy to meet an attack upon his extreme right, General Ando despatched a portion of his force, with orders to move as quickly as possible, to the high ground north-east of Ma-chia-fang-hsin, and with the remainder opened fire on the position in front of him. The Russians were still holding the ground east and south of Tung-lung-kou (G 4), but by 11.20 a.m. they were forced back, and the hill on the east of

that place secured. This success greatly facilitated the movements of the 5th Division, which was enabled shortly after noon to capture the ground south-east of Tung-lung-kou.

While everything was giving way before the Japanese attack west of the railway, the condition of the 3rd Division, east of it, had not improved. The ground held by its right was only maintained with difficulty in face of a series of fierce counter-attacks, which were focussed on and around the village of Ssu-chia-chou (J/K 6). Again and again the Russians flung themselves against their obstinate opponents with the utmost intrepidity, and, at one point, the hostile lines approached so close to one another that, when ammunition gave out, stones were freely thrown by both sides.* Report after report reached General Oshima, announcing the critical condition of his troops, who, from the nature of the ground, could only be supported by a totally inadequate force of artillery. Every battalion, except the single one held in reserve, being hotly engaged, reinforcements were asked for from Head-Quarters, and at 11 a.m. General Oku—who was posted on the "hill north of Ssu-chia-chou" (H 8)—despatched one battalion, the half of all that now remained with him. On the left of the 3rd Division, owing to the rain of shrapnel and hail from small arms and machine guns poured from front and flank, attempts to force the railway gap and come to close quarters with the strongly posted enemy failed, but the fire of the 5th Division guns on Lung-wang-miao had allowed those of the 3rd Artillery Regiment to push somewhat to the front at 10 a.m.

On the right of the 3rd Division, the Cavalry Brigade, which marched northward at an early hour, hearing the sound of guns reverberating on its left, dismounted and prepared to join in the attack. Part moved north-west, thereby to help the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, which was at Ching-chia-hsiao-tun L (6), and the remainder turned against Fei-chia-tun (M 4). The brigade, however, was greatly retarded by the enemy's field gun fire, and for a time its situation caused its commander, Major-General Akiyama, some anxiety.

3rd Period.

On the Russian right, after the troops of the 4th Division began to make their presence felt, the situation rapidly developed. From noon onwards the resistance grew feebler,

* The general who commanded the troops at this point relates how a Russian second lieutenant entered the Japanese line of entrenchments and engaged with his sword a Japanese officer of similar rank. The latter killed him. A warrant officer, leading a party of about a dozen Russians, found on reaching the Japanese line that he was alone, his men not having followed him. He thereupon sat down and was shot dead with a smile on his face. The general ordered a special grave to be made to commemorate his gallantry.—A. H.

and a little later a general retreat began. The reserve, too, posted behind the centre, possibly apprehending that the successful advance of the 5th Division would endanger its line of retreat, had fallen back, and the last chance of saving the day disappeared. The 3rd Division, reinforced by the remaining battalion* of the Army reserve, pressed forward, and its artillery passing through the railway gap—no longer swept by projectiles—took position on Lung-wang-miao, where eight guns were captured, and thence raked the valley to the north. Further to the right, the Cavalry Brigade, whose timely arrival had greatly helped General Oshima's beleaguered troops, occupied Fei-chia-tun (M 4) at half-past three. A heavy fire was poured upon the retiring Russians, who soon fell into great disorder, but only two squadrons were sent in pursuit, for the ground near and beyond Te-li-ssu is of a nature unsuited to the action of mounted troops.

During the retreat, the Russians, crowded into a narrow defile, lost heavily from artillery fire, and their casualties were augmented by a disaster that befell a detachment of some eight or nine hundred cavalry. This force had fallen back early in the action, and, being ambushed by two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment and a battery from the main body of the 4th Division, was practically annihilated near Chiaochia-tun,† a village lying west by north of Te-li-ssu. The troops who carried out this successful minor operation had been despatched by the commander of the division at 10.50 a.m., on receipt of news that the enemy's mounted troops were falling back from Ma-chia-fang-hsin (F/G 4) through Tung-lung-kou to the north. The remainder of that division pursued its way to Sung-chia-tun (D 2), where it served to protect the extreme left of the Second Army, and thence reached Liuchia-kou (C/D 1) at 2 p.m., where a halt was called for the night.

When the victory was won, and the Russians were in full retreat, fortune favoured them by sending a blinding storm of rain, which effectually prevented the Japanese artillerymen from laying their guns, and probably helped to diminish the casualties.

On the night of the 15th the Japanese halted on the ground captured during the day, the 3rd Division in Lao-hsiao-kou (J 5), the 5th on the high ground west of Li-chia-tien (H/J 4), and the mixed brigade of the 4th Division north and west of Te-li-ssu.

No accurate figures are available to show either the fighting strength of the Russians engaged in this battle or the casualties sustained by them, but it seems probable that the

* This battalion was replaced by the 1/23rd of the 6th Division which came up a little after 2 p.m.—A. H.

† Not marked on Map 9, but the position of the cavalry is shown on square F 2.

latter amounted to at least 10,000 all ranks. This estimate is based upon the following data:—

Russian Losses.

Prisoners.		Dead buried by the Japanese.
Officers.	Rank and File.	
8	402	1,900

The following war material was taken by the victors:—

Rifles.	Guns.	Ammunition Wagons.	Rifle Ammunition.	Gun Ammunition.
958*	16	46	Rounds. 37,233	Rounds. 1,121

* More rifles were found later.—A. H.

And, in addition, large quantities of tents, provisions, tools, and clothing.

Japanese Casualties.

		Officers.		Rank and File.		Horses.	
		Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
3rd Division:—							
Cavalry	-	—	—	2	8	1	—
Artillery	-	—	2	4	30	20	35
Infantry	-	2	11	77	307	—	3
Engineers	-	—	—	2	8	—	—
4th Division:—							
Cavalry	-	—	—	—	—	4	2
Artillery	-	—	—	—	1	—	—
Infantry	-	1	14	73	266	—	—
Engineers	-	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Division:—							
Cavalry	-	—	—	—	1	—	—
Artillery	-	—	—	15	1	—	—
Infantry	-	4	10	36	219	—	—
Engineers	-	—	—	1	1	—	—
Cavalry Brigade	-	—	—	—	2	—	4
Artillery Brigade	-	—	6	—	59	1	24
Other units†	-	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	-	7	43	210	903	26	68

† Telegraph Corps, Bearer Corps, &c.—A. H.

Grand total, all ranks, killed and wounded, 1,163.

Comments.

The Russian general at Te-li-ssu had under his command troops who had not been previously engaged, and whose numbers were not greatly exceeded by those of the Japanese, although the guns of the latter outnumbered those of the former in the proportion of three to two, yet he sustained a severe defeat which, but for the heavy rain and the inability of his adversary to pursue, might not improbably have terminated in a rout. It has been said in explanation of the Russian defeat that the commander, General Stakelberg, himself intended to assume the offensive on the 15th, and throw his left against the Japanese right, but that their early attack, hidden by the fog, forestalled him, and he was forced to hold ground ill-adapted for defence. It is true that this contention is in some degree borne out by the character of the works on the position, which resemble those hastily thrown up rather than such as the Russians generally construct when a pitched battle is expected, but their somewhat inferior strength in men and guns induces the belief that they hoped to retard the Japanese advance by defensive action until more troops from the north had arrived. Be that as it may, there were several causes which contributed to the defeat, all of which deserve consideration. Putting aside the question of the quality of the troops, these causes resolve themselves into the position itself, the works constructed upon it, and the disposition of the troops allotted to its defence.

First, as regards the position, it was in several respects faulty. The screen of hills before it hid the movements of the attackers, and permitted them to dispose of the greater portion of their force in operations against the flanks. Should the high ground, which overlooks the village of Ta-fang-shen, fall into hostile hands, mountain guns—with which the Japanese division on that side was armed—placed there could enfilade the Russian main gun position on Lung-wang-miao. This weakness of the western flank was to some extent compensated for by the strength of the position east of Lung-wang-miao, which, from its comparative immunity from artillery fire, required fewer troops for its protection. The centre in the valley of the Fu-chou River, whilst strong against frontal attack, for the ground was level, open, and in places swampy, was overlooked by the hills on both flanks, and therefore at the mercy of an assailant, who should win success on either side. The line of retreat, which ran through a narrow defile, foreboded disaster, and this was escaped solely through the fortuitous circumstances already mentioned.

Next, as regards the field works, they were, as at Nan Shan, clearly visible to the naked eye at a distance of several thousand yards, and were unstrengthened by any form of obstacle.

Lastly, the posting of the reserve in one body behind the centre, unless it was intended with its assistance to overwhelm the Japanese left, was a serious error. Placed on the right flank, at least in part, it might have saved defeat, but where it actually stood it was far from the spot where its presence would have proved of value, and at the critical moment it retired.

As at Nan Shan, General Oku attacked on three sides, and the success won on the Russian right gave him the day. The determined opposition met by the 3rd Division east of the railway precluded anything beyond a holding attack on that side, but the support which he thought fit to give to General Oshima, even to the extent of sending forward the last battalion of the reserve, may have induced the Russian commander to retain his own reserve at a spot where their presence had no effect upon the issue of the day.

APPENDIX.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU.

Commanding—General Baron Oku.
Chief of Staff—Major-General Uchiai.

3rd Division—Lieut.-General Oshima :—

5th Brigade, Major-General Yamaguchi	{	6th Infantry Regt. (I. and III. Battalions).
		33rd Infantry Regiment.
17th Brigade, Major-General Kodama.	{	18th " "
		34th " "
3rd Cavalry Regiment.		
3rd Artillery "		
3rd Engineer Battalion.		

4th* Division—Lieut.-General Ogawa :—

7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.	{	8th Infantry Regiment
		37th " "
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.	{	9th " "
		38th " "
4th Cavalry Regiment.		
4th Artillery "		
4th Engineer Battalion.		

* Of this Division the 19th Brigade, one battalion of artillery, and one company of engineers took part in the battle, and two companies 8th Infantry Regiment and a battery also assisted. The remainder of the division marched north on the Fu-chou road.—A. H.

5th Division—Lieut.-General Kigoshi :—

9th Brigade, Major-General	{	11th Infantry Regiment.	
Surizawa.		41st	„
21st Brigade Major-General	{	21st	„
Murayama.		42nd	„

5th Cavalry Regiment.
 5th Artillery „ (Mountain Guns).
 5th Engineer Battalion.

Cavalry Brigade—Major-General Akiyama :—

13th Cavalry Regiment.
 14th „ „
 1 Mountain Battery, 5th Division.
 11th Company 6th Infantry Regiment of 3rd Division.

Artillery Brigade—Major-General Osako :—

13th Regiment.
 14th* „
 15th „

A battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division came up in the afternoon, but was not engaged.

The losses incurred by the 3rd and 4th Divisions at the battle of Nan Shan were mostly replaced by drafts from Japan before the battle of Te-li-ssu.

* The 14th Regiment was attached to the 4th Division, and did not take any active part in the battle.—A. H.

**(11) Second Japanese Army.—Operations from the
16th June to the 3rd August 1904, including
the Battle of Ta-shih-chiao.**

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff.
Tokio, 22nd October 1905.

Appendices.

1. Order of battle of the Second Japanese Army.
2. Casualties of the Second Japanese Army at the battle of Ta-shih-chiao.

Plate.

Battle of Ta-shih-chiao - - - Map 10

After the victory of Te-li-ssu, which secured to the Japanese the defiles debouching on to the plain of Hsiung-yueh-cheng, the Second Army halted for four days. On the 20th June, the advance was resumed in the direction of Kai-ping,* or, as it is called, Kai Chou, a walled city which stands on the right bank of the Kai Chou River, and is dominated by a semi-circle of hills on its northern side that rise at a short distance from the walls. As the Japanese advanced the Russians fell back towards Kai-ping, and on the 7th July their rear guard was driven from the hills of Sha-ho-tai.† A reconnaissance now revealed their position, which covered a front of almost seven miles, the right wing being placed at Hai-shan-chai,‡ while the left stood as far north-east as the heights of Shih-tai.§ It was observed that, for a distance of several miles south of the hills overlooking the city, the ground was level, and that, in advancing to the attack, the Second Army would be much exposed to the fire of the defenders' artillery.

On the 8th, the Second Army arrived in the vicinity of Kai-ping, and traversing the level ground, under cover of night, approached the Russian position.

At daybreak on the 9th, an enveloping attack was delivered, and by 7.30 a.m. the enemy had vacated his first line and was falling back towards Ta-shih-chiao, uncovering by this movement the roads which connect Hsiu-yen* with Kai-ping, and

* See Map 1.

† 3 miles north-west of Kai-ping.

‡ 1 mile south of Kai-ping.

§ 6 miles north-east of Kai-ping.

thus opening up direct communication between the Fourth and Second Japanese Armies. The Japanese advanced guard followed closely, and by noon had established itself on the highest point of the hills where they are about two and a half miles north of the city walls. The action this day was of brief duration, and the losses on both sides were inconsiderable, for the Russian rear guard, consisting of a single division, did not offer serious resistance, but withdrew as soon as the strength of the opposing army was disclosed.

The casualties in the Second Army from the 6th to the 9th July were as follows:—

		Killed.	Wounded.
Officers	- -	0	5
Others	- -	24	124
Total	- -	24	129

From the 10th to the 22nd July the Second Army remained **10th July.** in the vicinity of Kai-ping, holding a line from the north of that place to the south of Fu-chia-tun* and exchanging fire with the enemy's cavalry, horse artillery, and infantry who appeared before the outposts day after day. Here the news of the Russian attack on the Mo-tien Ling on the 17th July, and its repulse **17th July.** by the First Army† was received, and information was obtained that the enemy, whose force opposing the Second Army was now increased to some four divisions, was in position near Ta-shih-chiao,‡ holding a strongly entrenched line of defence extending from Ta-ping Ling (J/K 7) to Niu-hsin Shan (E 6), where he intended to offer resistance to General Oku's continued movement towards the north.

At 11 a.m., on the 20th July, preparations for advance **20th July.** being ready, that commander issued orders to attack the Russian advanced position, which extended from Tang-chih (L 8) through Hua-lin Shan (G/H 10), Wu-tai Shan (E/F 10) to Huang-lu-tsu (C 9/10). These were as follows:—

- (1) The Army will advance on the 22nd with the object of attacking the enemy on the line from Liu-chiao-tien (L/M 10) to Wu-tai Shan (E/F 10).
- (2) The 3rd Division (less 2 squadrons and 1 infantry regiment) will advance from Kuan-li-pu§ at 4 a.m. The area in which it will march is bounded on the east by a line drawn from Hu-chia-tun|| to Hsi-kuei-wo-tzu (J 10), and on the west from Chou-chia-tun¶ to Hsin-shou-tun (F/G 10). When this division

* 18 miles north-east of Kai-ping.

† See page 147.

‡ See Map 10.

§ 12 miles south of G on southern edge of Map 10.

|| Below J on southern edge of Map 10.

¶ Below F on southern edge of Map 10.

advances it will leave a force at Kuan-li-pu to cover the advance of the 6th Division. The 13th Regiment of Artillery will be attached to the 3rd Division.

- (3) The 5th Division will advance over the area east of the eastern limit of the 3rd Division, keeping touch with it, and will take up a position from Hsi-kuei-wo-tzu (J 10) to the hill east of Liu-chiao-tien (M 10). Before advancing it will leave a force on the hill north of Kuan-li-pu to cover the advance of the 3rd Division.*
- (4) The 6th Division (less 2 squadrons of cavalry and 1 regiment of infantry) will advance at 4 a.m. from Kuan-li-pu over the area west of the western boundary of the 3rd Division, bounded on the west by a line drawn from Shih-men† to Hsi-shan-kang-tzu (F 10). After driving back any enemy that may be met, it will assist in clearing the front of the 4th Division, and, in connection with the 3rd Division, will hold from the left wing of the latter to Hsi-shan-kang-tzu (F 10). Both boundaries through which this division advances will be inclusive.
- (5) The 4th Division (less 2 sections of cavalry, 1 battery of artillery, and 1 battalion of infantry) will leave the vicinity of Shih-men† and advance on the line of the 6th Division to a position west of Chou-chia-tun (E 10). A detachment, consisting of a few cavalry and engineers, a battery of artillery, and a battalion of infantry, will occupy Hai-shan-chai,‡ in order to guard the left flank and rear of the Army.

The 14th Artillery Regiment will be attached to the 4th Division.

- (6) The 1st Cavalry Brigade will watch the left flank of the Army, and reconnoitre the enemy's right and rear. The 3rd and 6th Regiments (less 1 squadron each) will be attached to this brigade.
- (7) The head-quarters of the 1st Artillery Brigade and the 15th Artillery Regiment will advance in rear of the 6th Division to Wu-tien.§
- (8) The reserve of the Army will consist of 1 regiment of infantry from the 3rd and 1 from the 6th Division, and will assemble at the north of Wu-tien§ by 8 a.m.
- (9) Army Head-Quarters will leave Ku-chia-tzu and proceed to Chou-chia-tun (E 10) *via* Pa-ling.

Although the instructions quoted above directed the advance to be resumed at an early hour on the 22nd, a heavy fall of rain on the afternoon of the 20th so saturated the ground

* The hour of march of this division is not mentioned in the orders received.—A. H.

† Below F on southern edge of Map 10.

‡ 3 miles north-west of Kai-ping.

§ Near F on southern edge of Map 10.

as to make the roads impassable for artillery, and necessitated a postponement of the march until the 23rd. On that date each division moved off from the neighbourhood of Kai-ping towards its right front, and halted for the night on the line from Liu-chiao-tien (M 10) to Chou-chia-tun (E 10), while the cavalry brigade, which had gone to Huang-lu-tsui (C 9/10), withdrew after dark to the south-west, and the mixed detachment of the 4th Division sent to Hai-shan-chai* remained at that place. **23rd July.**

The advance, satisfactorily carried out, had not been unopposed, and it had proved necessary to bring guns into action in order to repel hostile troops in some strength, whose artillery, confronting the 3rd and 6th Divisions, delayed their march. In other quarters of the field resistance had been slight. At 10 a.m., Army Head-Quarters reached Kan-chia-tun, when staff officers, who were sent forward to reconnoitre, reported that the enemy was assembling at Ta-shih-chiao, and was in position from the hill north of Ta-ping Ling (J/K 7), through Ching-shih Shan (G 6), Wang-ma-tai (F 7) to Niu-hsin Shan (E 6). The front held from east to west extended for about ten miles, and, on the several hills that marked it, redoubts for infantry had been constructed, and the intervening spaces prepared for defence by rifle and artillery fire. The approaches to the entrenchments were protected by wire entanglement, abattis and mines, and signs were not wanting that far greater care and more labour had been expended upon the defences of this position than upon those from which the Russians had been driven at Te-li-ssu. Although the infantry trenches at Ta-shih-chiao suffered from the defect, to which attention has already been drawn, that they were plainly visible to the naked eye at some distance, the sites of the gun positions, on the contrary were so artfully concealed as to defy detection on the part of the Japanese artillerymen. The lessons of Nan Shan and Te-li-ssu had not been lost upon the Russians, although it is but fair to add that both of these positions, with their high command and steep slopes, were not naturally adapted for the concealment of a considerable artillery force.

While the Second Army was moving up against this position on the 23rd, the Fourth Army, to the east, whose presence indirectly had a considerable influence on the coming action, was preparing to cross the Fen-shui Ling for the attack on Hsi-mu-cheng.† **23rd July.**

From Kan-chia-tun, General Oku issued the following orders for the advance on the 24th :—

- (1) The Army will attack the enemy to-morrow on the high ground immediately to the west of Ta-ping Ling (J K 7).
- (2) The 3rd Division (less 2 squadrons with the cavalry brigade, and 1 infantry regiment in the general reserve) will leave its position between Hsi-kuei-wo-tzu (J 10)

* 3 miles north-west of Kai-ping.

† About 25 miles N.E. by E. of Ta-shih-chiao.

and Hua-lin Shan (G/H 10) and attack the enemy's defences on a front 2,000 yards west of Ta-ping Ling to the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou (H/J 7).

- (3) The 5th Division will leave its quarters at 4 a.m., and, keeping communication with the right wing of the 3rd, attack the enemy at Ta-ping Ling. It will watch the right flank of the Army, more especially towards Chien-tzu-lao-kou (L 5).
- (4) The 6th Division (less 2 squadrons with the cavalry brigade, and 1 infantry regiment in the general reserve) will march from Li-chia-tun (F/G 9) at 4 a.m., and keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division, will attack the enemy on the hill north-east of Kan-chia-tun (G 8). This division will take particular care to protect the front of its left wing.
- (5) The 1st Artillery Brigade (less the 14th Regiment attached to the 4th Division) will take up a position near Hua-lin Shan (G/H 10) at 4 a.m., and open fire at daybreak against the hill west of Ta-ping Ling, and Wang-ma-tai (F 7).
- (6) The 4th Division will take up a position near Wu-tai Shan (E/F 10) and hold it in strength as a protection for the left flank of the Army. No advance will be made therefrom until it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding. To this division the 14th Artillery Regiment is attached.
- (7) The 1st Cavalry Brigade will cover the left flank of the Army beyond the 4th Division.
- (8) The general reserve—18th and 23rd Infantry Regiments—will be at Tu-lao-po-tien (G/H 10) by 4 a.m.
- (9) Army Head-Quarters will leave its present quarters at 2.30 a.m., and proceed to the hill 2,700 yards north-east of Tu-lao-po-tien.

When the divisions left the vicinity of Kai-ping on the 23rd July and marched towards their right front the movement must have been plainly visible from the commanding ground held by the enemy. On both sides of the main road, north of Kai-ping, and stretching far to the west, is an extensive plain with villages scattered over it and almost entirely covered with *kaoliang*, which, at the time of the battle, had attained to a height of about six feet; but neither that nor the undulating nature of the ground, in places, was sufficient to conceal the Japanese advance. Some difficulty was experienced by the troops whose march took them between the valley of the Tung-ta River (M 6) and Hua-lin Shan (G/H 10), for here is a succession of hills extending up to the enemy's position, and no cover was available in the intervening spaces. Moreover, his left wing was thrown back and heavily entrenched, while the recent rains had converted the ground on either side of the

river into a sea of mud. West of Hua-lin Shan this country is flat, and affords no good artillery position except at distant ranges.

The last battle, fought independently by the Second Army, **24th July.** began by a general advance of the 5th, 3rd, and 6th Divisions at dawn on the 24th, the brunt of the fighting falling upon the two former, while the share of the 4th Division on this date was limited to purely defensive action.

5th Division.

The 5th Division, in close touch with the 3rd, occupied, between 7 and 8 a.m., a line extending towards the south-east from a hill marked 180 (J 7/8), whereon, as soon as it arrived the Russian concealed batteries on Ta-ping Ling, Pin-han-kou (H/J 7), and Cheng-chia-tun (H 6), opened a hail of projectiles which its own mountain guns, being outranged, were powerless to resist. To advance without artillery support against the strong position at its front foreboded nothing but disaster, so the infantry was ordered to take cover on the reverse slopes of the hill and there await events. At 2 p.m. the Army Commander sent word that the attack must no longer be delayed for want of artillery preparation, and the 3rd Division, which had meantime come up on the left of the 5th, was directed to co-operate. The artillery of that division came into action at 3.30 p.m., from positions in rear of the infantry line, and in conjunction with the guns of the 5th Division opened fire on the enemy. The infantry had now begun to advance, but the support derived from its artillery was inconsiderable, and of no material assistance. The supports of the 5th Division were sent up to join the first line, and the troops strove to get forward under a heavy fire of guns from Ta-ping Ling and from the east of Ching-shih Shan (G 6), while as they approached the hostile trenches a withering rifle fire met them, which first checked the attack and then brought it to a standstill. The infantry now ceased its efforts to close with the enemy, but the guns on both sides kept up a fierce duel until sunset.

3rd Division.

The 3rd Division, which had co-operated in this fruitless attack, had marched from its quarters at 5 a.m., and by 9 a.m., covered by its guns, drove back several small bodies of the enemy from the hill south-east of Sung-chia-tun (H 8), and took position on the left of the 5th Division. Here it came under a heavy artillery fire from the hill east of Pin-han-kou and from the north of the same village, which its own field guns failed entirely to overcome. An attack, ordered to take place at noon, failed, but at 4 p.m. fresh troops were added to the firing line, and the impetus given by their arrival sent the whole forward to some commanding ground further north. One of the foremost battalions boldly attempted to take the hill north

of Sung-chia-tun, but the enemy, bringing up reinforcements, charged from the north-east and drove it off the ridge. Here for a time it remained, separated from the Russians only by a score of yards, but at length it was forced to seek refuge in the valley beneath, whence after sunset it and the remainder of the division were withdrawn somewhat towards the south.

6th Division.

At 5 a.m., the 6th Division, on the left of the 3rd, came up to the line stretching from Hun-chia-tun (F 9) eastwards, while its artillery, from positions near Hun-chia-tun, fired upon the Russian line on the hill north of Sung-chia-tun, that south of Ching-shih Shan and that east of Yuan-an-tun (F 6/7). On the right of the guns of this division the 15th and 13th Artillery Regiments came up on to the hill north of Ma-chia-tun (G 9) and gradually advanced in support of the infantry of the 4th and 6th Divisions, being opposed by guns on the hill north of Wang-ma-tai (F 7) and at Pei-wang-chia (G 7). At 9 a.m. the infantry again moved forward, and about 10.30 a.m. occupied a line passing over the hills north-east of Kan-chia-tun, beyond which place no advance could be made, for though the mass of the artillery of the Second Army pounded the enemy at this point all day, night fell before they had produced any perceptible effect.

4th Division.

The 4th Division, in accordance with its orders, took up position from Chou-chia-tun (E 10) eastward across the main road as soon as it was seen that the infantry of the 6th Division had arrived at Kan-chia-tun, while its artillery advanced to Pao-lo-pu (F 8/9) and to the north of Ta-ping-chuang (E 9), where the Russian guns before them were engaged. Beyond this position the 4th Division did not go, for the attacks of the troops further east were not progressing and the sun set while it still awaited events.

At 8 p.m. General Oku sent the 23rd Regiment of the reserve to the 6th Division, ordering it to take position between that division and the 4th so as to give additional strength to the latter's right, for information had come in that a strong force of the enemy had assembled before sunset near Chiao-tai-pu (F 6) and Tien-chia-tun (E/F 6), and an attack upon the left of the Second Army seemed probable.

The Japanese cavalry had throughout the day effected little, merely watching the left from Huang-lu-tsui (C 9), and driving back the enemy's mounted troops near Li-chia-wo-peng (C 8) by shell fire at 1 p.m. This day the attack of the Second Army, backed by the fire of 252 guns, had failed to make any impression on the Russians, whose artillery at the highest estimate counted less than half that number of pieces. The infantry had tried to gain a footing on the enemy's position but in vain, for the Russian guns were well-placed and hidden from view, while

those brought against them were either forced to expose themselves or occupy inferior positions. When sun set the unequal duel of artillery, that had endured for over fifteen hours, ceased, except for a few of the enemy's batteries that maintained a desultory fire till 9 p.m.

The ineffectual combat of this day was not, however, to terminate in so inconclusive a manner, for the commander of the 5th Division, dissatisfied with the part which his troops had taken, and rightly judging that their strenuous though fruitless efforts to capture Ta-ping Ling had by no means quenched their ardour, applied to the commander of the Army for leave to attack the position by night, and requested that the co-operation of the 3rd Division might be given. So enterprising and gallant a request met with General Oku's approval, and the commander of the division was informed that although the whole 3rd Division could not be spared, that portion which was not required to guard the ground it held should be sent to join in the assault.

Orders were next issued by General Oku for the following day to the effect that the attack would be resumed at 4 a.m., but that the 4th and 6th Divisions must await the result of their own artillery fire before advancing. These orders were, however, never put into action, for at 10 p.m., as soon as the moon rose, the infantry of the 5th Division—without the assistance of the 3rd, which was withdrawn at the last moment—silently stealing down the hillside and crossing over the valley that lay between it and the goal, mounted the slopes upon the further side and rushing forward delivered an assault from three points upon the hill west of Ta-ping Ling. Under a heavy fire the works of the first line were captured, but those of the second and third lines fell by 3 a.m. with little opposition. The men of the 3rd Division joining in the attack in the early morning captured Pin-han-kou (H/J 7), and with little trouble took possession of the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou (H/J 7), securing the ground which had defied all efforts on the previous day. There they assembled, and at noon advanced and occupied a position east and west of Pa-chia-tzu (H 6).

25th July.

The artillery of the 6th Division had opened fire at 6.40 a.m., and as no reply came from the enemy's side some infantry occupied the hill north of Pei-wang-chia (G 7) while another force went further, and by 3 p.m. held the ground north-east of Pai-hou Shan (F 6).

The advance of the 6th Division was followed by that of the 4th at 8 a.m., and at 1 p.m. it held the line from Pai-hou Shan to Niu-hsin Shan (E 6).

The enemy, who had begun to retire on the night of the 24th, and whose reserves had passed through Ta-shih-chiao shortly after 11 a.m., was now in full retreat, and when the 6th and 4th Divisions arrived at that place at 1.20 and 2 p.m. respectively, they found that the stores that had been collected

there were on fire and that the main body was far beyond their reach. No pursuit was therefore made further than a line some four miles north of Ta-shih-chiao, the cavalry of the Army being still on the left flank at Ta-ping Shan (B 6), which it occupied at 1 p.m., and whence a detachment was sent at once to Ying-kou.*

A strong outpost line was taken up for the night by the Second Army, and General Oku moved his head-quarters to Chiao-tai-pu (E/F 6).

The strength of the opposing forces in this action was as follows:—

Japanese Force.

—	Men.	Guns.
4 divisions (3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th) - - -	54,400	144
1st Artillery Brigade - - -	2,460	108
1st Cavalry Brigade - - -	1,400	—
Total - - -	58,260	252

Russian Force.

1st Division, East Siberian Rifles.

2nd " " "

9th " " "

35th Infantry Division.

About 55,000 men and 120 guns.

The Russians are said to have been commanded in person by General Kuropatkin, and their losses are estimated to have numbered 2,000 killed and wounded. Those of the Japanese were as follows:—

—	Officers.		Others.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
*3rd Division - - -	4	16	69	290
4th " - - -	—	15	17	143
5th " - - -	4	12	62	389
6th " - - -	2	2	9	60
1st Artillery Brigade - -	—	11	12	72
Total - - -	10	56	169	954

* See Appendix 2.

The Russian position at Ta-shih-chiao was admirably adapted for a force inferior to its adversary in artillery, for the guns with their longer range were able, by utilizing indirect fire, not only to engage the greatly superior strength of the Japanese in that arm, but could with impunity direct their fire

* On Map 1.

exclusively against the infantry whenever it attempted to press forward to attack. Although the Russian line of communication and retreat was situated behind their right flank, no attempt was made to turn the position on that side, the efforts of the Second Army being mainly directed against Ta-ping Ling, while the left was entrusted with the duty of covering the road leading to Kai-ping. Such an operation, however, visible as it would have been to the Russians, owing to the nature of the ground, may have been deemed hazardous, for while containing the 3rd and 5th Divisions opposite Ta-ping Ling they could have strengthened their right and not only prevented its accomplishment but in turn have jeopardized the Japanese communications. Forcing a strongly posted enemy in front is generally a costly operation, but the commander of the Second Army, trusting in the valour of his unconquerable troops, preferred to take that course rather than adopt devious and more doubtful methods.

From the 25th to the 31st July the Second Army halted at Ta-shih-chiao, between which place and Hai-cheng detachments of the enemy still lingered. Ying-kou had been occupied by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and troops sent to replace it arrived there on the 26th July. On the day previous the Russian garrison, consisting of 500 cavalry, 4,000 infantry, and 10 guns, marched out and retired north-west, first setting fire to all buildings in the neighbourhood of the railway station. The Russian gunboat *Sivuch* and four armoured steam launches which were at that port steamed up the Liao River, the former being blown up by her crew on the 2nd August while the latter flotilla proceeded to Liao-yang or Tieh-ling. On the 28th July **28th July.** the 5th Division was despatched from Ta-shih-chiao to join the Fourth Army, and arrived in time to take part in the battle of Hsi-(or Ta-) mu-cheng, which was fought on the 31st July, **31st July.** relieving the Guard Mixed Brigade which had left to rejoin its own division with the First Army on the 22nd July. That Army on the 30th-31st July successfully engaged the Russians at Yü-shu-lin-tzu—Yang-tzu Ling, and the front of the three Japanese Armies moving towards the north was reduced to about forty-five miles.

The Second Army, aware that the main body of the enemy with whom it had been engaged at Ta-shih-chiao had retired northwards leaving two and a half divisions at Hai-cheng, marched against that place on the 1st August, and on the 3rd occupied it without firing a shot. The enemy, after having carefully fortified the hills surrounding the city, which were held by the Japanese in 1894-5 against all attempts of the Chinese to take them, had withdrawn and taken up positions near An-shan-tien, which lies 22 miles to the north-west. The railway bridge over the river which skirts the city walls had been left intact, but a number of store-houses near the station were in flames. These were in great part saved from destruction and a considerable quantity of provisions was rescued. The

Fourth Army reached the vicinity of Hai-cheng almost simultaneously with the Second Army and occupied ground which lies to the eastward of that city.

APPENDIX 1.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

Commanding, General Baron Oku.
Chief of Staff, Major-General Uchiai.

3rd Division (Lieut.-General Oshima) :

5th Brigade, Major-General Yamaguchi—
6th Infantry Regiment.
33rd Infantry Regiment.
17th Brigade, Major-General Kodama—
18th Infantry Regiment.
34th Infantry Regiment.
3rd Cavalry Regiment (1 squadron).
3rd Artillery Regiment.
3rd Engineer Battalion.

4th Division (Lieut.-General Ogawa) :

7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima—
8th Infantry Regiment.
37th Infantry Regiment.*
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando—
9th Infantry Regiment.
38th Infantry Regiment.
4th Cavalry Regiment.
4th Artillery Regiment.
14th Artillery Regiment.
4th Engineer Battalion.

5th Division (Lieut.-General Kigoshi) :

9th Brigade, Major-General Surizawa—
11th Infantry Regiment.
41st Infantry Regiment.
21st Brigade, Major-General Murayama—
21st Infantry Regiment.
42nd Infantry Regiment.
5th Cavalry Regiment.
5th Artillery Regiment.
5th Engineer Battalion.

6th Division (Lieut.-General Okubo) :

11th Brigade, Major-General Iida—
13th Infantry Regiment.
45th Infantry Regiment.
24th Brigade, Major-General Kigoshi—
23rd Infantry Regiment.
48th Infantry Regiment.
6th Cavalry Regiment (1 squadron).

* One attalion of this regiment was in Korea.

6th Division —*cont.*

6th Artillery Regiment.

6th Engineer Battalion.

1st Cavalry Brigade, Major General Akiyama—

13th Regiment.

14th Regiment.

3rd Regiment (less 1 squadron).

6th Regiment (less 1 squadron).

1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Osako—

13th Regiment.

14th Regiment (attached to 4th Division).

15th Regiment.

APPENDIX 2.

KILLED AND WOUNDED OF THE SECOND ARMY AT THE BATTLE
OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO. July 23rd to 25th, 1904.

Division.	Arms.	Dead.			Wounded.		
		Officers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Rank and File.	Horses.
III.	Infantry -	4	67	3	14	275	5
	Cavalry -	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Artillery -	—	1	1	2	11	8
	Engineer -	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Others -	—	—	—	—	3	1
	Total -	4	69	4	16	290	14
IV.	Infantry -	—	5	—	1	57	6
	Cavalry -	—	1	—	—	—	—
	Artillery -	—	10	11	13	79	72
	Engineer -	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Others -	—	1	—	1	7	—
	Total -	—	17	11	15	143	78
V.	Infantry -	4	57	—	9	322	2
	Cavalry -	—	1	3	—	2	3
	Artillery -	—	3	12	2	59	49
	Engineer -	—	1	—	1	4	—
	Others -	—	—	—	—	2	1
	Total -	4	62	15	12	389	55
VI.	Infantry -	—	4	—	1	42	2
	Cavalry -	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Artillery -	2	5	6	1	14	3
	Engineer -	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Others -	—	—	2	—	3	—
	Total -	2	9	8	2	60	5
	1st Brigade of Field Artillery }	—	12	14	11	72	69
	Grand Total	10	169	52	56	954	221

**(12) Fourth Japanese Army.—Operations from the
Date of its Disembarkation in Manchuria
to the 31st July 1904.**

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff.

Plates.

Sketch map to show the advance of the Fourth Japanese Army to Hsi-mu-cheng	-	-	-	-	Map 11
Environs of Hsiu-yen	-	-	-	-	12
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„ of Hsi-mu-cheng	-	-	-	-	14

Appendices.

Order of battle of the Ta-ku-shan Army on 27th June 1904	-	-	-	-	Appendix 1
Losses at the capture of the Fen-shui Ling, 26th and 27th June 1904	-	-	-	-	2
Ammunition expended at the capture of Fen-shui Ling	-	-	-	-	3
Order of battle of the Fourth Japanese Army at Hsi-mu-cheng on the 31st July 1904	-	-	-	-	4
Order of battle of the Russian force at Hsi-mu-cheng on the 31st July 1904	-	-	-	-	5
Losses at the battle of Hsi-mu-cheng, 31st July 1904	-	-	-	-	6

It has been already mentioned that, besides the Armies under Generals Kuroki and Oku, the Japanese had thrown into Manchuria a third force, which had begun to land on the 19th May near Ta-ku-shan.* This force, known later as the Fourth Army, was intended to operate between the First and Second Armies, which were on that date about two hundred and fifty miles apart by road, linking them together and rendering them assistance should necessity arise.

Great care was taken by the Japanese to conceal from the Russians the organization, strength, and destination of this force, which was to consist at first only of the 10th Division.

* See Map 11.

Its mobilization, which was ordered on the 16th April, was completed by the 1st May, when the troops moved to Kobe, where they had been ordered to embark. Only a limited number of transports* was available to convey them to the selected landing-place on the Manchurian coast, for the Second Army was at this time busily engaged in disembarking operations, and for that reason it was decided to despatch the force to its destination in three groups. The first of these was composed of the 20th Infantry Brigade under Major-General Marui, three mountain batteries, a squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment and a company of the 10th Engineer Battalion; the second group consisted of the remainder of the fighting troops of the division, and took with it, as did the first group, its regimental transport and one month's supplies, while the third group comprised troops for the line of communication, supply columns, and miscellaneous stores.

On the 9th and 10th May, the leading portion of the division, with head-quarters, embarked on board eleven transports, which sailed in twos and threes to the rendezvous off Chinampo. By the 14th May, the convoy was assembled there, and final arrangements were made by the naval and military authorities for a descent upon the coast in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan. The actual point selected for this operation had been reconnoitred by the Navy on the 4th May, and was situated near Ku-chia-tun, which is on the western side of a promontory, lying some twenty-five miles to the south-west of Ta-ku-shan. Here the foreshore, as at Pi-tzu-wo, consists of mud flats, of which a large expanse is exposed to view at low water, and, under certain conditions of wind and tide, landing by boats becomes impossible. No better place, however, was available† and, at dawn on the 19th May, the torpedo boats of Rear-Admiral Hosoya's covering squadron crept close inshore, and opened fire on some Russian scouts, who were keeping guard along the coast. The convoy which had sailed for Ta-ku-shan from the Korean coast on the 17th May, had arrived at dusk on the evening of the 18th, and had anchored at a distance of about ten miles from the shore, when boats were got out and everything made ready for the landing. The larger launches had, however, been despatched from Chinampo to the mouth of the Ya-lu, in order to mislead the Russians as to the objective of the expedition, and thence these vessels sailed along the coast to an island situated south of Ta-ku-shan. While the torpedo boats were firing on the Russian scouts, a party of five hundred bluejackets landed without opposition at the neck of the promontory, of which they took possession. On a signal that the landing

* Nineteen steamers of 54,932 gross tonnage, exclusive of 2 steamers allotted to the Harbour Commander for purposes of communication.—A. H.

† Notwithstanding its inconvenience, Ta-ku-shan continued to be used by the Fourth Army as a base until October 1904.—A. H.

was successful, the transports moved in to their second anchorage, distant some three miles from the shore, and the disembarkation of the troops began. By evening the whole of the 20th Brigade was on shore, while the cavalry, a battery of artillery, and the transport of the infantry were landed at a pier, which was constructed in two hours by the Harbour Commander and his staff. To maintain communication with the Second Army to the west, connection was made with the cable which had been laid some time before from the Korean coast to Pi-tzu-wo.

According to the orders drawn up by the Japanese Imperial Head-Quarters, the transports, after disembarking the first group, were to proceed to Kobe for the second group, and, taking it direct to Ta-ku-shan, return again for the last portion of the force. This triple journey necessarily involved delay, and twenty days elapsed before the whole division, with its stores, was disembarked. Haste in the operation was, however, unimportant, for no enemy was present in strength to assail the several fractions of the 10th Division as they landed.

When the first troops, consisting of the 20th Regiment, were put on shore, it was known that Major-General Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cavalry Brigade was gradually moving southwards from its head-quarters at Hsiu-yen, while another force of cavalry, under Major-General Chirikov, was posted on the Japanese left, at a point to the north of Chuang-ho. The troops of the former general had been distributed at the end of April as follows:—

- (a) At Chien-san (about 16 miles south-west of An-tung)—
 Head-quarters of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.
 1st Chita Cossack Regiment (of which one squadron was detached to Ta-tung-kou, and to a point on the Ya-lu midway between that place and An-tung).
 And the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.
- (b) At Ta-ku-shan—
 2½ squadrons, 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
 1st Battery, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division.
 2¾ battalions, 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment.
- (c) Watching the coast line between Ta-tung-kou and Pi-tzu-wo—
 2½ squadrons, Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.

In all, approximately, 1,100 sabres, 2,400 bayonets, eight field and six horse artillery guns.

In these positions the brigade remained until the 1st May, when, in accordance with Lieutenant-General Zasulich's instructions, Major-General Mishchenko ordered a retirement in the direction of Pien-men. Before, however, he had reached that place he received orders from General Kuropatkin, that, in view of rumours of an intended Japanese landing, he was to move

his force to the neighbourhood of Sha-li-sai, watching the coast from there and blocking the route from Ta-ku-shan through Hsiu-yen to Hai-cheng. To support him in carrying out the latter duty, the 18th Regiment of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division was pushed forward from Hai-cheng to the Ta Ling,* whither the 21st Regiment and the 1st/6th Battery, which had taken part in the retirement towards Pien-men, were also sent. Thus, towards the middle of May, the Russian troops nearest to the projected point of landing of the Fourth Japanese Army, consisted only of eleven squadrons and six guns.

No sooner had the 10th Division begun to land than a portion of it was pushed forward to occupy the plain of Ta-ku-shan, and, on the 20th May, with the object of covering the assembly of the main body at that place, Major-General Marui was despatched with a detachment to Tu-cheng-tzu, some twelve miles to the north, while another detachment was sent westward to Ching-tsui-tzu. **20th May.**

Meanwhile, in order to carry out his orders and observe the coast line to the south, Major-General Mishchenko had distributed his command, retaining under his own hand two squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment, and the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.

On the evening of the 20th, about 7 p.m., the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, which was reconnoitring towards Ta-ku-shan, arrived near Wang-chia-tun, where it was surprised by Major-General Marui's infantry and lost some 20 officers and men.† Other minor engagements followed between patrols sent out to reconnoitre by both sides, but no attempt was made by Major-General Mishchenko to interfere with the disembarkation of the 10th Division. Between him and Ta-ku-shan was Major-General Marui's force at Tu-cheng-tzu, while some six miles north of it was a detachment at Tung-fang-shen, with the divisional cavalry beyond it, the whole forming a screen through which the Russian reconnoitring parties could not penetrate.

Lieutenant-General Kawamura, commanding the 10th Division, had in the meantime been informed that Lieutenant-General Stakelberg was moving south against the Second Army, and that a strong force, which was still north of Hsi-mu-cheng, was coming in his own direction. Reinforcements were known to have already reached Major-General Mishchenko, and it was decided to occupy Hsiu-yen before that place could be held in force by Russian troops. In order to reach it, two routes were available. Of these, one road, trending north-westward from Ta-ku-shan, strikes a tributary of the Ta-yang Ho at Tu-cheng-tzu, and follows it for about eight miles. It

* Ling is the Chinese word for a pass.—A. H.

† The Russian losses were:—1 officer and 9 men killed; 2 officers (both taken prisoners) and 19 men (4 of whom were taken prisoners) wounded. The Japanese had only 1 man killed.—A. H.

then turns towards the north, and passing over an intervening ridge, descends to Kou-lien-ho, beyond which place it crosses the Liao Ling and debouches into the plain round Hsiu-yen. The other route is on the right bank of the Ta-yang Ho, which is crossed by an indifferent ford south-west of Sha-li-sai, where a road leads up its left bank and over the Ta-mu Ling to Hsiu-yen.

Of these routes, the first was chosen for the northward march, for although the alternative route joins the road to Feng-huang-cheng near Sha-li-sai, thus opening up communication with the First Japanese Army, it is longer than the road through Tu-cheng-tzu, and troops moving along it do not directly cover Ta-ku-shan. Moreover, on the road, which it had been decided to follow, was the mixed brigade under Major-General Marui, who was now ordered to advance to Kou-lien-ho, while behind him the remainder of the 10th Division was assembling at Ta-ku-shan.

**26th to
31st May.**

On the 26th May, a patrol of the 10th Japanese Cavalry Regiment moved up from Kou-lien-ho towards the Liao Ling, where it was joined, on the 30th, by a troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry. On the 31st, a reconnaissance to the front was made, which showed that the pass was held by the Russians, and the little force fell back and joined Major-General Marui's detachment at Kou-lien-ho. On the 3rd June, Major-General Mishchenko sent a reconnaissance towards that place, the troops employed numbering eight squadrons and two guns. About 1 p.m., the advanced guard of this force, consisting of three squadrons of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment,* met and engaged the Japanese. Shortly afterwards the main body of the Russian cavalry and the two guns arrived, and fighting was continued until 6 p.m., the Russians maintaining their ground, though losing the commander of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, as well as two officers and thirteen men.

3rd June.

4th June.

During this day by carefully concealing their strength, the Japanese led Major-General Mishchenko to infer that their main body was not present but was still at Ta-ku-shan. Next day, however, three Japanese batteries were observed in movement towards the Russian right, whereupon Major-General Mishchenko withdrew his force and concentrated it on the Liao Ling. On the same day he received information that a detachment of Japanese infantry from Feng-huang-cheng had occupied Sha-li-sai, and from there had pushed forward into the valley of the Ta-yang Ho towards Hsiu-yen. These troops were the advanced guard of a mixed brigade of the Guard Division, which, according to pre-arrangement, had left Feng-huang-cheng on the 6th June to co-operate by way of the valley of the Ta-yang Ho in the

* The 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment and one or more squadrons of the 5th Siberian Cossack Regiment had joined Major-General Mishchenko by this date.—A. H.

capture of Hsiu-yen. Into that valley the greater part of the cavalry of the 10th Division had been already despatched, and from San-tao-ho-tzu, where it was posted, covered the movement of the detachment of the First Army and at the same time was in touch with General Marui's force at Kou-lien-ho. This movement of troops upon his left caused some uneasiness to Major-General Mishchenko, and, on the 5th June, he withdrew from the Liao Ling and reported what was happening to Headquarters, whereupon General Kuropatkin sent the 1st Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division, to Hsi-mu-cheng. On the 6th **6th June.** Major-General Marui, seeing that Major-General Mishchenko had retired, advanced, and crossing the pass descended into the valley beyond. On the latter date the main body of the Guard Mixed Brigade left Feng-huang-cheng and halted for the night at Tao-kao-pu-tzu, whence Erh-tao-yang-ho was reached upon the following day.

Major-General Mishchenko had now in front of him two mixed brigades, consisting in all of five squadrons, ten battalions, and three batteries, one of which was a mountain battery. Against this force which, according to the reports of his reconnoitring parties, numbered besides cavalry, twelve battalions and four batteries, he could only bring some eighteen squadrons of Cossacks and six guns. Of his mounted troops about six squadrons were employed in reconnoitring, and the actual numbers available amounted only to between 1,500 and 1,600 men. With these he took position on the high ground to the south and east of Hsiu-yen, watching the route up the valley of the Ta-yang Ho and that from Tu-cheng-tzu, and sending his train some distance to the rear.

Everything on the Japanese side was now ready for the **8th June.** combined attack upon Major-General Mishchenko's force, and Lieutenant-General Kawamura ordered it to take place upon the 8th June. Accordingly, Major-General Marui's detachment pushed forward on the morning of that date, his advanced and flank guards driving back small parties of the Russian cavalry and infantry, and occupying by 11 a.m. the high ground north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu,* while the main body of his force deployed on the south side of that village. Here it came under the fire of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, which was posted west of Hsiu-yen, while, on a line of heights before it, were some six squadrons of the 1st Chita and 7th Siberian Cossack Regiments. Part of the Japanese advanced guard was now directed to attack, but, on moving forward to carry out his orders, the commander reported that his guns could not reach those of the Russians. These, he stated, were posted west of Hsiu-yen, whence they commanded the valley of the Ya Ho, and in consequence Major-General Marui decided to postpone the attack until the following day.

* See Map 12.

Meanwhile the detachment of the First Army had marched from Erh-tao-yang-ho at 6.30 a.m., in three columns, which were composed as follows:—

(a) Right Column—

1½ squadrons, Guard Cavalry Regiment.
1st Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment.

(b) Centre Column—

1 troop, Guard Cavalry Regiment.
2nd and 3rd Battalions, 1st Guard Regiment.

(c) Left Column—

1 troop, Guard Cavalry Regiment.
2 battalions, 2nd Guard Regiment.*
2 batteries, 1st Battalion, Guard Artillery Regiment.
3rd Company, Guard Engineer Battalion.
½ Guard Bearer Company.

The right column was directed to advance through Huang-chia-tien as far as Tao-chia-pu-tzu, and cut the Russian line of retreat north of Hsiu-yen; the centre was ordered to march from Huang-ti through Huang-chi-kou to Cheng-tung-kou, while the left column or main body, which Major-General Asada himself commanded, advanced from Hsiang-yin-tzu towards the Ta-mu Ling. At 11.30 a.m., while the left column was making a short halt in the vicinity of Hsiang-yin-tzu, a report was received which stated that part of the 10th Division was engaged with some six hundred cavalry at the Ta-mu Ling. The Russian troops on this portion of the field had at first consisted only of one squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, which held the saddle immediately east of Hsiu-yen, over which the road from Hsiang-yin-tzu runs, but as the Japanese pressed forward to attack, three more squadrons of the same regiment were brought up in support. On receiving this report, Major-General Asada at once ordered his command to advance, and despatched six companies of infantry to take part in the fighting. These troops, in co-operation with the right flank guard of Major-General Marui's force, almost enveloped the enemy at the Ta-mu Ling, and by 2.30 p.m. forced him back to the westward.

The left column now moved forward towards Hsiu-yen, but on debouching on to the saddle west of the Ta-mu Ling, it came under a heavy fire from the Russian horse artillery guns posted west of the former place. At this time the two batteries of field artillery, with the left column, were a considerable distance

* The remaining battalion of the 2nd Guard Regiment was left at Hung-hoa-ling, 5 miles north-west of Erh-tao-yang-ho, to protect the left flank and rear.—A. H.

to the rear, having been delayed owing to the difficulty of the road, while the mountain battery with Major-General Marui's force, which had come into action on the heights south of the town, had been silenced. On this account Major-General Asada decided that it was advisable to postpone the attack until his right column had worked its way to the north of Hsiu-yen. About the same time, also, Major-General Mishchenko, seeing that the retirement of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment had imperilled the situation of his troops south-west of the town, and hearing that a battalion of Japanese infantry was advancing against his line of retreat, ordered a general retirement towards the north.

The hostile Japanese battalion, that had been observed, belonged to the right column of Major-General Asada's force which, after driving back some weak detachments of Cossacks, succeeded at 4 p.m. in occupying Tao-chia-pu-tzu. It then advanced towards Leng-chia-wai-tzu, a movement which caused the Russians to accelerate their retirement and created some disorder in their ranks. Perceiving their condition the centre column now pressed forward rapidly from Cheng-tung-kou, while the left column, which was in close touch with the troops on its right, advanced against the south of Hsiu-yen.

The Russian cavalry had by this time fallen back to the bed of the river north of Hsi-pei-ying-tzu, which was held as a defensive position, covered by two squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment from the reserve, and the horse artillery guns, posted on the heights west of Hsiu-yen. But the Japanese pressed on, and by 5.20 p.m. Major-General Mishchenko's troops were hurrying in disorder to the rear, some taking the Hai-cheng road, but the greater number following that leading to Kai-ping. Those who took the latter road were assembled some miles north-west of Hsiu-yen, and during the night marched to join the remainder on the direct route to Hai-cheng. The Russian losses in this rear guard action were significant, as also were those of the Japanese,* whose force greatly outnumbered that of their antagonists.

The capture of Hsiu-yen furnished Lieutenant-General Kawamura with a convenient centre for carrying out the preparations necessary for his further movement towards the north. On the day following the action the detachment under **9th June.** Major-General Asada was disposed so as to cover the town from the direction of Huang-chia-tien and Hsi-mu-cheng,† that of Major-General Marui watching the routes from Kai-ping and the south-west, while the remainder of the 10th Division moved up the line of communication and concentrated in the neighbourhood of the place itself. North of it no general

* Japanese losses: killed, 3 men; wounded, 2 officers and 31 men.
Russian losses: killed, 3 men; wounded, 2 officers and 17 men.

† See Map 11.

advance would for a time be undertaken, for although the Second Army was about to move from Pu-lan-tien against the 1st Siberian Army Corps, General Kuroki was still at Feng-huang-cheng, where circumstances had compelled him to remain halted for several weeks. In the operation, however, which lay before General Oku's troops, it was recognized that the 10th Division, although at a distance, could still render indirect assistance, and on the 13th June Lieut.-General Kawamura was instructed by telegram from Imperial Head-Quarters at Tokio as to the nature of the co-operation which would be required of him. He was informed that, on that date, the Second Army would advance against the Russians, who were moving south in considerable strength, and that the 10th Division must complete its transport arrangements without delay and make a rapid advance towards Kai-ping, thus threatening the enemy's flank and rear. The detachment under Major-General Asada was placed under his orders, and was directed to remain at Hsiu-yen, guarding from the direction of Hsi-mu-cheng the flank and rear of the troops despatched towards Kai-ping.

13th June.

In accordance with these orders, a detachment under Major-General Tojo, consisting of the 1st Squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Battery of the 10th Artillery Regiment, and the 1st Company of the 10th Engineer Battalion was sent on the 15th June along the Kai-ping road. This detachment, as it moved westward, drove back the advanced troops of a force which was posted at the Chi-pan Ling,* some thirty miles from Hsiu-yen, and on the 18th June, when the enemy, informed of General Stakelberg's defeat at Te-li-ssu, began to withdraw, Major-General Tojo attacked and occupied his position.† There his force, to which was added the 1st Battalion of the 40th Regiment, remained until the 25th June, on which date the Ta-ku-shan Army‡ began those movements which resulted in the capture of the main range of mountains that lay before it.

18th June.

25th June.

That range, although its slopes are steep and rugged, can be traversed by wheeled traffic at several points north-west of Hsiu-yen. Of these points, which were guarded by about one mixed brigade under Major-General Mishchenko, the chief is the Fen-shui Ling on the road to Hsi-mu-cheng, and to cover it the Russians had erected works of a semi-permanent character. The approach to the works was so well defended with wire entanglements and other obstacles that General Kawamura decided not to attack in front, but force the enemy from the

* The Japanese state that the Chi-pan Ling was occupied on the 18th June but accounts from the Russian side show that that pass was not evacuated by Major-General Mishchenko until the 24th June.

† Japanese losses: killed, 1 man; wounded, 5 men. Russian losses: killed, more than 50 men; captured, 1 officer and 2 men.—A. H.

‡ The 10th Division and the mixed brigade of the Guard Division were not at this time known as the Fourth Army.

ground he held by a turning movement. With this object he assigned to his troops the following distribution* :—

(a) Major-General Asada's detachment—

Guard Mixed Brigade.†
2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.‡
1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.§
 $\frac{1}{2}$ an infantry ammunition column.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ an artillery ammunition column.
1 field hospital.

(b) Colonel Kamada's detachment—

1 squadron of cavalry.
1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
2nd and 3rd Battalions, 40th Regiment (less one company).
1 section, 10th Engineer Battalion.

(c) Major-General Marui's detachment—

$\frac{1}{2}$ of the 10th Cavalry Regiment.
1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
1 battalion, 20th Regiment.
39th Regiment.
2 sections, 10th Engineer Battalion.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ bearer company, 15th Division.

(d) Major-General Tojo's detachment—

1 squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
10th Regiment.
1st Battalion, 40th Regiment.
1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

(e) General Reserve—

1 squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
1st Battalion, 20th Regiment.

The date of the attack upon the Fen-shui Ling was fixed for the 27th June, and the duties assigned to the several detachments which were to take part in it were as follows :—

The detachment under Major-General Asada, was ordered to send a small force to watch the road leading from Huang-chia-tien, while the main body, leaving Wu-tao-ho-tzu|| at 7 a.m. on

* This distribution, which comes from Japanese sources, does not account for a battalion of the 20th Regiment and a company of the 40th Regiment. The cavalry present would appear to have amounted to $4\frac{3}{4}$ squadrons, of which $3\frac{1}{2}$ are shown as belonging to the 10th Cavalry Regiment (a corps of 3 squadrons). Two squadrons of Guard Cavalry were, however, present, and on this occasion were possibly detached from the mixed brigade.—A. H.

† For composition of this brigade, see Appendix 1.

‡ The regimental staff accompanied this battalion.—A. H.

§ The battalion staff was with these troops.—A. H.

|| See Map 13.

the 26th June, was to occupy the ground in the neighbourhood of Wang-chia-pu-tzu. On the following day a movement was to be made against the front of the position held by the Russians, with the object of drawing their attention from the turning movement, and at the same time their line of retreat in the direction of Yang-pan-kou was to be threatened. South of Major-General Asada's column, Colonel Kamada was instructed to march, on the afternoon of the 25th June, to the neighbourhood of Li-chia-pu-tzu and establish communication with him, and on the 27th, attack the Russian right from the direction of Ta-san-pi-huo. On Colonel Kamada's left, Major-General Marui was ordered to occupy the ground west of Ta-chu-tun on the 25th, and bivouac in the vicinity of that place. On the following day two parties were to be sent to occupy the heights west of Chieh-kuan-chin, and east of Pan-chia-pu-tzu, while the main body was to pass the night on the ground east of the former village. On the 27th, a strong detachment was to seize hill 1919, which lies about a mile and a quarter north of Chia-chia-kou, while the main body was to advance against the Russian line of retreat from the direction of San-tao-kou. Lastly, Major General Tojo on the extreme left of the Japanese attack was directed to occupy Ssu-tao-kou* on the 25th June with a portion of his detachment, and on the 26th, with the main body, take up a line extending from the height south of Hsia-ha-ta to that east of Chou-chia-chuang. By so doing he would cover the movement of Major-General Marui's detachment, with which he was directed to establish communication. Lieutenant-General Kawamura intimated to his troops that he would be at Wang-chia-pu-tzu with the general reserve on the morning of the 27th June.

The force against which the Japanese were about to operate is believed to have consisted of from twelve to sixteen squadrons of cavalry, fifteen battalions of infantry, and thirty-eight guns, the whole covering a front of some fifteen miles from the left at Yang-la-huo to the right near Hsia-ha-ta.

26th June.

In pursuance of his orders Major-General Asada detached the Guard Cavalry Regiment† and two companies of the 2nd Guard Infantry Regiment on the 26th June with instructions to protect the road leading from Huang-chia-tien to Hsiu-yen, and sent towards Wang-chia-pu-tzu an advanced guard consisting of a troop of cavalry, two battalions, and a company of engineers. During its march the latter force drove back some small bodies of hostile troops, in rear of whom it found that the hills between Chiao-chia-pu-tzu and Pien-ling were occupied. The infantry deployed and after dislodging the Russian troops, resumed the march towards Wa-fang-tien, but, on nearing that place, the Japanese advanced guard came under artillery fire from a force

* About 10 miles south-west of Li-chia-pu-tzu.

† Less one troop, which accompanied the advanced guard of the main body.—A. H.

posted on the high ground to the west of it. So steep were the slopes of the hills at the point where the force had now arrived, that the main body, which was following, could find no positions for its mountain guns. Major-General Asada therefore ordered the attack to be carried out by infantry alone, and by sunset the Russians, who had present some two thousand cavalry and infantry, were driven back. After placing outposts, Major-General Asada bivouacked for the night to the south of Wa-fang-tien, which is situated at the eastern foot of the Fen-shui Ling, whence he issued orders to the following effect for the attack next day.

The 2nd Guard Regiment, less two companies, was directed to move from the northern side of the Fen-shui Ling against the left of the Russian position, while the 1st Guard Regiment, less half the 3rd Battalion, was instructed to proceed to hill 488, south-west of San-hsien-fang, and draw the enemy's attention in that direction.

To support these movements the four batteries of the Guard and 10th Divisions, to which were attached the two engineer companies of the detachment, were ordered to take position on the hill west of Wa-fang-tien, while near that place Major-General Asada retained as a reserve a troop of cavalry and two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment.

At 5 a.m. on the 27th, the Japanese artillery opened fire, **27th June.** to which the enemy replied with nineteen guns from the hill east of Tung-wa-tzu-kou. For a time both sides maintained a heavy fire, but gradually the Japanese mastered the Russian guns, when Major-General Asada, calling up the reserve, ordered the 1st Guard Regiment to attack. Hidden in some degree by fog and smoke, the troops made their way forward, the 2nd Battalion occupying San-hsien-fang, while the 3rd and 1st Battalions took possession of the hills north and south of that village. No sooner was their presence discovered than the Russians turned their guns upon them and brought the forward movement to a halt. The Japanese artillery continued firing upon that of the Russians, part moving forward south of the road to closer range. A short time passed during which the Russian guns were silenced, when the 1st Guard Regiment advanced again, its 3rd Battalion moving against the left of the works on the Fen-shui Ling, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed directly towards them.

By this time the 2nd Guard Regiment, under Colonel Fukaya, which had been despatched on the 26th against the extreme Russian left, was making its presence felt. Commencing operations at midnight on that date, it had driven two Russian companies from Yang-pan-kou and the high ground west of that place by 7 a.m. on the 27th. Thereafter it moved forward, and by threatening the left of the troops at the Fen-shui Ling, so endangered the Russian line of retreat that

the defenders of the position shortly after commenced to withdraw.

Their right, too, was now becoming compromised, for the detachment under Colonel Kamada had come upon the scene. That officer, as already mentioned, had been ordered to attack from Ta-san-pi-huo, where he had arrived at sunset on the 26th, after having driven back some small hostile bodies, and opened up communication with Major-General Asada. Shortly after midnight he moved his troops on Ti-huang Shan, but as only a rough mountain track led to the summit of that hill, their march, which took place over difficult ground, was very arduous. About 5 a.m., however, on the 27th, the leading troops succeeded in arriving south-west of the hill, which was held by a battalion of infantry posted in strongly-made entrenchments. By 6.30 a.m., owing to the efforts of the engineer company which accompanied the attack, two mountain guns were brought into action on hill 2257, whence about 8 a.m. it was observed that the enemy facing Major-General Asada seemed as if he was preparing to retire; similar signs being noticed on Ti-huang Shan, Colonel Kamada at once ordered his men to advance. The Russians now fell back from their position in the neighbourhood of the Fen-shui Ling, and Colonel Kamada, instead of following them by the direct route, led his troops by the southern side of Ti-huang Shan on Wa-tzu-kou. Reaching that place at 12.30 p.m., he was enabled to pour a heavy fire upon the Russians as they streamed back towards Hsi-mu-cheng.

On the left of Colonel Kamada's detachment Major-General Marui's troops, which had been directed to operate against the Russian right and rear, marched to Ta-chu-tun on the 25th. On the 26th the movement was resumed, and at 2.30 p.m., after driving back a small force of cavalry and infantry at Pan-chang-huo, the leading troops entered Chieh-kuan-chin. During the march the sound of Major-General Tojo's guns in action had been audible, and after reaching Chieh-kuan-chin the roar of artillery from the direction of his force grew louder. To despatch troops to his aid was not considered possible, for a lofty ridge and deep valley intervened between him and the detachment situated on his right. Eventually, however, a slight depression was discovered in the ridge, and a small force of cavalry and infantry was sent through it and directed to march as rapidly as possible towards the sound of the artillery. But, after advancing about three-quarters of a mile, this force became engaged with some Cossack cavalry which brought its further movement to a standstill. As the Russian left appeared to be posted on the hills west of Hsien-chia-huo, Major-General Marui, anxious to establish communication with Major-General Tojo's detachment, brought his guns into action, and towards evening forced the troops opposing him to retire, after which Chieh-kuan-chin was occupied. At midnight the operations were resumed and the main body of the detachment marched

north-west for Pan-chia-pu-tzu, a small force being left at Chieh-kuan-chin whose duty was to guard the flank and rear. Pan-chia-pu-tzu was reached at 6 a.m. without the knowledge of the Russians, and the march was resumed towards San-tao-kou. About 7 a.m. a force of three battalions appeared moving against the rear of the detachment, part coming from the west and part from the north-west. To continue the movement towards the rear of the Russian force at the Fen-shui Ling was now impossible, and the troops were turned against the hostile force, which was driven back by 10.30 a.m. Major-General Marui then sent some infantry with orders to move as rapidly as possible to Sung-ta-tzu, as it was known that the enemy at the Fen-shui Ling was already in retreat, and the remainder of the detachment concentrated at San-tao-kou.

On the extreme Japanese left Major-General Tojo, leaving a small force in the neighbourhood of Ssu-tao-kou,* had marched at midnight on the 25th towards Hsia-ha-ta, and on the morning of the 26th had found the enemy in position on the hills west of Hsien-chia-huo. His force, which consisted of some cavalry, three battalions of infantry, and a battery of horse artillery, at once attacked, but the ground was unfavourable, and by nightfall no effort of the Japanese could obtain for them the line of hills which they had been directed to secure. As the duty of the detachment was to help as much as possible in the operations of Major-General Marui's force by engaging the Russians who might otherwise have been diverted against it, Major-General Tojo resumed the attack upon the 27th. The Russians had by this time added to their force, and now numbered, exclusive of cavalry, five battalions and sixteen guns. Major-General Tojo, with his four battalions and two mountain batteries, vainly endeavoured to expel them from their ground, but, hearing at sunset that the Fen-shui Ling had been secured, withdrew under cover of darkness to the west of Ssu-tao-kou.*

The operations of the 26th and 27th had terminated favourably for the Japanese, who by vigorously demonstrating with a portion of their force against the front of the Russian position, and at the same time throwing well-timed detachments against its flanks and rear, had secured the passage of the main Chien Shan range with a loss of little more than two hundred killed and wounded.†

After the retirement of the Russians, Colonel Kamada's detachment was posted at Ta-chu-tun, that of Major-General Tojo remaining at Ssu-tao-kou,* while Major-General Asada was recalled to Hsiu-yen, to watch the road from Huang-chia-tien. The detachment under Major-General Marui was ordered to

* About 10 miles south-west of Li-chia-pu-tzu.

† See Appendix 2.

hold the Fen-shui Ling and was reorganized so as to consist of the following troops:—

- 1½ squadrons, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 39th Regiment.
- 2nd Company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
- ½ bearer company, 10th Division.

Attached.

- 2 batteries, Guard Artillery.
- 2nd Guard Regiment.*
- 3rd Company, Guard Engineer Battalion.

The troops of the 10th Division and Guard Mixed Brigade were thus disposed so as to watch the routes by which they would eventually continue their advance, and repel any attempt of the Russians to regain the ground from which they had been driven. That such an attempt would be made was not thought probable, for although, after the action of the 26th and 27th June, reinforcements daily reached Major-General Mishchenko, his force at Hsi-mu-cheng from the beginning of July was gradually reduced. At this time General Ōku's Army was preparing to advance against Kai-ping, and the danger threatening the Russians in that direction necessitated a reduction of the forces facing Lieutenant-General Kawamura.

To assist in the forward movement of the Army on his left Lieutenant-General Kawamura was now ordered to demonstrate towards Kai-ping,† and with this object he detailed two detachments from the 10th Division. The first of these, consisting of a "mixed" regiment, was sent towards Hsi-mu-cheng while the second, a "mixed" brigade, moved towards Chieh-kuan-chin from the neighbourhood of Ssu-tao-kou. On the 9th July, when the mixed regiment arrived near Yang-la-huo, it attacked the Russian advanced position. The enemy there seemed to be somewhat taken by surprise, but, as he was subsequently reinforced by about ten battalions and two batteries, the Japanese decided to withdraw. On the same date, the mixed brigade encountered about two battalions and a battery at Chieh-kuan-chien,‡ and on the 10th occupied Hsin-tsai-kou.‡ During several days the patrols of both sides were engaged, but that the Japanese movement at this time towards Tang-chih was not serious was discovered on the 15th by a reconnaissance made south-east of that place by Major-General Mishchenko, who was accompanied by eight squadrons, six companies, and two guns.

Prior to that date Kai-ping had been evacuated, and the 10th Division had begun preparations for its next advance to Hsi-mu-cheng. Reinforcements had reached it on the 12th July

* Three companies of the 2nd Guard Regiment rejoined head-quarters of the regiment on the 30th June, of which two had been at Huang-chia-tun.

† See Map 11.

‡ On Map 13.

9th July.

12th July.

when the 10th Reserve Brigade* from Japan marched into Hsiu-yen, and, two days later, General Count Nodzu, who had been appointed to command the Fourth or Ta-ku-shan Army had sailed from Ujina. On the 17th he arrived at Hsiu-yen and, on the 22nd, under orders from Imperial Head-Quarters, despatched the mixed brigade of the Guard Division by way of Huang-chia-tien to rejoin the First Army.

On the 25th July the 10th Division moved forward along **25th July.** the main road to Hsi-mu-cheng and crossed the Fen-shui Ling and its advanced troops reaching the neighbourhood of Hsiao-ku-shan.† On the same date the mixed regiment of that division, which was now at Niu-hsin-shan‡ on the extreme right of the Fourth Army, advanced towards Tung-ta-ling,§ where it met a strong hostile force, and after severe fighting occupied the latter place.

By the 28th July, the position which the Fourth Army **28th July.** had reached was as follows†:—The advanced troops of the 10th Division and the 10th Reserve Brigade, except the 40th Reserve Regiment of infantry which was in reserve at San-hsien-fang,§ held a line extending from the high ground east of Yang-la-huo to the vicinity of Chang-chia-pu-tzu, the main body being at La-mu-fang. On the left of the 10th Division, on a front some five miles to the north of Tang-chih,‡ was the 5th Division of the Second Army which, after the victory of Ta-shih-chiao had been moved eastward to co-operate with the Fourth Army. At 10.30 p.m., on the 28th July, orders were received by General Nodzu informing him that the 5th Division was placed at his disposal and directing him to capture Hsi-mu-cheng.†

On this date it was known that near that place the Russians had assembled a force consisting of about thirty squadrons, thirty-six battalions, and seventy guns, and that the position held by them ran generally parallel to their line of communication with Hai-cheng. On the left of it from Shih-chia-wa-tzu to the hill south-east of San-chiao-shan was about one division of infantry and sixteen guns; behind on the high ground west of Hsiao-fang-hsin, was a strong work, while south of Hsi-mu-cheng, between the roads leading from Hsiao-ku-shan and La-mu-fang, was an advanced detachment which held the ground from Shan-cheng-tzu to Hsia-fang-hsin. The hills north and east of Yang-chia-kou guarding the road from Tang-chih were held by a force of all arms, north-west of which other troops in small numbers could be seen, while the cavalry brigade under Major-General Mishchenko was apparently divided between Miao-erh-kou and the ground east of Yang chia-kou.

* The 10th Reserve Brigade was ordered to mobilize on the 17th June, and on the 24th June sailed for Ta-ku-shan.—A. H.

† See Map 14.

‡ See Map 11.

§ Five miles south-west of Yang-la-huo.

29th July.

To force the Russians from their position and secure the town of Hsi-mu-cheng, General Nodzu planned to assail them in front and at the same time operate against both their flanks. With this view orders were issued at 11 a.m., on the 29th July, directing the Army to occupy certain positions on the following day in anticipation of the general attack, which was fixed to take place on the 31st. The 10th Division and the 10th Reserve Brigade were to push forward on the 30th and seize a line extending from Ta-fang-hsin through Shan-cheng-tzu to the hill north of Hsia-pa-cha-kou. On their left the 5th Division was directed to assemble its main body in the neighbourhood of Hou-shih-la-kou, its advanced troops establishing themselves upon a line extending from the hill east of Ku-chia-pu-tzu through Yin-lao-shan to Wang-chia-pu-tzu(a). As these dispositions would create a gap between the two divisions, special care was to be taken to maintain connection, and telegraphic communication was ordered to be arranged from La-mu-fang to Hou-shih-la-kou through Chang-chia-pu-tzu. As a general reserve for the Army, the 40th Reserve Regiment was directed to assemble at Yang-la-huo, in rear of the Japanese right, whence, as the attack progressed, it was to push forward and pursue as far as a line extending from Hou-chia-tun* to Erh-tao-kou, through Fei-lu-tun. General Nodzu intimated that his head-quarters would move at noon on the 30th from Wang-chia-pu-tzu(b) to Hsiao-ku-shan.

30th July.

On the 30th July, in accordance with the plan arranged, the 10th Division and Reserve Brigade moved forward in three columns and occupied a line running generally from Ta-fang-hsin through hill 685 to Chang-chia-pu-tzu, while the 5th Division, similarly organized, seized the ground which lies immediately south of Ku-chia-pu-tzu and Ying-lao-shan.

For the 31st July, the advance of the 10th Division and 10th Reserve Brigade was ordered to take place at 2 a.m., the force being distributed in three columns as on the previous day. The composition of these columns was as follows:—

Right Column—

- 2 troops, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 10th and 11th Regiments, 10th Reserve Brigade.†
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

Centre Column—

- 1 troop, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 10th Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

* About 3 miles north-east of Fei-lu-tun.

† The 10th Reserve Brigade, although organized as a "mixed" brigade, was composed, at this period of the war, of only three regiments, each regiment consisting of two battalions.—A. H.

Left Column—

- 1 troop, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 40th Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

As a reserve for the division two squadrons of cavalry, two batteries and the 20th Brigade were ordered to assemble at Wang-chia-pu-tzu(c).

During the night, a battalion and a battery were transferred from the right to the centre column as the enemy's forces appeared to be in greater strength towards the west than towards the east, and at dawn on the 31st the left and centre columns* attacked the Russians on the hill west of Ta-ping-ling, which was seized by their advanced troops about 9 a.m. The capture of this position did not, however, force the defenders to relinquish hill 787, to which they clung with great determination, supported by guns posted near Chang-san-huo and Hsia-fang-hsin. But as the rearmost troops of the column arrived, the Japanese pushed forward, and succeeded in occupying the hill at 11.30 a.m. under a heavy fire of guns and rifles. Prior to this the 39th Regiment and two batteries from the divisional reserve had been sent by Lieut.-General Kawamura to the extreme left of the 10th Division, where assistance was required, but on their way thither they were met by so severe a fire of guns posted on the saddle north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu, that they were forced to halt. The batteries, however, succeeded in coming into action and replied to the Russian fire. 31st July.

On the left of the 10th Division the 5th Division was distributed as follows :—

Right Column—

- 2 troops, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 5th Artillery Regiment.
- 42nd Regiment.
- 1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Centre Column—

- 2 troops, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 battalions, 21st Regiment.

Left Column—

- 1 troop, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 5th Artillery Regiment.
- 41st Regiment.
- 1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

* The Right Column, after occupying the Russian advanced position, had been ordered to unite with the Centre Column; thus when the attack on the main position took place, there were only two columns, the left and centre.—A. H.

Reserve,* to assemble at Yin-lao-shan—

1 $\frac{3}{4}$ squadrons, 5th Cavalry Regiment.

3 batteries, 5th Artillery Regiment.

11th Regiment.

1 battalion, 21st Regiment.

1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Advancing in a northerly direction at midnight, its right and centre columns forced back the Russian outposts and occupied the hill north of Yang-chia-kou at 5 a.m., whence later on a battery of the right column opened fire on the Russian guns north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu which were shelling the 10th Division's attacking line, and took them in flank and rear. The left column encountered heavy opposition during its advance, but was able, by 10 a.m., to secure the high ground further towards the west. There it came into touch with the 17th Brigade of the 3rd Division, under Major-General J. Kodama, which had been detached by General Oku to assist the Fourth Army in its attack upon the Russian right. This detachment† of the Second Army, on reaching Pai-tsao-yao, opened fire with its guns on the Russian batteries at Erh-tou-kou, and a fierce artillery duel ensued.

On hearing that the 5th Division was in possession of the hill north of Yang-chia-kou, General Nodzu, anticipating that this success would force the Russians to retire, sent orders at 9.15 a.m. to the commander of the 40th Reserve Regiment that he was to advance at once. This officer was informed that the enemy was holding a line from the hill north Hung-yao-ling to the hill west of San-chaio-shan, and that the route he was to follow lay through Ta-tao-huo and Ta-fang-hsin, whence, making for Lin-tung-huo, he was to menace the extreme Russian left. One company of the regiment which had been kept at Hsiao-ku-shan was ordered to proceed to hill 1105, whither head-quarters of the Fourth Army had removed.

The Russians, however, had not yet decided to retire, although their guns on the saddle north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu were silenced a little after 1 p.m. by a cross-fire of the artillery of the 5th and 10th Divisions. Their batteries on the hill east of Hsia-fang-hsin outranged those of the Japanese, and, when the reserve of the 10th Division, seeing that the guns which had checked its movement some hours earlier were silenced again tried to advance, it was again compelled to halt. In consequence of this, the front line of the division was forced to stand on the defensive, which gave the Russians time to bring up fresh troops from the rear. With these several unavailing efforts were made by them to recapture hill 787, and gradually their infantry and artillery fire grew

* Part of this reserve seems to have been taken by General Nodzu as a general reserve, which was kept on the Japanese left.—A. H.

† The 17th Brigade was apparently constituted for this occasion as a "mixed" brigade, being accompanied by artillery.—A. H.

heavier. At length, about 6 p.m., a force amounting to about one brigade of infantry was pushed into their fighting line, and a heavy counter-attack was made upon that portion of the 10th Division which was holding hill 787 and the ground adjoining to the west. The assailants were supported by a concentrated fire from the guns posted on the hill north of Chang-san-huo and on that east of Hsia-fang-hsin, and as their line came close to that of the Japanese, the shells of both sides showered alike on friend and foe. Four separate attempts were made to force the Japanese from their ground in the neighbourhood of San-chiao-shan, but the troops holding that part of the position clung to it until they crossed bayonets with the Russian infantry. Such was the determination of the attack and such the obstinacy of the defence that, in the left column of the 10th Division, the 11th Company of the 40th Regiment had all but thirty-five of its non-commissioned officers and men killed, while the only officer of the company who survived the action was among the wounded. This fierce struggle was maintained till 7 p.m., when the last of the Russian counter-attacks was repulsed, and the 10th Division bivouacked for the night on the ground which it had won.

West of the 10th Division, the 5th Division had been less heavily engaged, and its left column, assisted by the brigade of the 3rd Division, had held its ground although reinforcements constantly reached the troops to which it was opposed. The right column, which, after silencing the Russian guns north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu, had sent two companies towards that place, next occupied the ground in its vicinity, on which the Russians moved off towards the north. About 4.30 p.m. hearing of their retirement General Nodzu sent forward one-and-a-half battalions of the general reserve with orders to pursue towards Miao-erh-kou, but, on arriving to the south of that village, obstinate resistance was encountered, and it was found that a strong force was in position at Fei-lu-tun. As the situation was still unfavourable to pursuit, the troops despatched from the general reserve were recalled, and the 5th Division bivouacked on the ground that had been taken during the day.

On the opposite flank of the Fourth Army, the despatch of the 40th Reserve Regiment towards Lin-tung-huo with the object of pursuit, proved to be also somewhat premature. Nevertheless, by 6 p.m., its two battalions had secured the heights north-west of that place, where they remained during the night, and blocked the main road from Hsi-mu-cheng.

At 4.10 a.m. on the 1st August, General Nodzu sent orders **1st August.** to the commander of the 10th Division pointing out the urgent necessity of forcing the Russians from their position in front of him, and adding that the 5th Division had been directed to assist by sending a portion of its troops towards San-chiao-shan.

At 7.30 a.m. Lieutenant-General Kawamura replied to the effect that to continue the attack was, for the time being, impossible, but that his division would hold its ground to the last man. This attitude did not satisfy the commander of the Fourth Army, who insisted that the attack must be renewed and the enemy repulsed by daybreak on the 2nd August. The operation was not, however, destined to be carried out, for the Russians, fearing a resumption of the attack upon their right, had fallen back towards Hai-cheng,

About 8 a.m., the commander of the 5th Division had received a message from Lieutenant-General Kawamura in which the difficult situation of the 10th Division was described. Lieutenant-General Ueda at once ordered the bulk of his right column to co-operate and sent it towards the village of San-chiao-shan, but before that place was reached the detachment found that the Russians had withdrawn. This fact had been discovered some time earlier by the right column of the 10th Division, which had started in pursuit about 6 a.m., followed at 8.30 a.m. by the left column. These troops pushed forward and occupied a line from Shih-chiao-wa-tzu to Fei-lu-tun, while the 40th Reserve Regiment, which had marched at 5.30 a.m., came up on their right and occupied Hou-chia-tun.* These troops were followed by the remainder of the Fourth Army, which moved forward and occupied a line running from north-east to south-west through Fei-lu-tun.

In this action, as in the engagements which preceded it the Ta-ku-shan Army had received assistance from troops detached either by the First or Second Armies, and though on the 31st July, it failed to force the Russians from their ground, a victory had none the less been gained. Its efforts had sufficed to make the enemy relinquish his last position on the road leading to Hai-cheng, whither he had retired with a loss of six guns and many killed and wounded. The junction with General Oku's force was thus practically accomplished, for only a few miles of road, clear of the enemy, now separated the Fourth and Second Armies.

* About 3 miles north-east of Fei-lu-tun.

APPENDIX 1.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE TA-KU-SHAN ARMY ON THE
27TH JUNE 1904.

General Officer Commanding - Lieutenant-General BARON
KAWAMURA.
Chief of the Staff - - - Major-General UCHIYAMA.

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
10TH DIVISION.				
Commander.—Lieutenant-General Baron Kawamura.				
8th Brigade, Major-General H. Tojo :—				
10th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
40th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
20th Brigade, Major-General M. Marui :—				
20th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
39th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
Cavalry—				
10th Cavalry Regiment - -	—	3	—	—
Artillery—				
10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns).	—	—	36	—
Engineers—				
10th Engineer Battalion -	—	—	—	3
ATTACHED.				
1st Guard Brigade, Major-General N. Asada :—				
1st Guard Regiment - -	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment - -	3	—	—	—
Cavalry—				
Guard Cavalry Regiment -	—	2	—	—
Artillery—				
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns).	—	—	12	—
Engineers—				
Guard Engineer Battalion -	—	—	—	1
Total - - -	18	5	48	4

The Russian force present at the capture of the Fen-shui Ling on the 27th June is not known in sufficient detail to admit of the preparation of an Order of Battle.

The Japanese official account mentions that there were present at Fen-shui Ling 7 battalions, 9 squadrons, and 2 batteries. On the 26th, opposite Major-General Tojo's detachment there were 3 battalions, 9 squadrons, 1 horse

battery, and 2 machine guns, and on the following day these troops were increased by 3 battalions and 2 batteries. The total force present is uncertain.

APPENDIX 2.

LOSSES AT THE CAPTURE OF THE FEN-SHUI LING, 26TH AND 27TH JUNE 1904.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
GUARD DIVISION.				
1st Guard Regiment - - - -	1	6	2	49
2nd Guard Regiment - - - -	1	2	—	31
Guard Cavalry Regiment - - -	—	—	—	—
Guard Artillery - - - -	1	4	2	15
3rd Company Guard Engineer Battalion -	—	—	—	8
Guard Bearer Company - - -	—	—	—	3
10TH DIVISION.				
10th Regiment - - - -	—	6	—	30
40th Regiment - - - -	—	1	—	17
20th Regiment - - - -	—	—	1	4
39th Regiment - - - -	—	1	—	8
10th Cavalry Regiment - - -	—	—	—	1
10th Artillery Regiment - - -	—	—	—	8
10th Engineer Battalion - - -	—	—	—	2
Total - - - -	3	20	5	176

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows :—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
3	19	3	168	—	—	6	187

Russians.

The Russians in their official report give their losses as only one man killed and 20 wounded. Unofficial information raises them to from 300 to 500 killed and wounded. The Japanese, in their official report of this action, state that many were killed, those on the main road alone numbering over 90, while six officers and 82 men were taken prisoners.

APPENDIX 3.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE CAPTURE OF THE
FEN-SHUI LING.*Japanese.*

The expenditure of the 10th Division is not known, but that of the Mixed Brigade, Guard Division, on the 27th June, was as follows:—

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
1st Guard Regiment - - -	—	—	49,251
2nd Guard Regiment - - -	—	—	9,677
Guard Artillery Regiment - - -	317	971	—
10th Artillery Regiment - - -	182	376	—
Total - - - -	499	1,347	58,928

Two batteries of the Guard Artillery Regiment, and two of the 10th Artillery Regiment, are believed to have been present on the 27th June.

Russians.

No information is available regarding the expenditure of ammunition by the Russians in this action beyond the fact that one quick-firing battery expended the whole of its ammunition between daylight and 7.40 a.m., or in less than four hours.

APPENDIX 4.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH JAPANESE ARMY ON THE
31ST JULY 1904.

General Officer Commanding	-	General Count NODZU.
Chief of the Staff	-	Major-General UEHARA.
Commanding Artillery	-	Major-General KASUNOSE.
Commander of Engineers	-	Major-General FUROKAWA.

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
10TH DIVISION.				
Commander.—Lieutenant-General Baron Kawamura.				
8th Brigade, Major-General H. Tojo :—				
10th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
40th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
20th Brigade, Major-General M. Marui :—				
20th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
39th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
Cavalry—				
10th Cavalry Regiment - -	—	3	—	—
Artillery—				
10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns).	—	—	36	—
Engineers—				
10th Engineer Battalion -	—	—	—	3
A Reserve Brigade :—				
10th Reserve Regiment - -	2	—	—	—
20th Reserve Regiment - -	2	—	—	—
40th Reserve Regiment - -	2	—	—	—
ATTACHED.				
5TH DIVISION.				
Commander.—Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.				
9th Brigade, Major - General Yamada :—				
11th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
41st Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
21st Brigade, Major - General Tsukamoto :—				
21st Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
Cavalry—				
5th Cavalry Regiment - -	—	3	—	—
Artillery—				
5th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns).	—	—	36	—
Engineers—				
5th Engineer Battalion - -	—	—	—	3
Carried forward - -	30	5	72	6

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
Brought forward - -	30	6	72	6
3RD DIVISION.				
17th Brigade, Major - General Kodama :—				
18th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment - - -	3	—	—	—
It is not known if any other portion of the 3rd Division, beyond some guns, was present.				
Total - - -	36	6	72	6

APPENDIX 5.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG ON THE 31ST JULY 1904.

General Officer Commanding - Major-General ALEXEIEV.
(Commanding 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.)

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
5th East Siberian Rifle Division :—				
Commander.—Major - General Alexeiev.				
1st Brigade, Major - General Okulich :—				
17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.	3	—	—	—
18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major - General Putilov :—				
19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.	3	—	—	—
20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.	3	—	—	—
Machine Gun Company, attached to 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.	—	—	8	—
Artillery :—				
5th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Colonel Briuks—				
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries	—	—	32	—
31st Infantry Division :—				
2nd Brigade, Major - General Vasiliev—				
123rd Infantry Regiment -	4	—	—	—
124th Infantry Regiment -	4	—	—	—
Carried forward - -	20	—	40	—

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
Brought forward - -	20	—	40	—
Artillery :—				
31st Artillery Brigade, Colonel Bushen—				
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries -	—	—	24	—
35th Infantry Division :—				
2nd Brigade, Major - General Glasko—				
139th Infantry Regiment -	4	—	—	—
140th Infantry Regiment -	4	—	—	—
Artillery :—				
35th Artillery Brigade, Colonel Olkhoviski.				
One battery - -	—	—	8	—
2nd Siberian Infantry Division :—				
1st Brigade, Major - General Plishkov—				
5th Irkutsk Infantry Regiment	4	—	—	—
6th Yenisei Infantry Regiment	4	—	—	—
Cavalry :—				
Major - General Mishchenko (Commanding Trans - Baikal Cossack Brigade).				
Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade—				
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment.	—	5	—	—
1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—
Siberian Cossack Division :—				
1st Brigade - -	—	6	—	—
7th Siberian Cossacks - -	—	6	—	—
Orenburg Cossack Division :—				
2nd Brigade, Major-General Tolmachev—				
11th Orenburg Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—
12th Orenburg Cossack Regiment.	—	6	—	—
Artillery :—				
1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
Total - - - -	36	35	78	—

NOTE.—The above order of battle is mainly based upon the Japanese estimate of the Russian troops present at the battle.

It will be observed that only portions of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division and of the Siberian Cossack Division were present.

The total combatant strength, estimated at the rate of 120 sabres per squadron, 700 rifles per battalion, and 220 gunners per battery, would amount to 30,680 men, of whom 25,200 are infantry.

APPENDIX 6.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG, 21ST JULY 1904.
Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
5TH DIVISION.				
11th Regiment - - - -	—	3	1	14
41st Regiment - - - -	—	9	2	73
21st Regiment - - - -	1	2	—	8
42nd Regiment - - - -	—	2	1	0
5th Cavalry Regiment - - - -	—	—	—	—
5th Artillery Regiment - - - -	—	2	—	23
5th Engineer Battalion - - - -	—	—	—	2
Total, 5th Division - - - -	1	18	4	120
10TH DIVISION.				
10th Regiment - - - -	2	45	6	144
40th Regiment - - - -	2	89	8	194
20th Regiment - - - -	—	—	—	—
39th Regiment - - - -	2	14	1	63
10th Cavalry Regiment - - - -	—	—	—	—
10th Artillery Regiment - - - -	—	5	4	25
10th Engineer Battalion - - - -	—	—	—	—
Ammunition Column - - - -	—	—	—	5
Total, 10th Division - - - -	6	153	19	431
RESERVE BRIGADE.				
10th Reserve Regiment - - - -	2	11	—	72
20th Reserve Regiment - - - -	—	5	3	12
40th Reserve Regiment - - - -	—	—	—	—
Total, Reserve Brigade - - - -	2	16	3	84
Total - - - -	9	187	26	635

In the 5th Division two horses were killed and nine wounded, and in the 10th Division 10 horses were killed and 13 wounded.

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
9	186	24	617	—	—	33	803

Russians.

The losses of the Russians are not known, but the Japanese in their official report of the action state about 700 dead were found. The prisoners, who numbered 34, stated that a large number of killed and wounded were carried from the field during the night of the 31st July, and it was estimated that the total casualties must have reached over 2,000.

The Russians lost six field guns and some ammunition and supplies.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
5TH DIVISION.			
11th Regiment - - - -	—	—	14,905
41st Regiment - - - -	—	—	64,385
21st Regiment - - - -	—	—	13,750
42nd Regiment - - - -	—	—	9,338
5th Artillery Regiment - - -	402	2,727	—
Total - - - -	402	2,727	102,378

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
10TH DIVISION.			
10th Regiment - - - -	—	—	111,482
40th Regiment - - - -	—	—	77,166
39th Regiment - - - -	—	—	41,056
10th Cavalry Regiment - - -	—	—	240
10th Artillery Regiment - - -	439	3,131	—
RESERVE BRIGADE.			
10th Reserve Regiment - - -	—	—	41,642
20th Reserve Regiment - - -	—	—	23,903
Total - - - -	439	3,131	295,489

One gun was damaged in each of the artillery regiments.

Russians.

No information is available regarding the expenditure of ammunition by the Russians in this action.

(13) First Japanese Army.—Affair at Sai-ma-chi
(47 Miles N.N.E. of Feng-huang-cheng), the
7th June 1904.*

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers,
Sai-ma-chi, 15th July 1904.

Plate.

Action at Sai-ma-chi - - - - Bound in text.

*Covering Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton,
K.C.B., D.S.O.*

I have the honour to forward the attached sketch and accounts of the affair at Sai-ma-chi.†

2. Neither the position prepared by the Russians nor their retreat therefrom seem to call for any comment.

Report by Captain J. B. Jardine.

On 11th July I visited the Russian prepared position on the hill north of the town. The town is on a small plain, surrounded by hills. The plain is devoid of cover, flat and cultivated. 7th June 1904.

The principal roads‡ to and from the town are the Ai-yang-cheng and Feng-huang-cheng road, which enters the plain from the south, and the Pen-hsi-hu road, which enters the plain from the north. The former is the road by which the Japanese force approached the town, the latter that by which the Russians retreated. A river with a bed eighty feet wide, of which about one-eighth is now (15th July) under water and easily forded anywhere, flows in a south-west direction skirting the south side of the plain and passing at one place within two hundred yards of the town. It is a branch of the Ai Ho.

Sai-ma-chi has less than one hundred houses.§ The hill on which the prepared position was situated dominates the ground to the south, i.e., the direction of the Ai-yang-cheng road, for two thousand yards or more, is four hundred yards from the

* After the battle of the Ya-lu the First Japanese Army moved forward to the neighbourhood of Feng-huang-cheng, where it concentrated on 10th May. It remained there until 24th June, collecting transport and supplies, and reconnoitring. During this period the two actions of Sai-ma-chi and Ai-yang-cheng, described in the following pages, were fought. Map 33 shows generally the lines of advance of the First Japanese Army from the Ya-lu to Liao-yang.

† The ideograms for this locality vary, representing sometimes Tsai-ma-chi or Sai-ma-tzu.

‡ See Map 2.

§ See Plate opposite page 136.

town, averages something over two hundred feet above the plain, and is long and narrow from west to east. The top is convex and of small width (sometimes only ten or twenty yards), covered entirely by scrub and bushes. The slope is steep on the southern side but still steeper on the northern, where it is sometimes precipitous, and has at its foot a branch of the stream mentioned above (water at this season thirty-eight feet wide), as shown on sketch.

Bushes and scrub cover both northern and southern slopes in most places. The trenches were as follows:—A single line of trench dug at an average distance from the crest down the slope, of twenty-five yards, and following the contour. This was for men kneeling, and roughly made. The top of the hill being convex, the position of the trench in very many places does not admit of a field of fire at all when the attack is within one hundred and fifty yards, or has reached the foot of the slope.

Digging the trench cannot have been easy work, as there are many rocks and stones in the soil. There is no communication with the rear whatever, but there is good cover in rear of the crest of the hill. No lateral communication is provided except the trench itself, which is not always continuous, for when the working party came to a particularly difficult piece of rock they left it alone and started the trench again, perhaps ten feet or more further on. There is no attempt at head-cover or clearing the bush in front of the trench, which obscures the field of view very much; of course from the southern side of the river, where it flows south of town, to the foot of the hill on which the trench is dug (one thousand one hundred yards and more) the field of fire is excellent, though plunging.

From such a hill and position it follows that the line of retreat is very bad indeed, and in whatever direction the defenders retire (except perhaps by climbing into the hilly country to the west) they must do so across a plain immediately in rear of their position for three-quarters of a mile. The two lines of retirement which the Russians used were (1) the path over the neck (west of the hill, where they had guns) and (2) the road to Pen-hsi-hu, which passes to the rear by the east of the position. Sai-ma-chi is by no means easy to defend, and doubtless the Russian commander recognized this, and never intended to hold it long, if attacked, but merely to delay an enemy if possible. Nevertheless, as the Russians were in the town for many weeks it was worth while to make good arrangements. Holding such a position, the moment for retreat must be well-timed.

On the 7th June, shortly after 10 a.m., the Japanese guns came into action at about 3,000 yards range on some hills adjoining the Ai-yang-cheng road, south of the town. Two companies were sent to the right (east) over the hills to get round the Russian position, but were only in time to harass the enemy's rear guard a little. The Japanese infantry advanced

Action at SAI-MA-CHI.



towards the river in line. As soon as the Japanese infantry reached the opposite bank (north) the Russians retreated and the Japanese, pushing on, occupied the position and shelled the retiring troops. The enemy was pursued for some distance, but retired in good order. It was during this time that most of the Japanese and Russian casualties occurred. The action lasted until after 1.0 p.m.

In four or five places in the trench the Russians had made traverses. I could not see what useful purpose they could serve.

Russians: 1 battalion, 2 squadrons, 8 guns (of which they only used 2, those at the neck).

Japanese: 1 regiment of infantry, 1 squadron, 2 guns.

The Russians used neither gun pits nor epaulments.

**(14) First Japanese Army.—Outpost Affair at
Ai-yang-cheng (Aiyumon) (45 Miles N.N.E.
of Feng-huang-cheng), on the 22nd June 1904.**

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers,
Sai-ma-chi, 12th July 1904.

Plate.

Action at Ai-yang-cheng - - - Bound in text.

*Covering Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton,
K.C.B., D.S.O.*

I beg to forward the attached interesting report by Captain Jardine, 5th Lancers, on the outpost affair of Ai-yang-cheng, which has only just reached me.

2. Some surprise may be felt at the tactics employed on this occasion by the Russians, but such are the methods which appear to be habitually adopted by their existing types of general.

* * * * *

Report.

An Example of Russians in Attack.

**22nd June
1904.**

The Japanese force at Ai-yang-cheng on 22nd June 1904 was—7 battalions, 1 regiment cavalry, 3 batteries under Major-General Sasaki (of 12th Division, First Army); *i.e.*, his own brigade *plus* two squadrons and one battalion belonging to General Kigoshi's brigade.

The Prepared Position.—I visited the front in the evening before and two days after the action. It is within convenient distance, about a quarter of a mile, of the village in and around which a great portion of the troops were quartered. It lies east and west across a valley. Its left is on the hills to the south, and its right on hills to the north. The centre is on a spur jutting out from hills on north side into the valley, three-quarters of the way across it and at right angles to it, the remaining quarter contains the Ai River, running east at the foot of the hills on the south side of the valley. The valley is flat, especially for 1,300 yards in front of the position, well cultivated (at this time of year), dotted with cottages and sparse trees. The hills average 300 feet in height on each side of the valley, gradually rising as they draw away from it, are intersected with nullahs and have short scrub here and there. The highest hills have more vegetation and trees. A branch of the Ai River flows immediately in rear of the position, *i.e.*, between it and Ai-yang-cheng; it is easily forded, and was temporarily bridged by the Japanese.

The position is a mile long at the most. Artillery—two batteries on above-mentioned spur, one battery on the hill to the north, of which the spur is an under-feature—all in line in gun pits. Infantry trenches as on map. Position arranged for two battalions and three batteries, with other troops in reserve. Outposts (one battalion) two miles in advance of the position, to the north-west, up the valley and across the Sai-ma-chi road.

I made the following notes on inspecting the ground. Gun pits excellently made and position well chosen, as is always the case with the Japanese. Excellent field of fire down the valley. Excellent means of bringing up the guns or withdrawing them under cover, except for the last thirty yards immediately in rear of the gun pits. The battery on the hill north of the spur and above it had a good path under cover prepared for ascent and descent.* The infantry trenches were well made and thoughtfully situated and planned. For instance, the trench C, which is almost on a level with the plain, and the parapet of which is almost flush with the ground, is dominated by hills D and E, and on this account it was carefully concealed with brushwood, some trees in front were allowed to stand, even to the extent of interfering somewhat with the field of fire, and the inside of the parapet had been hollowed out to provide cover from plunging fire. At F, as will be seen on the plate, there were two tiers of fire, but it was obvious that no general would care to make a frontal attack on such a position over such open ground (except, perhaps, a Russian one, for it was done on the 22nd June).

The gap, or absence of infantry trench in front of the battery at A, is explained by the gentleness of the slope of the ground, which would have rendered the position of infantry there in danger from their own guns. The infantry trenches are of the same shape as those in the prepared position five miles north of Feng-huang-cheng, and the soil is exactly the same, being easy to work in. Abattis was employed three hundred yards in front of the infantry trenches on the right or north side only. The intercommunication of the trenches was good, and so was communication to the rear. The infantry field of fire was good (very good in centre), but the ranges are short in front of the trenches marked C. Hill E dominates D, and hill D dominates C. There was good range and field of fire for the guns to the west and the south, not so good to the north. The Japanese used no head-cover, but all trenches were carefully concealed with bits of scrub. (Evidently done while the outposts were engaged in the morning of 22nd, as I saw nothing of the sort on the afternoon of the day before. I asked a question about it then, and the staff officer told me that if there should be any fighting, the trenches would be concealed in no time. Of course green scrub withers, and what appears natural one day is a withered brown target on the next.)

* The guns were all mountain guns.—J. B. J.

The Russian force nearest Ai-yang-cheng was known to be at Sai-ma-chi, about sixteen miles away. At 10.0 a.m. on the 22nd the Russians, 2,000 strong (Cossacks, infantry, and three or four horse artillery guns), attacked the outposts (one battalion two miles in advance of the position), opening their attack with guns. The battalion fell back very slowly, fighting all the time, on the prepared position. On one occasion some of the combatants were within three hundred yards of each other. Most of the Japanese casualties, and they were very few, occurred during the retirement.* It was not until 2.0 p.m. that the Cossacks and guns appeared on the rising ground on which the temple of Hei-lao-shih is situated. The Russian infantry had already deployed across the valley, and part proceeded to occupy the wooded hill E. The Russian guns which came into action at the temple only succeeded in firing a few shots when the men serving them were compelled to seek cover by the Japanese artillery, which had carefully ascertained the range many days before. Several attempts were made by the Russian gunners to serve the guns during the afternoon, but they were always forced to desist. The Cossacks never got any further than Hei-lao-shih and did not come under fire for the rest of the day. The Russian infantry on the plain reached a point level with Wang-chia-pu-tzu, but never got any further. The Russian left never advanced much further than the hill crest, 950 yards from the Japanese guns. At 5.0 p.m. the Russians withdrew their guns under heavy artillery fire. Only part of the Japanese guns declared their position and fired during that day. Shortly afterwards the Russian infantry began to retire (Chinese inhabitants told me it did it very quickly and in great confusion at first), and all firing had ceased by 6.30 p.m. There was no pursuit.

It is difficult to understand why the Russians attacked with such a force in such a way—it is charitable to suppose that not only were they in ignorance of the force opposed to them, but had no idea whatever about the Japanese prepared position—a frontal attack on a very strong prepared position held by troops far exceeding them in number both in guns and men, with apparently no scheme or plan of any kind. The fact that the fighting lasted from 10 a.m. until 6.30 p.m. precludes the notion of its having been a reconnaissance in force, for by 3.0 p.m. the Russian general should have known a great deal about the position and number of the Japanese. The position, as mentioned above, is not a long one, and, being exceeding strong in its centre, the obvious way to attack it is across the hills on either or both flanks with a holding force in the valley, but anyhow, to attack an enemy three times superior in number in a prepared position was hopeless from the first. General Sasaki's chief of

* All accounts agree that the retirement of the outpost battalion was extremely well conducted, which must have been the case, as it took the Russians four hours to drive them back two miles.—J. B. J.

ACTION AT AI-YANG-CHENG. (AIYUMON.)

POSITION FROM 3:0 P.M.
UNTIL 5 P.M.



100 200 300 400 500 600 Yards

Japanese Trench

Guns

Russians

Trees partly cut down.

TRENCH at C!



staff said it had been settled beforehand there should be no pursuit, or there would have been time before dark to inflict considerable loss on such a force in retirement. Russian methods seem no better in attack than they are in defence.

The Russian loss was:—killed, 42 (the Japanese found 22 of these), besides wounded. The Japanese casualties were 11 in all (including one major, O.C. Reserve battalion).

(15) First Japanese Army.—The Russian Attack on the Mo-tien Ling on the 4th July 1904.*

REPORTS by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., Head-Quarters First Japanese Army, 17th July 1904, and Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery, 2nd Division First Japanese Army, 5th July 1904.

Plate.

Attack on the Mo-tien Ling - - Map 15.

Report of Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

4th July.

I have the honour to forward the accompanying report and sketch by Captain Vincent, Royal Artillery, relative to the attack made by two Russian battalions on the Japanese outposts shortly before dawn on the morning of the 4th instant.

2. The attack was so unforeseen, and the affair so quickly brought to a conclusion, that I failed to get up the Mo-tien Ling in time to see the fighting. I was, however, compensated for this disappointment by the kindness of the authorities, who arranged for me to be taken over the ground and shown all that there was to be seen.

3. On the pass we met several officers, all of whom accompanied us past the temples to the narrow ridge where most of the fighting took place. There was no mistaking the spot, for the bloodstains were still on the ground, and the trees were pretty well riddled with bullets.

4. I then heard the story as told by the principal actors, and although there might be slight discrepancies and occasional repetitions in connection with Captain Vincent's report, I think it will be interesting if I repeat what I heard.

5. On the night of the 3rd July the Japanese outposts were as stated by Captain Vincent in the opening paragraph of his accompanying report, namely:—

One section (36 rifles—piquet?) in the village of Li-chia-pu-tzu.†

One section (piquet?) in the valley to the north of the road.

* The First Japanese Army moved forward from Feng-huang-cheng on the 24th June; the Russian detachments gave way and retired without serious opposition, evacuating the Mo-tien Ling and all the passes on either side of it. On the 27th June the Japanese advanced guards made good all these important strategic points. The following reports describe the Russian attempts to retake the Mo-tien Ling.

† See Map 15.

Remainder of company and one company in reserve at the Old Temple, viz., one company and a half—(we would call this a support). The third company was also in reserve at the New Temple—(support?).

6. At midnight, a patrol was sent out from Li-chia-pu-tzu along the road to Ta-wan and returned saying all was well. At 3 a.m. two patrols went out, one of them going down the same road. They returned about 4 a.m., and just as the Ta-wan patrol was in the act of reporting no news of the enemy, a shot was fired, and the Russians were upon them.

7. At 4 a.m., the Japanese sentry, posted some fifty yards in front of Li-chia-pu-tzu, saw a single man standing before him. He took him for a comrade, and challenged, when he was answered by a shot and a mass of Russians came on with the bayonet. Most of the thirty-six men in the village fell back at once, or very nearly at once, in a southerly direction first, and then worked round eastwards, to try and join their reserve. Almost all the Russians passed through the village and continued to march to the east so as to get on to the top of the spur. Some five or six men, with the lieutenant commanding the piquet, remained, however, in the village fighting a confused fight in the darkness with a certain number of Russians. At last they had to fall back, but in doing so, found the Russian battalion athwart the ridge and between them and the support. How they managed to get through or round I do not exactly know, nor do I think they have any very clear idea themselves.

8. Meanwhile, the company commander at the Old Temple hearing the shooting, sent out an officer's reconnaissance with twenty men. They came up against the Russians just where the 1st Battalion is shown on the accompanying map. The officer in command fell back some two hundred yards eastwards, to the edge of the wood, which is very thick undergrowth of hazel and oak. The Russian line was then facing the New Temple, whence one company (the only remaining reserve immediately available) had advanced downwards into the valley from which they could threaten the Russian left if they persevered in moving eastwards towards the Old Temple. Thus, the fire of the twenty men, who were very speedily reinforced by the company from the New Temple, enfiladed the Russians, who threw back their right flank, and then advanced with a part of their force, with the hurrah and the bayonet, against the edge of the wood. They got as far as the edge, and it was here that most of the hand-to-hand fighting took place. But they never actually penetrated the wood or succeeded in forcing the Japanese back. Twice they made the hurrah, and each time the Japanese proved themselves the better men.

9. Unable to make headway, and attacked on both sides by an inferior, but enveloping force, whose numbers could not be

seen for the thick brushwood, whilst they themselves were in a column, or something very like it, on the open spur, the Russians gave way and fell back, just as it was getting light at 4.30 a.m. A few minutes later, the colonel of the 30th Regiment arrived on the ground with two more companies (battalion not stated). He left the two companies which had borne the brunt of the fighting, and taking on the comparatively fresh company of reserve, which had been at the New Temple, he pursued with three companies. The pursuit continued as far as Ta-wan. Twice the enemy tried to make a stand, but had to continue falling back when pressed. When Ta-wan was reached the Russian reserves came out and manned their trenches, letting the beaten troops pass through.

10. The Russian battalion of the 24th Regiment had advanced a short way up the valley to the north of the spur on which the battalion of the 10th Regiment had been engaged. Its intention probably was to attack the New Temple, but it observed the retreat of the battalion of the 10th Regiment before becoming seriously engaged and fell back also.

11. If only the Russians had timed their attacks simultaneously there is but little doubt they must have carried one or both of the temples, even if they did not succeed in taking the pass itself. It is difficult to believe that one company and one section, *plus* the remnants of a piquet of thirty-six men, could have stopped a whole battalion which had actually got to hand-to-hand fighting. This small force was enabled to hold its own, because the Russians were distracted by the attack from the New Temple. If, however, the battalion of the 24th Regiment had been in its proper place at the proper time, either it would have found no one to oppose it at the New Temple, or else it would have entirely relieved the left flank of the battalion of the 10th Regiment, which ought then to have been able to take the Old Temple. In short, the Russian attack was what the French call *décousu* to the last degree, and showed very bad staff work on their part.

12. Even if the attack had succeeded, the two Russian battalions must have been driven out or captured in a few hours time, as soon as reinforcements came up, and it is difficult indeed to fathom the meaning or intention which underlay this strange operation. I can only think of the two following possible explanations:—(1) That the Russians were in complete ignorance of the actual situation, notwithstanding the many Chinese who must be available to give them intelligence; or, (2) That it was hoped the two battalions might be able to take the two temples, or the pass, and maintain themselves there a short time so as to give a *point d'appui* to the Russians for a general action, into which the bulk of their force would hasten as soon as it was known their comrades had been successful.

Report by Captain Vincent, Royal Artillery.

On the night of the 3rd July, 1904, the Japanese outposts **4th July.** were placed as shown on the map:—

One section (36 men) in the village of Li-chia-pu-tzu.

One section in the valley to the north of the road.

Remainder of company and one company in reserve at the Old Temple. The third company at the New Temple. Observation posts as indicated.

At 4 a.m. on the 4th July, the Japanese sentry in front of Li-chia-pu-tzu saw troops approaching in the dark, but mistook them for a returning Japanese patrol. The Russians stopped on being challenged, then surrounded the village, and the thirty-six Japanese retired up the spur on which the road is, losing five killed.

Just about 4 a.m. a patrol of twenty men was preparing to start out from the Old Temple, and hearing the firing was the first to support the retiring piquet.

The Russians (a battalion of the 10th East Siberian Rifles) advanced up the road, and when on the top of the spur, in the open, were met by a fierce fire from the edge of the wood from the two reserve companies of the 30th Regiment and the remainder of the outpost company which had closed in. It was still dark and the opposing firing lines were only at about one hundred yards distance. They soon got mixed up together and fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place.

At 4.30 a.m. the Russians retreated in good order down the valley, carrying off all but the most severely wounded. Two more Japanese companies reinforced the other three, and the Russians were pursued to beyond Li-chia-pu-tzu. A battalion of the 24th East Siberian Rifles, which had come up behind Rocky Hill, seeing the others retreating, retired as well. If this battalion had continued up the valley north of the road, it might have taken the position. There were about fifty Russian cavalry with this battalion.

The Japanese loss was 18 killed and 30 wounded. There were a great many bayonet wounds; one officer who was wounded by both bullets and bayonet in six places, is progressing favourably.

The Japanese buried 53 Russians on the spot, and three others afterwards died, making 56 killed, 45 captured wounded, including a medical officer, and two unwounded prisoners.

As all the Russian wounded were severe cases (chiefly in the legs), probably the slightly wounded all got away.

It is not at all evident what intention the Russians had. They carried a lot of spare food and cooking utensils, as if for a stay of some days. Perhaps their information was bad, and

thinking the pass was only lightly held, meant to retake it at dawn.

They were evidently surprised to find a Japanese piquet so far down the valley, and not knowing how large a force might be in the wood whence the firing came, after a stubborn fight they retired.

The Japanese reserves turned out with admirable promptness, and the line of resistance taken up at the edge of the wood was good, though if the second Russian battalion had advanced up the valley it would probably have been turned.

In the war of 1894-95 only a few Japanese scouts came to the Mo-tien Ling, the main army finding it easier to go from Feng-huang-cheng to Hai-cheng, thereby turning the Chinese flank. The Chinese thought that the Japanese were afraid owing to the god in the Old Temple on the pass, and in commemoration of the event built the New Temple near the same place, now occupied by the Japanese. Outside the temple is a stone pillar inscribed to the above effect.

**(16) First Japanese Army.—The Action at the
Mo-tien Ling on the 17th July 1904.**

REPORTS by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Head-Quarters First Japanese Army, 25th July 1904, and
Captain B. VINCENT, R.A., Lien-shan-kuan, 20th July
1904.

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Report by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

I BEG to forward herewith a report of the attack made **17th July.** upon the Mo-tien Ling pass on the 17th instant. It is accompanied by four sketches,* which are quite admirable, and in his account Captain Vincent has succeeded in giving the reader a clear idea of an action which does not lend itself easily to description. I also enclose a description by Captain Vincent of the Hsia-ma-tang subsidiary fight, on the same date.

2. Taking these two enclosures together, however, they only represent the battle of Mo-tien Ling on the Japanese centre and right centre. The troops engaged on either side and the importance of the action would not be altogether realized by these accounts alone, and as the battle was fought over a front of about ten miles, I propose to set forth such particulars as I have been able to glean regarding the various points of contact of the opposing forces, beginning on the extreme right of the Japanese outposts.

3. To assist you in following the operations, I have prepared an outline plan, simply showing the roads along and across the front of the 2nd Division, and have marked it "A."†

4. The right of the Japanese line was held by the 16th Regiment, with its head-quarters at Hsia-ma-tang. The colonel of the regiment had only the 1st and 2nd Battalions under his command, the 3rd Battalion having been despatched upon a special mission to a point on the road Feng-huang-cheng-Hsi-mu-cheng,‡ which took it entirely beyond the sphere of operations of the battle of Mo-tien Ling. The outposts thrown forward by the 16th Regiment were one company on the Hsia-ma-tang-Chiao-tou road, one company on the Hsia-ma-tang-

* Only two of these are reproduced. † Map 16.

‡ For these places see Map 1.

Hsiao Ku-chia-tzu road, and one company on the Hsia-ma-tang-Hsiao-kao Ling road. This left the officer commanding the regiment with one battalion and one company in hand at Hsia-ma-tung.

5. At 11.50 a.m. the company on the road to Chiao-tou was attacked by eight Russian companies and one squadron of cavalry, which came from the direction of Hsiao Ku-chia-tzu. Very shortly after the attack began the Japanese company fell back upon its line of resistance, where it was reinforced by one company of engineers sent by the G.O.C. 2nd Division from Lien-shan-kuan. The enemy did not press the attack with much determination, and at 12.40 p.m. began to fall back in a north-westerly direction.

6. Continuing from right to left, the next outpost was that on the Hsia-ma-tang—Hsiao Ku-chia-tzu road, the famous 6th Company of the 16th Regiment. Captain Vincent has described the action in which this company and its reinforcements became engaged, calling it the defence of the position held by the 16th Regiment. As it will be seen, however, the mass of the 16th Regiment was elsewhere, and the action in question was rather the gallant defence of an outpost by the 6th Company, to whose assistance reinforcements were sent by the officer commanding the regiment, and by the general commanding the division. At 8 a.m. then, the enemy who had made a very wide turning movement from the direction of Ta Ku-chia-tzu, and had probably marched all night, suddenly opened a heavy fire on the 6th Company from a hill commanding their post and immediately to the west of it. Captain Vincent gives the force of the enemy at three battalions, but Head-Quarters put it at eight companies. It has struck me that this discrepancy may be explained from the numbers Captain Vincent tells us were observed on the enemy's caps. The numbers he gives are the 11th, 12th, and 21st Regiments. But these are the old Chiu-lien-cheng* regiments, and the 11th was quite cut to pieces there. It strikes me then that this was a two-battalion regiment, made up out of the remains of three Chiu-lien-cheng battalions, which would explain the discrepancy. Owing to the superior numbers of the enemy, and their commanding position, the 6th Company was very hard pressed indeed, but at about 9 a.m. the officer commanding the 16th Regiment sent it two companies as a reinforcement, and the enemy was temporarily checked. This was all, however, the officer commanding the regiment could do, for under urgent orders he had been obliged to march one battalion on to Hsiao-kao Ling, and thence to Ta-tu-kou, leaving only a small party at Hsiao-kao Ling. The battalion reached Hsiao-kao Ling at 10 a.m., and arrived at Ta-tu-kou in the course of the afternoon. Thus of the eight companies at the disposal of the commanding officer, one was on the Chiao-tou road (*vide* paragraph 5),

* The battle of the Ya-lu.

three were on the Hsiao Ku-chia-tzu road, and four were marching between Hsia-ma-tang and Ta-tu-kou. Fortunately the divisional head-quarters were alive to the situation, and had sent off the 2nd Battalion of the 29th from Lien-shan-kuan as a reinforcement. This battalion appeared in the distance at 1.30 p.m., just as the Russians made another vigorous attack and tried to regain the ground they had lost. After very stiff fighting they were finally repulsed at 3 p.m. The casualties were naturally most severe in the 6th Company, which had been on outpost, and had borne the brunt of the fighting from the first, and, as stated by Captain Vincent, every one of, or superior to, the grade of sergeant-major was either wounded or killed. At 4.30 p.m. the enemy retreated in the direction of Ta Ku-chia-tzu. Everyone seems agreed that the Russians here fought with intelligence and courage. Still, when all is said and done, and whilst gladly bearing witness to the fact that the Japanese infantry soldier is second to none in the world, is it quite comprehensible that eight companies should be stopped for an hour by one company when they had reached, unobserved, a commanding position a few hundred yards from it? For Manchuria is not South Africa, and neither Russians nor Japanese resemble the Boers. I mean to say it is infinitely more easy here than it was in South Africa, to judge by the extent of front held, &c., &c., the strength of the opposing force. Besides a most tenacious courage, the chief characteristic displayed by the 6th Company on this occasion was a combination of very great mobility with a wide extension, which always enabled them to present a front to every attempt of the vastly superior Russian force to turn their flanks. Eventually they actually succeeded, in spite of their inferior numbers, in turning the flanks of the Russians.

7. Passing on from the Japanese right to the left we now come to the centre, or the Mo-tien Ling, which was held by the 30th Regiment under the direct superintendence of its brigadier, Major-General Okasaki. At 12.30 a.m. an attack on the outpost of Hsin-kai Ling put everyone on the alert, and the 30th Regiment stood to its arms. At 3 a.m., therefore, when the attack actually began, all the troops were at their stations—namely, the 1st Battalion was posted on the south side of the main road, or the left of the road if marching on Liao-yang; the 2nd Battalion took the right section of defence on the north side of the road; whilst the 3rd Battalion was assembled on the eastern side of the pass awaiting orders. The guns had been ready in their gun pits for several days. Their position is shown on Captain Vincent's sketch.* This was the state of things at 4 a.m. I have ascertained from the General Staff that, as a matter of fact, the outposts on the night of the 16th were not quite the same as on the occasion of the attack of the

* Map 17.

4th July (*vide* paragraph 1 of Captain Vincent's report and my former report).* The piquet line had been retired from Li-chia-pu-tzu to the Old Temple, where the supports had formerly been posted, and Li-chia-pu-tzu was therefore unoccupied, except that it was at intervals visited by patrols.

There was practically, therefore, no resistance to the advance of the enemy till he got into actual touch with the troops entrenched on the main ridge, as the piquets in the two temples had orders to fall back upon their supports, which in this instance were on the line of resistance. About 5 a.m. the 1st Battalion of the 30th opened fire on the enemy, who had reached a point on their right which brought them within 300 or 400 yards of the Japanese left. Directly this happened, the enemy, who was of a strength of about two battalions, replied vigorously all along their line. This line was not parallel to the Japanese line of defence. The extreme Russian right was, as before stated, within a few hundred yards of the Japanese left. From thence it trended away northwards along the New Temple ridge, striking the road about one thousand yards south of the building. The side of the road, which was sunk about a foot, gave a little cover, and the Russian line followed this up to the New Temple itself, and the little rising ground B immediately above it.† This temple marked the left of the Russian line, for all practical purposes, at this early hour, although afterwards it became the centre. Thus the Russian right was within three hundred or four hundred yards of the Japanese, and their left was at least one thousand five hundred yards distant. As the enemy's right seriously threatened the position, two companies of the 3rd Battalion 30th Regiment, which was still in reserve, were sent out at 5 a.m. to occupy the very highest point of the Mo-tien Ling, thus prolonging the first battalion to the left, up a piece of most precipitous mountain. One more company was sent to reinforce the centre of the line, and only one company was kept in reserve.

From 5.40 a.m. onwards it seemed as if the enemy was constantly being reinforced. At 6 a.m. the firing became especially heavy on the heights to the Japanese left, whilst the true Russian left showed to the extent of some two companies on the heights north of Hsiao-kao Ling, marked C. At 6.30 a.m. the Japanese guns shelled the enemy on this Hsiao-kao Ling ridge. At 8 a.m. great masses of Russians were seen coming up to reinforce their own right wing and left centre. Those reinforcing the left centre showed a solid line and advanced shoulder to shoulder up the valley which lies between the New Temple ridge and Rocky Hill. The Japanese guns got a better chance here than has been offered to any artillery since the battle of Omdurman. The range was about three thousand yards, and the guns were about five hundred feet above their objective. This made the fire rather too plunging for absolute

* Pages 145 and 142.

† Map 17.

perfection, and possibly, if an artilleryman had been asked to arrange something quite ideal, he would have shortened the range by five hundred yards. Still, it must have been very much the target a good gunner dreams of and ordinarily dreams of in vain. Some three hundred Russians were killed here by the shrapnel of the six guns, and probably three times that number were wounded.

The strength of the Russians was now estimated at four regiments. The fighting went on until 9 a.m., without the position of either side changing materially; the enemy repeatedly endeavouring to envelope the Japanese left and being as often foiled by the fire of the two companies posted, as already described, on the highest point of the Mo-tien Ling. Soon after 9 a.m. the enemy began to fall back, commencing from his left. I see that Captain Vincent attributes this retirement to special causes. I do not think either of them can be held accountable, for reasons I shall give in my comment at the end of the report. The retirement began on the Russian left, whilst their right held on obstinately to prevent the line of retreat from being cut. The Japanese, seeing the backward movement, assisted it by magazine fire and the rapid fire of their guns.

At 10 a.m. the whole of the enemy's line relaxed its grasp on the Japanese position, except the two companies on the extreme Russian right. At 10.30 these two companies had fallen back to ridge E, whilst the Japanese, pursuing with deliberation, were firing at them from ridge D and from the road coming down from the pass. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 30th pursued with their front extending from Hsiao-kao Ling to the Mo-tien Ling road, and the 3rd Battalion now took the Japanese left (so I am informed by Head-Quarters) and pressed the enemy's right, which fell back slowly in the direction of Tien-shui-tien and Ta-wan. The 3rd Battalion of the 29th Regiment arrived as a reinforcement on the Mo-tien Ling at 9.30 a.m. They were immediately sent off in pursuit of the enemy together with the divisional regiment of cavalry. Finding it quite impossible to attempt any mounted pursuit of the enemy, who were not by any means routed, the cavalry dismounted, leaving their horses at the Old Temple, and attacked some of the enemy on M, who were annoying the right of the Japanese pursuit. The main force of the enemy retreated into the Ta-wan valley from Tien-shui-tien and Chin-chia-pu-tzu. A part of the enemy occupied the high ground marked G, to the west of Chin-chia-pu-tzu, and the pursuing force exchanged fire with them till 4.20 p.m., when the engagement ceased.

It should be mentioned that at 2 p.m. a Russian battery near Chin-chia-pu-tzu opened rapid shrapnel fire for about half a minute on ridge C. I do not wish to see better practice, and the Japanese company holding it came tumbling down the eastern slopes in double quick time. The New Temple, the Old Temple, Rocky Hill, and ridge D were covered by Japanese

troops at the time, and why the Russian guns did not open on these is strange. From where the battery was posted it could not see either of the temples, it is true, but the enemy on G must have seen us plainly, and with the help of a $\frac{1}{50000}$ Russian map it would have been easy to have done some damage.

8. Passing now to the left of the 2nd Division, there was a company of the 4th Regiment, 3rd Brigade, on outpost on the ridge of the Hsin-kai Ling.* One company of the enemy attacked shortly after midnight. Before long it was repulsed and fell right back to the north of Ma-kou-men-tzu. At about 6.30 a.m. another company of the 4th Regiment, sent out from the Hsin-kai Ling to reconnoitre, came in contact with a Russian company to the east of Ma-kou-men-tzu. After a brisk conflict the enemy were compelled to retreat and the Japanese pressing on were enabled to occupy the high ground above Ma-kou-men-tzu at 7.30 a.m. Hardly had they got into position when a battalion of Russians advancing from the direction of Li-chia-pu-tzu attacked their right flank. At the same time a party of the enemy were seen coming towards them from the direction of Ta-wan. Encouraged by this the Russian company, which was in full retreat after the conflict, turned back and renewed the fight. The Japanese were thus attacked on three sides and were very hard pressed. They were on the very point of falling back when, in the nick of time, two other companies of the same regiment which were on reconnaissance duty came up, and not only helped them out of their difficulties but shook off the enemy. These three Japanese companies were then enabled to cause considerable loss and annoyance to some of the enemy who were marching to the Mo-tien Ling at 9 a.m. by pressing upon their right rear. Later on two more companies were sent from the 4th Regiment, making a total of five Japanese companies. The enemy engaged with the 4th Regiment, of a strength of about three battalions, now definitely retreated in the direction of Yang-mu-lin-tzu. At 1 p.m. the mass of the enemy retiring from the Mo-tien Ling along the main road had to run the gauntlet of these five companies, who held the high ground east Ma-kou-men-tzu, whence they poured a heavy fire upon the Russians which is believed to have caused much loss.

9. This ends the account of the battle of the 17th July as far as I have been able to glean particulars up to date.

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The closeness of the Russian formations left nothing to be desired from the Japanese point of view. The men were shoulder to shoulder, usually quite visible lying along the top of a ridge, whilst their officers stood up with field glasses directing their fire.

The fire was by section volleys, a section being about seventy rifles. It was easy to see the rifles come up simultaneously

* See Map 16.

to the present, and then anyone who was wise on the other side put their heads down and let the bullets fly past. The marksmanship was bad, as it always must be with volleys in the field except at very long range where they can be executed with the utmost calmness. Some of the Russian prisoners, reservists, could not sight the rifles and knew very little about handling them, having only had them to work with for a fortnight previous to the battle.

The Russians retired with almost contemptuous deliberation, which a couple of pom-poms would have done much to enliven.

I cannot speak too highly of the Japanese. Some critics seem to think the pursuit was too deliberate. After having been under arms since midnight and having shaken off, but not routed, a greatly superior foe, the Japanese were, in my opinion, absolutely bound to go slow in pursuing up a valley where whole brigades might be concealed and within a few miles of the enemy's main camp.

*Report by Captain B. Vincent, Royal Artillery.**

The following account has been collected from a variety of sources, personal observation, conversations with officers and soldiers on the field, as well as a short official account of the day's operations.

At 12.30 a.m. on the 17th July, Major-General Matsunaga, **17th July.** commanding 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, communicated to Major-General Okasaki, commanding 15th Brigade, 2nd Division, that a detachment of Russians was on his front, and that there might be a general attempt to surprise the Japanese position at or before dawn.

At 2.30 a.m. a squadron of Russian cavalry, and a large party of infantry (afterwards discovered to have been one brigade, with the rest of a division close behind in Chin-chia-pu-tzu) approached the Japanese outposts at Li-chia-pu-tzu, some two miles west of the Mo-tien Ling. The outposts were occupying much the same position as when attacked on 4th July.†

The piquet line, seeing this large force in front, after some firing, fell back up the road to the supports in the Old Temple. Then the whole outpost line retired almost immediately, as pre-arranged, to the "line of resistance," on the ridge of the Mo-tien Ling. Meanwhile Major-General Okasaki called out the remainder of his brigade to the place of rendezvous at the pass.

When dawn broke at 4 a.m. the Russian position was as follows:—

Their right extended to the south of the Old Temple along the wooded ridge, where they had thrown up some trenches.

* See Map 17.

† Shown on Map 15.

Their centre was on the hill of the New Temple, which they also occupied, and extended along the road from there towards the pass. A strong force was also seen on the spur running west from the New Temple.

For about an hour after dawn brisk rifle fire was exchanged between the Japanese on the main ridge and the Russians on the road, at ranges varying from 300 to 2,000 yards. Soon the main body of the Russian centre column in close formation was seen advancing up the valley to the north of Rocky Hill, and the Japanese field battery which had been in position on the ridge for about a fortnight, opened fire with great effect. Shells were also fired at the temple, which bore marks of having been hit about ten times. The Russians offered splendid targets at very effective ranges, and the Japanese say some three hundred Russians corpses were found in the valley.

While this shelling was taking place a battalion of the 16th Regiment on the right of the Japanese position opened on the advancing Russians with long range volleys.

At this time there were also two Russian regiments on ridge C, and one corps and one divisional commander (Generals Keller and Kashtalinski) were said to have been on the road near the New Temple. The Russian right was nearest in touch with the Japanese position, but the left was never nearer than one thousand yards from the ridge.

The Japanese force at dawn consisted of the 30th Regiment (three battalions) and one battery of field artillery. By 9 a.m. this force had been increased to three regiments, and one more battalion was on its way from Lien-shan-kuan. Even with this addition, however, the Japanese were still too weak in numbers to attempt a counter-attack.

At 9 a.m. the Japanese battery shelled the Russians out of the New Temple, and at 9.10 a.m. the Russian retirement began. An officer who was on the main ridge said that at first they could not understand why the Russians suddenly began to retire, and thought it must be due to happenings in some other part of the field. This proved to have been the case, for about this time the 3rd Brigade advanced through the woods, and, pushing back the Russian right, threatened their rear.

Also the Guard Division on the left of the 2nd Division sent out at dawn a reconnoitring party of one battalion of infantry and one battery of field artillery to a point about two miles south of Ta-wan. This force, hearing the heavy firing at the Mo-tien Ling, opened fire with its guns so as to create a diversion, and no doubt made the Russian commander feel anxious about his line of retreat.

I also heard unofficially that the officer commanding 3rd Brigade sent out a small reconnoitring force from Hsin-kai Ling, some few miles south of the Mo-tien Ling,* towards the

* 5 miles south of the Mo-tien Ling.

Russian main camp at Ta-wan. This detachment met a company of Russians who were soon reinforced by a battalion.

The Japanese force suffered very severely, though they were also reinforced from their battalion. Word was sent back to the regimental commander, who sent up further reinforcements, with the result that the Russians retired. Then the officer commanding this regiment, being rather pleased with his success, made a detour through the hills, though there were no paths, and marched towards the sound of the guns at the Mo-tien Ling. One may also assume that this advance on the Russian right rear may also have had something to do with their sudden retreat.

The Japanese position on the ridge would have been exceedingly difficult to take, even though held by a comparatively small force.

The Russian retirement was conducted in the most orderly manner, the wounded being carried away on stretchers and in ambulances. Their left drew back first and occupied ridge M beyond Rocky Hill where four field guns were ostentatiously displayed.

Then the centre, instead of returning down the valley by which they had come, climbed over ridge C. The right drew back through the woods along the main road to the south of Rocky Hill.

The Japanese say that they could do little to press the retirement. At 9.30 a.m. they commenced to advance from the left and right of their position on the main ridge, the former proceeding through the woods, while the latter tried to scramble down the valley in front of the position, but found it so steep and slippery that most of them had to go round by the road. At 9.40 a.m. the Japanese held the line of the New Temple ridge.

From daylight on the 17th we could hear the sound of guns and volley firing from our quarters at Lien-shan-kuan, some five miles east of Mo-tien Ling.

The valley in which Lien-shan-kuan lies was enveloped in a dense fog and it was not until we had almost reached the pass at 10 a.m. that the fog cleared (I was told afterwards that the fog was not nearly so thick on the west side of the pass).

On the road we passed six artillery ammunition wagons, which had been despatched from the 2nd Division Artillery camp some four miles south of Lien-shan-kuan, also some sections of pack ammunition columns and about one battalion of infantry. At 10.30 a.m. we reached the pass and rode at once to the New Temple. There we left our horses and proceeded on foot down the thickly wooded ridge past the Old Temple, where I got separated from the remainder of the party. Near the edge of the wood I climbed a tree, and got a fine view of the Russians in the valley south of Rocky Hill. Several mounted

Russians were riding through the nearest village, and hundreds of infantry were retiring in the most leisurely manner imaginable down the road and river bed. Others were climbing slowly over the ridge M, stopping to fire a volley now and then at the Japanese across the valley. The ridge G was still held in force. At about 11.30 a.m. the severest exchange of fire was between the Russians on a wooded rocky ridge E, and part of the 30th Regiment on the slightly lower spur D. The Russians were firing nothing but volleys, the officers standing up on the skyline to direct their men's fire. The men too could be seen lining the crest of the ridge, shoulder to shoulder, and offering a splendid target to the Japanese on ridge D at from 800 to 1,000 yards. The Japanese were clustered together in groups around the little rocky knolls along the top of the ridge, a great many sitting down resting and eating their dinners behind the crest line. They also fired volleys to some extent, but chiefly used independent fire.

The Russian bullets which cleared ridge D came rather too thickly round my tree, so I climbed down and crawled down the road to point V, where I remained till 12 noon. By that time the Japanese firing line had worked its way down to the foot of spur D and held a small rise in the valley. From there half a company extended cautiously, at about one pace interval, across a meadow field, but were met with a furious fire from the wood two hundred to three hundred yards in front which was apparently still strongly held by Russians. The Japanese lay prone on the ground about a yard apart, while the companies in rear fired volleys into the wood and at the Russians straggling quietly down the valley.

At 11.40 a.m., I noticed a few Japanese on the top of Rocky Hill to my right, and as a splendid view down the valley could be obtained from there, I determined to try to reach it. In the wood on my right there was a company or two of the 30th Regiment in deep shelter trenches without head cover. The men were eating their lunches and firing occasionally down the valley. I obtained permission to climb Rocky Hill. Beyond the wood in the open were several Russian dead and numbers of their brown blanket coats, rolled with the ends tucked into the aluminium cooking pot which each man carries. In some cases a section of a shelter tent was rolled inside the coat, and attached to each was a bundle containing black bread. If only a battery of artillery could have come into action here, it could have caused great loss to the Russians.

From the top of Rocky Hill, one saw the whole line of the Russian retirement down the valley, across the plain towards Ta-wan and up the valley beyond the Monument. There were still several companies of Russians in the valley and many others streaming over the ridges on each side. Just beyond Chin-chia-pu-tzu, eight field guns about twenty yards apart could be seen unlimbered in the open, the limbers and horses being

behind a slight rise in the ground to their left flank. For some reason or other the detachments had left their guns, and they certainly missed a splendid chance of shelling the Japanese on and around Rocky Hill.

The Russians were still pouring volleys from ridge M and G up the valley, and a Japanese soldier on the top of Rocky Hill received a bullet through his copper marksman's badge just above his heart, the bullet coming out at the back. He fell over and shouted "*Banzai*," but soon sat up again, and was actually seen walking home in the evening, showing the wound to his friends along the road.

A company of Russians held tenaciously to a knoll on ridge G and fired volleys continuously across the valley. Each volley was very easy to detect, though the grey uniforms were not, as the Russian powder emits a faint smoke. The light grey Russian uniform and cap are decidedly hard to see on the bright green background of the hills in these parts. The colour is, if anything, less conspicuous than the Japanese khaki.

All this time the Japanese on the south of the valley had been slowly working their way along, a little national flag being displayed behind each group as it advanced from knoll to knoll, a very good device which shows the general exactly the points which the troops have reached. The use of these little flags, carried by each half company or section, seems to solve the problem of how to overcome the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe at long ranges, and when displayed judiciously behind the firing line, they need not form a conspicuous mark to the enemy.

Beyond Chin-chia-pu-tzu there was a long column of Russians retiring towards Ta-wan, this place being crowded with carts and horses. Ambulances were going and returning between the above-mentioned villages.

At 1 p.m. two battalions of Russians appeared in quarter-column near the guns, and part of them deployed along a low ridge to the south of them.

The firing on both sides now began to slacken, and I returned to the New Temple to which the wounded, both Russians and Japanese, were being conveyed. There had evidently been severe fighting in and around the temple, judging by the number of empty cartridge cases along the road and the Russian dead around the building. It is a square enclosure of some forty yards wide, with a wall ten feet high, built by the Chinese in 1895 in honour of the god of the pass, who, they say, had prevented the Japanese army from coming there.

The buildings inside were crammed full of wounded, who were lying about at the feet of the great wooden gods.

While standing there at 2.10 p.m. the Russian artillery suddenly opened an accurate shrapnel fire on ridge C and drove off a company of Japanese, who scampered quickly

down into the valley. Every moment we expected them to turn their fire on to the Temple Spur, but instead of doing so they turned their attention to ridge M, on to which the Japanese had advanced from Rocky Hill.

The moral effect produced by these few rounds of shrapnel was most noticeable.

Except in the early morning, when the Japanese shells from the main position had a disastrous effect on the closed ranks of the advancing Russian main body, it may be said to have been entirely an infantry battle. The last shots were fired about 5 p.m., but four battalions and a Russian battery remained till next morning in Chin-chia-pu-tzu, when they withdrew to Ta-wan, which is being strongly fortified.

The Russian troops engaged at the Mo-tien Ling are said to have been the 34th and 35th Regiments of the 9th Division of the 10th European Corps, and also portions of the 3rd and 6th Siberian Divisions, in all probably about three regiments and a battery. Their casualties are estimated by the Japanese at about 2,000.

On the defenders' side, three regiments and a battery took part in the fight at the pass, and their casualties were 1 captain, 3 lieutenants and 99 men killed, 15 officers and 202 men wounded.

This attempt to take the Mo-tien Ling seems to have been part of a general attack on the line occupied by the 2nd Division. At Hsia-ma-tang,* some 3 miles north-east of the Mo-tien Ling, a most desperate encounter took place. Here a Russian regiment, making a wide sweeping movement, debouched into the new road north of the Mo-tien Ling, and swooped down on a battalion of the 16th Japanese Regiment in position on the hills near the junction of the road with the An-ping-Liao-yang road driving it back. One Japanese company on outpost suffered severely, losing all its officers and sergeant-major killed or wounded, the command ultimately devolving on a sergeant.

Beyond this, another post, on the extreme right of the line, was occupied by the 2nd Division. One squadron and several companies of Russians came down the Mukden road and attacked the Japanese outposts. The latter were sorely pressed, when both sides were reinforced, and finally, after severe fighting, the Russians retired towards evening.

Short Account of the Action of the 16th Regiment, 15th Brigade, 2nd Division, First Army, on 17th July 1904.†

17th July.

On the 24th July we rode to Cha-chia-pu-tzu, some 6 miles north-west of Lien-shan-kuan, the head-quarters of the 16th Regiment. We were shown over the position and the fight on the 17th was explained to us.

* On Map 16.

† See Map 18.

The fact that the Russian force of at least three battalions evidently contemplated a turning movement on the Japanese position at the Mo-tien Ling, but were defeated by the gallantry of the 6th Company, supported by the rest of the regiment, makes this a most important engagement.

Apparently the Russian attack was carefully planned and carried out in a most determined manner. It was only by a most skilful use of the defending force and the great exertion on the part of the troops themselves that the Russians were prevented from getting through.

Starting from Cha-chia-pu-tzu we rode up a rocky path in a deep valley with high hills on either side past a few huts called Erh-tao-kou where the outpost reserves were on the 17th.

We then climbed a very steep hill to spur J which was held by the 6th Company from dawn till dark on the day in question.

On the night of the 16th and 17th, the 6th Company was on outpost duty, the rest of the 2nd Battalion in and around Erh-tao-kou, while the 3rd Battalion was in reserve about Cha-chia-pu-tzu.

From spur J, we climbed through thick jungle to point B, whence a splendid view of the surrounding country was obtained. Unfortunately it was raining, so I was unable to sketch. About six miles south-west the mountain of Mo-tien Ling could be seen. Point B is about 1,000 feet above the valley to the north-west, and about 150 feet above spur J which it commands. The ground slopes away steeply to the valley and is covered with scrub and trees, many of which showed bullet marks. The little cairn of stones on the summit had also been hit hundreds of times. The valley to the north-west extends for several miles, a river having its source at the foot of the hill. In the distance one gets a glimpse between the hills of the flat plains of Liao-yang, though the town itself must be about due east.

To reach this point the Russians must have had a very hard climb at the end of a long and difficult night march, for a more intricate or difficult country it would be hard to imagine.

We were informed that at 3 a.m. on the 17th warning was received that an attack was probable. At 6 a.m. the fighting began, the 6th Company gallantly holding its ground on the ridge J until reinforced. All the officers and the sergeant-major were killed or wounded, and the command ultimately devolved on a sergeant.

The Russian main attack was directed to turning the Japanese position on this spur, and their intention was evidently to advance, if possible, down the valley to the north of it over the saddle. Several Russians actually got into the valley, but the main body never got through.

The hardest fighting took place between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m.

The 7th Company, as shown on the map, was sent from the extreme left to reinforce the extreme right, and apparently arrived just at the right moment to prevent the Russians from getting down the valley. Looking at the ground it seemed to me marvellous that the Russian attack did not succeed, as they could not have chosen a better or more unlikely place to attack from. They climbed unobserved to the very highest points, and from there they had thickly wooded ground to cover their movements.

Of course, they were probably tired after their long night march, but, at the same time, it must have entailed great mobility on the part of the Japanese to have defeated them at every point.

The numbers of the Russian regiments engaged, as denoted by their caps, were the 11th, 12th, and 21st.

Fifty-four Russians were buried; no prisoners were taken.

I noticed that the Japanese soldiers had put flowers over the graves of the Russians near spur J. The men of the regiment also spoke very highly of the way the Russians fought.

The Japanese casualties were 135 (41 killed including 4 officers). The last shot was fired at 5 p.m.

(17) First Japanese Army.—The Action at Chiao-tou* (Kyoto), on the 18th and 19th July 1904.†

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers, Head-Quarters 12th Japanese Division, 27th July 1904; with REMARKS by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., Head-Quarters First Japanese Army, 7th August 1904.

Plate.

Action at Chiao-tou - - - Map 19.

Covering Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B.

With reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Lieut.-General Hamilton's report, it would obviously be as advantageous as it is impossible for the observer and critic on one side to be acquainted with the objects, dispositions and orders of the commander on the other side. These, however, can only be deduced at the time from the action taken and the results achieved.

Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

I beg to submit herewith a report by Captain Jardine, 5th Lancers, on the battle of Chiao-tou, which, I may remark is always spoken of at Head-Quarters by its Japanese name, Kyoto.

2. It may be remembered that in a previous report commenting upon the fighting in the neighbourhood of the Mo-tien Ling on the 17th July, I referred to the difficulty of making a serious criticism on operations when still in ignorance of the orders issued by the general officer commanding-in-chief of the forces of the enemy. It now transpires through the press that the attack in question was after all a reconnaissance in force. Judged from that standpoint, it will

* $37\frac{1}{2}$ miles south-east of Liao-yang. For its general position, see Map 20.

† The 12th Division, which was engaged in this action, was operating to the north of 2nd Division at the Mo-tien Ling.

probably be quoted in the future as an example of an incompetently executed operation of war, not only for the reasons given in the report aforesaid, but because, with all the loss and demoralization to the Russian troops which it involved, it rather added to than diminished the obscurity which surrounded the Mo-tien Ling and its vicinity. The three Japanese battalions, afterwards increased to four, and supplemented by one field battery and a squadron of cavalry, were magnified into a superior force of the enemy. Surely one thousand casualties was a heavy price to pay for so misleading a piece of information. A reconnaissance in force appears to me to be a favourite device of an irresolute and unimaginative commander. No soldier fights his best in such a reconnaissance, because it is not intended he should do anything more heroic than draw the enemy's fire. The result usually is that a repulse is suffered and morale lowered without any corresponding advantage except that the general is enabled to say he is not to blame because he never meant to gain a victory.

3. The foregoing paragraph has been written not only to amplify my report but to lead up to the statement that, in commenting on this action of the 18th and 19th July, I am again confronted by the same difficulty of not knowing the instructions issued by the Russian General Officer Commanding-in-Chief to his detachment at Chiao-tou previous to the 18th and 19th July.

4. If the Russian commander at Chiao-tou merely meant to fight a delaying action why did he not, as Captain Jardine suggests, put his Cossacks in the trenches with their horses handy, and get his infantry clean away half-an-hour earlier? Had this been done the action would have been, from the Russian point of view, a very successful one of its kind. The Japanese would have been delayed and would have lost more than the Russians; and not only would the turning troops of the 12th Division have suffered great fatigue, but troops would have been attracted over from the 2nd Division also, all without very much result.

If, on the other hand, the Russian general intended to stop the Japanese, he must surely have seen that his flanks were his weak point, holding as he did an extraordinarily strong front. Under such circumstances the situation seemed to demand that he should keep half his force in reserve ready to launch it in the shape of a determined counter-attack against any Japanese troops which might isolate themselves in attempting to turn either flank. His failure to do this, supposing he meant to deny passage to the Japanese, is to me incomprehensible at present.

5. I will now supplement Captain Jardine's careful report by a more general statement made to me at the time news of the battle first reached Head-Quarters.

Statement.*

"The position of the enemy about Chiao-tou commanded the entrance to the defile through which we must pass in our advance, and was situated on a ridge which ran across the valley almost at right angles. The river flowed through a narrow gap at the eastern edge of the ridge. The name of this river is the Hsi Ho and the eastern extremity of the ridge on which the Russian left wing stood was 65 feet above the water, the western end of the same ridge being 325 feet above the flat cultivated plain on either side of it. From the strategical point of view, the tempting thing to do was to turn the enemy's right wing, but to carry this into effect, it would be necessary to make a very wide turning movement (*mouvement très prononcé*) over a series of precipitous pathless mountains. In short, this position was one so full of excellent advantages to the defence that it may be said to have been all advantages. 18th July.

"On the 18th, at about 4.30 p.m. the enemy in position made a semblance of commencing a retreat towards An-ping. The commander of the outposts thereupon advanced to reconnoitre and keep in touch with the enemy who turned about and retook the position, showing a very determined front and deploying about two battalions of infantry and eight cannon. The commander of the outposts, had thus fallen into a very critical situation, and the 6th Company which was in advance, lost all its officers in a very short time. By 6.30 p.m. the 46th Regiment and one battalion of the 24th Regiment belonging to the advanced guard, lined up with the outposts and thus a stiff fight was maintained until 9 p.m. The Japanese were, however, unable to carry the enemy's position, and as it grew dark, they bivouacked on the spot on which they found themselves, in fighting formation. During the night the Russians twice attempted to assault, playing military music, but were repulsed by our troops in the first line. It seems a strange thing to play music during a night attack—perhaps it was the moon which made the Russians feel sentimental.†

"On the 19th July the 12th Division, which had been getting into position during the night, attacked the enemy. The artillery took up a position at Hou Miao and on the height south of that locality. The Kigoshi Brigade extended in front of the enemy, the Imamoura Regiment (only two battalions) was detailed to turn the enemy's right, and the Shiba Battalion (only two companies) was posted at Lao-miao Ling‡ to hold the enemy 19th July.

* See Map 19.

† See Captain Jardine's report, page 167; it seems doubtful whether the Russians quitted their trenches.—Ian H.

‡ Between Chiao-tou and Pen-hsi-hu (17 miles north of Chiao-tou).

should he attempt to advance from the direction of Pen-hsi-hu. All these troops commenced their march on the night of the 18th.

"At 5 a.m. on the 19th, thirty-two of the enemy's guns in gun pits opened a heavy fire, but fortunately they were unable to locate exactly our much weaker mountain guns. The artillery fight continued with great fury till 9 a.m., after which only a very slow fire was exchanged. It was intended that the Imamoura Regiment should have marched a circuit of about ten miles in its turning movement, but the mountains it had to cross proved impassable in so many places that when they had arrived on the right flank of the enemy at 3 p.m. they had traversed between sixteen and seventeen miles.* At the same moment two companies of infantry, the head of a small column sent to co-operate from the 2nd Division, arrived equally at the same spot opposite the right wing of the Russians. These troops from the 2nd Division were under the command of Colonel Taniyama. Then the Kigoshi Brigade began its frontal attack, strongly supported by our artillery. The enemy still resisted stubbornly although he began to get his guns away. For two hours the fighting continued until the Imamoura Regiment and the Taniyama Column (one battalion and two companies) pushed impetuously against the enemy from a south-westerly direction. The combat of this wing then became bloody until at 5.30 the Kigoshi Brigade marched to the assault and carried the enemy's position on the ridge south of Chiao-tou. Simultaneously the Imamoura Regiment pushing across cut the enemy's line of retreat. The Russians then fell into confusion and their principal force marched off in disorder towards An-ping. One portion of their troops escaped into the mountains in a 'pell mell crowd.' At 6 p.m. the neighbourhood of Chiao-tou fell completely into our hands.

"The enemy who took part in this combat consisted of the 35th Regiment (4 battalions) and 36th Regiment (3 battalions) under the command of General Gerschelman. Also one regiment of Cossacks (Argunski) and 32 guns (3 field batteries and 1 mountain battery). The loss of the enemy is unknown, but it seems likely to be at least one thousand. According to prisoners' statements some companies had only one single soldier left. Up to 10 a.m. on the 20th sixty had been buried in the position itself. The prisoners up to that hour were 2 officers and 45 non-commissioned officers and men, but that number will augment. Our loss, as far as known at present, is 54 killed and 367 wounded, amongst whom Majors Okamoura and Hiraoko killed, the latter having served with your army in South Africa."

* It seems this is under the mark, *vide* Captain Jardine's report. —Ian H.

*Report by Captain J. B. Jardine.**


The troops engaged in the battle of Chiao-tou were as follows:—

Japanese, under Lieut.-General Inouye, 12th Division, which included 1 squadron and 36 mountain guns.

Russians under Lieut.-General Gerschelman, 9th Infantry Division, Tenth Army Corps, which included 1 Trans-Baikal Cossack regiment, and 32 guns of the 9th Artillery Brigade (24 field and 8 mountain guns). Both artillery and infantry had just arrived from Russia.

The Russian position was south-west to north-east on a ridge which more or less divides a valley. In front of the position, the valley stretches for 2,600 yards to the east and roughly three miles to the south. The Japanese approached from the east. In rear of the position the direction of the valley is west for over three miles. The ridge is abrupt to the south-east (the front) and gently sloping to the rear. The Russian centre and left were on the ridge; the right was unentrenched, except in a hurried way in places, and was on the slope of high hills bordering the west of the valley, of which the ridge is an underfeature, and among the hills themselves, some one thousand feet above the plain. The entrenchments were situated as on sketch, *i.e.*, on the ridge and partly up the slopes of the hills west of the valley and bordering on it. The hills on the left flank are practically impassable (their rise from the plain is precipitous, and cliffs and precipices occur in great numbers among them) so that flank might be considered secure. There is an excellent field of fire from the trenches as the plain is flat, and, except for the cottages which dot it, there is little natural cover from fire, although there is cover from view in the *kaoliang*, which is now over five feet high, and covers one-third of the ground. The large or main river is fordable in most places, although there are holes here and there (one man was drowned in the attack) and it is fifty yards wide. It has practically no banks (from the point of view of cover). There are no bridges. Trees are scarce in the valley; but there are a certain number on slopes of the high hills up to within eighty yards of the tops. There is also scrub interspersed with these trees, although little of it in the valley. The ground in rear of the position is similar, but, if anything, more open as the crops appear more backward. The trenches were most excellent for men standing, well drained, with good lateral and rear communication, and comfortable for the men, as they mostly have a ledge dug to form a seat.

* See Map 19.

Form of Trench.

On the other hand, there was no head-cover and no concealment. I could see rows of heads easily through my glasses. For the most part the trenches were on the edge of the ridge, and from quite half of them there is a sheer drop into the valley in front, as they were on the edge of a cliff. On this account some of the ground in front is dead. On the Russian left the trenches were only ten or twenty feet above the river bed. The lateral and rear communications of these were good and much trouble had been taken. The gun pits (there were no epaulments) were very good, and more were dug than there were guns. During the action I saw the guns moved from pit to pit. No cover for horses was provided near them, so these were kept some way down the slope in rear. Certain Russian guns could not fire on certain Japanese guns, and *vice versa*, otherwise the field of fire was good.* The Russians, as seen on sketch, dispersed their guns, but sometimes four were in line at close interval, in order, presumably, to obtain good positions for them and to avoid putting more than necessary on the front crest of the ridge. The result was that certainly not more than half of their guns, if as many, could fire on the attacking infantry when within 1,400 yards. A certain number could have done so, for I saw gun pits prepared for this purpose, but they had not been occupied and were few in number. The immediate reserves for the trenches were in shrapnel-proof shelter pits, two hundred to three hundred yards in rear, or concealed in the numerous folds in the ground.

18th July.

To continue the general movement of the Japanese First Army on Liao-yang, it was necessary to drive back the Russian force known to be in a strong position at Chiao-tou. This position was strategically important, for the enemy's occupation of it prevented the 12th Division moving either on Liao-yang, *via* An-ping, or across the Tai-tzu Ho, *via* a good road on the Russian rear or on Mukden. This road branches off at Hou Miao—the first Japanese gun position at this battle.

The position was reconnoitred by Major-General Kigoshi, whose brigade was in advance, with one battalion at 4.30 p.m.

* The conventional signs for gun pits on Map 19 do not represent their number but their positions.—J. B. J.

on 18th July. This battalion committed itself somewhat deeply and remained all night in front of the enemy's position. A line drawn through Chiao-tou village and parallel to the enemy's position will give roughly the ground it occupied.

Intermittent musketry went on all night, and, although the Russians did not leave their trenches, at 9.0 p.m. and again about midnight they opened a very heavy fire, accompanied by music from regimental bands which were presumably in the trenches too. The casualties of the battalion were 247. As it was already in position it formed part of the attack next day. 19th July.

On the 19th July the centre and left of the Russian position were attacked by the 46th Regiment and two battalions of the 24th Regiment respectively, *i.e.*, General Kigoshi's brigade, less one battalion. Two companies only of this battalion formed the reserve. The other two companies (half battalion) were posted at Lao-miao Ling,* to watch the enemy known to be at Pen-hsi-hu. These two companies, or rather a part of them, finding the Pen-hsi-hu road clear, by hard marching managed late in the day to find their way over the very difficult ground on the north-east of the Russian position and open fire on the last body of Russians to retreat, but they did not affect the general result. The 14th Regiment executed the attack on the Russian right, with the assistance of the companies of the 2nd Division, which arrived just as the enemy were falling back in front of that regiment. The 14th moved off on its long turning movement (17½ miles) out of sight of the enemy at about 7.30 a.m., travelling over a most difficult country for the greater part of the journey. The 47th, or remaining regiment of the division, was disposed to hinder any movement from the enemy from the direction of Sai-ma-chi. The batteries took up the positions marked A A on the sketch (three batteries at each) before day-break and hastily entrenched.

Head-Quarters of the division left Shang-tsui-tzu (17 miles south-east of Chiao-tou), at 4.45 a.m. on 19th July, and I accompanied them. I heard the first gun at 5.5. It was a fine morning, bright and clear, without mist. The infantry, commencing with one battalion, began to advance at 6.10 a.m. Artillery fire was very heavy from 5.15 till 6.0, but it ceased at 7.30. It took the Russian gunners over forty minutes to discover the whereabouts of the batteries at Hou Miao. During this time they fired at various places, but principally at the face of a hill one thousand yards in rear of the Temple. Up to the very end I do not think they were at all certain where all the Japanese guns were. Head-Quarters arrived close to the batteries on the low ground at Hou Miao at 8.0, and the G.O.C. took up the position marked E on the sketch. At 8.30 the guns resumed firing, which continued intermittently for some hours, being hottest between

* Between Chiao-tou and Pen-hsi-hu.

8.30 and 9 o'clock. The guns did not fire between 12 noon and 1 p.m., and often they were silent for half-an-hour or less. During the morning the infantry of the attack kept working their way in small parties of six to ten along the base of the difficult hills on the right of the Japanese advance and in the crops and villages. A great many men seemed to be concentrating in Chiao-tou, where they remained until late in the afternoon. Their appreciation of the value of cover from view and fire, as well as the way they utilized the folds in the ground, was most evident.

At 9.30 a.m. the enemy withdrew two guns from the front crest of the ridge (its highest point) and put them in gun pits eighty yards in rear, from which they started firing at once. The Japanese fire at these two guns when on the front edge of the ridge had been most accurate (range, 2,300 yards), which perhaps accounted for their removal. They were well shelled while this was being carried out. At 10 a.m. the infantry was still advancing; gun fire was intermittent. Nothing of importance could be seen for a long time after this, but all this time the enveloping attack on the Russian right was being prepared by the long march of the 14th Regiment. At 2.0 p.m. I saw the Russians remove two guns from the centre of the position to the rear at a trot which caused the dust to rise on the road. At 2.30 I saw some more guns removed, but under a hot fire from the Japanese artillery. At this time clouds of dust were rising some distance away in the valley in rear of the Russian position. At this time, too, I could see the Russian infantrymen, one at a time, slowly and leisurely leaving the trenches. At 2.40 the Japanese infantry began to deploy out of Chiao-tou into a sunken lane. I must mention that all the morning, and in the middle of the day, the musketry had been intermittent, varied by occasional volleys from the Russian trenches, and the Japanese certainly did not fire away as many rounds as the Russians. At 2.45 heavy firing began on the Russian right; it was the attack of 14th Regiment in the hills. At 2.50 I saw men, whom I took to be Japanese, on the sky line of hills in line with the Russian trenches on the ridge. The Russian guns having ceased firing altogether at 2.40, and having retreated, at 3.0 the three Japanese batteries at Hou Miao advanced to 1,700 yards for the first time to support the infantry (position B). At 3.15 p.m. the attack became general—heavy musketry all along the Russian position. At 3.30 the guns were still vigorously shelling the trenches. At 3.45 the reserves advanced, but a few minutes later were recalled by the commander, and took no further part in the action. At 4.25 I could see the Russians leaving the trenches in greater numbers. At 4.30 the musketry was incessant along the whole Russian line. At 4.45 I saw a body of Russians (two hundred, perhaps), retreating along the road that runs at the foot of the hills that border the west side of valley in rear of the

position, from to the side of the road (shoulder to shoulder, apparently), standing and kneeling, and fire up hill, presumably at the 14th Regiment, where bullets, I saw by their dust, were falling short. The next moment a shrapnel burst over them, and they scattered like sheep, running down the road. The three batteries from the position (A) on the top of the hill were now in their second position (B) and firing. At 5.0 the Russians were leaving trenches in greater numbers under severe shrapnel fire. At 5.10 the whole Japanese line advanced. At 5.12 the line broke into the double; the Russian trenches appeared empty. At 5.14, the first Japanese flag crowned the crest. The road in rear of the position was covered with clouds of dust raised by the retreating Russians. After halting to re-form on the crest of the ridge, during which the Russian guns at long range burst three shrapnel among them, the greater part of the Japanese hurried on in pursuit, while the three batteries at B took up a position on the highest part of the crest of the ridge to shell the retiring enemy.

To return to the movements of the 14th Regiment. As mentioned above, its enveloping attack on the Russian right among the hills was proceeding at 2.45 p.m., for the heavy firing could be heard by the staff at E. By enveloping the extreme right of the Russians, it was enabled, step by step, to drive the greater portion of them off these hills into the valley below (about 4.15 p.m.). The officer commanding the regiment did not follow them, but watched them retreat from all directions and collect to re-form at a certain point 2,900 yards in rear of the trenches. He then, as unostentatiously as possible, took up a convenient position with his regiment and waited. At last the stream of fugitives ceased leaving the trenches, and General Kigoshi's brigade appearing on the position, he attacked the Russians from the south and south-west. Apparently they had no idea of this regiment's presence on their flank, so were taken at a great disadvantage, neither being formed to resist an attack nor on ground affording much cover. This took place between 5.15 and 5.30 p.m., and it was not long before General Kigoshi's brigade and the batteries attacked them from the rear. They resisted stubbornly, and pursuit was not given up until about 7.0 p.m., when the Japanese halted and occupied Chin-chia-pu-tzu.* Being taken at such a disadvantage the Russians in retreat lost heavily, the Japanese burying something short of two hundred killed in the pursuit. The Russian guns did not assist their retreating troops, nor apparently did their reserve take any part in the action.

The Russian casualties for the two days were 1,000. Four gun wagons were found in the position, and 300 rifles captured in pursuit. Some 70 prisoners were taken. The Japanese casualties

* Not on map.

during the two days and one night were 450 odd, of which 53 were killed. I regret to state that Major Hiraoka, who accompanied our forces in South Africa as military attaché, was one of the latter. He commanded the 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment.

The position was undoubtedly a very strong one, but like many strong positions, the defenders had little means of making counter-attacks, and made none. The Russian commander without doubt did not intend to do more than delay the Japanese, as the getting away of his guns early in the afternoon seems to indicate. The position is somewhat similar to that at Saima-chi on 7th June this year (already reported on by me),* for there is a large extent of valley (about three miles) in rear which must be crossed by the defenders in retreat as quickly as possible. In connection with this it must be mentioned that there is no rear guard position in these three miles, which gave an opportunity to the Japanese they were not slow to avail themselves of.

Looking at the enemy's position, it seemed that the course adopted by the Japanese was the proper one, but it entailed a long march in a very hot sun for some hours over a country which for half the journey can only be described as villainous. The mountain paths are bad enough in these parts, what must it be like going across country? It is worthy of note that no Chinese was employed as guide by the 14th Regiment on its journey to envelop and attack the Russian right. The ground for the movement and the position of the enemy's right was carefully noted during the reconnaissance on the 18th. The whole movement of the regiment from first to last was well conceived, well timed and well carried out. It follows that the Russian left and centre were merely held by the remainder of the Japanese, whose firing line remained at a distance of one thousand yards and more from the position until the end, and nothing serious was ever intended by the infantry or guns. On the difficult hilly ground on the Russian left, it was without doubt secure for the day, but with time and trouble it would have been far otherwise. As mentioned above, part of two companies did manage to arrive in time to fire on the last Russians who left the trenches. On my pointing out to three of the staff that if a larger number of men or perhaps the same number had arrived there earlier, they could have made it extremely uncomfortable for the trenches on the Russian left—could almost have made them untenable in fact—their reply was "Yes, we thought of that, but we knew the difficulties in getting there were very great, and if troops got there, they would be unable to descend into the valley owing to the precipitous nature of the ground." In spite of the above remark I still think it might have been done with great

effect, although it might have to a certain extent spoiled the evening's *coup*.

To return to the 14th Regiment, and the Russian right. During the regiment's march and when attacking, if occasion had required, reinforcing it would have been difficult. It was somewhat *en l'air* as was this division at the battle of the Ya-lü. The Russian general, in spite of his reserves consisting of one-third of his force, failed to reinforce his right flank—it is said that half his infantry were not actively engaged that day.

The Japanese infantry did not employ what one is used to term German formations in the attack. They were like ours, but by no means so extended as one often saw in the South African War. The greatest care was taken to utilize cover and take advantage of folds in the ground, and in the early stage of the advance advantage was taken of cover from view afforded by the *kaoliang* (now over 5 feet high). The Russians from the trenches repeatedly volleyed the *kaoliang* within one thousand yards of them, on the off chance, I suppose, of there being an enemy in it, and a few Japanese were killed who mistook cover from view for cover from fire. The early stages of the infantry advance being directly under the fire of the Russian guns for from two thousand four hundred yards in some places to three thousand yards odd in others—nevertheless, the men from the very outset wriggled their way, in small parties of never more than ten, along the cliffs and steep ground on the north-east side of the sketch, all through the *kaoliang* and other crops, collecting from time to time as they progressed in the small villages or groups of cottages. All these have small gardens adjoining them with loose stone walls affording fair cover.

The Russian commander, as mentioned above, only actively employed two-thirds of his entire force, *i.e.*, two infantry regiments, one Cossack regiment, and his guns. Had he meant to make much of a stand he surely would have re-inforced his right. He must have under-estimated the strength and mobility of his enemy. It is difficult to understand why during the scene that was enacted two thousand nine hundred yards in rear of the position, the Russian guns and reserves made no effort to assist these troops in rear. As mentioned before, the trenches were excellently planned and prepared, affording a marked contrast to those at the Ya-lu. The soil on the ridge being sandy, the diggers there had easier work by far than they had at the Ya-lu. The Cossacks* were active during the Russian retreat. The Japanese squadron was not actively employed during the two days.

The Japanese batteries on the 19th fired 440 common and 2,500 shrapnel shells. In addition to before mentioned wagons,

* I heard them praised by the Japanese for the first time.—J. B. J.

prisoners and rifles captured, there were taken 152 shells (in wagons), 441 overcoats, 17,800 rounds small arms ammunition, spades, haversacks, &c. (mostly abandoned in retreat).

Marauders in great numbers, as at the Ya-lu, tried to strip dead and wounded Russians, but were prevented from doing so in most cases; however, owing to the wide dispersal of the bodies over the ground in the retirement, it was impossible to entirely put a stop to it. Military police were employed for this duty.

**(18) First Japanese Army.—The Action of the
31st July 1904 (Yü-shu-lin-tzu-Yang-tzu Ling).**

REPORT by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
with REMARKS of Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON,
K.C.B., Tokio, 28th September 1904.

Plate.

Japanese positions after the Action of the 31st July - Map 20.

Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson's remarks.

In submitting for information the appended report from Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, I beg to offer the following remarks thereon:—

* * * * *

(a) As the event proved, the latter portion of paragraph 3 is not quite correct. By constructing by means of Chinese labour a series of well-designed and strongly entrenched defensive positions to the south and west of Liao-yang, and aided by the natural strength of the ground in these directions, Kuropatkin was able so to reinforce the troops opposed to General Kuroki that, after very severe fighting, that commander was unable to penetrate north of Liao-yang in time to cut off the enemy's retreat. The withdrawal of the Russian force was greatly facilitated by the railway and by the heavy rain which fell during the conflict, and converted most of the plain country surrounding Liao-yang into a morass. It is probable also, that during the halt of the Japanese forces from the south at and near Hai-cheng, Kuropatkin may have received considerable reinforcements. For reasons of supply and transport such delay was, however, unavoidable.

(b) As regards paragraph 5, I doubt whether General Hamilton attaches sufficient weight to Kuropatkin's transport difficulties. Hitherto he has had, I believe, to rely mainly on the railway for the supply of his troops, supplemented by hired Chinese carts. These carts will only work in the vicinity of their owners' villages on an *etappen* system—i.e., they are not available for more than one stage, at the end of which they have to be replaced by other carts. The carts are plentiful in the plain and highly cultivated country, but much less easy to obtain in the hills. In fact, Kuroki also has been much hampered by transport difficulties between Feng-huang-cheng and Liao-yang. Consequently I hesitate to accept the view that Napoleon would have concentrated his force for the purpose of overwhelming the First Army, leaving a screen in front of the

Second and Fourth Armies. The Japanese had good intelligence of the enemy's movements, and had such an operation been attempted (the obstacles to which I have already indicated), the Second and Fourth Armies were near enough to have brushed aside the screen, occupied Liao-yang, and possibly seized a sufficient length of the railway northward to sever Kuropatkin's communication by rail with Mukden. What Napoleon might have done after a study of the map is one thing; what he would have done after weighing local conditions and the enemy's distribution and strength, as well as studying the map, is another.

(c) Paragraph 6 is very interesting as showing that the First Japanese Army was somewhat weak for the task assigned to it, especially after the reinforcement of the Russian left flank after the withdrawal from Hai-cheng, and also as showing the decision and promptitude of its commander under very critical circumstances.

(d) With reference to paragraph 8, I can recall several notable instances of our troops being surprised in South Africa owing to the want of ordinary military precautions. And there will, I imagine, be similar instances in every war, until the ideal is attained, and every commanding officer becomes in every respect professionally qualified for his position. As regards spade work, my impression is that the Russian soldier is far inferior to the Japanese, for all the formidable Russian entrenchments which I have seen have been constructed by Chinese labour, which, of course, is not forthcoming while field operations are actually in progress.

(e) With respect to paragraphs 9 and 10 it is doubtless the case that a handful of men armed with the magazine rifle can cause much confusion and annoyance, if they are allowed to enfilade undisturbed a line held by a considerable force of the enemy. The point, however, is, why under such circumstances counter-action should not promptly be taken and the enfilading riflemen be driven off by a stronger detachment from the enemy's force. As regards the amount of extension in the attack formation of infantry I have on a previous occasion expressed the opinion that our South African experience cannot be accepted as conclusive, especially in a war between two well-organized armies. It is not so accepted by any of the great military Powers, whose interest it is to study such a subject in all its bearings. Much must depend on the position, formation, and fighting qualities of the troops which are being attacked, and to my mind no general rule can be laid down. In the assault of the series of strongly entrenched positions covering Liao-yang to the south the extension was at much closer intervals than 4 metres (4·37 yards) from man to man. In fact, the assaults would have failed, had the momentum and cohesion of the Japanese infantry at the point of actual collision not been superior to the resisting power of the defenders.

(f) As regards paragraph 11, I agree that the Japanese artillery horses are undersized and of an inferior type, though they stand hardship and exposure well. This matter is receiving the attention of the military authorities in Japan, but horse-breeding in this country is a difficult and costly business, very few horses being employed in civil life, and the climate and soil being unsuitable except within a limited area.

(g) I do not quite concur in Sir Ian Hamilton's view. Imaginative instinct is of high importance; in fact, Wellington said that the great gift of a commander was to be able to divine what was taking place on the other side of the hill. But this instinct must be combined with professional knowledge and experience and intense application to the problem in hand. The careful deliberation and forethought displayed by Napoleon, Wellington, and Von Moltke, even in matters of detail, are notorious, and, in my opinion, there is no royal road to success in war.

*Report by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.**

I have the honour to submit herewith reports of the fighting which took place on the 31st July 1904 from the British officers attached to the head-quarters of the three divisions concerned.† **31st July.** Considering that this fighting took place over a front of some twenty miles of very difficult country, I think I am fortunate in having been able to secure accounts by eye witnesses, which cover practically all the ground. I shall now endeavour, by reviewing the general situation and by adding such special information as has been placed at my disposal, to show these separately described engagements in their true aspect, viz., as a great and important victory won on the 31st July by the First Japanese Army under the command of General Baron Kuroki.

2. The positions held by the enemy on the day before the battle were, beginning on his left, Yü-shu-lin-tzu, Pien-ling, the valley of the Ta-wan, Yang-tzu Ling, Yang-mu-lin-tzu. Holding this line, he effectively covered the roads to Liao-yang via Tang-ho-yen and An-ping. On the same date the Japanese line, beginning on the right, was Chiao-tou, Mo-tien Ling, Hsin-kai Ling, Li-pu Ling, Pa-pan Ling. Outposts on either side were in advance of the places named, and the bulk of the centre was not as far advanced at the Mo-tien Ling, but still, lines drawn through the respective places would very fairly represent the true front of each army. In addition there was a considerable force of the enemy threatening the Japanese right flank at Pen-hsi-hu and two battalions had to be left at Chiao-tou to watch this road, whilst on the 31st another battalion had to be detached from the divisional reserve for the same purpose.

* See Map 20. † Printed in this volume as Reports 19, 20, and 21.

The Russian troops at Pen-hsi-hu were a distinct body from the enemy covering An-ping and Tang-ho-yen, their line of communication and retreat lying to the north, and as neither they, nor the Japanese sent to neutralize them, took any part in the engagement beyond a slight skirmish, they will not be referred to further.

3. The result of the battle of the 31st July was to place the First Army in the position previously occupied by the enemy, who fell back out of touch by Lang-tzu-shan on the south, and Ku-chia-tzu and Li-pi-yu on the north, upon Tang-ho-yen and An-ping, where they appear to have halted. Thus, by defeating an enemy of superior force who occupied strong positions, the Japanese had succeeded in shortening their distance from Liao-yang by some eleven miles. From the position held by the Japanese before the battle it would have taken them three days to march upon Liao-yang, whilst, even upon sanguine estimates, they could not have reckoned on defeating the Russians and opening a free passage for themselves under another four days. Accordingly seven days was the minimum period within which the First Army could expect either to enter, or begin the siege of, Liao-yang, after getting the order to march. Since the battle of the 31st, this force is within two days' march of Liao-yang, whilst it is reasonable to assume that if the Russians are not given sufficient time to receive large reinforcements and recover their morale, they will, supposing the force remains distributed in the same proportions as formerly, be more easily forced to give way than they were previous to their recent defeat. If, on the other hand, the commander changes the distribution of his forces and removes troops from the south to reinforce his covering army in the east, then the task of the First Army will be accomplished equally as if it had itself forced its way to Liao-yang.

4. Whilst the attainment of this position, so threatening to the enemy, so helpful to his friends, must be a cause for self-congratulation to General Kuroki, it is very clear to me that there must be serious anxieties associated with his very triumph. Because the Japanese army has done wonders it does not necessarily follow that it can accomplish miracles, and if Kuropatkin is the man Anglo-Indian students of his character have always believed him to be, he may yet put this force to a test more severe than any to which it has so far been subjected.

5. Until now the powerful combination of the Second and Fourth Armies in the south was actually nearer to Liao-yang than the First Army, which was operating in a bad mountainous country, better adapted for defence than attack, and not at all adapted in any way to forced marching by large bodies of troops. In a previous report, I expressed the opinion that Kuropatkin should lose no time in advancing in superior force upon Feng-huang-cheng, and crushing the First Army before

the Japanese were in a position to threaten him seriously from any other direction. I did not realize then, as I do now, that it would have been practically impossible, without at least so much time and labour spent in the collection of transport and the formation of magazines upon his intended route, as would have enabled counter-preparations and movements of troops to be made. The minimum number of troops with which he could have started on such an adventure would have been 100,000, and civilians frequently, and soldiers too, often forget that such a multitude of hungry stomachs cannot be whisked across mountains and rivers and miles of barren country as easily as a little flagged pin is shifted from one part to another of Messrs. Stanford's war maps. But since the 31st July, the relative position of the Japanese to the Russian armies has been altered. The First Army is now a little nearer than the Second and Fourth Armies to the main force and main stronghold of an enemy still formidable, whilst that important obstacle, both from the point of view of movement or supply, the Mo-tien Ling, no longer stands between this force and the hostile forces at Liao-yang. It is well to remember, at such a moment as this, that something more is needed to trap a wounded bear than merely to get very near the road which leads back towards his den. The First Army is very well placed, but very delicately placed also. If General Kuroki had another division of infantry and three batteries of howitzers, the delicacy would be all on the side of Kuropatkin. Indeed, although the present strategical situation of the Russians is critical enough, I must say I cannot enter into the views of those who consider it desperate. If the Great Napoleon were to be offered his choice between a concentrated army at Liao-yang, or still widely divided armies posted where the Japanese armies are posted, there can be but little doubt he would, after a study of the map, unhesitatingly elect for the former. Why Kuropatkin does not leave a screen in front of the Second and Fourth Armies, and fall in overwhelming force on General Kuroki's men who are now nearest to him and easily accessible, is a question historians will puzzle over, unless he saves them the trouble by still putting his fortune to the test, not by dribblets as hitherto, but by boldly staking the maximum. If he succeeded, even partially, he could then fall back on Mukden with a certain amount of prestige, and there await his enemy from the south. If he failed he might still hope to fall back on Harbin (only in that case without the prestige) and there await his reinforcements and the winter snows. But if he stays where he is and merely awaits events, or falls back without any vigorous offensive attempt to break the persistent sequence of the Russian defeats, then I do not think he deserves that fortune should ever smile upon him again.

6. I am indebted for the substance of the remarks which will be included in this paragraph to information which was given to me.

When Hai-cheng and its neighbourhood became denuded of Russian troops, and when after the lapse of a suitable interval, the Japanese General Staff became aware that the left flank of the enemy was receiving very considerable accessions of force, it seemed clear to General Kuroki that Kuropatkin was laying his plans to crush the 12th Division which was on the right. The probability of his making such an attempt had always been foreseen, as the very great difficulty of communicating through the pathless mountains which separated the centre from the right flank of the Japanese army, rendered the operations specially tempting to an enemy who could bring troops to bear upon the 12th Division, not only from the direction of Tang-ho-yen and An-ping, but from Mukden and the north as well. There has also been a constant anxiety lest Russian cavalry and Cossacks based on the north should have cut the line of communication of the 12th Division. However, so far, nothing unpleasant had happened, possibly because General Rennenkampf had been wounded. Now, however, it seemed clear that, whether or no the line of communication was to be attacked, the 12th Division itself was in some danger. It was fortunate for the Japanese, indeed, that they got wind of what was happening the day they did. One day later might have been just one day too late. As it was, not a moment was lost; they struck with all their force all along the line, and were just in time to catch the Russians, not only before they had completed their movements of troops, but whilst all their arrangements and formations had been momentarily disorganized by those movements.

Many nice things have been said about the great success of the First Army on the Ya-lu, but this battle of the 31st was an infinitely more anxious affair for the General Staff than the passage of that river. For one thing, superiority of numbers was no longer on the Japanese side but on that of the Russians. In front of the 12th Division and the brigade on the Japanese right stood two Russian divisions, viz., the 31st Division, a part of the 3rd, 9th, and 35th European Divisions, the whole commanded by General Tserpitski, commander of the 10th Russian Army Corps. Opposite the 2nd Division in the centre and the Guard Division on the left were two and a half Russian divisions, namely, the 3rd Siberian Division, the 6th Siberian Division, and a part of the 9th Division, the whole under General Count Keller commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. Thus on this occasion the Japanese, with three and a half divisions, had to storm strong positions held by four divisions, which was quite a different story from undertaking the capture of Chiu-lien-cheng on the Ya-lu. The anxiety of the Japanese General Staff can best be appreciated when it is understood that, owing to the superior strength of the enemy, a general reserve to the Army had to be dispensed with. It was not long before the want of this began to make itself felt. Although it was well known that the ground in front

of the Guard was difficult, it was expected that the Division would be in possession of the Yang-tzu Ling by midday at the very latest. As, however, the terrain was even more unfavourable than was expected, admitting of no good artillery positions, such expectations were completely disappointed. In fact, the Guard attack was everywhere brought to a complete standstill. When this was realized Head-Quarters had to admit to themselves that the situation was critical. If only the Guard had been able to carry out its instructions and make good its attack on the Yang-tzu Ling, then the Mo-tien Ling itself, and the main line of communications which crossed it, were practically safe. For even if the Russians advanced in force against it there was always the 2nd Division available to hold them on this side. But as the Guard attack was checked, and success or failure in that section of the field of battle seemed to hang in the balance, the Japanese could no longer continue to act with all the prudence to which they constantly aspire. This is a very important point, and should be made clear even at the risk of repetition. So long as the 2nd Division remained inactive, or active only to the extent of co-operating with the Guard by its left wing, the Japanese could enjoy the security of possessing an Army reserve, although in orders for the battle they had not expressly set apart any troops to perform that function. Any threat against their centre, where they were most sensitive, could be met by the employment of the right wing of the 2nd Division, which could, in the long run, be reinforced by the recall of Okasaki and his four battalions. But the moment the right wing of the 2nd Division had to be used to co-operate in the attack against the Yang-tzu Ling, it was entirely lost as a potential reserve, and moreover, in the very process of making such an attack it must turn its right flank towards the Ching-shih Ling, and as it moved forward uncover the Mo-tien Ling itself.

At this period General Kuroki did not yet know of the great success on his right which would have relieved him of all anxiety regarding Generals Okasaki and Inouye. As a matter of fact, however, he did not think there was any imminent danger of a forward movement being made by the Russians in the northern section of the battlefield, as he knew their preparations for their intended advance against the 12th Division were not complete, and he felt confident therefore they would be too fully occupied in endeavouring to defend themselves to be able to think of much else. For his left wing and the southern section of the battlefield the general suffered no active anxiety, for although the Japanese could not make good their point, the ground was just as bad for counter-attack as it was for attack, and the General Staff felt quite certain the Guard could hold on to what they had gained. Therefore, feeling that the risk must be taken, the Commander of the First Army gave the order at 11 a.m. to the 2nd Division to begin to press upon

the enemy as a preliminary to attacking seriously and taking the Yang-tzu Ling. The Staff had done what it could, and had nothing more to do as there were no more men to do anything with. They were all in action in so far as the Commander of the Army was concerned.

7. The foregoing paragraph will, I hope, be considered interesting. It gives as deep an insight into the works of the machine as any outsider could reasonably expect to receive. I have not got the actual battle orders issued to the several divisions, and I do not think they would be very illuminating even if I had got them. I suspect they were something very much to the effect of "Go ahead!" or something of that sort. All eventualities are considered, prepared for, and worked out to the last detail in this army, and I am sure there is very little left to write about at the last moment. Indeed, the one test the Japanese have not been subjected to so far is that of some bold and dashing initiative on the part of the enemy. This would have been supplied, in full measure, on the afternoon of the 31st, had the Russians attacked the right of the 2nd Division with determination and in force.

No map or statement can ever make the course of an action stand out as vividly as it does to one who, well placed in a central position, has actually followed its fluctuating phases with his field glasses. I had been told that there was a Russian force, equal probably to a division of all arms, between Tang-ho-yen and An-ping. Had this force fallen in to the sound of the cannon at daybreak and marched towards it, then by 3 p.m., or certainly by 4 p.m., its head might show marching from Ching-shih Ling through the big gap in the hill. Until well on in the afternoon there was force sufficient in hand to offer considerable resistance to any such attack, although by his orders to the 2nd Division to take Yang-tzu Ling the General Commanding had parted with his power to control it.

I attach a small hand sketch* by a Japanese officer which shows the position of the right wing of the 2nd Division in the earlier part of the afternoon and again at about 5.20 p.m. It will be observed that at first there were three Japanese battalions lying in a hollow about three-fourths of a mile north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu. Half a mile behind these battalions, on a ridge, were four batteries of artillery. On the right flank of the four batteries was another Japanese battalion, whilst half a mile behind the batteries came again two more battalions. On the south side of the Mo-tien Ling road close to Chin-chia-pu-tzu were two battalions, and half a mile in rear of them were two batteries, or, to be accurate, 10 guns only. By 5.20 p.m., however, these last two battalions were visible to us all, scaling the steep ridge north

* Not reproduced. See instead Map 22 on which the details are inserted. Chin-chia-pu-tzu is 2,000 yards S.E. of Tien-shui-tien.

of Ta-wan. The regiment formerly three-quarters of a mile north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu joined by the battalion which had been on the right flank of the four batteries was also visible to us all, having crossed the Tien-shui-tien valley and moving in a south-westerly direction, in attack formation, up the northern slopes of the big spur which forms the northern limit of the Ta-wan-Yang-tzu Ling valley. Of the two remaining battalions of the 2nd Division, six companies, or a battalion and a half, had moved out as a flank guard far away north in the direction of Erh-tao Ling,* whilst the half battalion, or two companies, was pushed across the Tien-shui-tien valley towards Ching-shih Ling for a similar purpose. These eight companies and four batteries of artillery (the latter already fully occupied in firing towards the south) were absolutely all the Japanese could count upon from the point of view of meeting any counter-attack from the Ching-shih Ling direction to which the four battalions moving in a south-westerly direction were already exposing their right rear. As they moved on, the Mo-tien Ling became completely uncovered to a vigorous advance round the right of the 2nd Division, and it seemed as if only the General Staff of the Army and the foreign military attachés were available to resist any such movement on the part of the enemy. Personally, I watched the Ching-shih Ling gap as anxiously as if I myself had been the commander, but no Russian column made its appearance. The fates had favoured the brave, and by a quarter to 6 p.m. the unchecked advance of such of the Japanese troops as we could see and the characteristic dropping shots which denote the close of an action, made it clear that the Russians in the centre had decided to abandon the field.

8. I will now make a few comments on the engagements fought by the three divisions, commencing with the 12th Division on our right.

* * * *

The Russian troops at Makura-yama (Fu-chia Shan)† were encamped on the flat ground between two ridges some 800 yards apart. The Japanese forces were entrenched only 2,300 yards to the south-east of their camp. It is difficult to understand how, under such circumstances, the Russians elected to hold the ridge to their front, their only shelter, not only from view, but actually from fire, with a weak piquet, whilst they permitted the remainder of the troops to "turn in" to their tents which were pitched in advance of the ground where ordinarily the reserves for the outposts would have been placed. Finally, as if to make this defiance of every customary precaution for outposts complete, the piquet which was placed on the hill did not, it seems, send out frequent patrols through the thick crops which ran up to the

* Near Hsia-ma-tung, on Map 16.

† See Map 24.

very foot of the ridge on which they were posted. On the southern extremity of Makura-yama, the key to the position, a Japanese battalion lay for half an hour at the very feet of the piquet on the crest of the ridge, and no patrol came down to give his own party or the sleeping camp a chance of getting ready to defend themselves.

These facts carry their own condemnation with them and further comment is superfluous. Nor is there much to be gained by considering what might have happened had elementary rules been observed. At least it seems clear that in such a case the men in camp would have had time to occupy the crest line of Makura-yama. This line was better suited to the full deployment of their force than the contracted ridge (D)* which they held all day, even after the demoralization of their surprise and bloody repulse in the morning. It is true they were reinforced at D from the Hsi Shan ridge, but they could equally have been reinforced from the Hsi Shan ridge had they been able to hang on to Makura-yama.

The following information, obtained from Japanese sources, amplifies Captain Jardine's report:—(a) The reason Makura-yama is the key to the position is that when the Japanese had mounted artillery there they could make the whole of the Hsi Shan and Yü-shu-lin-tzu position untenable. (b) I have seen some freehand sketches of the ground, and the Makura-yama ridge is higher, steeper, and more imposing generally than would, I think, be imagined from the map. As shown in the freehand drawing, B in Captain Jardine's map is quite a steep, sugar-loaf looking mountain. (c) The Head-Quarter Staff describe B as Makura-yama. Captain Jardine gives that name to the southern extremity of the long spur running south from B. I have followed Captain Jardine's nomenclature. (d) During the two or three days the Russians had been on Makura-yama they had done no spade work. Another observer told me that the shelter trenches on Makura-yama and Hsi Shan were so paltry that he thought they had been scraped out in a few minutes after the firing began on the 31st July. In striking contrast to this are the very powerful type of shelter trenches and gun pits put through during the night of the 31st by the Japanese on Makura-yama, when they thought they might have to continue the engagement next day. On the plain, too, during the night of the 31st, it was explained to me what a very clever arrangement some of the batteries had made for continuing the fight next day. During the night they brought the guns out into the open just beyond, *i.e.*, on the enemy's side of, a field of Indian corn. Having dug their gun pits they cut some Indian corn stalks and placed them in front of the guns. My informant took the trouble to go over on to the Russian side to see the effect, and, from the Hsi Shan ridge, the covering advanced line of Indian corn stalks

* On Map 24.

blended so perfectly with the rest of the field in rear of the guns that it would have been impossible to have suspected their presence at such a spot. (c) Captain Jardine says there were only weak Russian outposts at B. Several officers, generally well informed, have assured me that the Japanese found B unoccupied, and that it was their firing on the Russian outpost on the south point of the Makura-yama spur which roused the sleeping camp. I merely mention this as a point requiring clearing up hereafter. I think Captain Jardine is probably correct, as he must have been watching the operation very closely at the time.



9. Turning to the fight at Pien Ling* between a force of Russians and Sasaki's brigade, into which entered afterwards Okasaki's four battalions, I do not think with Captain Jardine that the Russians were wrong to place troops in such a position, although I cordially agree that, once occupied, the line of occupation should have been strongly entrenched, spade work being also employed to safeguard the line of communication which was so vulnerable from the south. If no Russian force had been placed at Pien Ling, then there was nothing to prevent the Japanese from turning the right of the Russians at Yü-shu-lin-tzu and threatening their retreat on An-ping. Where there are so few roads the Russians could not well afford to leave one of them unguarded. In connection with this fight a Japanese officer said a few words which should, I think, prove interesting. But first he took three matches and two cigarettes and placed them on the paper. The thin pen strokes mark the matches and the thicker strokes the cigarettes in the following diagram, from which it will be understood at once that the cigarettes represent Russians, the matches Japanese. (See next page.)

In the second phase it will be observed that the cigarette is crumpled up with some of the tobacco lying dispersed around it. "A" is Sasaki, "B" is Kigoshi, "C" and "D" are the two Russian regiments, and "E" stands for General Okasaki. The officer also made a few remarks in the following sense:—"The Okasaki Detachment got behind the enemy's right, and, occupying a very high and precipitous mountain, fired a long time upon the Russians, who were quite helplessly entangled in the narrow gorge down which they were being driven by the Sasaki Brigade. The mountain on to which Okasaki had managed to climb was the highest in that part of the country, and was so precipitous that whilst he could not go down to the Russians neither could they climb up to him. The distance of the Japanese from the Russians varied from 300 to 1,000 yards. Unfortunately Okasaki had no guns. The enemy struggled through the bullets in pell-mell disorder, and were very effectively cut about. To get a

* See Map 25.

"chance such as Okasaki got can only be compared to gaining the *gros lot* at Homburg!"

Another officer who visited the spot after the battle told me that for a distance of 400 yards the whole of the road through the gorge was a mass of bloody bandages and rags. The passage of that defile must have been enough to try the nerves of any troops.



I have not much more to say about this portion of the battlefield. Captain Jardine speaks of a Russian brigade holding the position at Pien Ling, but Head-Quarters are quite clear that no less than twelve battalions were assigned to its defence. Possibly some of them were in reserve and did not come up during the engagement. There was no reason at all why, with

a little labour, the Russian guns at Li-pi-yu should not have improved their communications sufficiently to enable them to come up in case of need and support their infantry in the position, and officers here cannot understand why this was not done.

The Japanese had five battalions, and attacked with four in the front line and one in reserve. The Russian right was enveloping the Japanese left, and curving forward in doing so, when they became aware of Okasaki's approach and fell back into line. This withdrawal, coupled with the effect a handful of Japanese riflemen had produced on the Russian left flank by enfilading it, encouraged the Japanese to assault the position.

The effect produced by seven Japanese (*see* Captain Jardine's report)* getting on the left flank of the Russian line is perhaps the first practical exemplification of a theory, at the time considered by some to be fanciful, which I put before the Royal Commission on the war in South Africa. It was to the effect that the power of the magazine rifle was now so great upon anything fairly exposed to its action, that if even half-a-dozen men could penetrate and enfilade the line held by an army, they might cause such local loss and confusion as to enable a frontal assault to be delivered across the open without excessive loss.

10. Moving along the battle front I now came to the centre. I was able to closely observe this portion of the action myself but Captain Vincent has dealt with it fully† and I have not much to add, especially as I have already written at some length in paragraphs 6 and 7 regarding the larger aspects of the movements and fighting. I will only say here that the attack of the four battalions at 5.20 p.m., moving in a south-westerly direction up the northern slope of the spur forming the northern limit of the Ta-wan-Yang-tzu Ling valley (*vide* paragraph 6)‡ was delivered exactly in Boer tactics style. The extension (about 4 yards between each man in the firing line) was not as great as was used by us in crossing a flat plain as at Elandslaagte (Devons' extension, 8 yards) or in working over the glacis of Doornkop (Gordons', 8 yards), but it was identical with the extensions ordered for the Gordons, Royal Irish, and Royal Scots at the action of Paardeplatz above Lydenburg, where the ground approximated very closely indeed to the terrain above Ta-wan.

11. The left section of the Japanese line of battle has been described in great detail by Colonel Hume.§ I have visited the gun positions and most of the infantry positions, except on the extreme left, and I think Colonel Hume has pretty well exhausted the subject. I attribute the fact of the Japanese artillery not being so well placed or concealed as usual partly,

* Page 210.

† *See* Map 22.

‡ Page 205.

§ Page 188.

of course, to the very unsuitable nature of the ground, but partly also to the small and weedy horses which were unable to bring the guns into line up to time. Had the batteries been able to get to their positions before daylight, I think they might have done a good deal more to put themselves upon a par with the artillery of their adversaries.

* * * *

12. Turning now to the points of more general interest brought out by this battle, I have made certain notes regarding the artillery. The Japanese gunners, whilst quite ready to stand up to the bullets and fight to the last if necessary, were yet quick to realize that they could ultimately do most harm to the Russians and best assist their own infantry, by leaving their guns and seeking cover when the enemy had accurately ranged them and was about to commence the *rafale* of shrapnel. As soon as the storm of bullets subsided they were quick to emerge, make a slight baffling alteration in the position of their guns, and recommence the duel.

13. I have noticed numerous very misleading remarks lately in such English, French, and German newspapers as percolate through these mountains, to the effect that the Japanese artillery is superior to that of the Russians, and even, according to some of them, superior to the artillery of any European power. This is indeed a strange error. Probably it has arisen from non-professional reports of the action on the Ya-lu, when the effect of the field howitzers was confused with the effect of the field and mountain artillery.

* * * *

14. I have made the most careful observations regarding the Japanese high-explosive shells. The explosive seems to me identical in every way, as far as conditions enable me to judge, with our own lyddite.

* * * *

15. The Russians fought their guns pluckily, and shot straight, but their fuzes were generally badly set. The fact is that they seemed to be in too great a hurry. One shot over and one shot short seemed sometimes sufficient for them when ranging for distance. Two or three time shrapnel enough when ranging for fuze. Then they begin the *rafale*, or, in other words, begin to waste ammunition at a great rate. The Japanese spend four to six shots on their bracket work and from two to six more on getting their fuzes properly set, for which purpose they always endeavour to get at least one burst on graze. As much as twelve shots are thus sometimes expended in their preliminary work. Even then it is usual for them to verify after a period of rapid fire, and the burst of a single high-explosive

shell, when obviously it was not a moment for *abus torpille*, has frequently denoted this precaution to onlookers like myself. Nothing in fact could be more different than the two methods, although there are not wanting indications that the Russians are beginning to take a leaf from the book of their adversaries.

LOSSES.

31st July to 1st August.

	Killed.		Wounded.		Total.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Guard Division -	5	74	17	317	413
2nd ,, -	1	15	8	99	123
12th ,, -	2	61	10	351	424
Reserve Brigade	—	1	2	26	29
Total -	-	-	-	-	989

(19) First Japanese Army.—The Action of the 31st July 1904. Operations of the Guard Division.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
Head-Quarters, Guard Division, 20th August 1904.

Plates.

Sketch to illustrate advance of the Guard

Division	-	-	-	Map 21.
Attack of the Guard and 2nd Divisions	-	-	-	" 22.
Attack of the Guard Division	-	-	-	" 23.

1. The general position on the 30th July was as follows:—

12th Division at Yü-shu-lin-tzu, and on its right the 5th Reserve Brigade south of Pen-hsi-hu.*

2nd Division near Lien-shan-kuan.

Guard Division about Ho-ya-tsun† with one regiment at Ling-kou (south-west) and cavalry at Ma-ya-pu-tzu (west). It provided the outposts from Hsin-kai Ling southwards.

The Russian main strength was opposite the 12th Division, and as it looked like attacking, the Commander of the First Army determined to forestall it. He therefore ordered the 12th Division, strengthened by a detachment of four battalions of the 2nd Division, to attack the enemy at Yü-shu-lin-tzu while the Guard and 2nd Divisions attacked the enemy about Yang-tzu Ling.

2. The Guard had been reconnoitring the Russian position, but more reconnaissance was necessary. It could not, however, be carried out owing to the orders for the attack.

The country over which the Guard Division had to advance from its position of the 30th was of the same character as that in which it has been operating ever since leaving Feng-huang-cheng, *i.e.*, a tangled mass of steep wooded hills, rising generally from four hundred to one thousand feet, sometimes much more, above the narrow valleys along which the tracks and rough cart-roads run. A glance at the sketch† will show how uninterruptedly broken and mountainous the country is, and will also show that from the Mo-tien Ling on the north, a main ridge runs in an irregular line south-westwards. In their advance the columns of the 2nd and Guard Divisions had to cross this ridge at the various passes Mo-tien Ling, Hsin-kai Ling, Li-pu Ling,

* See Map 20.

† See Map 21.

Pa-pan Ling, and San-tao Ling. These passes were all occupied by the Japanese outpost line and the roads over them had been improved, but the tracks further on were very bad. Li-pu Ling, the only pass I have been over, is on a narrow ridge separating the heads of two valleys, above which it rises abruptly to a height of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred feet.

From the main ridge the valleys and spurs run down in a westerly direction to a broad cultivated valley lying nearly due north and south, which I will call the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley, along the western side of which rise to nearly six hundred feet the hills on which the Russians had taken up their position across the roads from Lien-shan-kuan and Li-pu Ling to Liao-yang. These roads run *via* Mo-tien Ling and Ta-wan, and *via* Chu-chia-pu-tzu, respectively, meeting about Yang-tzu Ling. The valleys on the west side of the main ridge are of the usual narrow description, two hundred to four hundred yards wide, and along the bottom of each runs a stony river. They are all cultivated where possible, and west of the ridge the cultivation increases, crops being grown much further up the hill sides and branch valleys, while there are also more cleared hill sides—signs of the neighbourhood of a more populous district. The principal crops, maize and millet (*kaoliang*, or Indian corn), were at this time of year from five to eight feet high, completely concealing troops passing through them. The spurs running down from the main ridge are very irregular, rising in high hills and knolls, and ending generally in steep bluffs, one hundred to two hundred and fifty feet high, overlooking the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley; they are not completely wooded, many slopes being clothed with oak-scrub and bush.

The Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley is from six hundred to eight hundred yards wide, quite flat and covered with crops, mostly maize and millet. The river,* twenty-five to fifty yards wide, is of the usual stony, low-banked description, fordable anywhere in fine weather; it keeps to the east side of the valley as far north as Ma-kou-men-tzu.

On the west side of this valley the country consists of a mass of bold stony hills with cultivated valleys, scrub covers most of the slopes, and woods occur only in patches.

4. As will be seen from the sketch,† the Russian position presented a peculiarly irregular line. Three distinct crest lines were occupied, the main position being on the central ridge running south-west from Ta-wan to the Yang-tzu Ling. On this ridge were placed the bulk of the Russian guns most of them on the crest line at elevations of five hundred feet, and even more, above the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley. No. 1 Battery commanded the Mo-tien Ling road; No. 2, the Ma-kou-men-tzu valley; Nos. 3, 4, and 5 the valley debouching opposite Shui-ta-yang-tzu (which I will call the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley), and the western

* Known as the Lan Ho.

† See Map 22.

crest of the southern ridge, *i.e.*, the ridge running south-west from Chu-chia-pu-tzu. To put the guns in position in Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Batteries, zig-zag roads had been made with great labour on the steep reverse slopes of the ridge, the crest of which was only just broad enough to give them a platform. The guns were all Q.F., or rather quick-loading field guns, one I saw being dated 1903. The batteries were connected by infantry trenches, running right along the crest line and carried round the spur east of Ta-wan, where there were also four alternative but unused gun emplacements defending the mouth of the valley against an attack from Chin-chia-pu-tzu. There were also shelter trenches along the crest, running down south-east from No. 5 Battery, and on the spur running down south-east between Yang-mu-lin-tzu and Chu-chia-pu-tzu; the east end of this latter spur lies low, and hardly seems to belong to the ridge itself.*

The Russians on the central ridge thus faced east and south-east. The left flank, however, along the northern ridge faced due north, the two ridges forming a dangerous salient at Ta-wan. This portion of the position and the attack on it is beyond my province.

The southern ridge was only occupied by infantry. There were no gun emplacements prepared on it, and the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley, south of Shui-ta-yang-tzu, was screened by it from the fire of the Russian batteries, on the central ridge. The ridge itself runs south-west from the village of Chu-chia-pu-tzu, and turns south-west above Han-chia-pu-tzu; the face is steep and stony, and seamed with sharp spurs, and, with the exception of an occasional small patch of wood, is covered with short scrub. The crest is razor-backed, and at the north end precipitous on its reverse side. The north end (C) of the main crest turns abruptly east for a couple of hundred yards, and falls steeply to a point above the village of Chu-chia-pu-tzu, and the further continuation of the ridge to the north consists of a group of low-lying spurs (A) stuck on, as it were, to the parent ridge; the slopes of these spurs above the village are wooded, while their northern ends are covered with scrub and crops.

The only entrenchments on the southern ridge consisted of (1) a line of lying-down shelter pits scraped in the crest of a spur at (B), where there were also what might have been emplacements for four machine guns, and (2) a series of infantry trenches on the low spurs at (A). There were three knolls on these latter spurs which had been converted into regular field works, the southernmost and highest of them having no less than four tiers of trench on it. The villages consist of groups of from twenty to thirty five mud and stone houses with thatched roofs, separated by gardens surrounded by walls of loose stone, in which maize, beans, and other vegetables are grown; this time of the year they are very blind. None of the villages were put

* See also Notes 2, 3, and 4, page 200-201.—C. V. H.

in a state of defence, though they all contained Russian riflemen in the morning. There were patches of open fir wood above Ku-chia-pu-tzu and Shui-ta-yang-tzu.

5. As will be seen from the above description, the road from Chu-chia-pu-tzu to Liao-yang was very effectively guarded by the Russian position on the central ridge, and by the infantry entrenchments at the mouth of the valley. Even presuming the Japanese obtained possession of the southern ridge, they would still have to attack or outflank the central ridge before securing the passes at Yang-tzu Ling, and the country between the two ridges is a series of steep, stony spurs traversible only by infantry and mountain artillery, and that with great difficulty; it was on this ground that the flank attack came to a standstill. As regards frontal attack, the Russian artillery positions commanded and looked into the Ma-kou-men-tzu and Shui-ta-yang-tzu valleys for a considerable distance before they debouched into the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley, while from their crests of vantage the Russians could observe any movements of infantry among the lower-lying hills in front of them. The only positions available for the Japanese artillery must of necessity be of inferior command, and, as a night march was necessary to get the division into position along the east side of the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley, there was no time to make the necessary roads to get the guns up on to the steep bluffs, and they had perforce to come into action on the valley bottoms. Add to the difficulties of the country a night march followed by a hot, airless day, one of the hottest of the season, and it will be seen that the task before the Guard, to whom was allotted the capture of the position, was an extremely difficult one. A simultaneous attack by the 2nd Division on the Ta-wan salient would have seemed the natural solution, but this was barred by the strong Russian concentration opposite the 12th Division, to whose assistance the 2nd Division might have to be called.

6. On the evening of the 30th July the Guard Division was distributed in three columns, as follows* :—

(1) Right Column—5 battalions; $1\frac{1}{2}$ troops cavalry; 5 batteries field artillery; 2 companies engineers. Of this force, 3 battalions and 3 batteries field artillery were to march *via* Hsin-kai Ling to Ma-kou-men-tzu (this I will call "Right Column (A)"), while 2 battalions and 2 batteries field artillery marched *via* Li-pu Ling, crossing into Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley by a road which had been made practicable for field guns during the previous afternoon by the engineers and two companies of infantry.† This latter force I will call "Right Column (B)."

(2) Centre Column—3 battalions; 3 troops cavalry; 1 mountain battery; $\frac{2}{3}$ company engineers. This column to advance *via* Pa-pan Ling.

(3) Left Column—3 battalions less 1 company; $2\frac{1}{2}$ troops cavalry; 1 battery field artillery; $\frac{1}{3}$ company engineers. This

* See Map 23.

† See Note 3, page 201.—C. V. H.

column to march *via* Ma-ya-pu-tzu. On the evening of the 30th the infantry was at Ling-kou.*

(4) Cavalry—As the bulk of the Russian cavalry was south-west of Ma-ya-pu-tzu, the remainder of the cavalry, 5 troops ($1\frac{1}{4}$ squadrons) was placed at the latter village, supported by 1 company of infantry, to protect the left flank.

(5) Divisional head-quarters, with 1 battalion as divisional reserve, to follow the centre column.

7. On the night of the 30th, by the light of a bright moon, four days past the full, the division marched, and by daybreak on the 31st were occupying the positions shown on sketch.† As regards Right Column (A), the infantry had been ordered to rendezvous with a detachment only on the north side of the Ma-kou-men-tzu valley, and the bulk on the south side. As, however, the Russians had been in the habit of occupying some advanced points on the north side of the valley, the officer commanding had taken upon himself to march the bulk of his battalions along that side of the valley and had not time to rectify this distribution before day broke. Before this infantry finally attacked, therefore, it had to be moved to its left under the eyes of the enemy.

8. The field telegraph followed divisional head-quarters, its duty, which it fulfilled, being to maintain communication between divisional and Army Head-Quarters. The road in the Pa-pan Ling valley was so bad that the regulation transport carts carrying the material could not use it and the material had to be carried a long way by hand.

Communication between columns was to have been kept up by means of the field telephone,‡ but in this mountainous country it was found useless. With the right column only was communication established *via* Li-pu Ling, but a fault occurred early in the day which could never be located. There was therefore but little communication between columns during the day. What there was consisted of written messages sent by hand along a line of infantry posts established in the hills. Mounted men were useless in this terrain.

9. I marched with four other foreign attachés from Ho-ya-tsun.* We started at 2 a.m., and after passing Li-pu Ling were asked to march in silence. At 5 a.m. we reached the point, from two to two and a half miles beyond Li-pu Ling, whence the newly-improved road led over a ridge from two hundred and fifty to three hundred feet high into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley. Here we climbed a high hill at the head of the latter valley, but finding our view obscured by the hills and spurs in our front, we descended again into the Li-pu-ling valley, crossed by the new road, up which the field guns were struggling,§ into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley, and, leaving our

* See Map 21.

† Map 23.

‡ See Note 5, page 202.—C. V. H.

§ See Note 3, page 201.—C. V. H.

horses under cover in the valley, climbed to point X,* getting there about 7.30. At about 8.30 a.m., seeing that the infantry lying under a knoll in our front had taken off their packs† and advanced, we moved on to point Y, whence we got a very good view of the attack along the southern ridge above Shui-ta-yang-tzu; later, between 11 and 12, we moved nearer still to point Z, near which a dressing station‡ had been established in a Chinese house in the little valley, and there we remained till between 7 and 8 p.m., at which time we returned to our horses in the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley, reaching them just as darkness fell. The day was exceedingly hot and airless, one of a spell of very fine weather.

As regards what took place, I can speak from personal observation of the attack from the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley. For the remainder I am indebted to various informants.

10. We have not been told what the plan of attack of the division was, but it worked out as follows:—Right Column (A) to hold the enemy on the central ridge. Right Column (B) to attack Shui-ta-yang-tzu and Chu-chia-pu-tzu. As the south end of the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley was screened from artillery fire, it was natural this attack should come from the south, along the face of the southern ridge and above the strong entrenchments of Chu-chia-pu-tzu. A portion of this column was also told off to protect the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley from counter-attack. Centre Column to drive the Russian extreme right off the ridge, and moving round that flank to co-operate with the Left Column. Left Column to make a wide turning movement through the mountains towards the Yang-tzu Ling passes and the Russian line of retreat.

11. *Action of Right Column (A).*—At about 6 a.m. the guns with this column came into action against No. 2 Russian battery—that is to say, nine of the eighteen did. The valley offered very few facilities to field artillery, and when day broke the only position that could be found was a somewhat crowded one for nine guns in the valley bottom.§ The hills were too steep to put the guns on, and the remaining nine guns remained inactive in rear till the evening, when they too came into action in the valley bottom near Ma-kou-men-tzu to assist the advance of the infantry. The nine guns in the morning seem to have held their own, as at one period, about 9 a.m., I saw the Japanese shrapnel bursting all over the battery for half an hour, the Russian guns remaining silent; the silence, however, was only temporary. The subsequent loss of a gun was due to the fire of these nine guns.||

By midday the Right Column (A) was moved into the position it was originally intended it should have occupied at daybreak, and there it remained until the evening, when it advanced to

* See Map 22, S.E. corner.

† See Note 6, page 203.—C. V. H.

‡ See Note 8, page 203.—C. V. H.

§ See Map 23.

|| See Note 2, page 201.—C. V. H.

the attack. To get into this position the reserve had to advance straight across the steep hills, the valley road being exposed to the fire of the Russian guns.

12. *Action of Centre Column.*—When day broke two or three companies of Russian infantry were occupying the villages of Ku-chia-pu-tzu and Han-chia-pu-tzu and the hillside and crest above them. As soon as it was light the mountain battery came into action, and after shelling the hillside, the infantry advanced, cleared the villages and the hill, and after a stiff climb reached, between noon and 1 p.m., the position it occupied for the rest of the day, detaching two companies to reinforce the attack of the Right Column (B). After the advance of the infantry, the mountain battery, which had ceased firing at 8.15, went forward to support it, and at 11.10 a.m. came into action at the point where the crest of the southern ridge turns to the west. Here it remained the rest of the day engaging Nos. 3 and 5 Russian batteries, whose shrapnel we could see bursting about it. It suffered severely, having over twenty casualties, and was, I am told, obliged to cease fire four times, but it claims to have put three Russian guns out of action with the common shell it was firing. To reach its position it had to tackle some slopes of nearly 45° , and from our position the battery ponies under cover of the crest looked like flies on a wall.

13. After the advance of the Centre Column, head-quarters were established in Ku-chia-pu-tzu and remained there till the following morning.

14. *Action of Left Column.*—The position of the Left Column is shown on the sketch.* After a hot and toilsome march it reached, between noon and 1 p.m., the second position shown, and there it remained without fighting for the rest of the day. It detached one company as escort to the mountain battery, which company, by means of officers' patrols, kept touch between the Centre and Right Columns. The field battery attached to this column could not accompany it, as the ground was impossible, and was ordered to return to the mouth of the Pa-pan Ling valley, where it came into action later, see paragraph 17.

Before the arrival of the Centre and Left Columns in their final positions, the Russians had been reinforcing their line at Chu-chia-pu-tzu, and they thus threatened the Japanese line at the mouth of the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley. The Japanese guns in this latter valley were, as will be seen further on, more or less powerless in the face of the Russian artillery fire, and the point seemed a favourable one for a Russian counter-attack. The effect of the arrival of the Centre and Left Columns on the flank was that the Russians had to cease reinforcing Chu-chia-pu-tzu and had to form front against them. The two columns were at first opposed by about four battalions which were later

* See Map 23.

increased to about a brigade. They were intended to assist the Right Column's attack on Chu-chia-pu-tzu by themselves advancing to the attack at the right moment, but the ground in front of them was terribly rocky and difficult, and an advance over it would have involved very heavy losses which they did not feel justified in accepting.

15. *Action of Right Column (B) Artillery.*—This was the attack we witnessed, so I will describe it more in detail.

We left our horses, as related, in the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley and climbed to point X.* At that time the leading battery of the two with this column was getting its guns into positions on, and beside, the valley bottom, and at about 7.50 a.m. it began ranging at over five thousand yards against No. 4 or 5 Russian battery. The reply was immediate, and when the Russian guns had got their range they poured a rain of Q.F. shrapnel into the valley, and in half an hour (8.20) the Japanese guns ceased firing.† We were four hundred yards to the left flank of the Japanese battery and saw all that occurred. The cool way the gunners worked their guns is worthy of all praise, and after the duel had begun, two guns were brought up into action in front of the others, and unlimbered and came into action as calmly as on parade. When the fire became too hot the gunners were ordered away from their guns under cover and the guns left in position, the gunners returning to them at frequent intervals during the day. The second Japanese battery had come into action after the commencement of the duel, three hundred yards in rear of the first, and on account of the bad ground and the heavy fire had had to push its guns separately into action by hand. I could not see this battery, but was told it began firing at about 8 o'clock. It also ceased at 8.20 a.m.

The reasons for the superiority of the Russian artillery are not, in this case, far to seek:—

- (1) The Russian guns, in entrenched positions, were firing at known ranges and with a 500-ft. command at the Japanese guns in the open.†
- (2) The range—from 5,200 to 5,500 yards—was beyond the effective range of the Japanese shrapnel but within that of the Russian shrapnel.
- (3) The Japanese, therefore, had to use common shell, the supply of which with the gun limbers is limited; and as the ammunition wagons had not yet been able to follow the guns over the steep road from the Li-pu Ling valley, and as ammunition had therefore to be brought up by hand, the supply of common shell at the guns did not permit them to come to rapid fire.
- (4) The two batteries seem to have come into action in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, due probably to the

* See Map 22.

† See also Note 3, page 201.—C. V. H.

necessity of their opening fire as soon as possible, unexpected delay having taken place on the steep road and further delay in finding positions for so many guns in the narrow valley.

These batteries opened fire again six or seven times during the day, and at one period, about 2.30 p.m., kept it up for a considerable time and put in some rapid fire, but each time they had to cease fire again in consequence of the hail of shrapnel from the Russian guns, which also paid them occasional attention during the intervals. The guns remained in position during the day, and during the succeeding night also, in expectation of the action recommencing the following morning.

16. *Infantry Attack Right Column (B).*—At 9 a.m. the infantry attack commenced. As will be seen from the sketch,* one battalion (No. 1) of this column was in position at the mouth of the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley at daybreak, three companies (Nos. 1, 2, and 3) being on the north side, and one company (No. 4) being on the south side. The latter company was the only one of this battalion which took part in the attack, the other three companies remaining in position and firing across the valley at the trenches above Chu-chia-pu-tzu, nine hundred yards distant,† till dark; at midnight they advanced against the village, but found the enemy gone.

As regards No. 2 Battalion, we had seen it in the early morning moving down the valley and then taking ground to its left to a hill above the little valley at Z. Here the men left their packs‡ and the battalion disappeared into the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley opposite Ku-chia-pu-tzu.

At 9 a.m. we saw Company 4/I advance across the Yang-mu-lin-tzu valley against the southern section of Shui-ta-yang-tzu. The attack of this company was carried out in three lines of apparently one section each, which advanced in very extended order, lines being from two hundred to three hundred yards apart. The valley here was somewhere about six hundred yards wide and covered with crops, mostly maize and millet. Each line doubled first through the river, which was here about twenty-five yards wide and up to the men's knees, lay down for a moment under the far bank, and then disappeared into the high crops, reappearing at intervals in groups. I watched one group in the first line, with which there was an officer; when after a rush through the crops it reached an open space, he made his men lie down while he himself remained erect and exposed. He was very conspicuous, as his khaki had faded to yellow, as has the khaki of many of the officers. On reaching the far side of the valley there was an appreciable pause, I presume to reform the line, which was very ragged, and then the overlapping left wheeled to its right, and the south end of the village was carried with shouts of *banzai* at 9.30 a.m.

* See Map 23.

† The distance is greater on the map.

‡ See Note 6, page 203.—C. V. H.

The attack was carried out with fine dash and in the face of a heavy fire from the villages, woods and entrenchments, and but for the cover afforded by the crops I doubt if it would have been so successful, even with the support of the remainder of the battalion which continued firing from the east side of the valley. I have since been informed that most of the casualties in this attack occurred in crossing the river. On the arrival of the firing line on the far side of the valley I saw several small national flags being waved by individuals and thought they were for use as rallying points, but find now they are the private property of the men.*

The village was so blind that I could not see any of the defenders. There may not have been many, but I do not think the Russians evacuated the north end of the village and the patch of wood above it till much later, as occasional firing went on for a long time in and about it. At the time, the Japanese seemed to get to the south end of the main village at 9.45, but no further.

At about 9.30 a.m. No. 2 Battalion advanced from Ku-chia-pu-tzu along the lower slopes of the ridge. The leading troops were well extended, but on a narrow front, and on approaching the south end of Shui-ta-yang-tzu they worked up hill to their left, apparently without exposing themselves, and after a broad front had been formed behind a spur, the battalion advanced northwards along the face of the hill, their right well above the valley. Company 4/I also worked up hill and came in on the right of the first line. By 10.30 a.m. the firing line was occupying a spur at D 500 yards south-west of Shui-ta-yang-tzu, with its left on the main crest, the Russians having withdrawn from the main crest and the spur opposite the village; the remainder of the battalion was collected in the valley behind. The day was exceedingly hot, and there was no shade on the hills, and in this position the battalion halted till midday, resting and feeding.† I do not think they had met with any serious opposition up to this point. A few minutes after midday the advance recommenced, and soon got to the spur at E, north-west of Shui-ta-yang-tzu, a position beyond which they were unable to advance for the rest of the day.

The advance of the infantry along the face of the hill was carried out in well-extended order, such as we should employ under similar circumstances, the distances between lines varying with the formation of the ground. The slopes were almost precipitous in places, temporarily breaking the lines and formations, which re-formed after passing the bad ground. The second and third lines were kept in close formations in the valleys, where they were completely under cover. The formations used seemed elastic and familiar, and adapted to the ground.

* See Note 5, page 202.—C. V. H.

† See Note 10, page 203.—C. V. H.

17. During the above period the following incidents had been taking place elsewhere:—

(1) Between 10 and 10.45 a.m. the Russian guns had been firing occasional shots into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley without reply; at 11.30, however, the Japanese guns opened fire for ten minutes, receiving a heavy fire in reply.

(2) At 11.10 a detachment of cavalry, the best part of a squadron, came from Ku-chia-pu-tzu to Shui-ta-yang-tzu, probably with the object of trying to push through the north end of the latter village and on to Chu-chia-pu-tzu, but I do not think they made much headway.

(3) At 11.50 the field battery which had been sent back from the Left Column opened fire from F. Only four guns arrived, two having been left behind in order that their teams might help the other four over the difficult roads.* Their first target was the spur on the north side of the valley running west from Chu-chia-pu-tzu, at which they fired slowly for a quarter of an hour. The range was a long one.

(4) Between 12.10 and 1.30 p.m. the Russian guns fired rapidly at intervals into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley, probably with the object of preventing the Japanese guns from co-operating with the infantry attack on the southern ridge which they could have very materially assisted.

18. At about 12.30 p.m. the infantry attack had come to a standstill. From where we were we could see individual Russians appearing over the sky-line at G, and crouching under rocks which sheltered them from the Japanese fire, while they themselves flanked the valley which separated the two lines. A subsequent visit to this point showed that along the Russian line at H there was a natural breastwork formed by the rocky crest, and that both at G and H the Russians were completely protected by it from shrapnel fire. From the knoll, woods and entrenchments about J they were also able to bring a concentrated fire to bear on the right of the Japanese line. The Japanese had to keep their left below the main ridge, otherwise it came under fire from Nos. 3 and 5 Russian Batteries. The narrow valley between them and the enemy was only between two hundred and two hundred and fifty yards across; it was steep but open, and covered with stones and short scrub, except at the base of the spur G H where there was thick bush.

This was the situation the Japanese infantry had to face. They thickened their firing line till it looked like a long mass, but the deadly fire of the well-posted Russian infantry stopped any forward movement.†

At 2 p.m. the Japanese guns from F opened again, this time against the Russian line at H and J at a range off from 1,300 to 1,500 yards, but, as explained above, could do but little damage

* See also Note 3, page 201.—C. V. H.

† See also Note 1, page 200.—C. V. H.

at the vital point H, though they kept up their fire for an hour.

The situation did not alter between 1 and 4 p.m., and as the enemy was increasing in strength opposite the centre and left columns, which were isolated, the general officer commanding sent orders at 3.20 p.m. for Right Column (A) to attack, and strengthening the force above Chu-chia-pu-tzu with three of the four companies composing the divisional reserve, he ordered it to advance also. The latter order, however, could not be complied with.

19. Between 4 and 5 p.m. six batteries of the 2nd Division Artillery and one regiment of infantry also came into position opposite Ta-wan and attacked that valley.

20. There had been a lull in the firing which only went on spasmodically after 3 p.m., but at 3.25 it began again on all sides and at 4.5 p.m. the battery at F opened again against H and J and fired salvoes till 5 p.m. The batteries in the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley also joined in with the same target for a short spell at 4.30. Between 4.30 and 5 p.m. about two companies extended along the spur at K, extending a bit further down an hour later.

I cannot get any reliable information as to the time, but I think it must have been between 5 and 6 p.m. that the Russians from J attempted a counter-attack against the Japanese right. They approached through the thick bush, and got within fifty yards of the Japanese line, but were repulsed with a loss of twenty killed.

Still the attack made no progress, and at 6.10 the field battery at F commenced firing again at H and J, and the infantry and artillery fire was heavy all along the line for three-quarters of an hour, the batteries in the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley joining in twice for a short time and drawing down the usual overwhelming reply. Shortly after 7 p.m. the artillery fire on the left ceased on both sides, with the exception of an occasional shot into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley and firing died away almost entirely as darkness came on, about 8.45 p.m.

21. *Attack of Right Column (A).*—In accordance with the general officer commanding's orders, Right Column (A) advanced to the attack late in the afternoon and after a good artillery preparation crossed the river at 6 p.m. and at 6.25 had captured the knoll L and the villages north and south of it* (see Map 23). Beyond this line it was unable to advance or make headway against the enemy holding the spurs in front and the crests above. At 10 p.m. however, it advanced again to the attack, but found the Russians had withdrawn; it therefore took possession of No. 2 Russian Battery and the heights about it.

* See also Note 1, page 200.—C. V. H.

22. When darkness set in, the situation was as follows :—

- (1) The flank attack of the Left and Centre Columns had been brought to a standstill at a point too far from the Yang-tzu Ling passes to threaten the Russian retreat.
- (2) The central attack of the Right Column (B) had also been brought to a standstill as described.
- (3) The right attack of the Right Column (A) had also been brought to a standstill.
- (4) The 2nd Division had captured Ta-wan.
- (5) The 12th Division had defeated the Russian left.

Towards 9 p.m. the Russians began to withdraw, and when the Guard Division moved forward at daylight, it found the enemy had disappeared, leaving only a small rear guard at Yang-tzu Ling.

At the close of the day's fighting, the only reserve in hand in the Guard Division was one company of infantry.

23. The losses, which were not heavy, were as follows :—

Right Column (A) 2 officers wounded, 160 n.e.o.'s and men killed and wounded. Total, 162.

Right Column (B) 2 officers killed, and several wounded. Total, 159.

Centre Column - Total, 60.

Left Column - Total, 1.

Add to these between 60 and 70 casualties in the artillery and other arms, and there is a grand total of 450 for the division.

The enemy's losses are unknown. General Keller was killed, and two guns and half-a-dozen prisoners were captured.

24. Head-quarters moved to Ta-wan on 1st August.

NOTES.

1. In each of the three attacks, the strength of the defence against frontal attack was amply demonstrated. I have not had an opportunity of seeing the ground where the attack of the Left and Centre Columns was brought to a stop, but I am assured by Japanese officers that it is as described in paragraph 14. Right Column (A), when it took the knoll at L at 6.25 p.m., had in front of it an entrenched knoll of greater command, and above it the Russian trenches along the crests.

Officers who were in the firing line in the attacks of Right Columns (A) and (B) report that after occupying their final positions, any man who showed himself received a shower of bullets, and most of the men hit were shot in the head and chest. One officer described how he put up his glasses, and was immediately covered with earth from a shower of bullets.

The position at Chu-chia-pu-tzu was defended by the bulk of the 21st East Siberian Rifles, a regiment that has a certain reputation for straight shooting among the Japanese. One Japanese soldier told his officer in all good faith that they were so brave, exposed themselves so much, and shot so straight, that at first he thought there must be some mistake, and that they must be Japanese. To make sure he put up the small national flag he carried, and when this immediately received three bullets through it, he was satisfied they were Russians.

2. The Russian entrenchments are of the same simple kind hitherto described, only being in very stony ground were shallower than usual. There was a continuous line of trenches along the almost inaccessible crest of the central ridge. There was no attempt at concealment; and both infantry trenches and gun pits were rendered conspicuous by the newly-turned earth and dead foliage which stood out brown against the green hill sides. The zig-zag roads leading up to the elevated gun position were monuments of hard work, but one of the disadvantages of perching guns up so high was demonstrated by the fact that the Russians lost two guns thereby, one lay overturned, limber and all, at the foot of the steep slope behind No. 1 Battery, having evidently taken charge during the withdrawal; the other, from No. 2 Battery, had lost a spoke from a Japanese shell, and in turning the angle of one of the steep zig-zags on being withdrawn, the weight had come on the damaged wheel which had given way. This gun lay overturned, with a broken wheel, half-way down the hill.

3. The want of "horse-power" in the Japanese field artillery, especially when operating in such a mountainous country, was severely felt. On crossing into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley in the early morning, we passed guns struggling up the steep, newly-made road, some with double teams and men manning the wheels, some with single teams and drag ropes manned by infantry.

The shooting of the Japanese artillery is decidedly good. During the short periods they were permitted to fire during the day, the batteries in the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley made some excellent practice against No. 5 Russian Battery, at a range of from 5,200 to 5,500 yards. When we passed the latter next morning there were many craters (principally, I think, made by high-explosive shells) all round the battery, while just behind were three dead horses, one of them blown to fragments.

I did not see any attempt on the part of the batteries in the valley to keep their guns concealed and to use indirect fire. Some may have done so, as the ground in the valley bottoms seemed to lend itself to such tactics.

4. The losses sustained by the Japanese artillery in the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley were comparatively small, considering the overwhelming fire they were subjected to. They totalled,

for the two batteries, 1 officer and 4 men killed and 1 officer and 13 men wounded.

As regards damage to material, I saw a limber on the morning of 1st August with a piece knocked out of the wheel and I believe one gun was put out of action, but of this I am not certain, nor do I know how it was damaged.

The Russian field gun is a fine weapon, shooting straight and rapidly.

As regards Russian artillery tactics, there seems to have been some shuffling of guns between Nos. 3, 4 and 5 Batteries. An order of General Keller's, dated 6.7.04, which fell into the hands of the Japanese, prescribed that guns in defence should occupy a false position to start with, and, having drawn the enemy's fire to it, shift to their real position—

No. 1 Battery had emplacements for 4 guns and only 2 in position.

No. 2 Battery had emplacements for 4 guns and 4 in position.

No. 3 Battery had emplacements for	} The actual number of guns in these batteries is not known, but probably totalled 9 or 10.
4 guns - - - -	
No. 4 Battery had emplacements for	
6 guns - - - -	
No. 5 Battery had emplacements for	}
4 guns - - - -	

The Russians therefore had 16 or 20 guns on the centre ridge.

5. I do not think there is any sealed-pattern telephone in use in the army, but I understand that each regiment is given a certain sum to provide its own. The wire used is of a very light description, invisible at dusk and often hard to see in daylight. It is laid beside the roads on trees and bushes if handy, otherwise on light rods cut as the march proceeds. Bits of paper or linen are tied on where it hangs low or crosses a road, but in spite of precautions mounted men must often ride into it, and as it is not strong it often gets broken. It cannot therefore be relied on for long distances or for operations in mountains such as those on the 31st July. At the halt it is invaluable.

The Japanese use small flags on occasion for signalling and we saw them practising at Feng-huang-cheng, but they are as yet only employed in a desultory way. Large flags or a heliograph would have been invaluable on the 31st.

The above-mentioned small flags are the private property of individuals who carry them in the hopes of being the first to plant a Japanese flag in the enemy's position. The practice is permitted, with the idea of encouraging dash and emulation. The firing line above Chu-chia-pu-tzu was dotted with them.

6. On going into action the packs are left under a guard, the ammunition and rations being carried in the blue sling-bag, to which also the entrenching tool is tied with anything handy in the way of rope or string. We saw some of the packs discarded on the 31st being brought in on the 3rd and 4th August.

7. On the 31st, supplies of ammunition were brought up by cart and by hand over the difficult country in rear, and then transferred to the ammunition ponies. The ponies were able to follow close behind the battalion on the southern ridge as the spurs gave excellent cover. As a rule it is reinforcing troops who bring the ammunition up to the firing line.

8. The field hospitals were established after the fight at Yang-mu-lin-tzu, Shui-ta-yang-tzu and Han-chia-pu-tzu. One half of a field hospital had been left at Ho-ya-tsun as the sick and wounded there had not yet been taken over by the line of communication staff. It came up the following morning (1.8.04).

Each man on receiving first aid in the field, is sent to the dressing-station with a ticket, the colour of which denotes the character of the wound.

9. I remarked to a Japanese officer that I did not think the company that attacked Shui-ta-yang-tzu could have got across the valley if it had not been for the cover afforded by the *kaoliang*, and that I wondered that the Russians had not levelled it, anyhow partially. He replied that he himself would rather have open ground to attack over, as the *kaoliang* broke up formations, and prevented the men using their rifles, so that one portion of a line could not, by its fire, support the rush of another portion; further, that it was after all only cover from view that was obtained, and that the enemy would probably produce just as many casualties by firing at the waving crops. He thought it quite right that only one company should have been sent to attack directly across the valley, as a bigger force would have been unmanageable.

10. When the attacking lines rested at 10.30 a.m., I noticed a shimmer all along them, and putting up my glasses saw that nearly every man had produced a fan. A consignment had been received a few days previously as gifts to the men, and they had been distributed to the troops. The foreign attachés were also each presented with one.

11. The heavy baggage was left parked behind the passes in rear, and came up on and after the evening of 1st August.

12. The combination between artillery and infantry is very close, and well carried out. In addition to the instances I have mentioned during the fight, I also got a glimpse of the low hill captured by the Right Column (A) undergoing a severe shelling before it was attacked.

13. The enemy opposed to the Guard Division is reported to have consisted of the 3rd and 6th East Siberian Divisions, and part of the 9th (European) Division.

14. Everything in this district points to good treatment of the inhabitants by the Russians. Their houses and crops are respected, and I cannot but think that the neglect of the Russians to level the crops, and prepare the villages for defence, is due, to some extent anyhow, to their wish to treat the Chinese well.

**(20) First Japanese Army.—The Action of the
31st July 1904. Operations of the 2nd Division.**

REPORT by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery.

Plate.

Attack of the Guard and 2nd Divisions - Map 22.

On 30th July at 5 p.m. we received instructions to be ready to march at 3 a.m. next morning from Lien-shan-kuan.* At 3.30 a.m. we left the division head-quarters in bright moonlight, and reached the Mo-tien Ling just about sunrise (5 a.m.). We were then ordered to remain at the Temple ridge, where I waited till 8.30 a.m., when we received permission to proceed a mile further west to Rocky Hill, provided we did not expose ourselves to the enemy's view. At 6.30 a.m. General Baron Kuroki and the Head-Quarter Staff arrived at Temple ridge, all looking very cheerful and apparently pleased with things in general. At this time the distant guns of the Guard Division on our left could be heard, and at 6.45 a.m. their infantry fire and the sound of Russian volleys. Japanese infantry of the 2nd Division could be seen at various points among the hills to the north-west. At 7.20 a.m. the sun at last lit up the valley beyond the monument of Ta-wan, and showed that what we had imagined to be Russian tents, were really only the white walls of the houses. Some fifteen Russians, one of whom was carrying a white flag, rode down the valley, probably to the Russian gun position at R,† their white jackets being very conspicuous in the morning light. We could now see the time-shrapnel from the Guard artillery, bursting near R and K. About 7.40 a.m. we heard infantry fire near the entrance to our valley, which we were told came from two battalions on the north and one battalion on the south of Chin-chia-pu-tzu, which were firing across the main valley towards the west. We also heard that the day's operations were to consist of a general advance of the 2nd and 12th Divisions westwards, while the Guard came up almost at right angles from the south-east.

At 8.30 a.m. I moved to Rocky Hill* (about 3,000 yards east by north of Ta-wan), from where an excellent view of the Russian position could be obtained and where I remained till dark.

* See Map 17.

† R and K are marked in blue on Map 22 (which is the same scale as Map 17), the former just S.E. of Ta-wan, the latter west of Shui-tayang-tzu.

Up to 8.45 a.m. there had been very heavy infantry and artillery fire on both sides, chiefly from the Guard Division which we could not see. Hundreds of Japanese shrapnel burst over K and R, the white smoke from the bursting charges hanging like a cloud over the Russian gun positions. Then the Japanese artillery fire began to slack off, and about 8.45 a.m. they only fired intermittent shots. The Russian artillery answered from 8 to 8.30 a.m., but luckily did not fire a chance round or two over the hill just south of Chin-chia-pu-tzu, behind the crest of which a Japanese battalion was sitting with piled arms all day. At 9.5 a.m. four batteries of the 2nd Division field artillery which had taken up a position in the hills before daybreak, but which had been silent up to now, began to search the western side of the main valley with shrapnel. They seemed to get their ranges very quickly, and made accurate shooting at the Russian shelter trenches at between 3,000 and 4,000 yards range. At 9.20 a.m. the 2nd Division artillery, having satisfied itself that there were no Russians in the trenches on the ridge nearest the valley, opened further up the hill towards B,* and at 9.25 a.m. concentrated the fire of all the batteries at the latter point. At the same time the Guard artillery recommenced their bombardment of K and made beautiful shooting, the fuzes being most accurate. About 9.40 a.m. the Japanese artillery scattered shrapnel thoroughly over the slopes west of the main valley, but no Russians showed themselves. The 2nd Division having by their fire betrayed their positions, at 9.45 a.m. the Russian guns at B opened a terrific fire on them, especially at the right battery which we could see plainly. The Japanese guns were placed at about their normal interval of 15 yards, along the crest of the ridge. The limbers were parked together on the right, one wagon was behind the centre of the battery, and the horses were under cover in a valley on the right flank.

The Russian guns seemed to get the range at once and burst their shrapnel so accurately just in front of the Japanese guns, that the detachments must have suffered severe loss if they had not immediately taken shelter under the bank of the road in rear. The Russian fire on this battery only lasted 10 minutes about 9.55 a.m. there was dead silence all over the field. The rapid fire of the Russian guns on this battery was most interesting to observe, and a splendid illustration of the annihilating effect of accurate shrapnel by the artillery which first gets its range and fuze. Judging by the two guns left behind by the Russians, they were not using their latest pattern quick-firing guns, but the 1903 pattern, but the fire they poured into this battery was certainly rapid.

A point often overlooked is that during the ranging process, the ordinary field gun and the quick-firer are on the same level owing to the necessity of observing shots. The moment the range is found, however, the Q.F. has all the advantage.

* See Map 22, B is in blue, west of Ta-wan.

From 10 a.m. to 12 noon there was absolute silence. Then the altered light showed up the Russian gun positions plainly and a Japanese battery opened fire on the heights near B. At 2.5 p.m. another artillery duel began. Three guns of the right Japanese battery were run some twenty yards down the slope in front to a position where they were covered from view by a knoll in front, but too short a distance away from their original position to escape the fire on the three guns left behind.

The 2nd Division artillery made good shooting at B and R, and judging by the columns of thick smoke and dust they were now using high-explosive as well as shrapnel shell.

The Russian artillery at D* were firing up the valley to the north at ranges of about 5,000 yards. Apparently none of the Japanese batteries attempted to reach them, though their guns and detachments stood out distinctly on the sky-line. At each discharge of the Russian guns slight smoke as well as dust is always visible. At this time no Russian guns fired from B, so presumably they were withdrawn early in the day. The whole landscape was full of the white smoke of Japanese shrapnel, the darker smoke of Russian shrapnel and the dusty columns thrown up by the Japanese high-explosive shell.

At 2.50 p.m. the artillery duel ceased, but the Guard artillery still kept up an accurate fire on K till 3.20 p.m. and probably silenced the Russian guns there. The 2nd Division artillery also fired an occasional shot at B to which they had the exact range. At 3.30 p.m. we heard that the Guard Division had not got on as well as had been expected, and that the 2nd Division was going to attack at once.

The infantry on the central hill† at the entrance to our valley moved down the northern slope in extended order, and another battalion followed it. At 4.25 p.m. there was another interchange of artillery fire between the Guard and K. At 4.30 p.m. the Russians at D opened fire to the north up the valley, presumably against infantry crossing it. The 2nd Division artillery renewed their fire at B in preparation for the infantry attack which was to take place up its north-eastern slopes. At 4.35 p.m. the Japanese infantry from the central hill† commenced to advance across the main valley in a north-west direction hidden from view from the Russians at D by the ridge north of the Monument at Ta-wan.

At 4.50 p.m. the Japanese infantry came into view advancing up the west side of the valley as shown by arrows on the map. They were scattered about with very wide intervals between men, and each company as soon as it came under shrapnel fire seemed to adapt itself automatically to extended order and to make use of any available cover.

* South-west of Yang-tzu-ling.

† This would seem to be the hill north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu.

The sun now setting west lit up the whole of the Russian position, and enabled one to follow distinctly the Japanese firing line as it advanced up the opposite slopes through the high crops of millet and Indian corn.

At 5.10 p.m. we saw the Russians removing guns from R. Two guns and several mounted men galloped westwards up the valley opposite the Monument, and one gun was upset and abandoned, as we saw next day.

At 5.30 p.m. the Japanese could be seen climbing the steep slopes of the west of the main valley, men with flags leading. At 5.34 p.m. the first man with a flag reached the Monument where he was joined by others, all of whom took cover behind it. At 5.40 p.m. the Japanese infantry advanced up the entrance of Ta-wan valley past the foot of the Monument, the Russians at D still firing salvoes over their heads up the main valley. The Guard artillery were again bombarding the saddle at K and heavy rifle fire could be heard in their direction. At 5.45 p.m. all firing seemed to cease and the Russians had apparently retired from the positions north of Ta-wan in front of the 2nd Division.

At daylight on 1st August no Russians could be seen from Rocky Hill,* and the Head-Quarters 2nd Division moved into the town of Tien-shui-tien.

Remarks.—The 1st to 6th August I spent in examining and sketching the Russian position. They had expended a great deal of labour in constructing excellent well-graded roads to their gun positions, and paths connecting the various points of defence. The gun positions generally consisted of levellings sometimes quarried into the crest of ridges, with ammunition recesses and pits for the detachments. In a few cases only were the latter roofed. The infantry shelter trenches afforded very little cover against shrapnel fire, but were not of such a glaringly conspicuous nature as at Chiu-lien-cheng. Branches were often stuck upright along the trenches, and no doubt served the double purpose of concealment and shade.

The Russian gun positions were very well placed, with in every case high ground on either flank to prevent them from being easily enfiladed. The ground showed evidence that the Russian gunners, like the Japanese, retire under cover when the enemy's artillery fire becomes too dangerous. Behind K an overturned Russian gun, with a broken wheel, was lying still loaded, some 60 yards down the slope behind. As one of the spokes was lying in the gun pit, it looks as if the wheel had been damaged by a shell, and had given way when submitted to the strain of being run downhill. Both this gun and the one upset near R were of the same pattern as those captured at the Ya-lu.

The battle, as seen from the particular part of the field which I was in, appeared to be a prolonged and intermittent

* On Map 17.

artillery duel. It was only late in the evening, when the infantry of the 2nd Division advanced, that I saw any infantry work at all, and then their advance was not seriously opposed.

The Russians, as far as I could judge, used their artillery well, took cover intelligently, and managed to get their guns away well (except two) through a difficult country.

The 2nd Division artillery positions were certainly far from ideal, but doubtless it would have been difficult to have found better. The three batteries on the right were placed on the sky-line of two small ridges, the line of fire of one battery being directly over the battery in front at 120 yards distance.

The other three batteries came into action on a low spur in the valley east of Chin-chia-pu-tzu. The gun pits, which were hastily made, were well placed just behind the crest of the spur, but only a very limited field of fire could be obtained, and none of the Russian gun positions could be seen.

(21) First Japanese Army.—The Action of the 31st July 1904. Operations of the 12th Division.

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O. 5th Lancers,
Yü-shu-lin-tzu, 13th August 1904.

Plates.

Action at Yü-shu-lin-tzu	-	-	-	-	Map 24
Action at Pien Ling	-	-	-	-	„ 25

Report on the Battle of Yü-shu-lin-tzu, and a short account of the action at Pien Ling, fought in conjunction with it.

Troops engaged.—Japanese under Lieutenant-General Inouye, 12th Division, one regiment (of Guard reservists), 30 mountain guns, 6 field guns, and 4 battalions from the 2nd Division under Major-General Okasaki, and one regiment of cavalry.

Russian forces under General Kuropatkin (who directed operations from An-ping), 23 battalions, 32 guns (of which 28 were at Yü-shu-lin-tzu, and 24 came into action), 2,000 Cossacks (Circassian and Siberian), 2 companies of engineers, one balloon section (4 balloons), and part of one Trans-Baikal infantry regiment. Up to date the Japanese have been unable to obtain accurate information regarding the number of the Russians, the above is merely a computation. I do not suppose more than half the Russian force was in action at any time on the 31st July.

Japanese preparations prior to 31st July.—After the action at Chiao-tou (19th July) the Russians retreated beyond the west of Yü-shu-lin-tzu and the Japanese halted in Chin-chia-pu-tzu and neighbouring villages in the valley between Chiao-tou and Yü-shu-lin-tzu. The position at Yü-shu-lin-tzu,* Hsi Shan ridge and Makura-yama,† is not a good one to hold against an enemy attacking from the west. Hsi Shan ridge is under fire of guns on the Lao-kuan Ling,‡ to attack which would have been a premature advance on the part of the commander, who had received orders to halt. An advance to the Lao-kuan Ling or

* See Map 24.

† The Chinese name for this hill is Fu-chia Shan, but as the Japanese troops gave it the special name of Makura-yama (Pillow Hill) their nomenclature has been retained.

‡ Two miles west of Hsi Shan.

the holding of Hsi Shan and Makura-yama being out of the question and the valley of the Hsi Ho (the way of the Japanese advance) being dead level from Yü-shu-lin-tzu to Chiao-tou, the ordinary observer would suppose that General Inouye would take up a defensive position at the latter place, until further orders for an advance reached him. What he did, however, was as follows. On the night of the 20th, pushing forward his outposts, he dug a line of good field entrenchments across the valley (on the flat) 2,000 yards in front and east of Makura-yama and 3,000 yards from the Hsi Shan ridge, both of which of course dominated it. The field of fire in front (west) of this entrenched line was good, but the field of view was bad for the most part, as maize 14 feet high comprises the bulk of the crops in the valley, which is very much cultivated. In many places maize fields were less than one hundred yards in front of the trenches.

On the 28th July, General Inouye sent one squadron and one company on to Makura-yama to reconnoitre and hold it, at the same time sending a detachment to the east of Pien Ling to reconnoitre; they obtained good information. At this time the enemy were occupying Hsi Shan, but their strength was not known. On the 29th three battalions of the enemy attacked Makura-yama, and the Japanese retired at once without loss behind their line of entrenchments. Although Makura-yama was the key of the Russian position at Yü-shu-lin-tzu, to retain it at that time would have been a mistake, as reinforcing it would have been almost impossible. Of course, the state of affairs was otherwise on the 31st, for the Japanese were then the attackers and had seized the ground that enfiladed it. Attempting to tighten their hold on Makura-yama would have precipitated a general action in which they would have been at a disadvantage at the start; and they had orders to stand fast. The Pien Ling detachment was also forced to retire on the 29th.

In the meantime the Russian forces at Yü-shu-lin-tzu, Pien Ling and Pen-hsi-hu were increasing, but those at the last-named place did not cross the Tai-tzu Ho. On the 30th the situation remained unchanged, but at 10 p.m. orders arrived from Army Head-Quarters to attack the position on the morrow. It was also stated that each division of the First Army was to advance and attack whatever force was immediately in front of it. On the night of the 30th, and not until then, the Japanese prepared a gun position for 13 guns, at the south end of their trenches and one hundred yards to the rear. There was not sufficient room for more than that number, but the ground looked as if it had been specially designed by Providence for the purpose of the Japanese. The epaulments were actually made during the night (to avoid the observation of spies, who were plentiful in the neighbourhood), but of course they had been planned long before. They were situated about twenty yards down

a gentle slope; there was excellent rear and lateral communication, and good cover for horses from fire and view. As the guns (using indirect fire) were out of sight, branches of small trees (4 inches in diameter) had been cut into small logs and placed upright, with 6 feet of length above ground, to give the gunners good protection from shrapnel when serving the gun. When I visited these epaulments I saw no trace of Russian shells. The Russians never really found their target. The Japanese infantry trenches were as usual well made, but no obstacles were used. I noticed small white sticks were stuck in the ground at convenient intervals in the trenches, on which were written the ranges of houses, villages, woods, &c., to the front, *i.e.*, towards Makura-yama. The Japanese do not omit the smallest detail that may contribute towards success. I noticed small trenches in advance made for double sentries by night, each of which had two ways of retreat cut through the maize fields, *i.e.*, one for each man. Finally the west slope of Chiao-tou ridge (about 2 miles in rear of this line of trenches) was prepared for defence, with abattis, gun-pits, &c. Presumably this was done "in case of accidents."

The Russian Position at Yü-shu-lin-tzu.—This took the form of two lines facing east across the valley of the Hsi Ho, which lies roughly east and west.

The line in rear was on Hsi Shan ridge, an under-feature of the hills bordering the south of the valley. The ridge was precipitous to the east (*i.e.*, front) gently sloping to the rear. On it were the guns in pits and infantry in hasty shelter trenches, both of which lined the outer edge of the crest. The line in front was on a hill in the centre of valley connected by a neck with the slopes of the hills to the northward of it. It was carried on up the slopes and to the tops of the hills north of the valley, while the rear line (one thousand yards and more from it) was carried on up the slopes and to the tops of the hills south of the valley. The forward line ends abruptly to the south with Makura-yama, at the south end of which the Hsi Ho flows; the rear line ends abruptly at the north end of Hsi Shan ridge, with the Hsi Ho flowing at the foot of that end also. In other words, neither line is prolonged across the valley. The Hsi Shan ridge lies south-south-east and north-north-west; Makura-yama and the neck lie north and south. Makura-yama, the neck and the slopes of the hills bordering north of valley were entrenched to a very small extent. The Hsi Ho, which also flows past the position at Chiao-tou, passes in front (east) of Makura-yama and south of it, separates it from Hsi Shan and finally, passing the north end of Hsi Shan, flows west. The river bed is wide, open and fordable in most places. On 31st July about one-tenth of it was covered by water. Makura-yama is steep in front (east) and slopes gently to the rear and the neck. It is covered with small scrub on its front (east) face, but has no trees. There are crops,

grass, and a few spinneys on the rear slope. The neck is bare. The hills on each side of the valley are rough, steep and bare, but in places there are trees. They are 450 feet above the plain. This very hilly and difficult country on each flank of the position renders a turning movement a long affair. The guns on Hsi Shan commanded the valley for over 5,000 yards up to the Chiao-tou ridge, and the slopes of the hills on each side. There was an excellent field of fire (though somewhat plunging) from Makura-yama in all directions, but there was a certain amount of dead ground in front owing to the steepness and slightly convex shape of the slope in places. There was a very good field of fire from Hsi Shan. The ground between Makura-yama and Hsi Shan is absolutely flat, the greater part being occupied by the open river bed. In front of Makura-yama (east of it) the valley is everywhere flat and highly cultivated. Maize fourteen feet high and above a horseman's head, comprises two-thirds of the crops and affords excellent cover from view, but there is little cover from fire except in the cottages or behind the stone walls of their small gardens. So little cover was there, that no movements of Japanese troops (except the guns changing from first to second and final position) took place on the plain all day. As mentioned above, the hills lining the valley being steep and craggy for the most part are very difficult for the movement of troops. This is particularly the case on the north side of it. The valley in rear (west) of the Yü-shu-lin-tzu position is quite flat and of the same nature as that in front. There is good retreat from the position, as there is the Lao-kuan Ling (Pass) two miles or less to the rear, where a covering position can be taken up by infantry and guns with field of fire as far as Hsi Shan.

As mentioned before, it was a very difficult matter to find positions for the attacking artillery, in fact, in their second artillery positions, the Japanese could not use all the guns they had. The summit of Makura-yama is stony and affords a certain amount of natural cover to the defenders, when the attackers come from the east. The trenches on the crest were not well made, and evidently little time had been expended on them. This hill was really the key of the position. As will be seen on sketch, the way of retreat from it was not good—the ground is too open to the rear. On Hsi Shan ridge the infantry trenches were only of the half-an-hour shelter trench pattern. The surface of the ground on Hsi Shan is soft sandy soil for six inches, then stones and rocks are met with. On account of this every time a Russian gun fired, it caused clouds of dust to rise which must have obscured the gunners' view very much and "given away" its position. The gun pits were good in some cases, where trouble had been taken, but bad in others, for they were all on the outer edge of the ridge on the crest, and the only protection to the gunners in some cases was heaped-up rocks without earth. The Russians made no obstacles.

Altogether it must be termed a very strong position, although the Russians had failed to entrench or prepare it thoroughly. Such trenches as had been made were of the half-hour shelter trench description for the most part and hardly worthy of much consideration.

Six miles south of Yü-shu-lin-tzu—in a most difficult country of steep hills and deep valleys, was a Russian brigade occupying a strong position at Pien Ling, across a shallow valley.* Although the Russians had occupied it with troops for two or three days prior to 31st July, they had made very little attempt to put it in a state of defence. About one hundred yards of weak trench dug on the small rise across the valley over which the road passes to the west was all I could see on visiting the place. Like Yü-shu-lin-tzu, the Pien Ling position faces east and stretches north and south. It has a frontage of barely a mile. The ground on which the position was taken up is bare and devoid of cultivation, and there is little or no natural cover of any sort, but the small scrub in places gives cover from view. There is no cover from fire on the tops of the hills. On the Pien Ling sketch (which is not drawn to scale) at the point A, the Russian right took advantage of a sunken road which afforded them excellent cover from view and fire. The Russians had no guns at Pien Ling, but three at Li-pi-yü in rear—which to a certain extent protected their retreat. So little preparation had been made, that had I not known otherwise when I visited the spot, I should have supposed the position to have been that of a rear guard, where perhaps it might have delayed the pursuit for an hour or two. I have called it strong, I should rather have said: should have been strong had any trouble been taken. And yet, a senior Russian officer who was captured there said, "We were told to hold on at whatever cost." The field of fire in most places was good—and so it was for the attackers. I cannot find out if the Russians had any troops disposed over the ground between Pien Ling and Yü-shu-lin-tzu. They cannot have had many, but there may have been a few. It is a villainous bit of ground, the worst I have seen in Manchuria. What renders the movement of troops over such a country still more difficult is the fact that the roads are really tracks and impassable for wheeled transport. It is difficult for even mountain artillery to get into good positions.

The Action of 31st July at Yü-shu-lin-tzu and Pien Ling.†

Major-General Kigoshi's brigade (six battalions, four batteries mountain artillery, one battery field artillery) attacked the position at Yü-shu-lin-tzu. Major-General Sasaki's brigade (five battalions, one squadron, one mountain battery) attacked the

* See Map 25.

† See Map 20.

enemy (discovered after the action to have been a brigade of infantry) at Pien Ling. The remainder of Lieutenant-General Inouye's force was in reserve, for the most part at Chiao-tou, and amounted to three and a half battalions; the two remaining squadrons were chiefly employed in scouting on the right (north) flank of General Kigoshi's attack. It was arranged that Major-General Okasaki with four battalions of infantry (of the 2nd Division) should assist at Pien Ling. The plan was first to take Pien Ling and Makura-yama and then, if possible, for the two forces to join hands, and, cutting off his retreat, to crush the enemy at Yü-shu-lin-tzu. Pien Ling and Makura-yama were to be taken at all costs. Major-General Okasaki was expected to be at Hsia-ma-tang (16 miles south of Chiao-tou) at 1 a.m. on the 31st.

At 4 a.m. General Kigoshi's force started from its rendezvous in rear of its entrenchments, two battalions leading, to attack Makura-yama* and the hills north of the valley, *i.e.*, the first Russian line. One regiment came along the hills which border the south of the valley and was directed against the enemy's right. In attacking the enemy's left one battalion climbed the hills north of the neck B, while the other quietly and undiscovered reached the dead ground in front of Makura-yama before dawn and lay down and waited. As dawn was breaking (just before 5 a.m.) the Japanese reached the neck and rushed the advanced trench at B, which only contained a weak picket. The firing at once awoke the Russians in their camp, and amid much confusion a large body of them, with very few clothes on, made up the slope towards the ridge A, which is a steepish climb, but only two hundred and fifty yards from their tents. It was a race as to who would crown the ridge first; the Japanese from B, the Russians from their camp. The Japanese did it, but only by the shortest of heads, for several of the enemy were actually within ten yards of them when they reached the top of the slope. As may be imagined, most severe fighting then ensued, and the Russians losing very heavily were slowly driven down the slope, by fire, into the valley and their camp, and some along the road towards Pen-hsi-hu; finally the greater part of them joined their friends, who had at the beginning taken up their position at D, and were pouring steady volleys at the Japanese on the ridge A. This hard fighting lasted thirty minutes. The description which an infantryman, who was present, gave, of what happened after his arrival on the ridge A, explained the utter unexpectedness of the attack. He said, "three hundred yards below lay the camp and we could see of course everything that was going on there, horses being saddled up, men washing their faces, officers putting on their swords." As he and his companions fired they had a great choice of targets, at one moment (as he explained) firing at the man with his coat off, and at another moment at the man with

* See Map 24.

his trousers off, everyone making jokes the whole time. The Russian force engaged seemed to be about two battalions.

The capture of Makura-yama, on which there were very few of the enemy at first, was the result of this early fighting, for part of the infantry who took the neck wheeled to the left and attacked the hill. At a well-chosen moment, when the Russians, not knowing of the presence of the battalion in the dead ground in front, were only paying attention to the enemy from the neck, the Japanese began to scale Makura-yama in front (east side). At 7.7 a.m. the Japanese batteries opened fire on Makura-yama from a position near Chin-chia-pu-tzu on the plain (range 3,000 odd yards), and three minutes later the Russian guns replied.

At 8.30 a.m. Makura-yama was taken, the Russians on it retreating down the slope in rear to their second line and the hills at D. At 9 o'clock the batteries opened from their second positions (as on sketch), one mountain battery still being on the plain, and seven mountain guns and six field guns on a rise south of the valley. The remainder were unable to obtain a good position anywhere. The range of the two gun positions from Hsi Shan ridge was 3,100 yards, and the Japanese guns now used indirect fire. The mountain battery, on its way to take up its second position near Tung Ta-chia-pu-tzu, had to cross the Hsi Ho in full view of the enemy's guns. It had 14 casualties from one shrapnel, and several horses were killed, but no time was wasted in getting the wounded and those parts of the guns carried by the dead horses out of the river and under cover from view in the Indian corn. Meanwhile on Makura-yama, the Japanese infantry had been unable to occupy the crest, for it was quite bare, and it was swept by the fire both of guns and rifles from Hsi Shan, so the men waited just below it on the eastern side. At about 9.30 a.m. the Russians made a counter-attack from the direction of the Pen-hsi-hu road, attempting to envelop the Japanese right. At noon a Russian battalion again endeavoured to do this, but a prompt reinforcement of two companies from the reserve (of the brigade) prevented it.

As regards the attack of the 24th Regiment on the Russian right:—In the darkness the regiment moved along the hills south of the valley and the road (Chiao-tou-Yü-shu-lin-tzu), and occupied the hill above Lien-sha without opposition. At day-break it was seen how difficult a further advance would be, so it remained halted, to await the expected eventual junction with General Sasaki's force. This never took place, as will be related, so the 24th Regiment remained in this position all day.

To turn to Pien Ling, General Sasaki's brigade left Hsia-chia-pu-tzu ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Chiao-tou) at 3.30 a.m., and occupied East Pien Ling at 7.0 a.m., meeting with little resistance.* It was then seen that the enemy's main position was on West Pien Ling,

* See Map 25.

but General Sasaki knew nothing of the ground, and little of the force against him. Shortly after 7.30 a.m. he set in motion against West Pien Ling one battalion, but soon it was discovered that the Russians were equal in numbers, if not superior to it. At 8 a.m. the Japanese battery opened fire. Having no guns against it, it directed its attention to the enemy's infantry, whom at first it found difficult to locate, especially on the Russian right, where it lined a sunk road. At this time too, the Russian right was attempting to envelop the Japanese left, so the latter was reinforced.

It was the left of the Russian line that was the first to go. One and a half companies had occupied the crest of a hill, and assisted by the men in the sunken road, were effectually hindering the Japanese advance. The artillery silencing their friends in the road and seven Japanese getting round their left and enfilading them, three and a half companies were sent up to reinforce; they came up with a band playing and began to climb the slope. Seeing their advantage, the attackers pressed on and drove the one and a half companies off the hill down upon the band and reinforcements. The early morning performance at Yü-shu-lin-tzu was repeated, but if the actors were not so numerous, the stage was certainly smaller, and they did not lack an orchestra. From the crest which the Russians held to the next one is only about three hundred yards, *i.e.*, the gully is only about three hundred yards wide. There was no cover except in the nullah which runs down its centre. The sides of the gully are steep, and so cannot be climbed quickly. The Japanese buried ninety of the enemy here.

By 11 a.m. General Sasaki had driven off the Russian left from the hill, and the entire Russian line commenced to retreat, descending into the valley in rear of the position (west of it). It was at this time that General Okasaki's force played such an important part. It left Hsia-ma-tang at 1.30 a.m., arriving at Chang-ma-ling (south of West Pien Ling) at 8 a.m. It had been the General's intention to make direct for West Pien Ling, but finding the action going on he manœuvred to get in rear of the enemy's right flank (south), and cut off his retreat. He did not quite succeed in getting in rear and cutting them off, but part of his force lining the ridge which borders the south of the valley, and therefore runs parallel to the road, fired steadily on the long line of retreating Russians as they passed. (They are said to have occupied 3,000 yards of the road.) During this retreat of the Russians, guns opened on the pursuers from Li-pi-yü, firing chiefly on the squadron, which was within closer range than the infantry. The only casualty was one horse wounded. West Pien Ling was taken about noon. An advance by General Okasaki on the guns caused their withdrawal at 2 p.m., but at 3 p.m. more guns appeared at Ku-chia-tzu and fired on his force and two battalions of General Sasaki's; the country being exceedingly difficult, pursuit was abandoned. It was

owing to the difficult nature of the country too, and the lateness of the hour, that General Sasaki with the remainder of his force (*i.e.*, minus the above two battalions) did not attempt to drive off a portion of the enemy who were making a stand to the north-west, and to join hands with General Kigoshi at Yü-shu-lin-tzu.

To return to the fighting at Yü-shu-lin-tzu,* while Pien Ling was being taken the position of affairs remained unchanged. The Japanese could not occupy the crest of Makura-yama for reasons mentioned above, and to cross the open ground between A and D (600 yards wide), and the equally open and wider ground between Makura-yama and Hsi Shan under such a fire was out of the question. In fact, it was a sort of stalemate. The musketry was severe all day and at times very heavy, especially before dark, when one could not distinguish the Russian volleys at all. Owing to the nature of the intervening country there was no communication all day between the Japanese at Yü-shu-lin-tzu and those at Pien Ling, but towards night it was seen that the Russians were gradually withdrawing their guns from Hsi Shan, by which the Japanese at Pien Ling could tell that operations had been successful there.

At 7.30 p.m. (just before dark), when rifle fire was heavier than it had been all day, I asked one of the staff if he thought they would manage to carry the position before dark, his answer was, "Well, I really don't know, the enemy are very "stubborn to-day." The Japanese and some of the Russian artillery went on firing until dark, although the latter must have had many casualties. It made a splendid target on the near edge of the ridge, the dust that rose after each discharge being most conspicuous and forming a background to the flashes. The musketry went on long after dark, and it was not until 8.40 p.m. that it began to lessen appreciably. At 8.50 p.m. the last shot was fired, and the Japanese bivouacked where they had fought all day, entrenching themselves on the crest of Makura-yama, with a view to engaging Hsi Shan ridge in the morning, should the enemy not retire in the night. Some time between midnight and dawn on the 1st, the enemy withdrew to Lao-kuan Ling, two miles in rear, and in the morning thence to Ku-chia-pu-tzu, and beyond.

1st August. On the morning of the 1st August General Sasaki attacked the position of the Russians, who made a stand (as mentioned above) north-west of Pien Ling on the afternoon of the 31st. The battery did great execution, and it hardly needed the infantry to force them to retreat, which they did in good order on Ku-chia-pu-tzu, joining up with the enemy from Yü-shu-lin-tzu. They were harassed by General Okasaki, but the country was too bad for the Japanese to effect much. The retreat was covered by guns from Ku-chia-pu-tzu. The Cossacks took no

* See Map 24.

active part in the fighting on the 31st July, but to a certain extent they covered the retreat on the 1st August.

I must mention that in addition to preparing trenches on the crest of Makura-yama during the night, the Japanese built gun pits on the neck to shell Hsi Shan in the morning, carefully situated under cover from rifle fire from the hills marked D on sketch.

The Japanese casualties at Pien Ling and Yü-shu-lin-tzu were 550. The Russians buried by the Japanese numbered over 600. It is estimated that the Russians killed numbered 1,000 at least, for they had good opportunities of getting their dead away at Yü-shu-lin-tzu, never being driven from their second line. The Russians taken prisoner numbered 250, including some wounded. The number of Russian wounded is unknown. Among many assorted articles which fell into the hands of the Japanese were 600 odd rifles, 20,000 rounds of S.A.A., 400 engineering tools, 1,018 tents, 1,400 haversacks, 1,538 overcoats, 3 field kitchens (on wheels), 6 wagons and 20 to 30 band instruments.

Comments.

On Makura-yama the outpost line was on the position itself, and on the neck and slopes connecting it with the hills north of the valley the sentries were not put far enough forward to give warning to the troops in camp that they might get into position in time. There can have been little or no patrolling to the front (which the Japanese infantry scouts probably discovered very quickly on the nights of the 29th and 30th), although the view to the front was by no means good. The piquets were weak. Makura-yama was so weakly held at daybreak that had it not been for the steep slope in front, it might have been captured simultaneously with the slope A and the neck. An imitation sentry made of straw was found on the hill at B. Herein perhaps lies the reason why the piquet was surprised.

Some of the Russian gun pits were well made, some were badly made, and there is apparently no systematic way of entrenching a battery. Each gun, it seems, was entrenched according to the fancy of the men in charge. No water seemed to be used, although it was handy, to obviate the clouds of dust made by the guns when firing, by soaking the ground and heaped-up earth of the gun pits. It was a still day, and I could see a regular bank of fine dust suspended in the air above the guns whenever firing was frequent. As mentioned before, in some of the gun pits, stones and rocks only, heaped up, formed the protection of the gunners, earth was not brought from elsewhere to lessen the danger from splinters.

With reference to the capture of Makura-yama, I asked the question, "Why did you, on taking it, not bring a destructive rifle fire to bear on the guns on Hsi Shan?" The officer's

reply was, "There was practically no cover on the top for men firing in that direction, and it was swept by rifle fire and shells from Hsi Shan whenever our men appeared." The position of Makura-yama, in fact, resembled that on Spion Kop.

On the 29th and 30th the Russians did not fire on the Japanese trenches (2,000 yards range) from Makura-yama. I am inclined to think from what I have seen, that neither Japanese nor Russians quite appreciate the value of long-range rifle fire (either volley or independent). Of course I do not refer to sniping.

**(22) First Japanese Army.—The Action of the
31st July 1904.**

LECTURE given by a GENERAL STAFF OFFICER; reported by
Captain B. VINCENT, R.A. Head-Quarters, First Japanese
Army, 9th September 1904.

The lecture was very short and unaccompanied by a sketch; so, as most of the facts have already been embodied in Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton's report, I give it almost word for word without re-writing my previous report.*

It was thought that one and a half or two Russian divisions were in front of the 2nd and Guard Divisions and that one and a half Russian divisions were before the 12th Division which was in or near Chiao-tou. Therefore there were at least four Russian divisions in front of the First Army towards the end of July.

A Russian attack on the 12th Division was expected, so the 2nd Division handed over the Hsin-kai Ling to the Guard Division and moved troops to support the right of the Army.

Position of the 2nd Division on the 30th July:—

The advanced guard occupying the line of the Mo-tien Ling—
Right flank near Hsia-ma-tang.

One regiment near Lien-shan-kuan.

One regiment at Tung-tao-kou,† near Hsia-ma-tang.

We thought the 12th Division would require assistance early on 31st July, so the 15th Brigade (Okasaki) assembled at Hsia-ma-tang, and we sent two battalions from the regiment at Lien-shan-kuan towards Chiao-tou on the 30th. On this date the Guard Division commenced to attack and we were ordered to assist.

On the 30th also the 15th Brigade was ordered to assist the left wing of the 12th Division.

The 2nd Division advanced towards Ta-wan as follows:—
The 3rd Brigade was ordered to take up a line from a hill east of Tien-shui-tien to a hill east of Ta-wan. One and a half battalions 16th Regiment were sent to Erh-tao-kou† to cover the right front of this part of the Division, because it was reported that one Russian regiment was at a village, some 6 miles east of Tien-shui-tien.

The Officer Commanding the 15th Brigade advanced with four battalions to press the Russian right wing in front of the 12th Division. One battalion of the 3rd Brigade and two

* See Map 20.

† A tiny hamlet near Hsia-ma-tang.—B. V.

companies of the 16th Regiment were ordered to remain near Chin-chia-pu-tzu.* The cavalry were sent to the right flank of this part of the Division.

Two batteries of the divisional field artillery crossed the Mo-tien Ling and took up a position before daybreak on the 31st about one thousand yards east of Chin-chia-pu-tzu; four batteries came into action at the same time on the hill north-east of Chin-chia-pu-tzu.

Two battalions advanced by the main road towards a hill south-east of Chin-chia-pu-tzu, which was found to be occupied by Russians. Two companies advanced and drove them out. The hill was very steep, so the Russian fire had little effect; although the Japanese had fifteen casualties caused from stones thrown down the hill. They were therefore able to take up their position on the appointed line by daybreak on the 31st July.

At dawn the hills above Ta-wan were very silent, as if the Russians had retired, but firing was soon heard in the direction of the Guard Division. The artillery fired a few trial shots, but they met with no response. At about 9.30 a.m. (9.45 a.m. by my timing) the Russian battery on the hill west of Ta-wan fired at the artillery.

At 1.30 p.m. the Japanese infantry was ordered to advance. The two battalions near Chin-chia-pu-tzu remained there. The three battalions north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu plus one reserve battalion from near the batteries attacked the Russians on the hills north of Yang-tzu Ling. This force occupied the heights south-west of Tien-shui-tien about 6 p.m. and opened fire on the Russians. At 7 p.m. the latter began to retreat, so two battalions from Chin-chia-pu-tzu advanced towards the hill north of Ta-wan (5.30 p.m. by my time). Yang-tzu Ling was not yet occupied.

Before the battle commenced, one company was sent towards Ching-shih-ling† to cover the right flank of the attack. At the time the attack was ordered (1.30 p.m.) one and a half battalions of the 16th Regiment also advanced, leaving one company at Erh-tao-kou.‡

On the 1st August the Japanese advanced to Yang-tzu Ling and found a few Russians, who retired without fighting.

The position was then handed over to the Guard Division and the 2nd Division moved towards Tien-shui-tien.

Casualties :—

One officer of artillery (of the battery on hill north-east of Chin-chia-pu-tzu) and 17 n.c.o.'s and men killed.

Five officers and 70 n.c.o.'s and men wounded.

The Okasaki detachment, consisting of the 30th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion 16th Regiment, with no artillery, fortunately arrived just at the right time on the flank of the

* On Map 22 north-east of Ta-wan.

† On Map 20.

‡ A tiny village near Hsia-ma-tang.

12th Division, in rear of two Russian regiments which were advancing to attack its left wing. This detachment achieved great success with little loss.

The field batteries fired 650 shrapnel and 250 common shell (high-explosive).

On 17th July at Mo-tien Ling the battery fired 200 shrapnel and 3 common shell.

(23) The Battle of Liao-yang. Second Japanese Army.—Operations from the 4th August to the 4th September 1904.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff, Head-Quarters Second Japanese Army, 8th November 1904, with covering letter; with REMARKS by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B.; Tokio, 20th November 1904.

Appendices.

1. Order of battle of the Second Japanese Army.
2. 3rd Division Orders, 30th August 1904.
3. Report of Reconnaissance Patrol.
4. Narratives of Officers who took part in Attack on 31st August.
5. General Oku's Order of 2 p.m., 1st September 1904.
6. Orders for the final assault issued to the 34th Regiment.
7. Total casualties of the Japanese Armies at the battle of Liao-yang.

Plates.

General movements of the Japanese and Russian Armies	- - - - -	Map 26*
Positions of the Japanese and Russian Armies on 23rd August 1904	- - - - -	Map 27*
Disposition of the Russian Forces by Divisions	-	Map 28*
Sketch to illustrate the advance of the Japanese Armies on Liao-yang	- - - - -	Map 29
Operations of the Second and Fourth Japanese Armies	- - - - -	Map 30
Shou-shan-pu position	- - - - -	Map 31
View of the Shou-shan-pu position	- -	Panorama 2

* These plates were sent home by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton. Maps 26 and 28 are not referred to specifically in the text, but indicate clearly the general movements during the battle.

*Covering Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir W. G.
Nicholson, K.C.B.*

The annexed excellent report by Lieut.-Colonel Haldane, on the operations of the Second Japanese Army, from 4th August to 4th September, is submitted for information. The suggestions put forward in his covering letter appear to me to be deserving of careful consideration; and I would refer more particularly to the supply of rifle ammunition during an engagement and the carrying of entrenching tools by the infantry soldier (paragraphs 4 and 5).

Covering Letter by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O.

I have the honour, in forwarding the enclosed report upon the operations of the Second Japanese Army from the 4th August to the 4th September 1904, to draw attention to several points which I venture to think deserve consideration.

1. As the passage by the attack of certain obstacles, more particularly barbed wire entanglement and abattis, covered by artillery and rifle fire, is by day practically impossible, it may be assumed that those parts of a position so protected will rarely be subjected to assault. By night, however, or during thick weather, unless the defenders hold ground in close proximity to them, or watch them by means of outposts or searchlights, they can be destroyed, as were those in front of Captain "M.'s" company. (See Appendix 4, p. 256.)

The obstacles constructed for the protection of the Shou-shan-pu position were placed between three hundred and six hundred yards in front of the trenches, whereas in a line of works recently prepared by the Japanese, barbed wire entanglements and abattis are to be seen at a distance of only one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards from the parapets.

Rifle and artillery fire are presumably the most efficient obstacles to an enemy's advance by day, and as it will rarely be possible in field fortification to have a double line of obstacles, one near and one at a distance, it would seem best to consider such impediments to advance as mainly useful in preventing an enemy from rushing a position by night. For this reason they should be kept close to the position, where they can be easily guarded.

2. The extremely high percentage of losses in the engineer companies at Shou-shan-pu—losses among men not easily replaced on account of their technical training—seems to suggest the provision of some form of protection for those engaged in destroying obstacles, or laying charges under rifle fire. As a sap-roller is, or was, provided for the attack on permanent

works, so a few bullet-proof shields, constructed to move on wheels or otherwise, might be allotted to each engineer company. Had such an article been available in the attack on Shou-shan-pu many lives would have been saved. On the north-west frontier of India, where the towers of refractory tribesmen have occasionally to be blown up, two or three shields *per* company would perhaps suffice and would not add greatly to the transport.

As an alternative to shields it might be possible to include in the ingredients of a few or all of our high-explosive shells some substance which on ignition would raise a cloud of thick smoke. In support of this suggestion I may mention that I have recently been informed that the engineers of the 4th Japanese Division were enabled to cut the barbed wire entanglements at Nan Shan, at the points where access to the position was gained, under cover of the dust thrown up by the concentrated fire of their guns, which fired high-explosive shell. The day, however, was fine, and the ground parched.

I may add under this heading that according to "Combined Training," section 38,* paragraph 3, a detachment of engineers with entrenching implements should accompany the reserve. Japanese experience, however, points to the necessity of a detachment of engineers with wire-cutting shears as well as entrenching tools accompanying the firing line. Had the engineers with the 6th Regiment in the assault on Rocky Ridge been left with the reserve, the infantry would not, possibly, have succeeded in passing the obstacles.

3. The great difficulty of moving troops across country at night—an operation which is of frequent occurrence in the present war, and one, moreover, which seems of vital importance on account of the risk of approaching an enemy's position by day—under some conditions, leads me to represent that increased attention might be paid with advantage to instruction in "night operations" in our army.

4. The difficulty of supplying the soldier with ammunition during a battle has been fully recognized by the Japanese, and men go into action with about 200 rounds. It is customary also for men reinforcing the firing line to carry with them one or two parcels containing 180 rounds in each. Every parcel contains twelve cardboard packets, and in every packet are three clips holding 15 rounds. The parcels are tied up in a white cloth, and at the top and bottom is a small slab of wood with four bevelled grooves cut in it so as to prevent the broad tape which binds the whole together from slipping off. There is a sufficient length of tape on each parcel to allow of their being tied two and two and being slung over the shoulder, one in front and one behind, or round the neck. The ammunition boxes, two of which are carried by a mule, each hold eight parcels, and

* Section 140 of the 1905 edition, which has been amended as above suggested.

the latter arrive from Japan made up ready for placing in the boxes which are carried by the transport animals of the regimental units and ammunition columns. The only improvement in this excellent arrangement for carrying ammunition to the firing line which I can suggest is that the cloth might with advantage be khaki-coloured, as even at three-and-a-half miles distance—through binoculars—a parcel carried on a soldier's back looks like a bull's-eye on a target.

5. According to "Combined Training" it is impossible to entrench during an attack.* This is doubtless the case as regards regular entrenchments, but the Japanese soldier, in spite of the heavy fire which he comes under in attacking the Russians, does a great deal of spade work. Half the men in an infantry battalion carry either a spade or pickaxe, the proportion of tools being regulated according to the nature of the country in which operations take place. The front and rear rank carry the tools on alternate days. Wherever the infantry halt in an attack, except in the final advance after reinforcing, traces of their spade work may be seen, and were they not provided with entrenching tools they would be placed at a grave disadvantage in this open country. For instance, had the men of Captain "M.'s" company not carried tools, those for whom there was not room in the hollow road would certainly have been picked off by the Russians.

I think that I am right in saying that our army has discarded the carrying of entrenching tools by the men individually, and that we are now only provided with battalion tools on pack animals; yet in Manchuria the occasions must be rare when the battalion tools have been able to come sufficiently far to the front to be of service except at night.

6. The Japanese infantry company is provided with six sets of binoculars for the non-commissioned officers. I have frequently noticed them in use in action, and occasionally a sentry posted at a point from which a good view is obtainable may be seen with a pair.

7. The frequent and unavoidable isolation of companies, sections, and individuals, during an action, and the impossibility of obtaining medical assistance, points to the advisability of a more thorough instruction in ambulance work in our service than there is at present. Every officer, non-commissioned officer, and man should be able to bandage a comrade or stop the bleeding from a wound. Those men of Captain "M.'s" company who were wounded at dawn on the 31st August did not receive professional medical aid for seventeen hours, being dependent during that time on such assistance as their comrades could give them.

* 1905 edition, section 122, "It is impracticable, however, to construct entrenchments under heavy fire."

*Report by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Haldane, D.S.O., General Staff.**

The carefully planned march of the three Japanese Armies, executed with clock-like regularity, had at length brought them simultaneously upon a line running eastward from the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng city (C 6). Thus far they had been practically isolated from each other, but two of them, the Second and Fourth Armies, were now in touch, and the First Army would shortly come into close co-operation with them after traversing the difficult country which lay between it and Liao-yang. Arrived in the vicinity of that strategic point, all three Armies would be in a position to exert their united strength against the Russians, who, covered by powerful works, were expected to offer a vigorous resistance.

At this stage, however, an unavoidable pause in the operations occurred, for, throughout the greater part of August heavy rain fell, turning rivers into torrents, roads into morasses, and making movements of magnitude impossible. During this enforced halt a new and shorter line of supply than that in use from Dalny† was opened, and through the port of Ying-kou,† captured after the battle of Ta-shih-chiao,† large quantities of stores were poured into Hai-cheng.

In the meantime the Russians, who had effected an orderly and undisturbed retreat, were reported to have taken up position astride the railway and the main road north near An-shan-tien (E 4), at the same time holding another and more advanced position near the village of Kao-chuang-pu (D 5). Between this place and Hai-cheng were the outposts of the opposing forces, those of the Japanese following generally a line along the Wu-tou-hou-tzu Ho (C/D 6), with observation posts in front upon the hillocks which, here and there, rise some fifty feet or more above the level of the surrounding plain. Minor collisions of patrols were not unfrequent, for each side jealously watched the other, seeking to gain intelligence at the earliest hour of any movement, but beyond the arrival of reinforcements for the Russian right nothing of note occurred. It was observed by the Japanese scouts, however, that the enemy took especial care of his outer flank, keeping the bulk of his cavalry upon the road leading south to Ying-kou, from which direction he doubtless anticipated danger to his communications.

At this time the strength of the force in front of the Second and Fourth Armies was believed to amount to about seven divisions. This was as follows:—

1st, 5th, and 9th Eastern Siberian Rifle Divisions.

Part of the 6th Division.

3rd Division.

One brigade of the 31st and one of the 35th Division.

Two battalions of the 5th Regiment from Moscow, composed of specially selected troops.

* See Map 29.

† For these places, see Map 1.

On the 25th August, Field-Marshal Marquis Oyama, **25th Aug.** Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria, with his staff, arrived at Hai-cheng, and orders were issued for the Second and Fourth Armies to advance next day.

The First Army was already in motion, and on the 23rd, when it recommenced its march, pressed the enemy back towards the valley of the Tang Ho (H 4/5). On the 24th, part of its left division occupied the position of Hou-lang-kou (H 5), and on the 25th the same troops captured Lang-tzu-shan (H 5) and Ta-hsiang-tun (G 5). Compelled to retire on this side, the Russians gave way only step by step, and brought into line a force of nearly four divisions, which were placed as follows:—

At the Kung-chang Ling (J 3), the 1st Rifle Division.

At Ta-tien-tzu (H 4), the 6th Rifle Division.

In the vicinity of Ku-sao-cheng (H 3), the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division.

At Hsiao-ling-tzu (H 4), the 3rd Division and a portion of another Siberian Division.

As yet the Japanese left had not moved, for on the progress of the right depended the date of its departure. As, however, by the 25th that wing had fulfilled its allotted task, the general movement could begin next day. On that day the First Army carried out operations on an extended front, its right attacking the Hung-sha Ling (J 3) and the Han-po Ling, its centre the Kung-chang Ling, and its left the ground northward of Ta Hsi-Kou (G 5); while the Second Army, leaving the vicinity of Hai-cheng (C 6) at 3 a.m., marched against the enemy in three columns. On the right, the 3rd Division, followed by the 2nd Reserve Brigade, took the main road, which runs parallel and close to the railway on its eastern side; in the centre, the 6th Division with the Artillery Brigade* directed its march towards Yang-hsiang-tun (D 5), while the left or 4th Division headed towards Ta-lung-chai (C 5). The 1st Cavalry Brigade, pushing back the enemy's mounted troops, covered the extreme left flank of the Army's march. Between the First and Second Armies the Fourth Army moved in two columns, on the right the 10th Division (both divisions of the Fourth Army were armed with mountain guns) quitting Shan-yin-tsai (E 6) for Hsi-pai-lu (E 5), while the 5th Division, taking a road more to the west, maintained communication with the 3rd Division of the Second Army.

The nature of the country through which the Second and **26th Aug.** Fourth Armies had begun to advance is singularly adapted for rear guard actions. Between Hai-cheng and Liao-yang a succession of positions formed by the outlying features of the Chien Shan range protrude into the plain which stretches westward to the Liao Ho. These lengthy spurs run generally at right angles to the railway, which either traverses them by

* Of three regiments of 36 guns each.

natural gaps or avoiding them, sweeps round their western end. On these positions, as already mentioned, the enemy had taken post. Fully informed regarding his dispositions, the object of the commanders of the Second and Fourth Armies was to drive in his outposts on the 26th and gain the line of Kao-chuang-pu and Tien-chia-chiang (C/D 5). This preliminary operation effected, the advanced position near these places would be attacked next day and that in rear of it reconnoitred, while on the 28th this last would be assailed. On the 26th the programme for the day was carried out, the hostile outposts being pushed back and the intended line secured. The affair cost the Japanese less than ten men killed and wounded, and the Russians, besides other casualties, had seven men taken prisoners.

27th Aug.

Early on the 27th the Second Army marched against the advanced position, which was believed to extend from Ssu-ma-tai (D 4/5) on the west through Tang-kang-tzu (D 5) to Pai-hsia-tai (E 5). The 3rd Division kept to the main road, while the 6th and 4th Divisions made respectively for Ku-chia-tzu (D 5) and Chuang-tai-tzu (not on the map, but west of Ku-chia-tzu). During the night of the 26th heavy rain had fallen, and on the 27th a wet and misty morning favoured the Russians, who retired towards An-shan-tien (E 4). The movement was not at once discovered, and General Oku's leading troops, who, greatly impeded by the heavy roads, were pushing on, arrived at the position only to find to their disappointment that, except for a weak rear guard which withdrew on their approach, it was deserted.

The enemy's retreat was at once reported to General Oku, who had reached the village of Kao-chuang-pu (D 5), at 8 a.m., and two staff officers were despatched by him to reconnoitre the main position at An-shan-tien. Their report was not received until 2.30 p.m., and once more the news was unsatisfactory. The enemy was in full retreat. Orders were given forthwith to pursue, but the troops could not be put in motion again before 4 p.m. At that hour the 3rd Division started along the main road, and, crossing the river which flows south of An-shan-tien, occupied the railway station there at 7 p.m. Some hours later, after a toilsome march, the 6th Division reached the river side at Chao-yang-ching (E 4) and the 4th at Ku-shu-tun (D 4). The Fourth Army, whose march this day had not been devoid of difficulties, halted for the night at Huang-chia-ling (E 4). Further to the right the First Army had been engaged all day, and had met with heavy opposition in its endeavours to cross to the right bank of the Tang Ho. Its situation gave some cause for anxiety, for the Russians had brought up reinforcements and vigorously resisted the advance, more especially that of the left division, which linked it with the Armies on the west.

28th Aug.

On the 28th the Second and Fourth Armies, regardless of the previous day's fatigue, were afoot at dawn and lost no time in following the tracks of the retreating enemy, who left a force

holding the ground near Pei-kuan-kou (D E 4). The 3rd Division took the road to Sha-ho village (E 3), the 6th that to Liu-shan-tun (E 3), while the 4th directed its steps towards Pai-chieh-pu (E 3). Before long the 3rd Division came up with and engaged the rear guard, driving it back in some confusion; two hundred dead were left upon the ground where it had stood, while the total casualties of the Japanese barely reached that figure. The Russians lost besides, eight guns, twenty ammunition carts, and one hundred supply wagons. General Nodzu, with the Fourth Army, moving through the hilly country eastward of the 3rd Division, helped it with his mountain guns. On that division the brunt of the day's fighting fell, for the march of the remainder was full of difficulties, and their guns which from time to time were sunk in mud to the axle-trees, could not be brought forward in time to assist. During the afternoon the Second Army came to the line of the Sha Ho, and there received a report that the First Army was endeavouring to gain touch with the Fourth Army, and would take up a line stretching from Wang-pao-tai (G/H 3) to Shuang-miao-tzu (H 2) and, if possible, occupy the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho.

The dates on which the three Japanese Armies began the final phase of the advance on Liao-yang had been determined with the object of placing them by a certain date, the 28th August, on a general front, whence in close co-operation with each other the enemy could be assailed. Without such an arrangement the risk of defeat in detail would have been incurred. With this view it was hoped that the First Army would succeed in pressing back the enemy, either west of the Tang Ho, or north of the Tai-tzu Ho, after which, securing the commanding heights near Liao-yang, on the left bank of the latter river, it would be able to join hands with the Fourth Army in operating against the Russian left. Similarly, the Fourth Army was to reach, if possible, the line of hills which fill the space between Meng-chia-fang (G 3) and Tsao-fan-tun (G 3) with its left extended as far as Yen-tao-yuan (F 3), while the Second Army was to assemble on the banks of the Sha Ho. Of the three Armies the Second alone had succeeded in completing the task assigned to it, but the Fourth Army was not far behind, and at 8 a.m. on the 29th reached the necessary limit, meeting with but little opposition on the way. General Oku had proffered the assistance of his 3rd Division, but this was not required.

On the 29th a reconnoitring force of two battalions and a battery was sent forward by the Second Army. Starting at 6 a.m. it reached at 8 the village of Tu-tai-tzu (B 5)* and came under the fire of two batteries on the heights in front, where the infantry could be perceived. A few shells were fired in reply, but the enemy's lack of concealment had furnished the information required, showing that the heights from Shou-shan-pu (C 4) to Hsin-li-tun (C 4) were prepared and held for

* See Map 30, and also for general idea of the battle Map 34.

defence. Besides this report another* of similar nature was received from the cavalry.

News from the other Armies was as follows.† The Fourth Army had gained the heights overlooking Liao-yang, whence an extended view of the country over which it must advance to reach that place was displayed. The First Army, on the north-east, stated that the main body of its right and centre divisions had seized, during the night of the 28th-29th, the ground held by the enemy from Ying-shou-pu (J 2) to Shih-chu-tzu (G/H 3), while part of its centre division and the whole of the left was coming up from the south towards Cha-lu-tzu (G 3), in order to occupy the heights lying north and north-west of that place. The enemy's outposts on this side were reported to be at Shuang-miao-tzu (H 2) and clear of the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, where it bends near Hou Kuan-tun (J 2), south of which place at Lien-tao-wan (J 3) is a ford, but an indifferent one.

From every source there was abundant evidence to show that the Russian positions were of great strength, and that determined opposition must be overcome before they could be taken. On the night of the 29th, General Oku received an order to the following effect from the Manchurian Army Headquarters, then some 5 miles south of An-shan-tien:—

“The Fourth Army expects to be opposed at Hei-niu-chuang (B 5)‡ and Tsao-fan-tun (E 5). Be prepared to assist it by advancing to, and occupying, the heights before you.”

Based on this laconic message the following order was issued to the Second Army:—

Sha-ho (A 6).

(?) p.m., 29th August 1904.

1. There is still an enemy on the heights running from Hsin-li-tun (C 4) to Shou-shan-pu (C 4).
Major-General Akiyama, commanding the cavalry, has this day advanced to Wang-erh-tun (A 3).
2. The Army will advance to-morrow to the line between Shou-shan-pu and Fang-chia-tun (C 4).
3. The 3rd Division§ will leave the line of the Sha Ho at 5 a.m. and advance to a line stretching from the east of the railway to the west of Ta-erh (B 6) through Hei-niu-chuang (B 5), and thence advance to the heights south-east of Shou-shan-pu. One regiment of the Artillery Brigade is attached to this division.
4. The 6th Division will leave the line of the Sha Ho at 5 a.m., co-operating with the left of the 3rd Division and marching along the road west of the railway

* See Appendix 3, page 255 (this report was received at 7.30 p.m.)—

A. H.

† See Map 29.

‡ See Map 30.

§ For orders of G.O.C., 3rd Division, see Appendix 2, page 254.—A. H.

through the villages of Tung-tai,* Ta-ya-tun (A 5), Ta-hung-chi (A 5), Li-chieh-pu (A 4), and Liu-chia-san-chia-tzu (A/B 3).

5. The 4th Division† will leave the line of the Sha Ho at 6 a.m., and taking the road west of the 6th Division will assemble its main body at the southern edge of Hsin-lin-tai (A 4).
6. The Artillery Brigade‡ (less one regiment attached to the 3rd Division) will for marching purposes follow close behind the 6th Division, but should the road be heavy it will take the main road.
7. The Foot Artillery will leave its quarters at 5 a.m., and, following the main road, proceed to Tu-tai-tzu (B 5).
8. The "Reserve" Infantry Brigade§ will march at 5 a.m. and follow the railway line to Sha-ho village (A 6).
9. The Army Commander will leave his quarters at 5 a.m., and will proceed along the railway to the hill immediately east of Sha-ho village (A 6).

In the great battle, the orders for the conduct of one portion of which have just been given, the Second Army, which covered what was soon to become the line of communication of the three Japanese Armies, was destined to play an important part. Its successes during the four months in which it had operated in Manchuria have been recounted, and the splendid qualities of its general and those under him touched upon, but in the struggle which was imminent greater efforts would be called for and made, higher self-sacrifice demanded and given before victory could be won. Nan Shan, Te-li-ssu, and Ta-shih-chiao, brilliant triumphs though they were, stand but as preludes to the great drama which was to be enacted before Liao-yang.

It has been said that the Chien Shan range throws off to the west several outlying features which were expected to be held by the Russians in their retirement north. The last and strongest of these positions|| lies some four miles south-west of Liao-yang directly across the main road, and juts out into the plain from south-east to north-west for about 4,000 yards. It consists of three hills, joined together by cols, which are at no great elevation above the surrounding plain. The north-eastern hill, called Shou-shan-pu,¶ is a rocky eminence rising to a

* Not included on Map 30; it is about 2,000 yards west of Sha-ho (A 6).

† The 4th Division was short of one battalion of the 37th Regiment, which was in Korea. It came to Manchuria and joined the head-quarters of the regiment north of Liao-yang on the 1st October 1904.—A. H.

‡ The Artillery Brigade is of course part of the corps troops.—A. H.

§ The "Reserve" Brigade consisted now of three regiments, each of three battalions, a fresh regiment having landed at and joined from Ying-kou.—A. H.

|| See Map 31 and Panorama 2.

¶ The Russians called this hill "99" on account of that number of sajens (1 sajen = 7 feet) being given as its height on their map.—A. H.

height of 693 feet, with steep sides verging in places on the precipitous. Its base forms an irregular triangle, the longest side of which with buttress-like ends is hugged by the railway, which here and for some miles north and south is carried on an embankment ten to fifteen feet above the plain. From the summit of the hill, on which stand the still solid remains of an ancient beacon, an extensive view of the Liao plain is obtained. On every side, to the west and north, as far as the eye can see, and in other directions up to the foot of the mountains, is a huge expanse of *kaoliang* (tall grain) or millet, growing to a height of at least ten feet, while here and there are villages of varying size hidden in clumps of trees and rising above the surface of the level ground like islands in the sea. Next to the hill of Shou-shan-pu is Middle Hill,* which lies immediately east of the main road to Liao-yang, and is the central feature of the position. Its sides, though steep, are less abrupt than those of its neighbours, and consequently lend themselves better to defence by rifle fire; moreover, it stands somewhat in advance of the general line, and so flanks Rocky Ridge, the next hill on the east. Between Shou-shan-pu and Middle Hill, thrust out from the latter, is a flat-topped under-feature—Low Spur—which not only commands the approaches by the main road, but serves to flank the front of the hill from which it springs as well as that of Shou-shan-pu. On the neck between Middle Hill and Rocky Ridge, and lying somewhat in the background, is a small knoll, well hidden from the plain in front and overlooking the stem of the deep and Y-shaped ravine before it. The last hill of the series is Rocky Ridge, with long and narrow top, stony, steep, and in parts thickly covered with low bushes and scrub. Bulging out on its southern side is a knoll which flanks both the front of the parent hill and that of Middle Hill. This knoll in turn is flanked from the ridge behind as well as from the sides of Middle Hill.

Although the range runs on beyond the road to Hsin-li-tun, that portion was not included in the Russian position, which from Rocky Ridge, bends northward along the crescent of hills overlooking the last-named village. These hills effectually guarded it on the east, while the railway embankment did similar service on the west. The whole position is in shape a rough horse-shoe, of which Middle Hill is the centre of the curve, and the railway and hills above Hsin-li-tun are the sides. Nearly at right angles to it and facing the eastern extremity of Rocky Ridge are two narrow valleys whose full significance will appear as the engagement is described. Apart from artificial aids, the ground which the Russian right held was as strong as could well be imagined, though, like all positions, it was not perfect.

* As the several hills lying east of Shou-shan-pu have no local names they are called in this report, for the sake of clearness of description, "Low Spur," "Middle Hill," and "Rocky Ridge."—A. H.

The strength of the left was somewhat detracted from by the lack of depth of Rocky Ridge, while the bastion-like positions of Low Spur and Middle Hill made the works upon them liable to enfilade and even to reverse fire from long-range guns posted beyond the Russian right, north of the railway line. As regards the latter contingency, the sodden nature of the ground at the time of the battle would have made the movement of heavy ordnance, except in trucks upon the railway, extremely difficult, so that little danger was to be expected from that direction.

On the whole the Shou-shan-pu position was admirably placed to serve the Russian purpose of safeguarding Liao-yang from the south and west. It covered that city and the bridges over the Tai-tzu Ho at suitable distances, and its great natural strength did not demand an exceedingly large garrison. It commanded the approaches, and the field of fire along the whole front was extensive, the tall millet which would have obstructed the view from the lowest trenches being levelled or broken down to the front for about one thousand yards. The flanks were secure and rested on the inner line of works near the city; excellent cover for reserves existed behind the hills, and the cols between them so hid the Russian artillery, which made use of indirect fire, that neither by day nor by night could the flash of a gun be seen. Communications were all that could be desired; the ground on the right was favourable for counter-attack, while the line of retreat led by many roads across a plain. Even water, often a difficulty where large forces hold small spaces, was easily procured from springs and wells close by. Lastly, from Shou-shan-pu the position of nearly every Japanese gun, though hidden in the *kaoliang*, could be noted, and where this was not possible, could be observed by means of a balloon.

From the above description it will perhaps be apparent that the Shou-shan-pu position was not deficient in natural defensive power, and in order to enhance that power the Russian engineers turned to account nearly every device which forms part of fortification in the field. Here, in strict contrast to the battlefields of Nan Shan and Te-li-ssu, were no conspicuous gun epaulments nor trenches visible to the naked eye for miles; yet by their appearance the works must have been constructed many weeks, probably months, before the attack. If then, as it is stated by the inhabitants of Liao-yang, work on the defences was begun soon after the campaign opened, it seems clear that while brains were blundering on battlefields further south, engineers of vastly different mould were leaving their mark on positions near that city which, through no fault in their design, were to fall.

The general character of the works at Shou-shan-pu and the adjacent hills may best be described as semi-permanent. They were prepared for infantry to hold one or two lines of trenches, both placed well below the crest-line, with their

parapets sod-covered or weed-grown, which merged gently into the slopes in front. On each hill, from one or other extremity, and sometimes from both ends, of these lines, deep and well defiladed approaches led to the splinter-proofs behind, or to the ground immune from gun or rifle fire.

From west to east the defences were as follows:—

Beyond the railway a strong line of shelter trenches protected the embankment from sudden attack at the point where it curves, while another line connected the village of Ku-chia-tzu with the permanent way. The existence of this embankment was fortunate for the defence, for being raised above the plain it afforded a good field of fire and protection against artillery, while on the west of it was a ditch filled with rain-water, whence the earth required for its construction had been taken. Four hundred yards south-west of the point where the railway bends, and flanking it, a Russian cottage with outhouses was prepared for all-round defence with strongly-made parapets backed by sleepers. Round that part of Ma-yeh-tun village which is nearest to the railway was a blunted lunette with thick parapets and a 10-ft. V-shaped ditch. This work was incomplete, there being no ditch on its western face and no obstacles in front of it. The walls of the rest of the village had been prepared for hasty defence, and to the east of it ran a trench which partly flanked the works on Low Spur. Below the crest of Shou-shan-pu were cunningly made breast-works built of rock and sandbags, and on its flank a trench from which fire could be delivered to front or rear. Communication with this hill was not forgotten, for, from near the summit, a double flight of easy steps was cut, which led to the plain in rear through a shady grove, on the verge of which stood a Chinese temple. Throughout the battle the deep-toned bell of this edifice tolled the hours, regardless of din of gun and rifle. On the col south of the hill was a completed work of nature similar to that before Ma-yeh-tun. Low Spur was held by an inconspicuous trench from which three covered ways conducted to a roomy splinterproof, behind which lay a deep and narrow ravine.

The defences on Middle Hill were much like those on Low Spur. Just below the summit was a circular trench, and lower down the hill side a long line of trenches stretching across the face from west to east. Behind the southern top were splinter-proofs connected with the trenches, and further cover was available in the deep and broad ravine at right-angles to the main road. On the neck between the two peaks of the hill were gun pits for four guns, which flanked the front of the whole position to the east. The rough crest of Rocky Ridge provided natural cover for infantry firing towards the south, but here and there, more especially towards the eastern extremity of the hill, were trenches, some of which were thrown back to meet a possible attack on the flank. Well below the crest, and

running partly round the knoll before it, was another trench, whose fire swept the ravine in front. Approaches joined this trench to splinterproofs behind the ridge, but neither these nor some behind the knoll were in a completed state.

The greater part of the front of the position was closed by a broad line of high barbed wire, or rows of military pits, or both in combination, but wide gaps were left in front of Middle Hill, and where the roads penetrated it there were no obstructions. The obstacles, which were completely under view from the trenches, were situated from three to six hundred yards in front of them. On the Russian left the entanglement was carried to the eastern side of the road to Hsin-li-tun, whence turning northwards it ran through the neck parallel to it for a short distance. On this flank, too, west of the road and on the lower slopes of Rocky Ridge, was a row of stone fougasses which could be fired by means of an electric wire from the position.

Sites suitable for hiding the Russian guns were found behind the cols, where in several places alternate lines of epaulments were made. The locality of two of these artillery positions deserves remark, for to them was greatly due the extreme difficulty which the attackers found in gaining a lodgment on Rocky Ridge. Of these, one lies behind the rear-most peak of Middle Hill, from which point the fire of its guns played upon the exits of the narrow valleys leading north from Yen-tao-yuan. The other was on the slope of the hills near Fang-chia-tun, whence the guns fired directly up these valleys, their projectiles crossing those from Middle Hill.

To complete these elaborate arrangements, a light railway, starting from near the railway station at Liao-yang, was laid through the fields to the gun position at Fang-chia-tun, whither it carried ammunition and supplies.

Such was the obstacle which faced the Second Japanese Army—one which held it at bay for forty-eight hours of almost ceaseless battle.

On the 30th August, the troops of that Army marched as ordered from the line of the Sha Ho, following in a north-easterly direction the roads allotted to them. At about 6.35 a.m. the two columns composing the 3rd Division reached respectively Hei-niu-chuang, at the foot of the hills on the east, and Tu-tai-tzu, on the main road, and were fired upon by two batteries posted on the col between Middle Hill and Rocky Ridge. Although the guns were well concealed, the Russian infantry could be seen moving on the hills in front. About the same hour as the 3rd Division came under fire, a heavy cannonade was audible in the direction of the Fourth Army, which was moving north-west through the hills some distance to the east. A part of its 5th Division had driven back a small force of the enemy, and occupied, between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m., the ground extending from the hill south of Ta-yao to the northern part of the village of Hsiao-yang-ssu, thus coming in touch **30th Aug.**

with the 3rd Division. Lieut.-General Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, sent forward reconnoitring parties, which reported that the Russian position extended from Shou-shan-pu south-eastward for about 3,500 yards, while the left was thrown back to Hsin-li-tun. As the works appeared strong and covered by formidable obstacles, the general decided not to attempt to force them by a frontal attack, and leaving a portion of his troops at Hsiao-yang-ssu, directed the remainder to move to the hills on their right. At 7 a.m. the guns of the division which had unlimbered on the north-east side of Tu-tai-tzu, opened fire on Middle Hill. Covered by them, the infantry threaded their way, slowly and in single file, through the saturated millet fields, and some time later reached, unobserved, the shelter of the hills. There they formed up and prepared, in co-operation with the 5th Division, to attack the Russian left. The brigade of the 3rd Division on the right with the portion of the 5th Division in Hsiao-yang-ssu was ordered to advance against Rocky Ridge, while the left brigade was directed against Middle Hill.

While these movements were in progress, the troops of the 6th Division in the centre were slowly coming up. The heavy rain which was falling and fell at intervals throughout the day, made the roads extremely heavy, and in spite of every effort they were unable to keep pace with their comrades on the right. At 11 a.m. the advanced guard reached the village of Ta-chiao-chia-tai,* and fired upon the enemy in front, and the artillery of the division, arriving at 1 p.m., came into action from the hillock east of Ta-hung-chi† against the enemy's guns south-west of Shou-shan-pu. The Russian artillery, apparently two batteries, replied, but their fire was wild, the shells frequently bursting far above the objective. Nevertheless, the exact position of the Japanese guns must have been visible from the post of observation on Shou-shan-pu, or from the balloon, which from time to time rose from behind the hills forming the Russian position. The Japanese gunners, on the other hand, laboured under the disadvantage of not being able to detect the precise position of the hostile batteries, but they continued to fire steadily at the hills in front.

By 1 p.m. the 3rd Division had made considerable progress, but not sufficient to allow of the assault of the heights, for whenever an attempt was made to emerge from the valleys leading directly on Rocky Ridge, the batteries near Fang-chia-tun beat back the assailants. The magnitude of the task before him had, however, been recognized by General Oku, who dispatched forthwith reinforcements consisting of a "second reserve" brigade regiment and a battalion of foot artillery, with sixteen 9-cm. (3.5-inch) mortars. At 3.20 p.m. this artillery reached the valley between the hills of Hei-niu-chuang, and, allying itself to the field artillery already there, opened fire.

* West of Shou-shan-pu.

† On west edge of Map 31.

At 1 p.m., too, the right brigade of the 6th Division came up, and, with the left brigade at Ta-chiao-chia-tai, was in a position to co-operate with the left brigade of the 3rd. Quitting the shelter of the village, the 6th Division now advanced to the assault, and endeavoured to reach the enemy's trenches lying to the west of the railway. The troops of the left brigade partly succeeded in surrounding them, but those on its right, their flanks devastated by the terrific fire which assailed them, were brought to a standstill. This attack was somewhat premature, for the whole of the artillery of the division* had not yet reached the scene of action, and it could not receive adequate support. At the hour when it was made the main body of the 4th Division was at Hsin-lin-tai, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Wang-erh-tun, with a battery of artillery, was firing on the enemy's right rear.†

At 4 p.m. the enemy, probably in anticipation of another attack, reinforced his right with both infantry and artillery. His troops at this point, despite the heavy fire concentrated upon them, maintained a firm front and showed no signs of giving way. Opposite them the 6th Division, crouching in the open before Ku-chia-tzu (B/C 3), were suffering loss from the heavy fire of machine guns which showered bullets on them from that village, and expecting every moment to be assailed by a counter-attack. Again, their commander, taking the initiative, ordered the assault, and the gallant troops, responding, rushed to what seemed certain death. But there is a limit even to the magnificent bravery of the Japanese, and once more the attack failed, for to reach those trenches meant extermination, and not success. Seeing the critical situation of the 6th Division, the commander of the 4th‡ sent for four of his battalions, and they, coming up at 5.30, helped to maintain the fight.

Turning again to the right, but little change had taken place in the condition of the 3rd Division. Every attempt to sally forth from the narrow valleys had been met by a withering fire, and it had begun to dawn on all that the formidable obstacles several hundred yards away could scarce be reached, except at night.

Such were the conditions of the battle, when, at 4.25 p.m., General Oku received the following order from the Commander-in-Chief:—

- "1. The enemy in front of the 10th Division of Nodzu's (Fourth) Army has assumed the offensive.
- "2. The Second Army must, without delay, expel the enemy from the height of Shou-shan-pu and come to the assistance of the division in difficulties."

* On this day only one regiment of the Artillery Brigade was engaged. Two of the batteries of this regiment were attached to the 4th Division, and, moving along the road west of the railway, took part in the action.—A. H.

† For general situation, see Map 30.

‡ This division was intended to be kept intact as a general reserve for the Second Army.—A. H.

So apparently drastic a measure, in view of the failure of the Second Army to force that position, was rendered necessary by the increasing energy of the Russians in the centre. There, while containing the First Army on their left and the Second on their right, they seemed about to overwhelm the Fourth, which was armed entirely with mountain guns.*

The order was issued by General Oku for a general attack, and the artillery of the 4th Division, which was firing from Li-chieh-pu (A 4) at the hill of Shou-shan-pu, advanced to the eastern side of Fu-chia-chuang (A 4), while the main body of the division was closed up as a reserve to Ta Chiao-chia-tui (B 4). But the attempt, like the previous ones, indirectly though it may have helped the Fourth Army, was doomed to failure, and by 8.15 p.m. the roar of guns and rattle of musketry had died away and the curtain of night fell upon the bloody scene.

The 30th August was a day of disappointment. Starting in the morning full of high hopes, the Japanese, who were accustomed to break down opposition, no matter how severe, found themselves at nightfall still at arm's length from the enemy. Fortune had refused that day to smile upon them, for the weather was bad, and the muddy roads, which in the morning made movement hard, grew worse and worse as the hours wore on. Only one regiment of the Artillery Brigade had been able to take part in the action, and in consequence endeavours to overpower the Russian guns had failed. Provided that every gun could be concentrated against the main points to be assailed success might be attained, but it was clear that a position whose front and flanks bristled with obstacles under the close fire of musketry was practically impregnable to assault by day. This conclusion had already been come to by the divisional commanders, who, aware of the peril in which the Fourth Army stood, decided to attack at night. But the night was exceedingly dark, so much so indeed as to render movement in strength over millet fields and miry roads impossible. On these grounds the 3rd Division deferred the operation, and the commander of the 6th, to whom the decision was communicated, agreed to assault at 4 a.m. This latter division had undergone a series of heavy counter-attacks about 1 a.m., all of which had been repulsed, but the men were somewhat scattered, and would not be ready to attack much before dawn.

31st Aug.

The Attack at Dawn on the 31st August.†

It has been mentioned that some infantry of the 5th Division co-operated with the 3rd Division on the 30th. These troops

* One "battalion" (*anglice* brigade) of the 15th Regiment of the Artillery Brigade of the Second Army (18 guns) and a battalion of foot artillery (sixteen 8·5-cm. (3·3-inch) mortars) had been sent to assist the Fourth Army and reached it at 5 p.m.—A. H.

† See Map 31, also Appendix 4, page 256.

consisted of the 21st Regiment, which was in occupation of Hsiao-yang-ssu, where it intervened between two brigades of the 3rd Division. Immediately east of Hsiao-yang-ssu was the 6th Regiment, and on its right the 18th, while directly west of the same village was the 33rd Regiment, and, between it and the railway, the 34th.*

This force of five regiments was ordered to carry out the assault on the position which extends from Low Spur to the south-east extremity of Rocky Ridge, and in reserve with divisional head-quarters behind hill "H" was a regiment of the Reserve Brigade. About 3 a.m. the battalions detailed for the firing line, leaving their trenches, formed for attack and marched towards the black mass of hills before them, which was dimly visible by the faint light of a cloud-covered moon. The 18th Regiment, moving first, had sent two companies to the point "F" east of the Hsin-li-tun road, whence they were to cover the attack as soon as the enemy discovered it. The remainder of the regiment crossing the ridge further east passed into the valley to the north, whence they were to endeavour to envelop the Russian left. As the reserve battalion came astride the ridge, the enemy, who may have seen or heard the movement, opened fire, which the two companies at "F" promptly returned. Nevertheless, the advance of the leading companies of the 6th and 18th Regiments had not yet been discovered, and the engineers with the former had succeeded in cutting a way through the barbed wire entanglement. Scarcely was this effected when the presence of the attackers became known, and they were greeted with a heavy fire and the explosion of mines. A momentary panic ensued, and the men of the 6th Regiment, who had already begun to mount the hill, ran back to the slightly hollow road† which they had just crossed over. Here they were assembled and remained till noon, when the assault was resumed. The leading companies of the 18th Regiment concluding from the enemy's fire that the attempt to surprise him had not succeeded, and receiving a report from their engineers that an impassable obstacle intervened between them and the road, withdrew to a ravine a short distance back. The advance of the 21st and 33rd Regiments had been attended with no better success, but the 34th Regiment, whom nothing could deter, raising the war-cry, stormed and gained a footing on Middle Hill. Unfortunately, that regiment's march had been delayed by the difficult ground which they had had to traverse, and the hour of their attack almost coincided with that of the failure of the forces further east. Rushing the lower trench, they pressed on to the next, which encircles the summit of the hill, and took

* The 6th and 34th Regiments belong to one brigade, and the 18th and 33rd to another, but the fighting of the 30th August had led to their standing in different order in this attack.—A. H.

† The cutting through which the road passes is about 3 feet deep.—A. H.

that also. But the Russians, recovering from their surprise, hastily brought up reinforcements, and strove by vigorous counter-attack to relieve the perilous plight in which they were for a brief time placed. The gallant 34th, victory almost within their grasp, dashed against the foe wherever he appeared, but the failure of the attack elsewhere allowed the enemy to devote all his attention to them, and their ranks soon grew thin under the terrible fire with which they were assailed. The artillery, too, which, owing to darkness had been silent, now fired through the mist, and from every side shells and bullets hailed. The colonel of the regiment fell, and his adjutant and every officer was soon either killed or wounded. The men, now almost leaderless, faced the enemy, and forming little groups ran to meet his counter-attacks. But a struggle so one-sided could not endure for long, and the Russians, seeing their desperate straits, plied them with bullet and bayonet, and drove the gallant remnant "foot-by-foot and with a horrid carnage to the bottom of the hill." There, some three hundred wounded men, all that survived of the seven companies that had attacked, assembled about 8 a.m., behind a company of the reserve which had come up.

The 6th Division, further to the west, had begun their attack simultaneously with the 3rd, the objective of the left wing being the village of Ku-chia-tzu, and of the right, Ma-yeh-tun. Suffering heavy loss from rifle and machine gun fire, they drove the enemy back to the railway embankment, and reached a line some fifty to one hundred yards from it, but beyond that no advance could be made. In the desperate fighting the cottage at the level crossing was taken, lost, and again taken, but the galling fire from the lunette in front of it and from Ma-yeh-tun made progress beyond impossible.

At 6 a.m. the position of the 6th Division was as follows:—

The artillery was on the eastern side of Ta-hung-chi.*

Of the infantry, one battalion was close to the railway embankment west of Ma-yeh-tun, another astride it a little further south, a third stood a little to the west of Ku-chia-tzu, and a fourth, in reserve, was to the east of Ta-chiao-chia-tai. Prolonging the line to the north was a regiment of the 4th Division, which was supplemented later by two battalions of that division.

Of the Artillery Brigade, a regiment had been placed on the west side of Yang-chia-lin-tzu, and a position close to the railway line had been made for four of the 10·5-cm. guns captured at Nan Shan. About 7 a.m. General Oku, hearing from every side that the attack had failed, ordered those portions of the Artillery Brigade to open fire, and at once despatched the Reserve Brigade along the Liao-yang highway to help the left of the 3rd Division. This brigade pushed forward, but was obliged to halt before the heavy fire that met it. Along the whole line the attack had met with but slight success, while the

* West edge of Map 31.

situation of the Japanese left gave cause for much anxiety. On that side the Russians held a strong line behind the railway embankment, to outflank which was impossible. An attempt to do so would have dangerously exposed the force so engaged to attack from Liao-yang. Here, too, as the troops were thrown into the fight, the defence prolonged its line, and the 4th Division, though intended as a reserve, was gradually being absorbed in a part of the field where its utmost efforts helped but little towards the general result. Fortunately, the enemy did not perceive or take advantage of the hazardous position of the Japanese left, and from early morning ceased to persevere in his counter-attacks.

After the several attempts to force the Russian position a lull occurred at dawn, broken only at intervals by artillery fire. The Japanese guns fired slowly, for much difficulty was being experienced in bringing up ammunition over the muddy roads and fields, and it had become necessary to husband it for the mid-day attack which was about to take place.

The general commanding the 3rd Division, satisfied that the capture of Rocky Ridge was not beyond the compass of his infantry, had reported his intention of again attempting it, and the assault had been ordered to take place at noon.

At 11.30 a.m. the artillery everywhere increased their fire, and the guns of the 3rd Division, advancing within the zone of the rifle fire, poured upon Rocky Ridge a rain of projectiles. Besides the guns of that division, a regiment of the Artillery Brigade, 18 guns of which were posted west of Hei-niu-chuang, and 16 mortars in the valley between "H" and "M," took part and directed their fire on the object of attack. For half an hour the cannonade went on, while the southern side of the eastern end of Rocky Ridge was deluged with shrapnel and battered with high-explosive shell. Here, as on the other parts of the position, were no splinterproofs where the garrison could lie in safety till the infantry advanced, and then by covered approaches reach the trenches and shoot them down.

The short but sharp bombardment shook the nerves of the defenders, and the first signs of their discomfort were marked by the few survivors of the companies of the 6th Regiment which at dawn had gained the hollow road east of the ridge. Crouched there, unable to advance or retire, they heard a bugle sounding the advance, and a moment later saw their own reserve battalion and one of the 18th coming on. The artillery fire began to slacken, betokening the moment for the assault. Twenty heroes led by a valiant second-lieutenant* sprang from the road, and racing up the fire-swept ridge reached the lower trench. Here a hand-to-hand fight began, both sides hurling stones at one another, but a company of the 18th coming up, the Russians turned and fled along the trench, whose

* This officer, who received the coveted decoration of the Golden Kite, was killed in the battle of Mukden.—A. H.

ends led into another parallel to it. Other troops of the 34th, 18th, and 21st Regiments hurried up the hill and joined the stormers on the top, and the capture of the hard-held ground was sure.

The assault, carried on in broad daylight, seemed to give promise of further success, but though the guns of the Japanese pounded the hill side all day long, their infantry could make no advance beyond the lower trench. The configuration of the ridge admitted of no attack but on a front of a few yards, and though the distance further up the hill to where the next trench stood was short, the rifles of the defenders and the guns at Fang-chia-tun served the same purpose as an impassable gulf. Throughout the day no efforts of the Russians could make the Japanese relax their hold of the portion of the ridge which had cost so many lives to take. There they clung, as it were, to the edge of a precipice, under an unceasing fire, and it was from this point that the Russian retirement later on was signalled.

The other divisions were not in a condition to attack when the 3rd Division made its successful effort, and from noon onwards the battle remained at a standstill. Although the enemy abstained from counter-attacks on the Japanese left, General Oku had since morning felt much anxiety for that portion of his Army, and decided that, in order to relieve the pressure west of the railway, another attempt must be made to capture Middle Hill. At 4 p.m., therefore, orders were issued for certain troops (of the 4th Division) which had not yet been engaged to carry out his resolve. An hour later, a report sent off at 3 p.m. by the commander of the 4th Division, who was on the extreme left of the Army, arrived. It stated that a somewhat strong force of the enemy comprising infantry and guns had appeared at Pai-tai,* only six miles north-west of Shou-shan-pu, and was advancing against the left. The danger which had been anticipated now seemed imminent, and the order to attack was forthwith cancelled, the troops detailed for it being directed to engage the threatening force. A short time elapsed, and another report arrived which stated that the enemy was not in strength; but it was now too late to carry out the intended attack on Middle Hill, and the troops moving towards the north-west were recalled and ordered to assist the 6th Division by sending to them two battalions.

It is necessary at this stage to glance at the general situation of the First and Fourth Armies, as affording an explanation of General Oku's order for the afternoon attack on Middle Hill.

At 4 p.m. on the 31st the First Army was on the point of crossing the Tai-tzu Ho† at Lien-tao-wan (J 3). The left division of that Army and the 10th Division of the Fourth Army had, both on the 30th and 31st, been operating under great difficulties, and

* On Map 30 (A 2).

† See Map 29.

so dangerous had their condition become that it was impossible for the commanders of the Armies of which they formed part to accept the risk of undertaking a vigorous offensive elsewhere. The responsibility of relieving the situation thus devolved on General Oku, who himself was not free from anxiety for the safety of his own command, and whose troops, heavily engaged during thirty-six hours, had already lost some ten per cent. of their numbers. In the hope of diverting the enemy's attention from the troops west of the railway, and at the same time diminishing the pressure on the Armies further east, he gave the orders for the attack, which, fortunately as events turned out, had to be cancelled. It was ordered, however, to take place at night, and its conduct was entrusted to the commander of the 3rd Division, who was given the following instructions* :—

- “(1) On account of the general condition of the three Armies you must endeavour to assemble your troops and repel the enemy to your front, and further capture the height south-west of Hsin-li-tun (*i.e.*, Rocky Ridge).
- “(2) Arrange for the Reserve Brigade, now on the Liao-yang highway, to attack simultaneously from the village of Tu-tai-tzu the hill immediately west of the highway (Low Spur).
- “(3) Report the time when you intend to begin, and inform the commander of the Reserve Brigade.”†

The attack was arranged to take place after dark, and the artillery was ordered to assist.

About 7 p.m., shortly after dark, every gun—some two hundred and twenty in all—was brought into play, and from end to end the position was assailed by a storm of steel and lead. At that hour, too, the distant roll of thunder could be heard, and as night drew on, the lightning flashes, combined with the bursting shells, seemed to encircle with a ring of fire the sombre mass of Shou-shan-pu. Now and again a Russian star shell, like a brilliant meteor, would for a brief space shed its light upon the ground over which the dauntless infantry once more hurried to attack. For an hour, without a pause, the impressive scene went on, man's puny efforts seeming to vie with the immeasurable powers of nature. Then the noise of gun and rifle ceased, for again the attack had failed.

It may have been that the determined bearing of the Japanese soldiers in their several endeavours to storm the heights and the tenacious way in which they clung to the captured point on Rocky Ridge influenced the Russian general at Shou-shan-pu, or his action may be attributable to causes more remote, but a retirement to the inner line of works round Liao-yang was ordered. At 1 a.m. the evacuation of the position which was then in progress was discovered, and the

* See Map 31.

† This brigade formed part of the corps troops.—A. H.

news was soon conveyed to the Second Army, which was waiting to attack again. Immediately the infantry advanced, the 5th Division in part helping on the right. By 3 a.m. the victorious troops stood on the heights which had defied their every effort for almost forty-eight hours, but not without loss, for in the last attack the Reserve Brigade,* composed of veterans, suffered many casualties. Its line of advance led it against Low Spur, which covered the main road to Liao-yang and was therefore obstinately held.

In the desperate fighting of the 30th and 31st August the Second Army had lost in killed and wounded over 7,000 men, and yet when the formidable nature of the ground attacked, the obstacles before it and the character of the defence are remembered, this loss was not excessive. The splendid courage shown by the Japanese soldiers in the battle will not easily be forgotten, and of them it might well be said, in the words applied by the renowned historian of the Peninsular war to the heroic stormers of Badajoz, that "no age, no nation, ever sent forth braver soldiers to battle."†

The approximate strength of the enemy's forces which held the position is believed to have been rather over two divisions and a half of infantry and eight batteries of artillery. These were as follows:—The 1st Rifle Division, the greater part of the 5th and 9th Divisions, and part of the 3rd Reserve Division.

1st Sept.

When the Japanese engaged the Russians at Shou-shan-pu, it was with the full knowledge that behind that formidable position lay a line of strongly-built defences prepared many months in advance, a line which covered the enemy's depôt of supplies and military stores, and one which he would assuredly not relinquish without a struggle. Thither early on the 1st September the main body of the Russians guarding the southern side of Liao-yang had withdrawn, and by 4 p.m. was assembled in the neighbourhood of the railway station. Thence, from that hour onwards, train after train was observed from the summit of Shou-shan-pu leaving in quick succession for the north; in one, the wounded, in another, stores. Meanwhile General Oku, whose troops after the rough experience of the past two days required some hours to reassemble and to rest before again engaging in an attack, had been apprised that the enemy had not passed the Tai-tzu Ho, but was making preparations to stand and fight. Thereupon, at 9 a.m., he issued the following

* This brigade, composed of soldiers older than those with the divisions, was not intended to join in the assault, but five of its battalions had got some distance to the front and joined the remainder of the troops in the 1 a.m. assault. The brigade lost:—Officers killed, 6; officers wounded, 6; rank and file killed, 107; wounded, 458. Total all ranks, 577.—A. H.

† Out of 60 engineers who cut the entanglement below Rocky Ridge, 7 were killed and 31 wounded; and of another party of 80 which performed the same duty near the level crossing, only 16 escaped untouched, and every man hit had two or three wounds.—A. H.

order to the commander of the 4th Division, most of whose troops during the battle of the 30th and 31st had stood as a reserve :—

- “(1) The enemy is retiring northward, and the Fourth Army is about to pursue.
- “(2) The main body of the Second Army will assemble on its present position.
- “(3) You will pursue the enemy on the western side of Liao-yang and reconnoitre his position near that place.
- “(4) One regiment of the Artillery Brigade, now in position on the hill south-east of Shou-shan-pu (Low Spur), will accompany you.”

At the same hour as this order was issued the Cavalry Brigade on the left flank was directed to co-operate with the 4th Division in reconnoitring the enemy's position as well as in the pursuit, and by 2 p.m. these forces were both in motion towards the north. At that hour, too, an order was given to the main body of the Second Army regarding its quarters for the night.*

While the 4th Division was preparing to advance, the four 10·5-cm. guns from the south of Shou-shan-pu had been brought up on the railway to support, and, from a position close to the embankment on the western flank of the hill, began throwing shell at 4 p.m. into Liao-yang railway station, and creating much confusion there. At 5 p.m. the artillery of the division reached the vicinity of Yu-chia-chuang-tzu (C 3),† and after a brief duel silenced the enemy's guns south-west of Hsi-kuan (D 3). By this time the division itself had occupied a line extending from a village immediately north-east of the gun position to the neighbourhood of Wang-pao-shan (C 2), whence the enemy's position was reconnoitred.

On the left of the division the Cavalry Brigade had reached the village of Tang-chuang-tzu (B 2), while to the right the Second and Fourth Armies were linked together by a detachment sent by General Oku.

By 5 p.m., particulars of the enemy's position had been obtained, and these, which were as follows, were sent forthwith to the head-quarters of the Second Army :—

- “The enemy holds a strongly-defended position extending from the N.W. of San-li-chuang (D 3) across the railway, and thence to Shui-wan-tzu (D 2).
- “He has a battery east of Hsi-kuan (D 3), another at the north-west side of San-li-chuang and two north of Shui-wan-tzu (D 2).
- “In the vicinity of Yang-chia-lin-tzu (C 2) is a detachment of infantry, forming a strong post of observation, and a number of troops are camped in the neighbourhood of Chen-tai-tzu (D 2).”

* See Appendix 5, page 267.

† See Map 30.

By 5 p.m., too, it was observed from the top of Shou-shan-pu (C 4) that the enemy had moved his troops from the ground near the station, and by the same hour the late field of battle had been almost cleared, and the 3rd and 6th Divisions were, if required, prepared to move.

About 6.30 p.m. the following orders were issued by General Oku :—

- (1) The main forces of the enemy are now on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, but part remains within the defensive works before Liao-yang. (Here follows a summary of the information sent in at 5 p.m. by the 4th Division.) The front of the Fourth Army has to-day reached a line extending from Tung Pa-li-chuang (D 4) to Ta Ta-pei-hu (E 4). The First Army is to-day fronting the enemy at Hei-ying-tai.*
- (2) The Second Army will attack to-morrow.
- (3) The 4th Division, awaiting the arrival of the 3rd and 6th Divisions upon the line which it has now reached, will co-operate with the 6th Division and attack the enemy, their objective being Shui-wan-tzu (D 2). The 6th Division, keeping in touch with the 3rd, will begin its advance at 7 a.m., and the 3rd, leaving Shou-shan-pu at the same hour, will follow the main road and advance to Hsi-kuan (D 3).
- (4) The Artillery Brigade will advance under the orders of the commander of the 6th Division.
- (5) The Foot Artillery will leave their quarters so as to be in a position to march from Shou-shan-pu at 10 a.m. when they will move on Hsi Pa-li-chuang (C/D 3).
- (6) The Reserve Infantry Brigade will march at 8 a.m. to Ku-chia-tzu (B/C 3).
- (7) The Reserve Infantry Regiment is placed under the orders of the 3rd Division commander.
- (8) The Army Commander will leave his quarters at 7 a.m. and proceed to Ku-chia-tzu (B/C 3).

During the night of the 1st an isolated attack was delivered by a battalion of the 37th Regiment of the 4th Division upon a portion of the enemy's works adjoining the railway line, but coming under a heavy fire of machine guns, and finding its front obstructed by obstacles, it was obliged to retire after incurring many casualties.

2nd Sept. At 7 a.m. on the 2nd, the 3rd and 6th Divisions began to advance so as to effect a junction with the right brigade of the 4th Division before attacking the enemy, whom various reports still credited with the intention of making a stand before Liao-yang.

* On Map 29 (H 2), north of the Tai-tzu Ho.

That city, within a few hundred yards of which heavy fighting was about to take place, stands in a plain on the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, which, after issuing from the mountains, sweeps in a broad stream past its eastern face. Its walls are thick and high, and, unlike those of many Manchurian towns, are in tolerably good preservation. Between the city and the railway line on the west lies the Russian settlement, while three miles to the north is a lengthy bridge of steel and stone, which carries the railway over the Tai-tzu Ho. To protect the city, settlement, railway line and bridge, the Russians had constructed a semi-circular line of works some ten miles long, which barred the approaches from the south and west. Starting on the Tai-tzu Ho, south of the village of Yeh-fang (E 3), and crossing the railway at a point distant about one mile south of the settlement, the line ran for some two thousand yards in a westerly direction. From this spot it curved round to the north-east, and again reached the river, which it crossed north of the railway bridge. The works consisted of a series of strong redoubts, between which were others of weaker type, while in rear were entrenchments for infantry and pits for guns. Near approach to the redoubts was made extremely difficult by an elaborate arrangement of wire entanglements and military pits, which in places were carried along the front of the intervening works. The main redoubts, eleven in number, were furnished with splinterproofs, and had commands which varied from 9 to 12 feet, and ditches 15 feet in width, and 6 feet in depth. An oblong tambour, with circular head, flanked and closed the gorge, while the flanks were swept with musketry fire from orillons. The larger redoubts were generally one thousand four hundred yards apart, and were probably intended to be manned by four hundred infantry with several machine guns. The line of trenches were well hidden by the weeds which grew upon them and the strips of *kaoliang* left before them, but the redoubts, through their high command, were visible at a distance, and formed an easy target for artillery. The ground in front was generally cleared for a distance averaging about eight hundred yards, and from end to end the line presented an obstacle of a most formidable nature. Provision was made for reinforcing or withdrawing the garrisons of the redoubts and the trenches by a very extensive system of well defiladed approaches, which led from them to points comparatively safe from fire, whence the city and the temporary bridges over the Tai-tzu Ho could be gained. The walls of the city were not spared by the Russian engineers, and wide gaps were cut through them to allow of intercommunication or retreat.

Against what might be called the *enceinte* of Liao-yang, south of the Tai-tzu Ho, the Second and Fourth Armies now advanced, the latter Army moving to engage those works directly south of the city. About 8 a.m. the 4th Division

opened fire, and with it the advanced guard of the 6th Division, moving up the railway, shortly afterwards effected a junction. Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. the advanced guard of the 3rd Division reached a line stretching from Ssu-li-chuang (D 4)* to Hsi Pa-li-chuang (C/D 3), while its artillery took position on the heights south-west of the latter place, whence at 9.40 a.m. it opened fire on the enemy's guns placed in the neighbourhood of Cheng-chia-lin-tzu (D 3).

At 10 a.m. the sound of guns was heard in the direction of the Fourth Army, which half an hour later began to advance. At this time it was learned that the front line of that Army had reached generally the environs of Ta Ta-pei-hu (E 4) and Tung Pa-li-chuang (D 4), which brought it into touch with the right of the Second Army. Recognizing the difficulty of assaulting so strong a line of works as those before Liao-yang appeared to be, General Oku, who had reached the village of Ku-chia-tzu (B C 4) at 10 a.m., moved forward his troops deliberately and with caution, keeping a special watch over his left, which the 4th Division, from Te-li-ssu onwards, had guarded.

That division, pushing forward, came under the fire, at noon, of two batteries which suddenly appeared to the north-east of Yang-chia-lin-tzu (C 2), where a hostile column also came in view, advancing southward in gradually increasing numbers. The enemy on this side seemed to be gradually drawing out his forces to the westward, as if to threaten the extreme left of the three Japanese Armies, a movement which was met by General Oku by the despatch of four battalions of the Reserve Brigade from Ku-chia-tzu (B/C 4).

Elsewhere the enemy gave no signs of assuming the offensive, but remained behind his works, which appeared both at Shui-wan-tzu (D 2) and Hsi-kuan (D 3) to be armed with machine guns.

The time had not yet come to assault, and the artillery of the Second Army, including the foot artillery, which had reached Hsi Pa-li-chuang (C/D 3) at 11 a.m., and the eight pieces captured at Nan Shan† opened a heavy fire on the station and against those works which appeared to be manned by machine guns.

The 4th Division, disregarding the threatening movement on its left, continued its attack, meeting with the same stubborn opposition as had been exhibited by the Russians at Shou-shan-pu, which made advance impossible. On the right and centre matters were no better, and though the Japanese soldiers would, with their accustomed impetuosity, have gladly tried to force the positions before them, the strength of the enemy's works, upon which their artillery made little impression, and the fierce

* See Map 30.

† Four 10·5-cm. (4·1-inch) guns and four 15-cm. (5·9-inch) howitzers.—A. H.

resistance they encountered in every attempt to draw closer, made such a course impossible. Till sunset the battle raged, and when darkness came the wearied troops dug trenches where they stood and there they passed the night.

At 10.15 p.m. General Oku received a report from the First Army, which contained the following information:—

“The right column of the First Army, about 3 o'clock to-day, occupied the enemy's position at Ta-yao (J 1, 2)* and continued its march towards Ta-lien-kou (H 1). The left column has not yet been able to occupy hill 131 (H 2) and is still attacking that height. About 3 p.m. a strong force of the enemy came upon the left wing of the right column.”

At 6 a.m. on the 3rd another report came from the First **3rd Sept.** Army. It was as follows:—

“Yesterday afternoon the enemy increased his guns opposite the front of the right column till they numbered about seventy. Our first line is unable to advance beyond a line running north-east and south-west through Ta-yao. About 2 p.m. yesterday about two brigades of the enemy's infantry charged the centre column, when the fighting became very severe and continued so till dark.

“The First Army will continue attacking on the line of San-tao-pa (G 1) and Lo-ta-tai (G 2).”

During the night of the 2nd, a portion of the right brigade of the 6th Division had essayed to storm the works south of Hsi-kuan (D 3),† but their onset was met by such a deadly fire from machine guns that they were forced to desist.

At daybreak on the 3rd the cannonade was resumed, but the enemy betrayed no signs of weakness. The assault on a position so well defended, except under cover of night, meant little less than extermination, and a further artillery preparation was deemed necessary. During the day the field and foot artillery moved forward within the zone of rifle fire, endeavouring with high-explosive shells to destroy the entrenchments and the machine guns. Their united efforts were in some degree successful, for one portion of the enemy's line fell into confusion. The rest, however, fought with undiminished obstinacy, and as no favourable opportunity yet offered for a charge, it was decided to continue the bombardment till dark, and then storm. By 7 p.m. the infantry had crept over the flat ground and established themselves some two hundred or three hundred yards from the works. About that hour the fierce fire of the Japanese guns grew fiercer, and the troops everywhere realized that the moment to advance had come. Darkness descended on the scene and the whole line of Japanese infantry, impelled by a common desire to terminate the bloody business, spontaneously attacked: but the position was not yet won, for the Russian, strong as of old in defence, maintained his ground with sullen obstinacy and

* See Map 29.

† See Map 30.

seemed resolved this time to beat back his irresistible foes. But nearer and nearer, like the swelling waves that will not be denied, they came, and at half-past twelve swept across the first and strongest line.

The Russians now fell back, fighting as they went, and eye-witnesses in Liao-yang relate that portions of their army which retreated through the city kept its ranks and gained the bridges on the Tai-tzu Ho without disorder.

4th Sept.

At 2 a.m. the 6th Division occupied the railway station—in the vicinity of which the Russian store-houses, set alight the day before, still burned up with great intensity—and were ordered to proceed to Chang-han-chia (E 2). At the same time a portion of the 4th Division reached and held the northern outskirts of the city, whence they were directed to seize the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, over which the enemy by his numerous bridges was now crossing. The infantry soon arrived at their destination, but only to find that the means of passing the river had been destroyed, and that the railway bridge, though standing, was in flames, for no sooner had the Russians cleared it than the wood work was fired. Here the pursuit by the Second Army terminated, that duty devolving on the Fourth and First Armies.

The force of the Russians which at first held the works at Liao-yang (for the numbers diminished daily as the troops were withdrawn to the north) is given by the Japanese as follows:—Three divisions, twelve batteries of artillery, and one or two groups of machine guns. The force was composed of the main portions of the 5th, 6th, and 3rd Siberian Rifle Divisions, and included in the 3rd Division were the 6th, 7th, 9th, and 12th Regiments.

The Russian losses are not accurately known, but those of the Japanese, between the 30th August and 4th September, were as follows* :—

	Officers.		Rank and File.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
3rd Division -	51	101	1,103	2,934
6th " -	30	64	1,066	2,432
4th " -	12	31	371	1,407
Reserve Brigade -	9	19	122	515
Cavalry " -	—	—	—	3
Artillery " -	—	4	7	62
Foot Artillery -	—	—	—	29
Total -	102	219	2,669	7,382

Total all ranks, 10,372.

* NOTE.—It has been found impossible to differentiate between the losses at Shou-shan-pu and before Liao-yang, as the two actions were nearly continuous.—A. H.

In addition to the above there were 178 men missing, and it may be assumed that they were killed.

146 horses were killed and 260 wounded.

The character of the Russian defence at Shou-shan-pu and at the works round Liao-yang showed that it had lost little, if any, of its traditional obstinacy, for, despite defeats on every side of the theatre of war, and continual marches towards the rear, the troops of the Czar still retained, to a considerable degree, their *moral*. It is true, no doubt, that of those who fought in the great battles above described many were fresh and had not before bowed the head to their southern foe, but their numbers, as compared with those already beaten, were small and insufficient to leaven the whole mass. The greatest master of war has said that "the first qualification of the soldier is fortitude under fatigue, courage is only the second," and that the Russian soldier has—so far as the present campaign has gone—proved that he lacks neither of these requirements and even possesses the first of them in a high degree is obvious to those who have seen his dead, examined his bivouacs and trenches, and held conversation with his prisoners. How long and how obstinately he might have held his two positions south of Liao-yang it is impossible to say, for the battles fought there with the Second Army were but a fraction of the whole, and their duration depended mainly on the success or failure of his left, north of the Tai-tzu Ho, but for five days and nights General Oku's valiant troops, flushed with many victories, were denied, and when at last they gained their hard-won object, the Russian, though defeated, was not routed.

APPENDIX 1.

Order of Battle of the Second Japanese Army at the Battle of Liao-yang.

Commanding	-	-	-	General Baron Oku.
Chief of Staff	-	-	-	Major-General Uchiai.

3rd Division.—Lieut.-General Oshima—

5th Brigade.—Major-General	{	6th Infantry Regiment.		
Yamaguchi		-	-	33rd " "
17th Brigade.—Major-General	{	18th " "		
Kodama		-	-	34th " "

3rd Cavalry Regiment.
 3rd Artillery "
 3rd Engineer Battalion.

4th Division.—Lieut.-General Ogawa—

7th Brigade.—Major-General	{	8th Infantry Regiment.
Nishijima - - -		37* " "
19th Brigade.—Major-General	{	9th " "
Ando - - -		38th " "

4th Cavalry Regiment.
4th Artillery "
4th Engineer Battalion.

6th Division.—Lieut.-General Okubo—

11th Brigade.—Major-General	{	13th Infantry Regiment.
Iida - - -		45th " "
24th Brigade.—Major-General	{	23rd " "
Kigoshi - - -		48th " "

6th Cavalry Regiment.
6th Artillery "
6th Engineer Battalion.

1st Artillery Brigade.—Major-General Osako—

13th Regiment.
14th " †
15th " "

Foot Artillery—

1 battalion with 16 (9-cm.) 3·5-inch mortars.
1 " " 16 (8·5-cm.) 3·3-inch mortars.‡
1 " " { 4 (10·5-cm.) 4·1-inch guns, &c.
 { 4 (15-cm.) 5·9-inch howitzers.
1 Reserve Infantry Brigade of 3 regiments.

APPENDIX 2.

*Orders by Lieut.-General Oshima, Commanding 3rd Division,
30th August 1904. §*

1. The enemy is still holding his positions at Shou-shan-pu (C 4) and Hsin-li-tun (C 4).

The advanced guard of cavalry, under command of Major-General "X," has reached to-day, it is believed, the neighbourhood of Wang-erh-tun (A 2).

The Army will advance to-day to the line of Shou-shan-pu and Fang-chia-tun (C 4) with the object of attacking the enemy. (The remainder of this order is the same as No. 4 of Army orders of 29th August.)||

2. The division will advance to the hills south-east of Shou-shan-pu.

* One battalion of this regiment was in Korea.

† This regiment was attached to the 3rd Division during the earlier part of the battle.

‡ Sent to Fourth Army on 30th August.

§ See Map. 30.

3. "A" Infantry Regiment, one section of cavalry, "Z" Field Artillery Regiment (less one "battalion"),* and one section of "M" Engineer Battalion, as the advanced guard of the left column, under command of Major-General "P," will leave the line of the Sha Ho at 5 a.m. and advance to the hill south of Shou-shan-pu (Low Spur and Middle Hill) by the Liao-yang highway.

4. "B" Infantry Regiment, one section of cavalry, one "battalion"* of "Z" Field Artillery Regiment, and one section of engineers, under command of Major-General "Q," as right column, will leave from the north-east side of the Sha Ho at 5.20 a.m., and advance to the hill north of Hsiao-yang-ssu (C 5) through Yang-chia-chuang (C 5) and Hei-niu-chang (B 5)

5. All the remaining troops, forming the main body of the left column, will leave close to the advanced guard at 6 a.m., in the following order:—

One squadron of cavalry, less two sections.

Divisional Head-Quarters.

"C" Infantry Regiment.

Head-Quarters and one company of "M" Engineer Battalion.

"Y" Field Artillery Regiment.

"D" Infantry Regiment.

Field Ambulance.

6. The commander of the division will move at the head of the main body of the left column.

One regiment of the Artillery Brigade was attached to the 3rd Division on this date. (*See Army order No. 3 of 29th August.*)†

APPENDIX 3.

Report from a Lieutenant of Cavalry in Command of a Patrol.

(Despatched at 5.30 p.m., 29th August 1904.)

Yen-tao-yuan (B 5).

1. The enemy's defensive works at Shou-shan-pu are as per annexed rough sketch. (Not attached to this Appendix, not having been received.)

2. The inhabitants of Li-chieh-pu (A 4) state that last night, from about 6 to 7.30 p.m., a force of the enemy, viz., 200 cavalry, 3,000 infantry, and 16 guns, retired through the village.

* In the Japanese Army a "battalion" of field artillery is three batteries, a "brigade" is three regiments each of two battalions.

† *See page 232.*

3. At about 10.30 a.m. this morning the following movements of the enemy's troops were observed :—

- (a) 2,000 infantry were seen advancing in the westward and passing along the southern slope of the north-eastern point of the hills near Hsin-li-tun (C 4).
- (b) 500 cavalry were observed on the southern edge of the village of Yang-chia-lin-tzu (B 5).
- (c) 5,000 infantry on the hills east of Shou-shan-pu.
- (d) 1,000 infantry on the north-west slope of the hill north of Tsao-fan-tun (E 5).

4. At the western edge of Tsao-fan-tun is a hill, and on the southern slope of it there are about 1,000 infantry, but whether they are the enemy's or ours cannot be distinguished.

5. From 10.50 a.m. to 11.15 a.m. to-day a balloon of the enemy was seen above the height north-east of Hsin-li-tun, and in the afternoon from 3 p.m. to 3.20 p.m. another above Tung Pa-li-chuang (D 4).

(The above reached Army Head-Quarters at 7.30 p.m.)

APPENDIX 4.

Narratives of Officers who took part in the Attacks on the South-Eastern Extremity of Rocky Ridge, 31st August 1904.

No. I.*

The following account of the attack before dawn and at noon on the 31st August on the south-eastern extremity of Rocky Ridge has been prepared from a statement given by Captain "M." 1st Battalion 6th Regiment of Infantry. This officer commanded the company which made the first lodgment on the hill.*

During the afternoon of the 30th August the enemy was in strength on Rocky Ridge, and in the early morning of the 31st his fire was so heavy that it may fairly be assumed that his force had not been reduced in the interval. Moreover, during the night of the 30th–31st a large number of camp fires were observed between Rocky Ridge and Hsin-li-tun.

When orders were received by the commander of the 6th Regiment for the attack before dawn on the south-eastern extremity of Rocky Ridge, he detailed the 1st Battalion to attack along, and to the south-west of, that face of the hill

* See Map 31.

marked "F—O," and the 2nd Battalion to operate on the left of the first from the village north-east of "G," while the 3rd Battalion followed up as a reserve.

The ground to the north-east of that allotted to the 6th Regiment was to be covered in their attack by the 18th Regiment, and the commanders of the 6th and 18th Regiments agreed that the range "F—O" should be regarded as the dividing line between the two corps. The 18th Regiment, however (as will be observed in the report of an officer of that corps, which is attached), undertook the actual occupation of the crest of the range.

Two companies of the 1st Battalion 6th Regiment were detailed as firing line, each company providing its own supports, and another company as reserve, while the fourth company was attached to the commander of the brigade to which the 6th Regiment belonged, and was posted at the trees marked "Q."

The two leading companies each extended one section in single rank at one pace interval. Behind them followed their two remaining sections in column, the last section being ten paces in rear of the one in front of it, and that again fifty paces behind the extended section.

Prior to the advance, one section of an engineer company had been sent to the 1st Battalion. This section was divided into two squads, which were allotted one to each of the companies detailed for the firing line. The commanders of these companies subdivided, giving half to the firing line and half to the support.

While these dispositions were being made, the 18th Regiment sent two companies to hold the point "F," with orders not to open fire until the enemy showed by his fire that the attack was discovered. They were then to cover the attack by their fire. At 3.50 a.m. the enemy began firing heavily, and the companies at "F," concluding that the attack was discovered, replied to his fire. At this time the firing line of the 1st Battalion 6th Regiment, which stretched from the village north-east of the hill "G" to the flank of the range "F—O," had not been perceived by the enemy, for the night was dark, except for the faint light diffused by a cloud-covered moon. Gradually the enemy's fire grew hotter, especially from the south-east portion of Rocky Ridge.

The 2nd Battalion, which had been ordered to attack at 4 a.m. from the village north-east of hill "G," on the left of the 1st Battalion, did not advance on account of the enemy's fire from Rocky Ridge, and for some other reason not given. The 1st Battalion, ignorant of this, continued its advance, and a little before 4 a.m. Captain "M.'s" company reached the point "T," immediately south-east of the obstacles which run parallel to and east of the Hsin-li-tun road. Up to this time the

advance of the company was undiscovered, and no casualties had occurred in it.

The wire entanglement was now cut in several places by the engineers and infantry, but no sooner was this effected than the enemy discovered the presence of the company and opened a heavy fire upon it.

At this time Captain "M." heard that the 2nd Battalion of his regiment was not advancing, but as the entanglement was cut he decided that he must carry out his orders and attack.

Prior to this, and during the operation of cutting the obstacles, he had sent forward a non-commissioned officer to see if there were other obstructions in front. The non-commissioned officer returned and reported that there appeared to be a line of something which resembled mines. The engineers were, therefore, despatched to cut the connecting wire, if any, and the firing line passed through the entanglement and was reinforced by the two remaining sections. As the engineers were absent for some little time, Captain "M." decided not to wait where he had halted immediately west of the entanglement, and moved his company across to the north-west side of the road and a little beyond it up the hill. When the engineers returned, they reported that the wire which worked the mines was buried so deep that they had failed to reach it.

The company on the left, which was somewhat behind that of Captain "M.," had, in the meantime, reached the military pits at the point "U," where the Hsin-li-tun road passes through the obstacles. This spot had evidently been noted by the enemy as one through which an attacking force would attempt to pass, for he concentrated his fire upon it, and the company suffered many casualties but pushed on until it arrived behind that under Captain "M.'s" command. The reserve company had now arrived upon the flank of the range "F—O," south-east of "F," and behind it, close up, was the reserve battalion. Captain "M." was able to see the position of the mines before him, but as he considered that it would not be easy to pass them in the dark in line formation, began to tell off his men so that they might do so in single file. While so engaged two of the mines (stone fougasses) exploded, and the explosion of six others immediately followed. Beyond covering everyone with mud, no harm was done, but the suddenness of the occurrence at a moment when the nerves of everyone were in a state of high tension alarmed the men, who ran back from the hillside to the road and entanglement in rear in order to seek cover. Captain "M." and his officers succeeded in staying the momentary panic and preventing the men from retiring beyond the entanglement, and shortly afterwards reassembled them at the foot of the hill. Captain "M." was now shot through the thigh, but was able to continue in command of his company. One of his section commanders was wounded and the other company in the firing line had its captain and two section commanders

either killed or wounded. Dawn began to make objects clearer, and the enemy's infantry could be seen on the hill above firing heavily.

At this time a part of the 18th Regiment had reached the military pits close to the road north-east of the hill "F," where there is a ravine. Captain "M," seeing that with his small force it would be useless to assault, decided to wait until the 18th Regiment came up, and ordered his men to take such cover in the hollow ground as they could find. Where cover did not exist the men made it with their entrenching tools; but if a man raised his head he immediately drew the enemy's fire at 150 yards distance. On the flank of the hills west of "F," Captain "M." could see the commander of his battalion, but he was too far off to hear a voice from the hollow road on account of the noise of the firing. Twice messengers were sent from the road bearing a message that the companies there would await the arrival of the 18th Regiment before attacking. Twice the messenger fell by the enemy's fire and did not rise again, but the third time a non-commissioned officer, though wounded thrice, managed to crawl to the battalion commander, who conveyed his approval by signs.

No change in the situation took place till 12 noon, by which time the 1st Battalion had suffered three hundred casualties. During the interval between dawn and that hour the enemy maintained a heavy fire, while the men, crouching in the hollow road, were in imminent peril from the Japanese shells, which frequently burst close above their heads. Ammunition was growing scarce, for though the men had gone into action, each man provided with about two hundred rounds, and had been ordered to keep fifty as a reserve, most of them had only thirty left. Water, too, there was none, for the men's small aluminium bottles, containing about two-thirds of a pint, were empty.

Twice the Russians made as if to attack the small party which clung to the base of the hill, but each time that their heads appeared a heavy fire from the hollow road kept them back.

From 11.30 a.m. onwards the Japanese artillery fired very heavily at the hill above, and by noon the shells were bursting in scores over the enemy's trenches there. At that time a bugle sounding the advance was heard, and when Captain "M." looked round to see what was taking place, he saw a battalion coming forward from the village where the 2nd Battalion of his regiment had been, and the reserve battalion on the flank of the hill "F—O" began to advance. Thereupon the Russians on the hill above began to show signs of wavering, and Captain "M." decided to attack the heights forthwith. Unfortunately his wound had made it impossible for him to walk, but one of his section commanders was able to do so, and with twenty men behind him advanced up the hill. On reaching the lower trench, immediately below which are the tombs of

all who fell in the gallant exploit, there was hand-to-hand fighting, the Russians crouching down behind the parapet and hurling boulders over it at the Japanese, who threw them back again. Seeing the small party almost in possession of the hill, the reserve battalion, the reserve company, and the 18th Regiment, passing through the line of obstacles, rushed up it. The enemy in the lower trench began to fly, and a brave Russian lieutenant-colonel cut down the first two who did so; but as he stood on the sky-line, he afforded a good mark and he was immediately shot. After losing their commander the remainder ran along the trench and into the upper one, which was connected with it. The company first up the hill was now joined by the second company, and together they chased the Russians for a short distance, but the fire from the upper trench and the defences further along the ridge was so heavy that they were forced to take refuge in the lower trench.

During the day no further advance could be made for the front was blocked by the fire of rifles from the upper trench and the higher part of the ridge, and the flanks were swept by musketry from the conical hill "E," and by artillery at Fang-chia-tun.

According to a notebook found on the body of the Russian lieutenant-colonel above-mentioned, three companies of either the 3rd or 4th Regiment held the trenches at the south-eastern extremity of Rocky Ridge.

Captain "M.'s" company had the following casualties :—

	Officers.	Rank and File.
Killed -	- 0	30
Wounded -	- 3	85
	3	115

Captain "M.'s" account, which was given in Japanese, and translated sentence by sentence by an interpreter, was related in very modest terms. He remarked that it was a magnificent sight, and one that he will never forget, to see his gallant section commander rise up and, amid a terrific fire, lead the forlorn hope against an enemy many times more numerous.*

On the 11th October, one week after hearing Captain "M.'s" account, I passed that brave young officer being borne out of action on a stretcher shot through the shoulder during the attack and capture of a village, and as he passed and recognized me he called out the Japanese war cry "*Banzai*."

* See footnote, page 243.

No. II.*

The following account of the attack before dawn and at noon on the 31st August on the south-eastern extremity of Rocky Ridge, has been prepared from a statement given by Captain "M.," 2nd Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment. This officer commanded a company which came on to the hill immediately after the leading one of his own battalion, the captain of which was killed in the assault.

When the regiment received the order to attack it was posted immediately east of the centre peak of the range "F—O," at the point "O." It was detailed for the attack as follows:—

1st Battalion to cover the attack from the range "F—O."

2nd Battalion, firing line and supports.

3rd Battalion, reserve.

The 1st Battalion thereupon sent two companies to the point "F," where they made some slight entrenchments, and two companies to a spot about two hundred yards behind "F" and on the north-east flank of the hill.

The 2nd Battalion crossed the saddle on which they stood and reached the willows at "V" under the hill "F."

The 3rd Battalion followed the same route and joined the 2nd Battalion, which then advanced a short distance towards "W."

At about 3.30 a.m., as the 3rd Battalion was crossing the saddle, the enemy opened a heavy fire from Rocky Ridge.

The 2nd Battalion next sent forward two companies as firing line, each furnishing its own support, and kept two in reserve. In front of the firing line a section of engineers with a section of infantry led the way. As the advance began, the enemy opened fire from "F," and when the two leading companies of the 2nd Battalion reached the two willows at "W" they were losing heavily from the enemy's fire also coming in their direction. As the two companies of the 1st Battalion on the hill at "F" could see that the firing line was suffering casualties they returned the enemy's fire.

The advanced section now reported that the enemy in front was receiving reinforcements, and that it had come under the fire of about two companies.

The firing line continued its advance and reached a line close to the obstacles which run parallel to and east of the road to Hsin-li-tun.

On the date of the attack, the *kaoliang* had not been cut, and owing to this and the darkness, communication between the firing line and reserve was temporarily interrupted.

A further report came from the front, which stated that the engineer section could remove the obstacle—wire entanglement—but that beyond it lay what appeared to be a deep ditch with

* See Map 31.

steep and inaccessible sides. The engineers, however, were in error, for the supposed ditch is a deep (about twelve or fifteen feet) and narrow ravine, which can be crossed everywhere by daylight without much difficulty.

At this time a heavy rifle duel was proceeding between the companies at "F" and the enemy on Rocky Ridge, and from the direction of Hsin-li-tun firing began.

It was now thought useless to advance, as the attack was apparently no longer a surprise, and there was further an impassable obstacle in front. Moreover, day was about to break. For the firing line to remain in its present exposed position was impossible, and it was therefore withdrawn to a ravine immediately behind the willows at "W." Communication with the reserve companies was now restored. The reserve battalion was lying flat on the ground, protecting itself from the enemy's fire by such cover as could be thrown up under that fire. This battalion now sent a company to hold the hill "P," which was liable to attack from Hsin-li-tun.

About 6 a.m. day broke, and the enemy at Hsin-li-tun, from the *kaoliang* east of that village and also from Rocky Ridge, concentrated a heavy fire on the 18th Regiment. The two companies at "F" were suffering severely, as the ground held by them was commanded from Rocky Ridge. As, however, the firing line of their regiment was near the foot of the enemy's position they could not retire, and the two companies behind them were in an almost similar plight.

A little past 8 a.m., when the light improved, the enemy's guns at Fang-chia-tun opened upon the 18th Regiment in the valley south of "P," and the troops suffered many casualties; but to move from where they were was out of the question.

At 11 a.m. an order was received to storm the position.

The reserve battalion had, during the morning, been gradually strengthening the front line by sending to it men—one, two, or three at a time. These men ran as quickly as possible to the ravine where the firing line was, and on the way some of them were hit. The process was a slow one and by noon only one and a half companies had got up.

About noon, on account of the heavy Japanese cannonade on Rocky Ridge, the Russians showed signs of breaking. Thereupon the firing line began to advance towards the entanglement, but one part of the ground over which they had to pass on their way could only be crossed singly, which caused delay and losses. As the advance continued, every man took such cover as he could find, pointing it out to those following. Thus the leading company reached the entanglement, and the next followed and came up with it. To advance in formation was impossible, and the men of the first company stormed the hill as they came up. The next company—Captain "M.'s"—followed. The fire was severe, and the commander of the 2nd Battalion was shot dead on the road.

As the second company came to the entanglement, the enemy was firing common shell, but when the first company moved up the hill, shrapnel was opened against it. The first company was led by Captain "A.," and with him were only five men, the remainder following one after another.

A company of the 6th Regiment was also advancing up the hill at this time. On coming up to the lower trench Captain "A." received a bayonet wound in the eye, but he went on.

A few yards further on he was hit by eight shrapnel bullets and a piece of the shell struck him on the head, and he fell dead. A section commander who was with him was shot through the head at the same time. A non-commissioned officer took command, and the men took cover in the lower trench, as it was found to be impossible to advance further on account of the fire of the hill in front and from the extension of the upper trench down a re-entrant on the north-east side of the hill. To have assembled the men for further action would have been extremely difficult, for the slopes of Rocky Ridge gave no cover for the purpose, more especially on its south-east extremity, and therefore the men remained where they were, lying behind stones.

Fire was, however, kept up against the Russians until dark, being directed on Hsin-li-tun. About 12.40 p.m. a battalion of the enemy had advanced to that village from Fang-chia-tun, and the two reserve companies of the 2nd Battalion which were following the firing line went to the north-east side of Rocky Ridge and opened fire upon it. The hostile battalion went no further than Hsin-li-tun, where it remained till evening, facing the two companies.

When the 3rd Battalion reached the road whither it had followed, the commander took charge of the two reserve companies of the 2nd Battalion.

All the troops who happened to be on the north-east slopes of Rocky Ridge were much exposed to the fire of two batteries posted at Fang-chia-tun.

The wounded could not be collected and had to remain where they were till dark.

Losses in the two companies of the firing line:—

	Officers.	Rank and File.
Captain "A's." company - - -	2	87
Captain "M's." company - - -	0	65
	2	152

No. III.*

*The Attack on Middle Hill on the 31st August, by the
34th Regiment.*

The following account of the attack on Middle Hill—an attack which was intended to take place simultaneously with those against the hills to the right and left—has been prepared from a statement given by Captain "B." 34th Infantry Regiment. This officer commanded the company which was despatched to assist when the condition of the attack had become critical.

On the 30th August, the 34th Regiment was on the extreme left of the 3rd Division, and was detailed to attack the position from Yang-chia-lin-tzu, a village a little west of the main road. According to orders, the regiment left the village keeping parallel to the highway, but for the sake of concealment, just inside the *kaoliang*. They were unable to advance close to the position on account of the heavy fire which met them from Low Spur. The firing line made trenches and thence fired on Middle Hill to assist the right wing of the brigade, which was endeavouring to advance.

On the afternoon of the 30th the regiment was situated as follows:—

1st Battalion (Major "T.") east of the main road.

2nd Battalion (Major "K.") west of the main road.

3rd Battalion, two companies behind 1st Battalion as regimental reserve. Two companies in Yang-chia-lin-tzu with the commander of the brigade.

The night of the 30th was passed quietly and the enemy did not open fire.

At 1 a.m. on the 31st the regimental commander received orders from the brigadier, which stated that the regiment next on the right (the 33rd) was going to attack Rocky Ridge from Hsiao-yang-ssu, and that the 34th was to attack Middle Hill at 4 a.m.

Accordingly, the commander of the 34th directed the 2nd Battalion to move forward east of the highway, and the 1st Battalion west of it. The two companies of the 3rd Battalion in reserve followed the right of the 1st Battalion.

Each battalion had two companies in the firing line and two in the reserve. The two in the firing line were deployed, and the two in rear followed in line of company sections. The two reserve companies of the 3rd Battalion, the reserve, followed the 1st Battalion in line.

Each company of the firing line sent an officer's patrol to the front.

* See Map 31 and Panorama 2.

When the advance began there was a faint moon. The rain had just ceased and the *kaoliang*, which had been broken about two feet from the ground by the Russians, and not cut down, and also the muddy ground, greatly impeded the march. To maintain touch and to keep upon the objective of the attack were the principal difficulties to be overcome, for the movement through the *kaoliang* led to slight delays, and the men behind unconsciously lost contact with those in front.

About 4.40 a.m. the 1st Battalion, unperceived by the enemy, reached a spot about 400 yards from Middle Hill.

It did not, however, long remain unnoticed, and soon volleys and independent fire were opened from Middle Hill and from the trenches on its flanks. The battalion continued its advance and, though it lost heavily, reached some dead ground at the foot of the hill. Major "T." now deployed his own two reserve companies to the left, so that the whole battalion was at this time deployed in extended order.

Heavy fire was audible from the east, and it was thought that the condition of the action in that direction must be critical. Shouting the war cry, "*Banzai*," the 1st Battalion, under a heavy fire, advanced up the hill and succeeded in reaching the first line of shelter trenches. The enemy who occupied them was few in numbers and, seeing the Japanese advancing with great determination, retired. The Japanese followed, and took the trench which encircles the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion, which was on the left of the 1st Battalion, hearing the war cry, sent three companies against Low Spur and one to Middle Hill. Under a heavy fire, the three despatched against Low Spur crossed the obstacles in front of that feature. The two companies of the 3rd Battalion followed the 1st Battalion up the hill. This took place a little before 5.30 a.m.

The raising of the war cry was the signal for the enemy from every direction to fire upon the Japanese. The artillery behind Low Spur, and the infantry on knoll "E" poured in a very heavy fire.

At the time of the capture of the trench at the top of the hill only one-third of the 1st Battalion had reached that point, for the ground up to it is steep, and the fire was very severe. The enemy was now reinforced by two companies, and made a counter-attack which was easily repelled. This was followed by other attempts to drive back the Japanese, which were supported by the fire from the entrenchments on the flanks of the hill, but each of them, though unsuccessful, cost the 34th several men. They therefore sent parties to take the entrenchments on the right and left, while a portion of the troops faced the enemy from the trench on the top of the hill.

About 6 a.m. the enemy received further reinforcements, and the fire from the flanks increased. In repelling the counter-attacks the Japanese exposed themselves and suffered losses and, instead of remaining under cover, followed up the retiring

enemy, during which they lost still more. The number of Japanese on the hill was thus growing less and less. The commander of the 34th Regiment, though shot through the thigh, supported himself on his sword and cheered on his men. A second wound killed him. Major "T.," well-known in Japan as an expert with the sword, killed three Russians with that weapon immediately on the capture of the hill, but received a shot through the thigh. He was supported for a time by his adjutant, already wounded when he came to his commander's assistance, but receiving another wound fell dead, while the adjutant was slain by the last of two more bullets which struck him. The officer in charge of the regimental colour (which is carried into action in the Japanese Army) was thrice wounded, and obliged to hand it to another officer. The latter officer, though himself wounded, succeeded in saving it from falling into the hands of the enemy. No officer of the battalion received less than two wounds, and most of them as many as eight. Every man too, not killed, was more or less wounded.

The enemy was in the meantime receiving reinforcements, and his artillery was bursting shell on the top of the hill, and the din became so great that to command by voice was impossible. When the enemy made his counter-attacks the Japanese soldiers of their own accord ran in groups to meet them, desirous only of being killed for their country's and Emperor's sake. The brigadier had by now heard of the state of affairs from the regimental commander, and sent one company to assist; but that company (Captain "B.'s,") on account of the enemy's fire and the muddy roads and fields, arrived too late to take any useful part, and its captain decided that it would be best to remain at the foot of the hill and endeavour from there, by firing on the top, to save the few men left.

About 8 a.m. the wounded remnant of the regiment, some three hundred men, fought their way back, foot by foot, to the base of the hill, strewing the face of it with their dead and wounded.

At 9 a.m., Captain "B." received an order to retire, and by the evening the regiment was able to assemble at the point where it had passed the previous night.

The losses to the 1st Battalion were as follows:—

	Officers.	N.C.O.'s.	Men.
Killed	- 9	26	237
Wounded	- 10	27	277
	19	53	514

The 34th Regiment (two battalions) went into action with, approximately, 68 officers and 2,650 rifles, and lost:—

	Officers.	N.O.O.'s and Men.
Killed - - -	21	469
Wounded - - -	19	656
	<hr/> 40	<hr/> 1,125

These losses include those at Low Spur, Middle Hill, and before Liao-yang in the fighting after Shou-shan-pu. The losses before Liao-yang were, however, slight.

APPENDIX 5.*

General Oku's Order of 2 p.m., 1st September 1904.

- (1) The 4th Division is pursuing the enemy.
- (2) The Army will bivouac to-night upon the field of battle.
- (3) The 3rd and 6th Divisions will bivouac as above, the dividing line between them being the railway line.
- (4) The Artillery Brigade will be quartered near Ta-tzu-yin (B 4).
- (5) The Reserve Brigade will be quartered at Tung Wang-chuang and Hsi Wang-chuang (B 4).
- (6) The Reserve Infantry Regiment will be quartered at Yang-chia-chuang (C 5).
- (7) The Foot Artillery, under instructions of the 3rd Division, will be quartered in Hsiao-yang-ssu (C 5).
- (8) The Second Army Head-Quarters will remain at North Sha-ho (A 6), where messengers will be sent at 6 p.m. for orders.

APPENDIX 6.

Orders for the Final Assault on the Works before Liao-yang.

*These orders were issued by the Commander of the
34th Regiment.*

10 p.m., 3rd September 1904.

- (1) The enemy's position is in front of you, visible to all.
- (2) Our regiment, in co-operation with the regiments on right and left, is going to storm the enemy's position.
- (3) Our regiment has lost this day one of its three battalion commanders, of whom two fell at Shou-shan-pu.

* See Map 30.

- (4) I am going to avenge the loss of these commanders to-night. The 2nd and 3rd Companies will remain in their present position as a reserve. The rest of the regiment, assembling under the regimental colour, will firstly, advance to the position where our leading companies now are, and, secondly, in conjunction with the men in the firing line, rush into the railway station, fighting to the last man. The order for the rush will be given when the time comes.*

APPENDIX 7.

Total Casualties of the Japanese Armies at the Battle of Liao-yang.

	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.		Grand Total.
	Officers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Rank and File.	
First Army (3 divisions) -	52	1,053	194	4,850	1	18	247	5,921	6,168
Second Army (3 divisions) -	105	2,668	255	7,430	—	87	360	10,185	10,545
Fourth Army (2 divisions) -	57	1,281	193	5,371	—	—	250	6,652	6,902
Total -	214	5,002	642	17,651	1	105	857	22,758	23,615

* This order has lost much by translation. The fourth order, literally translated, is, "to-night is to be the mourning attack for the three commanders," &c.—A. H.

(24) The Battle of Liao-yang.—Second Japanese Army. Operations of the 24th Infantry Brigade in the Attack of Shou-shan-pu, the 30th–31st August and the 1st September 1904.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff,
25th November 1904.

Plates.

- | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------|
| (1) Attack of the 24th Japanese Infantry Regiment on Shou-shan-pu | - | - | - | } Map 32. |
| (2) Attack of the 48th Japanese Infantry Regiment on Shou-shan-pu | - | - | - | |

I have the honour to forward herewith an account, with plans, describing the attack of the 24th Brigade, 6th Division, at Shou-shan-pu on the 30th–31st August and 1st September 1904. This account was only recently received, too late to be embodied in the general report of the operations of the Second Army on those dates which was submitted on the 10th instant.

It will be observed in the statement given by an officer of the 23rd Regiment, that this regiment succeeded in crossing the railway embankment, a fact of which I was unaware when preparing that report.

From a perusal of this account it will be seen how valuable their light entrenching tools proved to the Japanese soldiers, enabling them to secure the ground they had won in spite of the proximity of the Russian infantry.

The Japanese in the present war employ entrenchments in their attacks to a degree probably unparalleled in any earlier campaigns, utilizing them as *points d'appui*, whence the troops can fire from cover while their artillery silences that of the enemy and shakes the *moral* of his infantry. During this period of preparation, which sometimes lasts for hours, reinforcements are sent to the foremost line in twos and threes, and, when a sufficient force is assembled there, and prospects of a further advance appear favourable, the infantry rush forward and either carry the position or gain a point still nearer, where a similar process is repeated.

- (a) *Account of the part taken in the attack on Shou-shan-pu by the 23rd Infantry Regiment, by an officer of the regiment.*

When one examines the details of the movements of my regiment on the 30th–31st August they are very interesting, but as the campaign is still in progress I am not permitted to state the deductions which I have drawn from my experiences

upon the battlefield of Shou-shan-pu, and I must restrict myself to a mere statement of facts regarding the movements of my regiment on those dates.

I desire first to mention that the fighting spirit of my regiment was at its highest when we went into action on the 30th, despite the very heavy roads over which it had had to march on the way to the field.

30th Aug.

At 6 a.m., on the 30th, my regiment received an order to occupy the line from Ta Chiao-chia-tai (B 4)* to Yang-chia-lin-tzu (B 5). Thereupon we started from Hsiao-ying-pan.† After several days' fighting the men were tired, but on receiving the order to go into action their eyes flashed and their faces brightened up. As it had rained heavily for some days the road was very bad, so much so that the men sank to their knees in mud, and as the distance covered under such trying circumstances was seven and a half miles, the time taken, three and a half hours, was creditable and would probably have been twice as great in peace time. By the way in which this march was carried out it will be clear to what a height our spirits were aroused. My regiment reached its first object at 9.30 a.m., namely, Ta Chiao-chia-tai (B 4), and we were met by a heavy fire of artillery from Huang-chia-tun (C 3), but it did little damage.

We were now on the battlefield, and I will tell you about its features round Ma-yeh-tun. The ground around that village is quite flat, but was covered with *kaoliang*, and, except along the road, no distant view could be obtained. Indeed, so high and thick was this *kaoliang* that it may be said to have introduced into the battle of Shou-shan-pu some of the characteristics of wood fighting, with its attendant advantages and disadvantages. The enemy had constructed strong defences in the village of Meh-yeh-tun and in that of Ku-chia-tzu, and had converted the railway embankment into a defensive work, and he had also machine guns, which added greatly to his power of resistance. Moreover, the stems of the *kaoliang* were broken down to a distance of about one thousand yards in front of the trenches in such a way as to form an obstacle difficult to surmount. In a word, the position seemed faultless.

At 1.40 p.m. my regiment was ordered to attack the enemy in the afore-mentioned villages. Thereupon the colonel ordered the 1st Battalion to maintain communication with the regiment (the 13th) of the 11th Brigade on our right; the 2nd Battalion to take post on the left of the 1st; and the 3rd Battalion to remain in reserve in the village of Pai-chia-lao-kou.

At this time the enemy's artillery began to quicken its fire, and the infantry in the villages of Ku-chia-tzu and Ma-yeh-tun, and on the hill of Shou-shan-pu, opened a brisk fire of rifles and machine guns, concentrating it upon the regiment, which

* See Map 30.

† About 5 miles south-west of Sha-ho (A 6).

suffered heavy loss. As, however, we were advancing through the *kaoliang* we could not see the enemy and, without replying, we pushed on. At this time on our left was the 48th Regiment, which kept level with us in our attack.

The position of my regiment at this time is shown on the sketch at A.*

Continuing the advance, we reached, at 3 p.m., a line about 800 or 900 yards south-west of Ku-chia-tzu. We now, for the first time, opened fire, and the enemy replied with vigour and resisted obstinately. On the 30th August, therefore, we were unable to expel him from either of the villages before darkness came upon us. The position occupied by the regiment at nightfall is shown on the sketch at B.

At 9 p.m. the firing from both sides ceased, and no noise, except that caused by the carrying away of the killed and wounded, broke the silence of the night. The casualties of the regiment had been heavy, and among them was our colonel, who was wounded.

The night attack.—At 3 a.m., on the 31st, we received the expected order to make a night attack upon the village of Ma-yeh-tun. The regiment was at this time situated with the 3rd Battalion on the right, the 1st in the centre, and the 2nd on the left, all three battalions being in line. In front of each battalion were a few scouts, who were deputed to examine the ground in front. Before we moved, the commanding officer ordered the men not to fire before they dashed into the position. At 4 a.m. the advance began. The field which the 3rd Battalion had to cross was covered with dense *kaoliang*, which made movement extremely difficult. The rain which had been falling had ceased and the moon was now shining, so that we were unable to comply with the first principles of night attack, that is, to advance unseen, for we were clearly visible to the enemy. However, we were quite composed, and our movement was so silent that we were apparently undiscovered until we had approached to about one hundred yards from the main line of defence. There runs the railway embankment, and on it were the enemy's sentries. 31st Aug.

A little before we reached the railway line our 3rd Battalion met a company of the enemy's infantry in a field about 500 yards to the west of Ma-yeh-tun, and after a hand-to-hand fight annihilated it, but shortly afterwards they received a flank fire from a nameless hamlet south-west of Ma-yeh-tun, and a company on the right of the battalion was almost destroyed by the fire poured upon it. Our men still pressed on, full of courage, and expelled the enemy from the railway embankment with their bayonets. Here the regiment reformed its ranks and charged against the enemy's main line. Everywhere we heard the trumpets blowing the charge and the shouts of men rushing forward with the bayonet; but the defences of the village of Ma-yeh-tun were very strong, and the enemy's fire from

* See Map 32, No. 1.

its loopholed walls, from the hillock between the height of Shou-shan-pu and the railway, and from both flanks, was so severe that a great number of our officers and men were killed and wounded in a moment. Thus we were unable to carry out our night attack with success. Soon day began to dawn, and the situation of the regiment became momentarily more desperate. We, however, made entrenchments in front of the enemy and only a hundred yards distant from him, and there we determined to keep him off with our fire. The position of several of our companies is shown at C on the sketch. As the sun rose the dangerous position of the regiment became more apparent, and about noon on the 31st many of our men in the front line were dead, and in order to hold back the enemy the severely wounded even had to use their rifles. The regiment had now been fighting for thirty hours, and had repulsed several counter-attacks. At last, at 1.20 p.m. on the 1st September, we again charged the position, and soon the flag of the Rising Sun was seen flying over the village of Ma-yeh-tun and on the hill of Shou-shan-pu.

1st Sept.

The casualties of the regiment during the two days' fighting were between 1,050 and 1,080 killed and wounded, and included in the number was our colonel. We had 30 officers killed and wounded.

(b) *Account of the part taken in the attack on Shou-shan-pu by the 48th Infantry Regiment, by an officer of the regiment.*

On the 26th August we reached San-chia-san-tai-tzu (not on map), a village 10 miles to the south of Shou-shan-pu, where we halted during the 29th while the enemy's position was being reconnoitred. Our regiment had been the reserve of the 6th Division during the march from Hai-cheng, and was still so.

30th Aug.

On the 30th August we left our quarters at 5 a.m., and followed the right column of the division, which was moving in two columns. At 10.30 a.m. we reached the eastern end of the village of Ta-hung-chi (A 5),* and there halted. About noon we received an order to move to the left column, and about 1.30 p.m. we halted on the south-east side of the village of Pai-chia-lao-kou (B 3). About 1.40 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Battalions were ordered to form the first line and to attack the enemy, who was in position from the environs of Ku-chia-tzu (B/C 3) to the village of Chiu-chia-pu-tzu (C 3). The 2nd Battalion was in second line, and was posted on the left wing.

Before speaking of the battle, it is necessary to mention the enemy's position which we were about to attack. His right wing extended beyond the hill of Shou-shan-pu† to the villages of Ku-chia-tzu and Chiu-chia-pu-tzu, in the walls of which he had made loopholes, and, where there were no walls, had dug trenches. The *kaoliang* in front was broken, which gave a clear field of fire to him and an obstacle to us.

* See Map 30.

† See Map 31, No. 2.

The distribution of the enemy's force before us, east and west of Ku-chia-tzu, was as follows:—Total force, at least one brigade of infantry, 2 batteries of artillery, and 4 machine guns. In Chiu-chia-pu-tzu was a company of infantry and some cavalry; in Ku-chia-tzu one regiment of infantry and two machine guns on the top and on the middle of the hill of Shou-shan-pu, one battalion of infantry on the elevation north-east of Ku-chia-tzu, two companies at the foot of the elevation north of Ku-chia-tzu, two battalions of infantry on the railway north of Ku-chia-tzu, one battalion of infantry, one battery of artillery and two machine guns, and on the south-west of Huang-chia-tun one battery of artillery.

The enemy's position was very strong, and the *kaoliang*, converted into an obstacle, was difficult to pass over. I have heard it reported that the Russian defeat at Shou-shan-pu was due to the *kaoliang*, but I think that it favoured the Russians and not us, for we were prevented from attacking with rapidity. Our artillery too, which is an indispensable feature of the attack, was to a great extent prevented from taking part in the action on account of the dreadful state of the roads. By order of the brigadier commanding the left column, our regiment kept up communication with the 23rd Regiment on its right. At first we deployed the 3rd Battalion in the field west of Pai-chia-lao-kou. About 2.30 p.m., we advanced gradually and gained the line of the nameless village situated north-west of Ku-chia-tzu. During this time the 1st Battalion advanced towards the north-east through the *kaoliang*, and reached the west of the nameless village. There the 2nd and 3rd Companies were ordered to go into the first line. They connected with the 3rd Battalion, and gradually turned towards the east against the village of Ku-chia-tzu. At this time the enemy was pouring a brisk fire upon us from the hill of Shou-shan-pu from Ku-chia-tzu and Chiu-chia-pu-tzu. We returned this fire. At this time, too, the 10th Company (the reserve of the 3rd Battalion) was advancing behind the left wing of that battalion. The 1st and 4th Companies (reserve of the 1st Battalion) had reached a point north-east of the nameless village, and about 400 yards from it. The 2nd Battalion, the reserve of the regiment, reached the same spot at about 3.30 p.m. Before this the 1st Battalion had sent out two scouts under an officer in a northerly direction in order to guard our left flank. About 3.30 p.m., a report came from them that a strong hostile cavalry patrol had appeared on the road leading from the nameless village northwards. In consequence, the 4th Company was ordered to move in that direction, expel it, and, if possible, occupy a village north of Chiu-chia-pu-tzu, and protect the left wing. At this time our right wing (3rd Battalion) continued its advance under a hot fire, and reached the road which is situated about 500 yards south-east of the nameless village. Here the two companies of the first line of the 1st Battalion had received a flank fire from Chiu-chia-pu-tzu, and could not advance. It

was therefore necessary to attack that village first, and the two companies advanced against it. The 11th Company (reserve of the 3rd Battalion) was extended to the right of the battalion, and also advanced towards the same village.

At 5 p.m., the attack of the 2nd and 3rd Companies against Chiu-chia-pu-tzu succeeded, and a part of the 3rd Company occupied the village. At the same time part of the 4th Company reached the east end of it, and a part kept guard towards the north. While these movements were in progress the 4th Company, which was in reserve, extended to the left of the 2nd Company, and the 3rd and 4th Companies moved into the village and there constructed defensive works. Thus the firing line of our division quite surrounded the enemy's right wing. Rain now fell, and the ground became more muddy. The enemy's shrapnel and rifle bullets came thicker and our casualties increased, so that we could make no further advance. Therefore every company dug entrenchments in order to secure the ground we held, and there pass the night. The major of the 1st Battalion, after examining the situation, came to the conclusion that Chiu-chia-pu-tzu was too far distant to be held by only two companies, since that village was on the extreme left of the division. Round the village were tolerably strong walls, and if they were strongly held the left of the division would be safe. Therefore after dark the 1st and 2nd Companies were moved into the village, while the 3rd and 4th held its northern walls facing Shou-shan-pu. The 1st Company was moved into the field south of it so as to maintain communication with the 3rd Battalion, and the 3rd Company in part was posted on its north-west side so as to guard the left flank, the remainder being held in reserve. The 2nd Battalion (reserve of the regiment) gradually advanced, and about sunset reached a point about 200 yards south-west of Chiu-chia-pu-tzu.

During the night the enemy occasionally fired lest we might be advancing, but we did not move, and the regiment passed the night of the 30th in its entrenchments 500 yards from the enemy's line.

31st Aug.

At 2.17 a.m. of the 31st, the enemy in front of us suddenly opened a heavy fire, and about three companies of his infantry came towards the 1st Battalion and approached to within 200 yards. That battalion greeted them with a rapid fire, and after about an hour's engagement they retired towards the hill of Shou-shan-pu. Before this incident, at 2 a.m., our regiment had received an order to make a night attack along with the troops on its right, but as one battalion became engaged almost at once the order could not be carried out. However, the 3rd Battalion attacked towards Ku-chia-tzu, courageously charging in that direction, but was repulsed by the severe fire from machine guns and forced to retire. During the 31st our regiment tried several desperate attacks, but the enemy, posted in so strong a position, gave no opportunity for a bayonet charge, and we were compelled merely to confront him with our fire.

At 10 p.m., he tried a night attack on our front and left wing, but it was repulsed. Since the 30th, the regiment had been constantly under fire, and though men were continually being either killed or wounded, they strenuously held their ground on the left of the brigade. The ground where this regiment was posted was naturally swampy, and while we were there much rain had fallen, so that we were lying half covered with mud, and with biscuits and rice soaked and almost uneatable. In such a plight two days and nights were passed. Nevertheless, despite the discomfort, our national spirit ran so high that no one thought of anything except to fight and die for his country.

At 1 a.m., on the 1st September, the troops on our right—23rd Regiment—observed that the enemy was retiring, and at once attacked and at last drove him out of Ma-yeh-tun, and, about 2.30 a.m., occupied the hill of Shou-shan-pu. Our regiment accompanied this attack and drove the enemy from Ku-chia-tzu, and took up a line extending from the north-east point of Shou-shan-pu hill to the railway line. The enemy was at this time retiring towards Liao-yang, and our division strongly occupied a line extending from the hill of Shou-shan-pu to the village of Pa-chia-lao-kou.

(25) The Battle of Liao-yang.—Fourth Japanese Army. Operations from the 29th August to the 4th September 1904.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff, Head-Quarters Second Japanese Army, 8th November 1904.

(See Map 30.)

Covering Letter.

I have the honour to forward herewith a report upon the operations of the Fourth Army, from the 29th August to the 4th September 1904. This report does not contain many details beyond those to be found in the official report of that Army of which it is mainly a translation, but, as there is no British officer attached to it, I have thought it advisable to send such information regarding its movements as I have been able to obtain.

* * * * *

The Operations of the Fourth Army, from 29th August to 4th September 1904.

29th Aug. From daybreak on the 29th the Fourth Army followed up the retreating enemy, the leading troops of the left wing, or 5th Division, arriving as far north as the village of Yen-tao-yuan (C 5/6), where they came into connection with the Second Army. The right wing, or 10th Division, driving back a hostile force of about one brigade, which was encamped near Wei-chia-kou (D 5), occupied a line extending from the hills north-east of Shui-chuang (E 6) to that west of Shih-hui-yao (E 6), whence they exchanged fire until dark with the enemy's artillery at Ta-erh-tun (D 5).

30th Aug. On the 30th the cannonade began at daybreak, the troops of the 5th Division moving forward to attack the enemy's position on the hills in the neighbourhood of the Fang-chia-tun (C 4) and Hsin-li tun (C 4), while those of the 10th Division were directed against the heights north of Meng-chia-fang (F 6) and Ku-chia-tzu (E 6).

Between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m. part of the 5th Division succeeded in establishing themselves on the hill south-west of Ta-yao (D 5) and in the village of Hsiao-yang-ssu (C 5), while the whole of their artillery took position on the high ground west of Yang-chia-chuang (C 5), and, co-operating with that of the 3rd Division on the left, endeavoured to silence the enemy's guns near Hsin-li-tun (C 4). The enemy's position, which on

this side extended from Fang-chia-tung (C 4) to Shou-shan-pu (C 4), was strongly entrenched, protected with formidable obstacles and prepared for an obstinate defence. In front of the 10th Division were several lines of defence, each line covering that to the south of it, while between the two divisions was an open space covered with *kaoliang* and dotted here and there with villages. The cannonade went on all day without intermission, but the infantry of the left of the Fourth Army were able to make little progress, every attempt being checked by the guns near Fang-chia-tun (C 4) and Ta-erh-tun (D 5).

At 5 p.m. a "battalion" of the Artillery Brigade* from the Second Army and 16 mortars reached the Fourth Army and came into action against these positions, but in spite of their fire the battle on this side remained at a standstill.

At 6 a.m., the right of the 10th Division stormed the hill north of Ku-chia-tzu (E 6) and took it, while the centre at the same time occupied the western slope of the hill. On this portion of the front attacked by the Fourth Army the enemy had only partially completed his works, but the force with which he held them surpassed in numbers that of the attacker. Gradually, and possibly with the object of forcing a breach between the First and Fourth Armies, he kept bringing up fresh troops, and between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. had no less than one hundred guns in action. Here, as on the left, every attempt to advance was driven back with heavy loss, and the utmost that the 10th Division could accomplish was to cling to the ground already won. It was decided, therefore, without attempting any further offensive action, merely to maintain the positions secured in the early morning. Nevertheless a gallant rush was made by some troops of the left and centre of the 10th Division against the enemy holding the hill south-west of Tsao-fan-tun (E 5), and they succeeded in capturing the village of Yu-chia-kou (D 5), but the heavy fire of guns and rifles from Tsao-fan-tun and Pa-chia-tzu (D 4) made its retention impossible, and under cover of dark the troops fell back.

On the 31st the 10th Division, in spite of the co-operation of the Guard Division of the First Army, could make no headway, but during the day repulsed the heavy attack made by the enemy, still in great force in this part of the field. The right of the 5th Division held its ground, and the left again co-operated with the Second Army, joining in the early morning attack on Rocky Ridge.

31st Aug.

The artillery of the division continued to engage the enemy near Hsin-li-tun (C 4) and Fang-chia-tun (C 4), and at 7 p.m. joined in the heavy bombardment which the Second Army directed against the position south-east of Shou-shan-pu.

* It has already been pointed out that the Japanese "Artillery Brigade" consists of three regiments each of two brigades (in Japan called "battalions").

1st Sept.

On the 1st September the occupation of that position by the Second Army in conjunction with the 5th Division of the Fourth forced the enemy to withdraw. The 10th Division attacked before daybreak and occupied the position on the hill south of Tsao-fan-tun (E 5). When day broke, part of the right and left wings of that division pursued, while its main body assembled in the neighbourhood of the captured ground and thence marched towards Liao-yang.

In the meantime the 5th Division had occupied the line extending from the isolated hill which stands north of Hsi Tu-chia-wa-tzu (D/E 4), thence to the northern part of the hill north-east of Fang-chia-tun (C 4) through the northern part of Tung Pa-li-chuang (D 4), and faced the enemy who stretched from San-li-chuang (D 3) to Yu-kuan-miao (E 3). This division assembled its main body at Nan Pa-li-chuang (D 4). The 10th Division occupied the line extending from Ta Ta-pei-hu (E 4) to Hsi Tu-chia-wa-tzu (D/E 4), and faced the enemy in the vicinity of Yu-kuan-miao (E 3), its main body assembling at Tsao-fan-tun (E 5).

The two divisions passed the night of the 1st in these positions.

2nd Sept.

At about 10.30 a.m. on the 2nd, both divisions of the Fourth Army advanced, and about 1.50 p.m. the cannonade opened. Part of the enemy's force engaging the Fourth Army was at this time on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, on the hills near Mu-chang (E 3) and San-wang-tzu,* and so threatened the advance of its infantry which took up a line running from Ta Ta-pei-hu by Shu-chia-tun (E 4) through the village north of Tung Pa-li-chuang to Ssu-li-chuang (D 4). Facing this line the enemy's position extended from Yeh-fang (E 3) through Yu-kuan-miao (E 3) and San-li-chuang (D 3) to Hsi-kuan (D 3). His defences were very strong, and consisted of five semi-permanent redoubts and several minor works connected by strong entrenchments and covered by abattis and wire entanglements, and it seemed that he would not be forced from them without very severe fighting.

Little progress was made this day and the Army passed the night on the line which it had taken up.

3rd Sept.

On the 3rd September, both divisions, holding approximately the same positions, opened on the enemy with their guns at 5 a.m. A report was received a short time later to the effect that he was withdrawing his main body northward, whereupon the infantry advanced, regardless of loss, and endeavoured to storm the redoubts. The 10th Division came to from three hundred to four hundred yards from the works, but the fire which met them from rifles and machine guns was so severe that their attempt to get closer was checked. The 5th Division succeeded in part in reaching a position about two hundred

* 4 miles east of Mu-chang.

yards from the entrenchments, while another part came to within sixty yards, but beyond this they could not advance. No change took place in the conditions of the fight until 6 p.m., when the 10th Division, seeing that their artillery was beginning to shake the enemy, decided to storm at all costs. The decision was put into effect, and under a terrible fire the men rushed across the absolutely open ground and passing the obstacles reached, at 7.50 p.m., the edge of the ditch at the salient of Redoubt No. 2, which lies to the east of Yu-kuan-miao (E 3), and penetrated it from that point. The remainder of the troops hearing of the capture of the work dashed forward and drove the enemy back before them.

Elsewhere the enemy was able to hold his ground, and the 5th Division, which was co-operating with the right of the Second Army, charged the enemy at San-li-chuang (D 3). Here, however, the fire was so overwhelming that they were held back and only at midnight succeeded in expelling the enemy from his redoubts.

At daylight on the 4th September the 10th Division pursued the enemy to the bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and detaching a force of all arms occupied with it the hill north-east of Mu-chang (E 3) and joined hands with the First Army. **4th Sept.**

The 5th Division pursued as soon as the redoubts were taken, and at 2 a.m. occupied the northern part of the city of Liao-yang and detached a force to secure the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho at the railway bridge.

During the retreat the enemy broke or burnt all his bridges over the river and fell back to Yen-tai, 12 miles north of Liao-yang.

The force of the enemy engaged with the Fourth Army amounted to 46 battalions and 140 guns, with cavalry and engineers.

The losses of the Fourth Army during the period described amounted to 50 officers killed and 173 wounded, and among the rank and file, to 6,600 killed and wounded

**(26) Battle of Liao-yang.—First Japanese Army.
Operations from the 23rd August to the
5th September 1904.**

REPORT by Lieutenant-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B.,
D.S.O., Head - Quarters, First Japanese Army, 12th
November 1904.

Plates.

Advance of the First Army from the Ya-lu to	
Liao-yang - - - - -	Map 33.
General Plan of the Battle of Liao-yang - - -	„ 34.

See also Maps 26, 27, and 28.

I have the honour to submit herewith reports by Lieutenant-Colonel Hume, D.S.O., Captain Jardine, and Captain Vincent, giving a graphic account of the fighting which began with the advance of the Japanese Guard Division on the morning of the 23rd August, and ended with the withdrawal of the whole of the Russian forces from the neighbourhood of Liao-yang on the afternoon of the 5th September 1904.

Not often, I think, has such a mass of independent testimony by military experts been brought to bear upon the military operations of another Power. By detaching an officer to each division, I have been enabled to check much of what I am told by the personal observations of British officers, as well as by my own exceptional experiences in being the only foreigner of any sort or kind who was present with the Head-Quarters Staff during the whole period under review.

Already I have shown that much difficulty was experienced in maintaining the First Army on the Mo-tien Ling line, and in accumulating such a stock of supplies there as would suffice for the troops during their advance on Liao-yang. The long halt rendered necessary by these preparations gave the troops a good rest, but the period was an anxious one for responsible commanders. The distribution of the Army, in truth, offered tempting opportunities to an enterprising and mobile enemy.* Its length of front was much too great for its strength. Thus, in the middle of July, the right was at Sai-ma-chi (F 3), and from that place to the left at Ko-ya-tsun (C 3) by the Mo-tien Ling (C 2 3) line, was some fifty miles, measured direct across

* See Map 33.

mountains and valleys. Still worse, half the Guard Division was altogether detached. It had been sent down to Hsiu-yen (A 7) to co-operate with the Fourth Army, and was thus fifty miles south of Ko-ya-tsun, and quite out of touch in case of any sudden emergency. This abnormal extension of front was, however, quite unavoidable. Owing to the steep and narrow passes and the rivers, the utmost any single line of communications in that country could supply was one single division. Even the best of them, the main road between Feng-huang-cheng (E 6) and Liao-yang (A 1), could barely do this. Therefore the troops had to scatter to be fed, whereas considerations of safety would have demanded concentration.

From the 20th July onwards the position of the First Army grew momentarily more critical. The forces of the enemy at An-ping (B 2) were increasing fast, and on the 24th July spies reported a feverish activity in all departments there, and that no less than two divisions were moving thence towards the 12th Division on the right of the First Army. In addition to these two divisions there were no less than 6,000 Russians at Pen-hsi-hu (D 1), who were making elaborate preparations to hold the place against the 12th Division. In marked contrast to the bustle and movement on the enemy's left was his quiescence at Yang-tzu Ling (B 2/3), a quiescence which, during the course of the 26th and 27th, made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that the Russians intended to hold them in front whilst they enveloped and attacked their right wing. As a Japanese staff officer remarked: "It is not our way to wait for the enemy to come on; and so, in accordance with our traditions, the commander of the Army decided to take the initiative." Or, as another officer put it to me on the 3rd August: "It was lucky we got wind of the enemy's intention, and luckier still that we had time to anticipate it."

The instant the enemy's plan declared itself the 1st Guard Brigade was summoned from Hsiu-yen (A 7) and every single man on the line of communications upon whom hands could be laid was swept up hurriedly towards the threatened 12th Division. The movements entailed by these orders began in some cases as early as the 24th July and ended on the 29th July. The battle took place on the 31st July.

As a result of this battle the Army moved on and occupied the Ta-wan valley (C 2). The map forwarded, which is dated 23rd August,* shows the exact distribution of the First Army during the occupation of what may be called the Ta-wan line. This new position, although still somewhat extended, was tactically much more defensible than the previous Mo-tien Ling line, and the Ta-wan valley especially, with its excellent lateral communication, offered an exceptionally advantageous situation for the cantonment of the Japanese centre, the 2nd Division.

* See Map 27.

From thence it could be shifted easily and rapidly to either flank, and in order that the very most should be made of this strong feature, the division was practically relieved of all out-post duties, so that it could always be relied upon to be ready to march off at full strength at a moment's notice.

The foregoing, read in conjunction with the map, gives a fairly complete idea of the events which immediately led up to the battle of Liao-yang. It may be as well to mention, before going on to describe those actions, that the mixed brigade of reservists which had been hurriedly constituted by troops swept up from the line of communications to assist the 12th Division, was not again redistributed, but remained as an organized unit at Pen-hsi-hu. It was placed under the command of Major-General Umezawa, recently promoted from the 4th Guard Infantry Regiment which he led into action at Ha-ma-tang. In addition to the infantry of the mixed brigade there were placed under his orders 1 field battery and 1 squadron of cavalry.

In an earlier report I have mentioned that the communications of the First Army were so abnormally difficult as to have precluded an earlier advance than that which actually took place. Now, however, I am informed that the line of communications had got into such perfect working order that an immediate advance of the First Army would have been feasible after the engagement of the 31st July had it had nothing to consider but the transport and supply of its own troops. It seems, however, that the arrangements of the Second and Fourth Armies were not so forward in this respect, and that it was also necessary to await the arrival of reinforcements which were on their way from Japan to strengthen the forces about Hai-cheng. These reinforcements, consisting principally of artillery and infantry, were not expected to reach their destination until the middle of August. It is claimed that it was on this account that the First Army was unable to take full advantage of the victory it had gained, and had to sit reposing on its laurels in the Ta-wan valley until the 18th August.* On that date it was free to move on, but heavy rains then intervened and continued for a week, so that the 24th August was actually the first day on which an advance was at the same time possible and permitted.

The task allotted to the First Army was to attack the enemy on the right bank of the Tang Ho at the same time that the Japanese forces in the south assailed the formidable works prepared by the Russians at An-shan tien. Map B†, dated 23rd August, shows in general outline the respective positions

* As the point is an interesting one, I took occasion some days after writing this page to see H. E. General Kodama, Chief of the Staff of the Army of Manchuria, and asked him how the matter stood. I wrote down his reply, from which the following sentence is an extract:—"No! The line of communications arrangements of the First Army were quite sufficient to stop them independently of any other cause."—IAN H.

† See Map 27.

of the whole of the Japanese and Russian field armies on that date, and very clearly demonstrates one of the principal weaknesses of the dispositions of the former, namely, the uncomfortable hiatus which existed between the left of the First Army and the right of the Fourth Army, sometimes called the Central Army. The gap in question measured twenty miles as the crow flies, over a difficult country, and the opportunities offered by its existence to the enemy caused some anxiety to the commander of the First Army. As regards his own immediate tactical situation, General Kuroki had to consider how he could best deal with not only the enemy but the natural obstacles to his advance.* In front of his right and centre the country was almost as breakneck and impracticable as Afghanistan, whilst the route by which his left must make its way, although more open, less rugged and traversed by the only decent road in the theatre of operations, yet afforded a succession of extremely strong positions to the Russian defence.

Turning now to the enemy, his left rested on the river Tai-tzu (G 5), whence his line ran in a southerly direction along the crest of a lofty razor-backed ridge, called North Pa-p'an Ling (F 5), through Hung-sha Ling (F 5), and on along the high ground to the centre at Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7). Thence the line took a curve in a south-westerly direction to the right at Ta-tien tzu (E 7/8) and Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8). This constituted the main Russian position but at Pen-hsi-hu (J 3) there were some six thousand Russians threatening the right flank of any Japanese advance, whilst the left flank was also exposed to a similar but less serious movement by a battalion and a few squadrons of the enemy's cavalry who were detached some distance to the south-west of Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8). The total strength of the enemy immediately opposed to the Japanese First Army along this line was about four divisions.

The distribution of the First Army on the 23rd August was, commencing on the right, the Umezawa Brigade at Chiaotou (J 6) watching the Russian detached force at Pen-hsi-hu. The 12th Division at Yü-shu-lin-tzu (J 5). The 2nd Division at Ta Hsi-kou (G 7) and Hsieh-chia-pu-tzu (G 8) with its headquarters at Tien-shui-tien (G 8), and the Guard at Ta-wan (G 9).

I have said that the First Army had orders to attack the enemy on the right bank of the Tang Ho (E F 5) at the same time that the Fourth and Second Armies attacked An-shan-tien (A 8), and it was now announced that an attempt to capture the latter place would be made by the Generalissimo of the Japanese forces on the 28th August. Therefore General Kuroki had to get his army within striking distance of the Tang Ho by that date and to do so must assault and capture the intervening positions of the enemy at the very latest by the 26th August.

* See Map 34.

The Hung-sha Ling ridge, which was the left of the enemy's position, was a singularly uninviting objective. It was a razor-backed mountain, only some twenty yards broad at the top, rising almost sheer 1,600 feet above the rivers and certainly, for the last one hundred and fifty yards of the ascent so steep that an unencumbered man had to climb with hands and knees to get up it. I must say it looked as unassailable as any military position I have seen. The Heights of Abraham are not half so imposing. In shape it resembled Caesar's Camp, and in altitude and several of its other characteristics, Majuba. Of all the strong sections in the Russian position this seemed the strongest, and yet how often has it not happened in history that confidence in material things such as precipitous mountains and swift or deep rivers has betrayed armies to their ruin!

The centre of the Russian line at Kung-chang Ling (F, G 7) and on hill 300 (F 7), if less dominating and imposing, was still most formidable. It ran along a high continuous ridge the approaches to which were broken up by a jumble of peaks and ravines. It was a sort of country for a very young man to go and hunt wild goats in. Take a sheet of foolscap; crumple it up; pull it out again; multiply the scale by 50,000; then some idea may be gained of the nature of this terrain. The right of the Russian position had been in their possession since May, and although it was much more open, with wider valleys and better communications than either the centre or the left, still it was known to be very well fortified, and if the road helped the Japanese to come up to the attack it also helped the Russian reinforcements to come down to assist the defence. The bulk of the enemy's force was kept in hand by him at the central points of Tang-ho-yen (E. 7) and An-ping (F 6).

It was with General Baron Kuroki undoubtedly a case of Hobson's choice. The disability which perturbed him more than any other was the impossibility of making full use of his artillery to support an attack upon such positions. He might with much difficulty find scope for his mountain guns, but it was not practicable to move field artillery in that country except by main highway from Ta-wan (G 9) to Lang-tzu-shan (E, F 8). There was, however, a weak point in the enemy's dispositions which suggested a plan of attack. The Russian position was strong, but it was too extended for the number of men available to hold it. This feature was absolutely the only one of which it seemed possible to take advantage, and accordingly General Kuroki determined to demonstrate against each of the enemy's wings and at the same time deliver his true attack upon the centre. As however, no artillery could be used opposite the enemy's centre, he further resolved that the only way in which this attack could be successfully carried through was by making it at night. Whatever opinion may be entertained as to the wisdom of such a plan everyone must admire the splendid boldness of the idea; an idea which could only be entertained by a com-

mander who was firmly convinced of the great superiority of his troops, man for man, over those of the enemy. In this connection, a staff officer made the following interesting remarks:—"We had no experience to guide us in framing orders for a night attack on such a scale. A night attack by four regiments was a new affair altogether. Fortunately, we had plenty of spare time in hand and so we set to work to master every detail of terrain, personnel, orders, &c., with the utmost minuteness. We worked at this business every day and all day, especially during the forty-eight hours immediately previous to the attack, and by the time it came off everyone above the rank of captain knew to a nicety what he had to do and how he was to do it. This particular night attack was a specially dangerous business, as our troops had to cross two ranges of hills before they could get into position to begin fighting. In short, the good results of the attack were due to careful preparation, and if we had attempted to carry it out with ill-prepared troops we should have found ourselves in a bad way, I am sure, before we had gone very far."

The great decision had now been taken and it only remained to formulate it into orders. Here they are:—

"Head-Quarters First Army,

"Chin-chia-pu-tzu (H 9),

"5 p.m. 22nd August.

"1. The enemy opposed to the First Army are the 9th and 31st Divisions of the line and the 3rd and 6th Divisions of Sharpshooters. They hold the line Hung-sha Ling (F 5), Han-po Ling (F 6), Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7), Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8), Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8). At Pen-hsi-hu (J 3) there is one regiment of infantry, five or six regiments of cavalry and some artillery, whilst at Liao-yang and on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho the enemy is in great force.

"2. The Second and Fourth Armies commence moving on the 26th and will attack the enemy on the 28th along a line extending from An-shan-tien (A 8) to Teng-yao-pu (which is 5 miles further west) and on to Josekio, called by the Chinese San-chia-chiao-tzu.

"3. This Army will attack the enemy at An-ping (F 6) with its main force, and the enemy on the main road with a smaller force, on the 26th instant.

"4. The 12th Division, less one battery of mountain artillery, but *plus* one mixed brigade, will attack the enemy at Chi-pan Ling (G 6) and to the north of it on the 26th instant. This division will keep a careful look-out for the enemy at Pen-hsi-hu (J 3).

"5. The 2nd Division, less the bulk of its cavalry and three batteries of field artillery, as well as one battalion of infantry, but *plus* one battery of mountain artillery, will attack the enemy at Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7) and on the hill marked 300 (F 7), south-west of Tse-kou (F 7), before

dawn on the 26th instant. The battery of mountain artillery will be handed over to it by the 12th Division.

"6. The Guard Division will attack the enemy early in the morning of the 26th instant along the main Liao-yang road, and at Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8). The 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment will be attached to the Guard.

"7. I shall be at San-tao-ling (G 7) from 6 o'clock on the evening of the 25th instant."

It will be observed that under the provisions of these clear and simple orders the strength of the 12th Division would amount to one and a half divisions with six batteries of artillery. One of its own mountain batteries was to be given to the 2nd Division, but it had been increased by the mixed brigade and its one field battery. The 2nd Division would amount to one division, less its own cavalry and three batteries of field artillery, but *plus* one mountain battery. It was intended that this battery should press forward from Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7) the instant that position was taken, and, to quote my informant, "in the sequel a good lesson was learnt, namely, that if artillery is ever required to make a rapid dash to take advantage of an opportunity, the guns must be mobile and light." The Guard Division was complete in all respects and was augmented by three batteries of field artillery from the 2nd Division, by the battery of captured Russian guns and by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Thus the Guard had with it ten batteries of artillery.

In addition to the detail of troops set forth in the foregoing orders, the General Officer Commanding had his Army reserve on its way to join him. This was to be composed of the garrisons of An-tung and Feng-huang-cheng, and of the line of communication troops serving between those two towns. As they were not warned for service until the moment when the orders were issued, General Kurcki might seem to be running the risk of having a paper reserve only for an action to be fought on the 26th. So promptly, however, did they start, and so admirably did they march, that they reached Tien-shui-tien (G 8) in forty-eight hours, to their own great credit, and no doubt to the equally great relief of the Head-Quarters Staff of the First Army, who seem to me, for no particular reason, to have run things a bit too fine in their orders on this occasion. The troops thus hastily summoned to the front were the 29th Reserve Regiment, and I may anticipate events a little by saying that, arriving at Tien-shui-tien at midnight on the 25th, they retained sufficient energy to put in an appearance on the field of action next day. To quote a picturesque phrase used by a Japanese officer when speaking of this march to the battlefield: "They seemed exhausted when they reached Tien-shui-tien but the sound of the guns on the 26th braced them

"up for another effort, and their tired feet became quite refreshed."

I have already referred to the fact that the main road to Liao-yang was the only one by which field artillery could advance. I must now qualify that statement, by adding that the heavy week's rain between the 18th and 24th August had damaged even this so-called highway to such an extent that it was impassable for guns until it had been repaired. There was no alternative, then, but for the Guards to advance by short stages, mending the worst places in the road as they went, so as to enable the artillery to keep up with them. This bid fair to be a desperately slow business, and the only way by which they could hope to come into line with the other divisions in the battle of the 26th was by getting a flying start. Accordingly, they led off on the 23rd, and at 10.30 a.m. on that date took up a position at Hou-lang-kou (F 8). On the 24th they advanced another stage, and occupied a line running from the hills south of San-niu-pu (F 8), through the hills south of Chi-mien-ssu (E 8), as far as the hills north-west of Pien-yao-wan (E 9). When they had got thus far, three battalions of the enemy's infantry, the 29th Regiment, showed front against them at Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8), but without seriously committing themselves. Next morning, the 25th, the Guard again marched forward, and had a little fight to the north-east of Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8), on the successful conclusion of which it was able to occupy the very line from which it had been ordered to make its attack on 26th August. This line ran from a point somewhat north-east of Lang-tzu-shan to Hei-lin-tzu (D 8), and there it may be left for the moment, having reached its destination just exactly up to time.

23rd Aug.

24th Aug.

25th Aug.

The 2nd Division assembled in the valley near San-tao-ling (G 7), where Army Head-Quarters were established on the evening of the 25th, and the rendezvous of the Okasaki Detachment was fixed at a spot a little to the north of the main body. The division was moving for the greater part of the night getting into position for its attack which was meant* to take place at 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, but which actually came off a little earlier.

The 12th Division began its movement against the enemy at about 7.30 p.m. on the night of the 25th. I have been told very clearly by a staff officer that their intention was to attack at dawn next morning. This officer went on to say, "there were two reasons why the 12th Division could not make a night attack at the same time as the 2nd Division. One was that the mountains on the line of advance of the 12th were so difficult in close proximity to the Russian position that a movement over them by night was practically impossible ;

* The word "meant" here applies to the intentions of the commander. The Head-Quarters of the Army say that the 2nd Division marched off at 9 p.m. on the 25th, "so as to attack at midnight."—IAN H.

“ the other, that the 12th Division was nearest to the main
 “ force of the enemy, which was of course greatly superior to
 “ the 12th Division, which had therefore to move warily and
 “ keep its eyes open. The 2nd Division was differently situated.
 “ It had made the fullest preparation, so that nothing was
 “ likely to go wrong, and the country though difficult was not
 “ so bad by any means as that which would have to be crossed
 “ by the 12th Division. The point of our whole plan was to
 “ use the 2nd Division as a wedge, and, by driving it well
 “ home before the other attacks commenced, thus facilitate
 “ the all-important advance of the 12th Division. Finally, the
 “ 12th Division had more artillery, and as these were mountain
 “ guns, they could help in the day attack, which is just where
 “ the 2nd Division could not get the requisite assistance.”

26th Aug.

Now all the foregoing is very interesting and sheds a most instructive light on the views of certain officers, but no one would imagine from reading it:—

- (1) That the 12th Brigade of the 12th Division did deliver a very typical night attack which ended at dawn on the 26th, by which time nearly two miles of the enemy's strongest and most important line of defence on his extreme left flank had been completely rolled up and captured. If ever a historian is justified in ascribing victory to the exploit of a single unit, then the 12th Brigade won the first phase of the battle of Liao-yang.
- (2) That the night attack of the 2nd Division, which was to drive a wedge through the enemy's centre, effected very little, at any rate during the night.

Before, however, I embark definitely upon the battle of the 26th and the succeeding operations, it is still necessary to say a very few words regarding certain movements made by the enemy in correspondence, as he imagined, with the intentions and preparations of the Japanese. Apparently his attention was first attracted and then absorbed by the preliminary forward movement of the Guard Division which, it will be remembered, was more a road-making than a tactical departure. Accordingly the Russian troops began to edge down towards Lang-tzu-shan, (E/F 8) and even their reserves at and about Liao-yang moved in a southerly direction. Along the main road and the other roads to the west of it, all the enemy were marching down to the south, and from An-ping itself a movement took place towards the south-west.

Once more I think it wiser to defer my account of the battle until I give a few extracts from a conversation I had with an officer of the staff of the First Army, on the 29th August. I have such a mass of rough material that it is difficult to know what to select, but, I believe, any remarks from this officer on

such a date must be more valuable than anything original I can write, and so I give a few brief extracts:—

“As I hear you are about to ride over the field of the battle of the 26th, between the Guard Division and the Russians, I am anxious first to let you understand to the very best of my power how we stand at present. . . . * As one who has commanded a force in war you will understand and sympathize with the difficulty a detached army such as ours has in playing up to exact dates laid down by the Generalissimo. To attack the enemy yesterday on the Tang Ho, as ordered, our calculations for an advance within striking distance had to include a study of the resistance likely to be offered by the enemy. This is a mighty delicate business. Not only, as you yourself have seen, was the position of the Russians the most formidable that can be imagined, but General Kuroki had to work out his problem to such a nicety as to allow exactly two days to reach the Tang Ho, those two days to include an action with an enemy as to whose strength, possible reinforcements, and dispositions he had to rely for information entirely upon his own reconnaissances and intelligence department. If General Kuroki had made a miscalculation and had not been in a position to attack the enemy on the right bank of the Tang Ho, whilst on the other side the Second and Fourth Armies carried out their part of the programme, then he must have felt that the First Army had grievously failed in its duty. Therefore, these last three days have been to us an exceptionally anxious time. When we attacked on the 26th instant our left wing was quite *en l'air*, and even our right wing only leant on the river, which was anything but an effective barrier or screen. Not only was the enemy in force at Pen-hsi-hu (J 3)† but he was supported by no less than twenty battalions of reserves near Mukden. Under such conditions we hoped at least that it might be found possible to take some steps to ensure our left flank against attack. Accordingly a request was made to the Generalissimo for some support in this direction, but the situation in the south did not admit of the despatch of troops for the purpose. As you very well understand, we did not so much require actual tactical support as the more general strategical support which is afforded by the presence on the theatre of operations of a force which might, in case of need, be made available for the purpose. It was not possible for us to shut our eyes to the danger that the attack of the Second Army on An-shan-tien (A 8), might hang fire till the 29th or 30th August, and in that case the whole force of the enemy might have been massed against us and we knew that in such an event this force would have amounted to five divisions. That

* Here he told me things which have, for the most part, been embodied in the foregoing paragraphs.—IAN H.

† See page 283.

is to say, each of our divisions were already faced by one division of the enemy who had two divisions in reserve. In front of the 12th Division the country was so difficult that it should have been easy for the Russians to defend it with a comparatively small number of troops, and worse still, the river Tang Ho from An-ping to the Tai-tzu Ho was not fordable.* The ground in front of the 2nd Division was almost, if not quite, as bad. In fact, judging by the configuration of the terrain, it might have been supposed that a couple of brigades could easily hold up the 12th and 2nd Divisions. Finally, although the Tang Ho promised to be a most difficult obstacle to our troops, it formed no impediment to a Russian offensive, as they had a bridge across it at Ku-sao-cheng (F 5), over which they could suddenly pour their reserves if they wished to make a big attack, whilst on the Tai-tzu Ho both junks and launches were available for considerable movements of troops."

"Our great fear was lest the enemy should concentrate in front of our right wing, but on the whole we thought the chances were in favour of a concentration to oppose our left. The easy communication up and down the main road would be sure, we thought, to appeal to the enemy, and to turn the scale in favour of a counter-attack on our left if opinions were evenly balanced in the Russian head-quarters. . . . The repair of the main road by the Guards was a difficult matter. To send out small covering parties was to invite defeat, and it was undesirable to deploy the division in line of battle, and very exhausting to the men. However, we managed all right with swarms of skirmishers thrown out in advance and armed working parties ready to lay down pick and shovel at a moment's notice and go into the fight. . . ."

I have purposely dealt somewhat fully with the motives and intentions of the Japanese, and with the nature of the problem which awaited their solution, because the detailed accounts of the actual fighting will be to a great extent left by me to the three officers whose reports I forward herewith. That actual fighting began at about 3 a.m. in front of the 2nd Division. I left San-tao-ling (G 7) at 3.30 a.m., and climbed one and a half miles up to a col by the light of the full moon hanging low in the sky. The path led west out of the Tien-shui-tien (G 8) valley, and when I reached the col I looked down into the next valley, or rather gorge, for the hillsides met one another at the bottom. Climbing a steep hill called Wu-chia Ling (G 8) I found the Head-Quarters Staff. To our front were two deep narrow parallel valleys separated by a sharp edged rocky ridge, which was much lower than the hill I was sitting on, or the mountain on the other side of the further valley. The ridge was just high enough to conceal the infantry of the 2nd Division, who had captured it during the night with the bayonet, and

* This turned out not to be the case on the dates when it had to be crossed. — IAN II.

who were behind it at the bottom of the further valley. The Russians were lining the crest of the mountain immediately above them. The general run of the valleys was north and south. The continuous rattle of the rifles reminded me of the evening of the second day at Diamond Hill. About eleven miles to our left to the south-west, a big artillery fight had begun soon after 6 o'clock, the Japanese guns firing from the line Erh-tao-kou (F 8)—Tung-hsin-pu (E 8), and the Russian guns replying from Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) and Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) where we could see even from here the flanks of the hills lined with trenches, whilst their tops were carved and ringed around with closed works of sorts.

The curious point about this artillery duel, in which there must have been a hundred* guns engaged, was that the battery positions were not denoted as of old by the smoke from the discharges of their own cannon but by the canopy of smoke from the bursting shrapnel of the adversary. About fifteen miles to our right front, to the northwards, lay a lofty, long, straight-backed black mountain with a small knob on its far extremity. I knew this to be Hung-sha Ling (F 5), the Russian left, and the objective of the hot-headed, impetuous 12th Division men. The Head-Quarters Staff were naturally very anxious, although, merely from their manner, no one could have guessed it. General Kuroki said his only uneasiness was about the 12th Division, which was so far away he had not got news of it yet. The shrapnel bursts, he said, showed him exactly where the Guard was and what it was doing, and evidently things in that part of the field were going, so far, as they had been intended to go. As to the 2nd Division, he was confident they would not only hold on to what they had gained during the night with their bayonets but add to it very shortly. This was the rub. The Head-Quarters repose an exceptional confidence in this splendid 2nd Division, who are the biggest, bravest,† and least clever men in Japan. They had confidently expected the 2nd Division would have broken through and carried the Russian positions in front of them before dawn, but the enemy had fortified successive lines, and in the darkness the Japanese had only succeeded in capturing ridges which were little more than subsidiary outworks. The Russians here in front of us were sticking to their trenches most stubbornly and

* This was, I believe, an over-estimate which was shared at the time by the Head-Quarters. The Japanese had 60 guns, and Colonel Hume does not reckon the Russian guns at more than 40, although on the 28th August I heard that prisoners had said they had 9 batteries, or 72 guns.
—IAN H

† Many Japanese do not agree to this. I would explain, then, that I use the word bravery here in the English rather than in the Celtic sense. Other divisions may do more dashing feats or lose more men, but the 2nd are solid, stolid, unimaginative, and although they do not court danger, are indifferent to it when it comes.—IAN H.

seemed quite undaunted even when the famous 2nd Division got within one hundred yards of them.

At 7.50 a.m. the guns of a Russian battery we could see fighting the Guard Division about ten miles distant were being subjected to a tremendous fire, when they cleverly withdrew them from one side of a small hillock and brought them out again on the other side of it, whence they renewed the contest, having upset the ranging of their opponents. At 8 a.m. an adjutant appeared with a despatch, saluted first General Kuroki, then the Chief of the Staff, and read out a message from the 12th Division announcing that it had carried the northernmost and most difficult part of the Hung-sha Ling (F 5) position, which formed the extreme left of the Russian line of defence, by 6.30 a.m. This was great news, but not definite enough to make the Staff quite happy. At 8.5 a.m. a messenger came in to say there were signs that the enemy in front of the 2nd Division were beginning to fall back on An-ping. At 8.20 a.m. another messenger from the 12th to say that Major-General Kigoshi had, with five battalions, scaled the high black ridge north of Hung-sha Ling (F 5) called North Pa-pan Ling, and that the enemy were quite driven off that northern position of the mountain by 7.20 a.m. At this everyone was frankly delighted. As far as I could judge, this ridge was the key to the Russian left and centre, as its occupation threatened An-ping and rendered untenable the whole of the country between the Lan Ho and Tang Ho. Indeed there was no chance for the Russian left and centre to find a secure position unless they fell right back over the Tang Ho or the Tai-tzu Ho. The Russian right, in front of the Guard Division, was not, of course, so immediately threatened, as it had the main road leading back from the position, which would take it to Liao-yang quite independently of An-ping. Still, if the others went it would also eventually have to follow suit.

Soon, however, the situation seemed to change for the worse. At 8.25 a.m. a messenger came in to say that, although a column of the enemy appeared to be falling back on An-ping, yet another very considerable fresh body of troops had concentrated on the left of the 2nd Division, and appeared about to make a serious counter-attack upon it. At the same time the musketry to our front redoubled in intensity, and the Russian guns north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu (F 6, a little to the east of An-ping) fired very heavily on the Japanese, who were unable to make any reply, as they lay so far back that they were out of range of the one battery of mountain guns which might otherwise have taken up their attention. General Nishi, commanding the 2nd Division, was most anxious about his position, as it might be affected by the counter-attack, and sent two urgent messages on the subject; but I heard the opinion

expressed that General Kuroki would be only too delighted if the counter-attack came off. The country, it was said, was so impracticable, bad, and broken, that even if the Russians did gain a temporary local success, the only result would be that they would involve themselves still further in the mountains. They could not bring up their artillery or gain any serious advantage, and meanwhile, if the 12th Division progressed as it was hoped it would do, the Russians making such a counter-attack might be entirely cut off and captured. That this confidence was not assumed is evident from the following interesting fact. Within one minute of General Nishi's message saying he expected a counter-attack an orderly arrived from the Guard Division saying that the situation in that wing was getting very serious, that the troops could make no progress either by asserting artillery superiority or advancing the infantry, and that the enemy to their front was increasing more and more. Thereupon General Kuroki gave orders to send the whole of the reserve from Tien-shui-tien to the Guard. This was the 29th Regiment, which had just done the 48 hours' march from An-tung and Feng-huang-cheng.

To send the whole of the reserves to a distant flank where they would entirely be lost to him, at a moment when a serious counter-attack was about to be launched against the centre where he himself was present, showed good confidence in the 2nd Division. Even the Chief of the Staff said to me, "*C'est une décision un peu audacieuse.*"

At 8.30 a.m. such troops of the 2nd Division as we could see were completely brought to a standstill. The double reverberation of the Russian rifles seemed to be getting the upper hand, and to drown the Japanese fire, but as it happened the mountain battery, lent to the 2nd Division by the 12th Division, saved the situation. This battery had taken post at 3 a.m. on the height marked 260 (G. 7). Shortly after 7 a.m. it moved up to the infantry, and came into action on the main ridge about the centre of the line held by the 2nd Division. The right and centre of the 2nd Division had by now got possession of the main ridge to their front, but the Russians were holding firmly on to the crest of the same line of mountain opposite the left of the 2nd Division, and were not only holding up the Japanese to their front, but were firing into and threatening to dislodge the Japanese centre. The bold advance of six mountain guns, to look at more like popguns than cannon, quickly put a different complexion on the conflict. As a staff officer put it, "They fired in every direction like a bundle of squibs or crackers." Certainly this was so. They fired at the Russians, who were so aggressively holding on to the trenches in their left, they fired at the Russians retreating on An-ping, and they fired on the reinforcements coming from the direction of An-ping. Never were greater results achieved by a smaller unit. Only six small

guns, but they were in the right place, and by 9 a.m. they had broken the back of the Russian resistance.*

Thenceforth everyone breathed more freely. At this time, although we did not hear it till 10.45 a.m., the right brigade of the 12th Division were fighting fiercely at Hung-sha Ling (F 5) and were unable to make any further progress, as is described in Captain Jardine's report.† The left brigade had met the enemy and had by this hour driven him back and occupied Chi-pan Ling (G 6) and Pa-pan Ling. Still, notwithstanding the check at Hung-sha Ling (F 5), and the fact that the left of the 2nd Division had not even yet made good all the heights in front of it—mountain marked "T" (F 7)—yet, generally speaking, the Japanese right and centre had now occupied the line of positions they had intended to take and had made them safe against counter-attack. But it was otherwise on the left, where the Guard Division was outnumbered and in danger of being over-matched. Some of the staff had held sanguine views as to the chances of the Guard bringing off a successful *coup*. The Chief of the Staff said to me at 9.20 a.m.: "It is the hope of General Kuroki that the 12th " and 2nd Divisions may to-night reach the right bank of the " Tang Ho, across the upper waters of which the Guard Division " is now extended, with its right regiment still on the right " bank of what is there little more than a streamlet, and its " main force on the left bank. The General Commanding hopes " that it may reach Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) to-night, but that " will only be possible if it routs the enemy properly." At this time the left brigade of the Guard, having made a wide sweep, was moving north-east and endeavouring to outflank the Russian position which was a mile or two south of Kao-feng-ssu. There were 24 Russian guns on this position and the Guards did not, as a matter of fact, occupy Kao-feng-ssu till next night. A few minutes after the Chief of the Staff had expressed these hopes about the Guard being able to advance, an officer, who brought news that detachments of the Fourth Army were visible from the extreme left, told some of the staff, incidentally, that having passed along the Guard line of attack in bringing his message, he did not think it looked like making much progress. Whether he repeated this officially or not, I do not know. At 10 a.m. the Russians to our immediate left front (left of 2nd Division) were still holding on to the hill marked "T" (F 7). Two of the mountain battery guns were withdrawn from the ridge

* Captain Vincent, who was much nearer the front than I was, thinks this description is a little exaggerated. The guns did good work, he says, whenever they could fire for a minute or two, but they were very much dominated by the Russian guns, although these were firing high. Captain Vincent agrees that nothing could exaggerate the extraordinary effect of the two guns which went down to the valley where they were not exposed to the Russian artillery. This is described in the following paragraph.—IAN H.

† See page 410.

in the centre of the 2nd Division infantry where they had done such good service and were brought down into the bottom of the valley, where at short range they opened up on the Russian trenches with high-explosive shell. The enemy, who had fought most bravely until then, could not stand this, and by 11 a.m. there was not a man of them left on the south side of the sky line. The 2nd Division is a very splendid body of men, but, judging by results, they must this day yield the palm to the 12th Division, who not only turned the enemy's left flank and threatened the retreat of all the Russians opposed to the 2nd Division, thus shaking their morale, but also lent the six little mountain guns without which I do not myself believe the Russians would have been completely driven from the central positions before dark.

At 10.15 a.m. an officer came in with a message to say that the Guards were about to assault the height of Pei-tzu-ha (D/E 8), close above the Russian artillery position near Ta Hsi-kou. I noted at the time that if the Guard Division really pushed this assault home it would cost it very dearly. As it turned out it did not do so. At 10.45 two Japanese mountain guns north of Hung-sha Ling (F 5) began to fire very fast and at the same time the Russians in front of the right and centre of the Japanese evidently gave up all idea of maintaining their ground and began to fall back on An-ping. The heavy rifle fire degenerated into sniping, and the only point of interest still remaining within my ken was the artillery fight between the Guard and the Russians which Colonel Hume has described very fully. At 1 p.m. an adjutant who had specially been sent to glean information at the front came back and reported that in one hour's time a road would be cut over a pass on the right of the 2nd and the left of the 12th Divisions which would enable a battery of artillery to be brought up to fire on the retreating Russians. This was the last message I heard.

The first phase of the battle was now over, unless the Guard was about to attempt a very hazardous attack. The Russian left and centre were knocked clean out of their positions, and although they might hang on for a little in the low hills on this side of the Tang Ho, they must fall back more or less rapidly on to the high ground on the opposite bank, or cross the Tai-tzu Ho. The Japanese all consider that the retirement was very well done. The Russians fell back more or less simultaneously and under cover of their guns north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu (F 6). These twenty-four guns could not be replied to by the Japanese artillery, and the Japanese infantry were naturally more or less out of hand and in disorder after executing their attack. They could not, therefore, easily or rapidly be reformed, and yet it was necessary to do this before engaging in a fresh attack on an enemy who was combining a concentration and a retreat. The Japanese say, and, I think, with justice, that their success would have been infinitely

greater if each Russian unit had fallen back independently. In that case the Japanese corps in touch with them might have been allowed to press on in pursuit without any halt for re-arrangement. Our allies are a little sensitive on this question of pursuit and of the accusations levelled against them of not making full use of their victories. I will refer to this later when the same question is again raised at the end of the Liao-yang fighting. In this case, at any rate, it appears to me quite clear that pursuit was absolutely out of the question. The troops had been marching, climbing, fighting, charging for over twelve hours. The enemy had eventually yielded their positions but were not demoralized or put to flight. They were falling back and concentrating under cover of a powerful artillery and a large reserve well posted in a strong position. The Russians were more numerous than the Japanese. If the latter had been able to bring up a strong force of artillery, then, at least, the Russians might have been severely punished as they fell back. But as the bulk of the Japanese artillery was with the Guard, and as, even if the 2nd and 12th Divisions had possessed sufficient artillery for the purpose, there was no means of bringing it up over the mountains, it was not possible to employ this method of harassing the Russian retreat. In short, the infantry could not advance without artillery support; there was but little artillery available; what little there was could not be brought up to be of use.

As far as the 2nd and 12th Divisions were concerned, then, the principal fighting was over for the day, although the right brigade of the latter force did not get over the last hundred yards which divided it from Hung-sha-Ling (F. 5) until 3.20 p.m.,* whilst the southern portion of the ridge, in front of the left brigade of the 12th Division, remained in Russian hands until nightfall. Still, General Kuroki was quite easy in his mind about the eventual result of the fighting on his right and centre. But it was quite otherwise on his left. There the Guard Division was fighting an engagement, practically independent of the rest of the army, from ten to fifteen miles to the south-west, where the fortunes of the day seemed inclining to the Russian side.

The battle of the Guard Division with the Russian right wing is so fully described by Colonel Hume in his report that I have not much to add to his descriptions. The enemy in front of them were the same Russians who had been beaten on the Ya-lu. They had retreated then and there to the neighbourhood

* Even then they were not able to take the six guns of the enemy, although these were within a few yards of them, as is explained by Captain Jardine in his report. The guns were deserted during the night and were captured next morning. The Japanese could not actually lay hands on them till then without great loss, but they would have incurred this sooner than permit them to be removed, and the Russians realized this. This incident affords an interesting example of guns being deliberately sacrificed to encourage the infantry as long as possible.—LAN II.

of Lang-tzu shan (E/F 8), and had been fortifying their position ever since. I rode over it on the 29th August. Their forces opposed to the Guard's right on hill 189 (E. 7) were very strongly entrenched. Although the ground was rocky they had nevertheless burrowed into it in every direction, and there were endless covered ways for inter-communications and deep trenches finished off with sandbag revetments.

During the evening three batteries of field artillery belonging to the 2nd Division were brought to Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7) with infinite labour. They began their advance at 6 p.m. and did not arrive until past midnight. In front of the, 2nd Division and of the left brigade of the 12th Division all was quiet and unchanged on the night of the 26th, but there was no rest for the troops on either flank. On the west the combat had been merely arrested by the rain and mist, and the Russians tried a counter-attack on the left of the Guard Division, which was only just able to hold on to its somewhat too extended and isolated position. On the extreme right Kigoshi's brigade after very desperate fighting the whole night of the 25th and the best part of the 26th had seized the rocky height 270 (F 5), the highest point of the ridge, at 4 p.m. There they were within point-blank range of the Russian guns, but they could not actually lay hands on them, as the Russian infantry was hanging on amongst the rocks, and covered them with their fire. The rain and mist at 4 p.m. made any further advance still more difficult, and so the men built sangars and remained where they were, exchanging an intermittent fire with the Russians at very close range. At dawn next morning the enemy had withdrawn and the guns, as well as Hung-sha Ling, fell into Japanese hands. Captain Jardine speaks of the narrow rocky ridge in front of Hung-sha Ling as reminding him of Waggon Hill. It is curious that he should have made this simile, for I had already noted my impression that the whole ridge north and south of Hung-sha Ling seemed to me greatly to resemble a glorified Caesar's Camp. Caesar's Camp was also the left of the Ladysmith line of ridges facing south, and it was turned at night by the falling back of the colonial troops who covered its extremity where it met the plain. In the Hung-sha Ling instance this almost impregnable position, a position which certainly Japanese Army Head-Quarters thought impregnable, was lost through sheer carelessness. The Japanese advanced in the darkness without firing, and the Russians possibly took them for a reconnaissance at first, and did not hurry up troops, or make a determined effort to stop them whilst there was yet time. The few Russians who lingered to fire were quietly bayoneted. No one on the Russian side seems quite to have known what was happening, and the rapidity and silence of the advance carried the little piquets and their supports before it, and flung them on their reserves before any fixed line of defence could be taken up and held.

The phenomenal success of Kigoshi's brigade adds one more to the melancholy examples of how easily carelessness on the part of a detachment may lose a battle. If the first Russian outposts encountered half way down the slope on their extreme left had made a stubborn resistance, time would have been given to the defenders of the ridge to grasp the situation and to man their lines of defence. The Russians had prepared stone sangars for this purpose, but these were more like defences built by British troops under similar circumstances than the solid and stoutly built fortifications made by the Japanese wherever they win a foothold. The Russian sangars indeed bore exactly the same signs that the officers did not like to exact too much work from the men as those which were so often very evident in South Africa—where attempts had been made to secure certain parts of a position against a *coup de main*. By gaining North Pa-pan Ling during the first night, the ultimate victory of the First Army was more than half won. If the scale of the Ladysmith defences were multiplied by ten and An-ping substituted for the town-hall, it is much as if the Boers on the night of the 5th–6th January had taken the whole of Caesar's Camp as far as Manchester Fort, and had continued to hold it. The troops on Waggon Hill and Rifleman's Ridge (the Russian centre and right in my parallel) had then to fall back or be cut off.

I slept with the Head-Quarters in Chinese hovels at Chin-chia-pu-tzu (F 6) that night.

27th Aug.

On the morning of the 27th rain was still falling heavily, and although there was a certain amount of artillery firing I do not think either side could see what to shoot at until 10 a.m. when the weather cleared, and it was found that the bulk of the Russians had made good their retirement during the night. Some rear guard detachments were hanging on to the low hills this side of the Tang Ho, to cover the retreat across it of the bulk of the enemy. From a hill, about two miles west of Chin-chia-pu-tzu (F 6), a good view of the valley of the Tang Ho and of An-ping was obtained about 2 p.m. when the fog lifted. A division of Russians was breaking up camp on the river flats just beyond An-ping, and dense columns of their infantry could be seen winding down the mountains into the Tang Ho valley and moving up the valley towards Ku-sao-cheng (F 5) where they crossed by a bridge. Others again continued up the valley of the Tang river to the point of its junction with the Tai-tzu Ho and there were ferried across in boats.

No better mark for artillery can well be conceived than these serried masses of infantry crossing the open river bed with the utmost deliberation. From where I stood there must have been at one moment at least 15,000 infantry within range of a Boer Long Tom. Neither in South Africa nor in Tirah did our infantry ever tempt fate by moving in such

formations in the vicinity of an enemy. The Russians could not have known that the Japanese had no artillery available but the one mountain battery with the 2nd Division, and that this battery unfortunately had not been pushed sufficiently forward to make use of its comparatively short ranging shrapnel. On this day, as on the 31st July, the Russian formations invited risks of loss and demoralization from the sudden opening upon them of artillery. In each case they escaped through the want of mobility of the Japanese guns, which on this latter occasion was to a great extent justified, I must admit, by reason of the difficulty of the terrain.

During the day the 12th Division occupied the line from Hung-sha Ling (F 5) to An-ping without serious fighting, and the 2nd Division took up a line from a little south of An-ping to Tang-ho-yen (E 7) without any fighting at all. The Guard Division had practically been defeated the previous day. Its left wing (the Asada Brigade) had attacked; had been brought to a complete standstill; had been attacked in turn and half surrounded. Its right wing, on the other bank of the Tang Ho, had done what it could to relieve the pressure upon its comrades by advancing towards hill 189 (E 7) against the Russians to its own front, but had also been forced to come to a full stop. Nevertheless, the brilliant success of the 12th Division had sent its decisive effect all along the line. First the 2nd Division felt it in the yielding disposition of the troops to its front, and by night the demoralizing news had its effect also on the Russians who seemed to have the Asada Brigade at their mercy. For, on the morning of the 27th, it was evident that they, far from pressing the advantage of the previous evening, were in full retreat, and during the course of the day the Guard Division was able to occupy San-chia-kou (D 7) and Kao-feng-ssu (E 8), the Russians holding on to a line extending from a little to the north of Kao-feng-ssu to the east of Hsiao-ling-tzu (E. 7).

So much for the line occupied by the main army and its opponents on the 27th; but there was a force detached from the Russians on the extreme Japanese right at Pen-hsi-hu, which had caused the First Army commander and staff many an anxious thought during the course of the fighting. This was the Russian detachment of all arms at Pen-hsi-hu, and, judging their enemy by themselves, the Japanese were very much afraid that their commander would assume the initiative and attack. Had this been done with vigour there is no saying what the consequences might not have been, and I can bear witness that no one felt this more acutely than General Kuroki.

On the 28th August I was told as follows, "The enemy had
" some remarkably good chances of attacking on either flank
" but lost them all through want of initiative. On our left
" flank he did show some energy and made us feel exceedingly
" uncomfortable thereby, but his great chance was a stroke on
" our exposed right, and right rear, from Pen-hsi-hu. General

"Kuroki had never felt happy in his mind at the presence of this strong force disposed in a position so threatening to our advance and he had made a complete plan for breaking up the Russian forces at both Chiao-tou and Pen-hsi-hu, but at the last moment, and with the utmost regret and misgiving, he had to abandon the idea and turn all his attention to co-operation with the Second and Fourth Armies. However, we might have spared ourselves many sleepless nights, for this formidable Pen-hsi-hu contingent retired quite quietly and inoffensively with the remainder of the Russian troops towards Liao-yang." I was also given the following information which fits in suitably at this stage of the narrative:—

"During the night of the 26th the enemy in front of the Second and Fourth Armies began to fall back from An-shan-tien (A 8). We only got the news at 6.23 p.m. on the 27th, yesterday. This movement was entirely unexpected and had never seriously entered into our calculations. We, in common with all the rest of the world I imagine, recognized that An-shan-tien was quite the best defensive position which could be found between Kai-ping and Liao-yang and it was also a matter of common knowledge that the enemy had expended an immense amount of energy, time and money in adding to the natural strength of the place by field works and defences of every description. We would not of ourselves venture to ascribe so important a withdrawal of the enemy to the merits of the First Army, but Marshal the Marquis Oyama in his telegram announcing the retirement specifically says that it seems to be due to the highly honourable battle fought by us on the night of the 25th and on the 26th, and that he has therefore pleasure in giving us his congratulations."

On the night of the 27th the General Commanding issued orders as follows:—

"The First Army will now advance and take up their fresh line from a point a little north-east of Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) by Ta-shih-men Ling (E 6) down to Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7). The 12th Division will extend north-east from Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) up to the bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. The 2nd Division from Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) down along the crest line of the mountains till it touches the main road at Ta-shih-men Ling (E 6). The Guard Division from that point on the main road to Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7)."

The orders went on to impress strongly upon all commanders that each division must make a point of reaching the position assigned to it notwithstanding any resistance which might be offered by the enemy.

28th Aug:

On the 28th the Head-Quarters marched across to the left of the Army and halted at Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8). I accompanied them, and at noon a telegraphic order was received from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters directing the First Army to press on as rapidly as possible to the south bank of the Tai-tzu

Ho and there prepare to make an immediate crossing. When this order came to hand it seemed to me, I confess, one which might fairly be expected to cause some difficulty and confusion.

At this time the whole Army was committed to an engagement extending all along its line amongst the Ta-shih-men mountains. It was no light matter to manœuvre troops involved over so long a front in a hard struggle, and to give them a new direction. Nevertheless the Staff remained imperturbable and undisturbed so far as I could judge. The order of Marshal the Marquis Oyama went on to say that the Second Army, if successful, should arrive that day on a line extending from Sha-ho (B 6) to the River Liao, and that the Fourth Army was expected to occupy a line extending from Yen-tao-yuan (B 6) to Tsao-fan-tun (C 6). The First Army was to co-operate by taking up a position with its left resting on Meng-chia-fang (D 6), and its right on the Tai-tzu Ho, passing by Kao-li-tsun (D 5), Shih-chu-tzu (E 5), &c. From this telegram it was clear that the Second and Fourth Armies were taking up their positions to attack Liao-yang, and the special instructions to the First Army necessitated the following modifications in the orders issued on the night of the 27th. The Guard Division was now directed to take up a line from Meng-chia-fang to a hill north-west of Cha-lu-tzu (D 6). The 2nd Division was to occupy Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) with its main force and push out its left to get into touch with the Guard. The 12th Division was to take up a line from Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) to Ying-shou-pu (F 4) to the north-east of it, and was to be prepared to cross the river between Hei-ying-tai (F 4) and Sha-kan (F/G 5), reconnoitring first thoroughly to secure the best conditions possible. At the time a staff officer said to me: "These are our intentions, but it depends, of course, upon the enemy whether they can be carried out. I may tell you now that I do not myself see how the Guard can possibly carry out its part of the programme, as at 5 p.m.* the enemy was fighting hard, and did not seem inclined to yield even one yard of ground, whereas our men have to push them back at least six miles if they are to bivouac according to their orders. I hope, however, that the 2nd and 12th Divisions may be able to do their part of the business all right.

As a matter of history, the 12th Division did succeed in arriving at the place assigned to it on the evening of the 28th. The main force of the 2nd Division was not so fortunate. Far from reaching Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) according to the amended orders, or the line Shih-chu-tzu (E 5)—Ta-shi-men Ling (E 6) as under their original orders it was only able to make good a hill a very short distance north of San-chia-sai (E 6). The left brigade† (Matsunaga's) was more successful in carrying out the instructions it had received to get into touch with the

* The conversation took place at 6.30 p.m.—IAN H.

† The brigade was given one mountain battery.—IAN H.

Guard. This detached force made a night attack on the Russians north of San-chia-sai, and took their position. Not content with this, Matsunaga pressed eagerly on in pursuit during the night and captured the highest point of the ridge—243 (E 6)—from whence he could see the promised land stretching out before him, and the town of Liao-yang, with its famous pagoda, wedged in between the railway and the Tai-tzu Ho, along the left bank of which were dotted at irregular intervals the encampments of the enemy. The Guard Division which, it will be remembered, was ordered to take up the line from Meng-chia-fang (D 6) to a hill north-east of Cha-lu-tzu (D 6), fully justified the doubts as to its ability to carry it into effect. It vigorously attacked a Russian brigade which lay across its line of advance at Wei-chia-kou (C 6), and reached a line Ssu-fang-tai (D 7)—Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7), but there it practically stuck fast, and could make but little progress. It will be seen, then, that:—

- (1) The 12th Division on the Japanese right had carried out its orders to the letter.
- (2) The 2nd Division in the centre had fallen short of its instructions by some five or six miles. Its left brigade had, however, actually exceeded its instructions by capturing the high point at Ta-shih-men Ling, which was in advance of the right of the Guard with whom it had been ordered to join hands. Thus, the 2nd Division may be said to have failed in part, and in part to have succeeded.
- (3) The Guard Division had, as anticipated by the Chief of the Staff, been unable to make good its point. The Russians opposed to it had fought three determined rear guard actions within a distance of as many miles, and on the evening of the 28th it was only able to occupy a position stretching from Hsiang-shan-tzu on the left to Ssu-fang-tai on their right. Still, the success of the 12th Division and of Matsunaga's brigade of the 2nd Division on its immediate right was of good augury for better progress next day.

29th Aug.

On the 29th August the 12th Division stood fast on the south side of the river Tai-tzu Ho, and continued reconnoitring for a good crossing as well as working at repairs on the road behind them. A large force of the enemy held Hsiao-tun-tzu (E 5) just in front of it. The main force of the 2nd Division was now able to take up the position assigned to it for the previous day, and occupied Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) by 8 a.m. The left brigade under Matsunaga improved its advantage, and pushing on beyond hill 243 (E 6), reached the next range of heights on the way to Liao-yang. The Guard Division, however, was only able to force its way to a line from Wei-chia-kou (C 6) on the left to a point a little to the north-east of Ssu-fang-tai (D 7), on its right.

A Japanese staff officer made the following observations to me on this date:—"To-day, the Fourth Army will advance to the line it was thought it might have occupied yesterday, viz., Sha-ho (B 6) to Shou-shan-pu (B 5). The Second Army should certainly reach the line from Sha-ho to the river Liao. It is desired by Manchurian Army Head-Quarters that the First Army should take up a line from the right of the Fourth Army at Shou-shan-pu to the end of the mountains on the south bank of the Tai-tzu Ho at Hou-ta-chieh (E 5). But the enemy is occupying this very line of mountains from Shou-shan-pu by Meng-chia-fang (D 6), and his trenches following the crest of the ridges in a north-easterly direction down to the Tai-tzu Ho at Hou-ta-chieh (E 5). This position of the enemy would be enormously strong if the First Army stood alone, but the Fourth Army has very favourable ground in front of it which should facilitate a turning movement of the right of the Russians who are facing our army. The problem now to be resolved is:—Will the enemy defend this line, or will he fall back on Mukden? Supposing he retires to the north he would be undertaking a most hazardous operation. He would have to face the probability of losing a considerable force in order that he might save the bulk of his army. Prospects are bright but for the fatigue of our soldiers, amongst whom the Guard has now been moving and fighting for five days and nights without respite and the other divisions for four days and nights. The enemy imagined that after the desperate fighting of the 26th we would not press on so fast as we have contrived to do up to date. On previous occasions we have paused for a while after each encounter, but this time we have pushed on day and night, and we have the good news from Chinese sources that the greatest confusion and disorder prevails amongst the Russians on the road between Hai-cheng and Liao-yang."

Speaking on a later date another staff officer said concerning the situation at this moment:—"Until this period we had expected Kuropatkin to fight a decisive battle on the line from Shou-shan-pu down to Meng-chia-fang. If he desired to fight a battle of this description that seemed to be the line on which it would take place. Before entering on such an undertaking we had first of all to be prepared at all points. As, however, we got fuller information we recognized that our forecast had been incorrect."*

On the 30th August the 12th Division still continued reconnoitring for a crossing, and the sappers of that division and the 2nd were busily engaged in making all necessary preparations. The main force of the 2nd Division also remained

* This remark was made to furnish an explanation of why there seemed some hesitation in pressing on at this critical moment.—IAN H.

at Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) and did nothing but a little reconnoitring. The active part of the day's proceedings was to be an attack by the Guard Division, supported by Matsunaga's brigade, on the enemy north of Meng-chia-fang. Putting together what I had heard with what seemed probable I divined that this would be the case and I obtained permission to ride from the Headquarters at Lang-tzu-shan (E, F 8) *via* Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) and Ssu-fang-tai (D 7) to get as near Meng-chia-fang and the Russian position as I safely could. I was accompanied by one Japanese officer and was fortunate in reaching a height about two miles south-east of Meng-chia-fang whence I saw the attack of the 3rd Guard Infantry as described by Colonel Hume. About one mile to the east was another equally high mountain marked in the map "5" (D 6). On this I counted nine individuals in waterproofs, for it was raining, and with my glasses I made them out to be the foreign military attachés with the Guard Division. As I must have therefore seen very much the same as Colonel Hume I will leave all detail to him, only saying that I saw the firing line of the 3rd Guards very clearly indeed at 3 p.m. about two miles to the north. It lay along a round cultivated ridge about one-third of the way up to the Russian trenches, which looked most solid and uncompromising. The distance separating the adversaries could not have been much more than three hundred yards. The firing line itself was thick and was shooting for all it was worth, but I noticed some supports came up over the exposed ground in rear to reinforce, and they crossed it in extremely open order. In fact they ran across more as individuals than as a formed body. If there had not been so many of them I should have thought they were ammunition carriers.

It will be seen from Colonel Hume's report that this gallant attack of the 3rd Guards failed through not being supported by the rest of the Guard Division or by Matsunaga's brigade which had been specially told off to do so. A staff officer, speaking of this failure, which, considering some of the unfortunate results, might almost be termed disastrous, said "Matsunaga's brigade " was ordered to co-operate with the Guard, but here a hitch, or " misunderstanding of instructions, took place, and by mistake " Matsunaga's brigade did not move. Small mistakes may have " big results!"

The results of the hesitation were deplorable. The 3rd Guards and 29th Regiment, whom I had watched attacking the Russians north of Hsui-chia-ho (D 6) fought a most gallant action and effected a lodgment in the main Russian position, taking several lines of trenches. But the moment came when their impetus was exhausted, and the highest point of the ridge on their right, from which the position they had captured was commanded, still remained in the enemy's possession. Only one more attack, not nearly so serious as those successfully carried through, was required to make definitely good the

Japanese grasp of this section of the Russian line. Had the men of the 3rd Guards and 29th Regiment been capable of it, or had they received the support of fresh troops, the general position of the Russians from Meng-chia-fang to Cha-lu-tzu (D 6) would have been captured and could have been held against any counter-attack by comparatively few troops. The bulk of the Guard Division could then have crossed the Tai-tzu Ho at once accompanied by Matsunaga's brigade, and it is obvious that this might have, nay, certainly would have modified the results of the subsequent Liao-yang fighting very much to the advantage of the Japanese.

As it was, General Kuroki's Army, or a part of it, suffered its first repulse of the war at Hsui-chia-ho which, apart from the great tactical consequences, caused a feeling of mortification to the Japanese and doubtless a corresponding elation to the Russians. Next morning the enemy had re-occupied all the positions from which the 3rd Guards and 29th Regiment had been withdrawn under cover of darkness, and from this strong line of entrenchments on a salient sweep of mountains were able to threaten to cut the First Army in two, did it venture to reduce very seriously the force which had failed in its attack. Thus it was that the whole of the Guard Division, the 29th Regiment, and Matsunaga's brigade remained watching the Russians north of Hsui-chia-ho and Meng-chia-fang, and were lost to the vital turning movement across the Tai-tzu Ho. Much of the foregoing came to my knowledge later. When I left the battlefield at 4 p.m. I had every hope that the 3rd Guards and 29th Regiment would get reinforcements and make good their attack. I reached Lang-tzu-shan (E F 8) at 9.40 p.m., after thirteen hours in the saddle. It was pitch dark and raining hard, but the Chinaman had barricaded his doors with carts and refused to give me admittance, saying the Head-Quarters and baggage had gone to An-ping at 3 p.m. and that my servant had accompanied them.

Next morning I rode to An-ping, some twelve miles, and found that Head-Quarters had left for Hei-yü (F 5) where I caught them up. I now learnt that the plan under which the First Army was to concentrate at Huang-ku-fen (F 4) on the north bank of the river by the 2nd September had been abandoned. It was reckoned that the Fourth Army would have advanced sufficiently by that time to be able to relieve the Guard Division and enable it to close in and cross the Tai-tzu Ho with the rest of its own Army. Had this scheme worked out smoothly, then with his Army complete and with the co-operation of the Umezawa Brigade from Pen-hsi-hu, General Kuroki would have led 50,000 veteran and victorious troops in a simultaneous and concentrated attack on the Russian line of communications with every hope of success. It will be observed that all this elaborate scheme of operations was based on the assumption that Kuropatkin was going to stake

31st Aug.

everything on fighting a great battle at Liao-yang. All the movements were to be carried out in a deliberate and systematic fashion, and I have no doubt every detail was worked out down to the last grain of rice.

Now, however, suddenly the enemy set the tune, partly by their check to the Guard, which immobilized that body of troops ; partly by showing signs which the Japanese interpreted as betokening a hurried retirement. Thus, when I caught up the commander of the First Army at Hei-yü (F 5), I found that on the 30th, whilst I was seeing the fight of the Guards, the Head-Quarters had hurriedly recast the whole of their well-considered plan of operations and had substituted another regarding which I think it possible that the verdict of history may not be altogether favourable. Briefly, the latest arrangement was that General Kuroki should at once cross the broad and rapid Tai-tzu Ho with only half his army and without the co-operation of the Umezawa Brigade from Pen-hsi-hu. Then with 20,000 men he would endeavour to carry out the same operation for which in his original scheme he had allotted 50,000. Some remarks on this subject by a staff officer are interesting, especially as there seems to underlie them an intention to anticipate adverse criticism. He said, "It was on the 30th August that the event took place which prevented us from making our pre-arranged attack on Liao-yang. That is to say, the attack could not be carried into effect on the lines we had carefully thought out and we simply had to push off into pursuit from whatever positions we were occupying at the moment. I do not know what Kuropatkin may have reported in this connection, but it is a fact that on the 30th the enemy began to retire. From the positions held by the 2nd and 12th Divisions we could see the enemy on the south bank of the Tai-tzu Ho falling back on Liao-yang, whilst two or three of his divisions were crossing the river and moving northwards. From the position held by the Guard we could see also that the enemy from Kao-li-tsun (D 5) was also retiring on Liao-yang. Finally, from information received from Marshal the Marquis Oyama, the enemy seemed to be falling back even from Liao-yang itself. If this evidence was not already quite conclusive that Kuropatkin was in full retreat, I might adduce the further fact that from hill 186 (F 5) we could see the railway north of Liao-yang, along which trains were passing in the direction of Mukden every five or six minutes. Therefore, whatever the Russians may now say, we actually, with our own eyes, did see them, on the 30th August, retreating as fast as they could. The question we now had to solve was, what course under such circumstances should be pursued by the commander of the First Army? It seemed clear that we must abandon the plan of attack we had so carefully prepared, and that, however hazardous and difficult such a movement might be, we should

" instantly despatch such a force as we could lay our hands upon across the Tai-tzu Ho. The Second and Fourth Armies were also compelled to depart from their well-thought-out schemes and simply pursue the Russians as best they could. It was under these conditions that General Kuroki ordered the 12th Division and half of the 2nd Division to cross the Tai-tzu Ho at Lien-tao-wan (F 5). The only possible excuse for so small a force putting a swift and deep river between them and their friends was that the enemy was retreating. Kuropatkin determined to retreat and began his preparations for that purpose on the evening of the 29th August. If it were true, as Kuropatkin has reported, that his army began to retreat only on the 3rd September, then he could not possibly have carried it out in so masterly a manner unless he had first defeated the Japanese Armies."*

I have put the foregoing between inverted commas to make it clear that the views expressed are those of the General Staff. The wording is my own. It is only the general sense which I have endeavoured to convey. In accordance with this change of plan, which was determined on the 30th, the 12th Division were ordered to cross the Tai-tzu Ho at Lien-tao-wan (F 5) that same night, and were then to move northwards along its right bank, and take up a position to cover the crossing of Okasaki's brigade, all that was available of the 2nd Division, which was to follow them. The Head-Quarters Staff smiled when they heard of my miserable night in the rain, and evidently thought that my mere physical mishaps were enjoyment compared to the acute mental strain to which they had been subjected during the same period. The Russians were in force opposite Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) and Shih-chu-tzu (E 5), and yet during the night of the 30th the Japanese troops left to keep them in check consisted only of two companies at Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5), and two more holding the ground to the north of that village. The whole of the rest of the 12th Division was committed to the crossing of the river, and the 2nd Division had also concentrated by 10 p.m. at Ku-sao-cheng (F 5) for the purpose of following the 12th to the Lien-tao-wan ford by the way of Hei-yü. The line of communications of the 12th Division lay through Han-po Ling (F 6) Chin-chia-pu-tzu (F 6) An-ping, Ku-sao-cheng (F 5) and Hei-yü; the line of communication of Okasaki's brigade of the 2nd Division ran by Tang-ho-yen (E 7), San-chia-sai (E 6), An-ping and Ku-sao-cheng (F 5). In the small hours of the 31st competent observers have spoken to me of the masses of transport encumbering the road from An-ping onwards. Yet only four companies were

* As this is a very much discussed subject, I thought I would settle it once for all, as far as the Japanese are concerned. Accordingly I asked the Chief of the Staff of the Army of Manchuria, General Kodama, and he replied to my question: " Kuropatkin determined to retire on the night of the 31st."—IAN H.

covering this vulnerable and practically defenceless crowd from a powerful Russian force, numbering certainly more than a division, within easy striking distance of it. If one good Russian battalion had got through those companies in the night, or had marched round their left into the valley of the Tang Ho and struck boldly at An-ping, there was nothing to stop them but transport, and the results are not comfortable to think about even now.

It must be remembered also that the Russians had by no means been beaten so badly as to have necessarily lost the power of initiative. On the contrary, they had repulsed the Guard north of Hsui-chia-ho (D 6), and, although it had been intended that the 2nd Division should have occupied the high ground immediately south and south-west of Shih-chu-tzu (E 5), as a matter of fact the Russians' positions there looked too formidable, and it was never done. In war, however, all is well that ends well, and not only was the 12th Division entirely unmolested during its withdrawal and march to Lien-tao-wan, but it also got across the Tai-tzu Ho before daybreak without a shot fired, and advanced as soon as it was light to cover the crossing of the 2nd Division without encountering any opposition worth mention.

I think all the British attachés with the First Army had been willing to give the Cossacks the benefit of the doubt until this unopposed crossing and advance. There were excuses of country, hostile inhabitants, &c. to be made for their want of success up to date. This last failure, however, was only explicable on the assumption of inefficiency. Captain Jardine's report brings out the fact that no particular secrecy was observed during the night march, and whether the Russian mounted troops failed to notice the crossing, or whether, discovering it, they failed to oppose it, the result in either case is not to their credit. It is not as if the mounted troops on the other bank of the river consisted of a few small scouting parties who might have chanced to be unfortunate in their commander. There was a considerable force of Cossacks in front of the 12th Division, and I do not think that any unprejudiced witness will deny that on this critical occasion at least they proved themselves unenterprising to a degree, and quite unworthy of their historical reputation.

Okasaki's brigade of the 2nd Division began to ford the river at 9 a.m. on the 31st, and completed the operation by 1 p.m. The field artillery had to wait until a bridge could be built, and it was left to the north-west of Tiao-shui-lou (F 4) where there was an excellent position from which it could assist the deployment of the Army on the north bank near Huang-ku-fen (F 4). Meanwhile another body of troops, which had hitherto lain outside the sphere of operations of the First Army, also received orders which were to bring it into touch with the remainder of the force. Major-General Umezawa commanded

a mixed brigade to the north of Chiao-tou (J 6), and was watching the Russians who had remained in Pen-hsi-hu after the withdrawal on the 27th of the main portion of their force towards Liao-yang. He was given orders to make an attack on the night of the 30th on the enemy at Pen-hsi-hu, and then to march westwards and join hands with the rest of the Army to the north of the Tai-tzu Ho. Accordingly Umezawa crossed the Tai-tzu Ho at 4 a.m. on the 31st near Wo-lung-tsun* and, attacking the enemy, drove them very easily out of Pen-hsi-hu and occupied it.

Besides the actual movements of troops on this eventful night of the 30th, there was special activity amongst the engineers, who were repairing the roads, and the sappers, who were working hard all through the hours of darkness with the pontoons of the 2nd and 12th Divisions to get a bridge made ready at Hou Kuan-tun (F 4) before daybreak on the 31st. By the afternoon of the 31st the half of the 2nd Division and the whole of the 12th Division had taken up a position near Huang-ku-fen (F 4). This was a good position, and better than would be imagined from the map. The Russians were occupying the Hei-ying-tai hills (*i.e.*, the mountain 131 (E 4)) and the tumulus-shaped hillock called by the Japanese soldiers Manjuyama (F 4), or Rice Cake Hill. The Russians were firing heavily from this position, but very wildly, much of their shrapnel bursting high, and most of it being directed wide of the mark. The bridge was finished by 8 p.m. on the evening of the 31st, and then the field artillery crossed over it. The general commanding had made up his mind to attack the Russians at Hei-ying-tai, and before nightfall on the 31st everything required for the artillery preparation was quite ready.

The position on the 31st was then as follows. The Russians were believed by the Japanese to be continuously retreating northwards. The Second and Fourth Armies were advancing, although not so easily or so rapidly as might have been wished. The Guard Division had gained some ground on its left in the vicinity of Meng-chia-fang (D 6), but on its right it was only looking at the position it had been unable to retain on the previous day. Matsunaga's brigade of the 2nd Division was still with the Guard at Wang-pao-tai (D 6), but the 29th Regiment had been sent an order to join the 2nd Division as soon as possible on the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. The Headquarters and Okasaki's brigade of the 2nd Division with the whole of the 12th Division had taken up a position near Huang-ku-fen (F 4). Immediately to their front the Russians were very busy entrenching themselves in the hills about Hei-ying-tai, and a big force of them could be seen from the high hills on the south bank of the river at Hsia-fu-tun (E 4)

* 7 miles N.E. of Pen-hsi-hu (J 3).

and Tsao-chin tzu (E 4). On the extreme right Umezawa's mixed brigade had captured Pen-hsi-hu.

1st Sept.

On the 1st September General Kuroki ordered Okasaki's brigade of the 2nd Division to march west and take Hsi Kuan-tun (E/F 4) and the mountain 131 (E 4), whilst the 12th Division was to prolong to the right of Okasaki and make a turning movement by the north-west. The Head-Quarters marched themselves, taking me with them, from Hei-yü to Ying Kuan-tun, a village not marked on the map, but a few hundred yards west of Hou Kuan-tun, where the pontoon bridge spanned the river. We crossed the bridge and turning west immediately climbed a steep rocky hill, the Chinese name for which is the Swallow's Nest.* This was 150 feet high, and gave a fine view of the prospective theatre of operations, although, if the Russians had possessed (as the Boers certainly would have under similar circumstances) a Long Tom on mountain 131, it would not have been as suitable a look-out station as it actually proved itself to be.

At our feet the Tai-tzu Ho ran due west for three miles, when it turned to the north and described a semicircle with an arc of about two miles until, bending regularly round, it flowed away along the base of mountain 131 in a southerly direction. Half a mile north of the northern point of this semicircle was Manju-yama, a flattened-out hillock, an offshoot of the mountain 131, which was about 350 feet high. The crest of 131 was about six miles due west of us, the river in its semicircular loop interposing twice between anyone wishing to go direct from one point to the other. Hsi Kuan-tun (E/F 4) was the village in the low ground just under the slight col which joined 131 to Manju-yama. Fifteen miles distant the railway could be seen coming out in a north-easterly direction, from behind 131, and then running northwards to Yen-tai station, which was clearly visible. Six miles to the north was Wu-hsien Shan (F 3), a peculiarly shaped five-headed hill perhaps 200 feet high, behind and to the north of which lay the Colliery Hills. The hills 131, Manju-yama, and Wu-hsien Shan (F 3) marked the limit of the mountainous country which lay to the east and south. To the west the whole country was flat and a mass of *kaoliang* eight to twelve feet high, a fact which gave a very special character to the fighting.

It is maintained by the Japanese that this *kaoliang* was better for the defence than for the attack. So it may be, theoretically, but in practice it gave, in my opinion, an immense advantage to the nimble, quick witted, self-sufficing, born soldier who marches under the banner of the Rising Sun, whereas it constantly exposed the slower Russians to unexpected, sudden emergencies and situations to which they were unqualified, either by natural instinct or acquired talent,

* Marked Chinese Fort (F/G 4) on Map 34.

to rise. One of Captain Vincent's sketches* will give a much better idea of the country in one glance of the eye than all this description, but every little helps, and it is important to be able to convey some notion of the theatre of these important operations.

At 6 a.m. on the 1st September the 2nd Division, represented by Okasaki's brigade, with the 12th Division on its right, was already committed to carrying out its orders to capture Hsi Kuan-tun (E/F 4) and mountain 131. It was fortunate perhaps that none of the onlookers at the Swallow's Nest knew the strength of the enemy who was thus confidently being attacked, or there might have been some hesitation which would have probably only aggravated the difficulties which had to be encountered. General Kuroki had not a man in reserve, but, as already stated, he had telegraphed the previous day for the 29th Regiment to come over the Tai-tzu Ho, and although this involved a march from the left to the right of the Army and a long detour to avoid mountains impassable by night, it was hoped it might get in during the afternoon. This good regiment surpassed expectation and actually struggled in before midday. At 6.30 a.m. twenty-four Japanese guns, entrenched on the low ridge running north and south, five hundred yards east of Huang-ku-fen (F 4), opened fire in support of their infantry. The artillery duel soon became hot, but never was there one more harmless to the principals. The Russian shells which burst in successive *rafales* were fuzed some three hundred yards too long, and throughout the day this continued uncorrected. The Japanese guns could not locate the Russian batteries and could not have ranged them even had they been able to do so. They accordingly very soon turned their attention to the Russian infantry and shelled Hei-ying-tai and Manju-yama. After a sharp burst of musketry, caused by the retirement of an advanced Russian battalion, the infantry action seemed to hang fire and grow slack, but the Russian guns fired faster and faster, always however mistaking the ridge on which the Japanese guns were entrenched, and doing no harm. At 9 a.m. General Kuroki received news from the Second and Fourth Armies telling him that the enemy had been retiring in front of the Fourth Army since the 31st, and that at dawn on the 1st September the Fourth Army had captured Hsin-li-tun (B/C 5). At the same time, according to this message, the Second Army had occupied the hill west of Hsin-li-tun with its right column, whilst its next division to the left, or west, had carried Shou-shan-pu, their loss being very great. It was clear then to General Kuroki that the Second and Fourth Armies had made a most important advance, and he concluded they must by now be in hot pursuit of the enemy. News also came to hand about midday that the Guard had captured the hill north of Meng-chia-fang (D 6) at 11 a.m.

* See Panoramas 3 and 5.

To the general commanding the First Army it seemed, therefore, that not a moment should be lost in pressing on as rapidly as possible to cut off the Russian retreat. After all, however, he was doing what he could. The whole of his available troops, viz., the 12th Division and half the 2nd Division, were advancing straight for the railway, but were at that moment exposed to such a heavy fire of artillery and musketry that they did not seem to be making much progress. At 1.50 p.m. a message arrived to say that a Russian brigade was moving down from the neighbourhood of Yen-tai coal mines (F 3) to attack to right flank of the 12th Division. From Captain Vincent's interview with an officer of the 15th Brigade, 2nd Division,* it is clear that there was a disposition to stand fast until this advance from the north could be dealt with, but the 15th Brigade was too far committed to the attack of Manju-yama to be able to hold off. Accordingly the 12th Brigade of the 12th Division faced north and formed for attack about Wu-hsien Shan to meet the Russian advance from the coal mines and Ta-yao (F 3), whilst the 23rd Brigade of the 12th Division continued to advance on Manju-yama and Hei-ying-tai in conjunction with the 15th Brigade.

It must now have become apparent to everyone that the actual situation did not closely correspond with the supposititious situation under which the pressing obligation of the First Army had been to cross the river hurriedly with what troops could be mustered in order to fling them across the path of a demoralized foe. On the mountain 131, and on Manju-yama and in the vicinity of Hei-ying-tai, were two Russian divisions. From the coal mines a brigade was advancing, hesitatingly it is true, but still advancing, against the right of the 12th Division. But when one and a half divisions advance to cut off two and a half divisions there is reason to fear that the process may be reversed. Face to face with this imminent danger General Kuroki did what he could to make himself stronger. He at once sent orders of recall to Matsunaga's brigade, which was still working in conjunction with the Guard on the south side of the river. He drew in the two companies which it will be remembered were left at Shih-chu-tzu (E 5), and Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5), when the 12th Division made its night march on the 30th. Finally, he sent an order to General Umezawa, who was then supposed to be attacking Pen-hsi-hu (J 3) and who had, as a matter of fact, captured it. This order was to the effect that a column of the enemy was coming up against the right flank of the 12th Division from the coal mines, and that he was to move north as soon as possible and surprise them. Umezawa, however, was a long way off, and the Russians, if they chose to come on, were within striking distance. So the afternoon wore on. The guns of the 2nd Division, who had advanced some five hundred yards to gun pits prepared beforehand, shelled

* See Captain Vincent's report submitted herewith.—IAN H. See page 395.

Manju yama, very heavy rifle fire from the 15th Brigade being also poured into it. No assault was delivered during the day, however, as the troops would have been exposed to a murderous cross-fire of artillery from three directions; so at least I have been assured by officers actually with the brigade.

Just at sunset, however, the musketry fire grew in intensity until it reached the highest pitch I have ever heard, and I cannot but think that some partial attempt to push in must have been made just as the light got too bad for long range artillery fire. The hillock was actually carried just as the moon rose at 10 p.m. There was no surprise, as has been said, but there were no very great number of Russians on it, and those who were there did not resist very stoutly and had not strong entrenchments. The enemy tried to re-take it till 2 a.m., and until that hour there was such heavy firing that I found it impossible to sleep and watched the sparkles of the rifles from the roof of my house. The Russian column from the coal mines had never come on with any determination. It opened fire at long range, first with two guns, then with a battery, and did some long range infantry skirmishing, but that was all. Umezawa, after taking Pen-hsi-hu, advanced northwards, driving the Russians towards Ping-tai-tzu (J 1) as a preliminary to carrying out his instructions and marching to surprise the enemy at the coal mines.

Concerning the tactical lessons of the day there is not very much to say. All the detail work of the Japanese was methodical and admirable as usual; also the steadiness, endurance, and confidence of their troops. The Russians gave me the strange impression of having been surprised by Kuroki's passage of the Tai-tzu Ho. Manju-yama was only hastily and perfunctorily entrenched, and the villages of Hsi Kuan-tun and Hei-ying-tai were not put into a state of defence. It seems almost incredible that the crossing of the river by the First Army should not have been foreseen and provided against, but I can only give my impression. The truth will have to be sought from Russian sources. The rôle played by the Cossacks in face of the crossing and advance of the 12th Division was so deplorable that it is quite conceivable to me that they may have lost time in conveying intelligence of this movement to head-quarters.

Another weak point in the Russian tactics, which is not easily comprehensible, unless it is admitted they were surprised, is the fact that Wu-hsien Shan (F 3) was so lightly held, so easily yielded, and so feebly counter-attacked when yielded. If there was any intention of turning the tables on Kuroki, and of enveloping him and cutting him off from his base, then Wu-hsien Shan was even more vital to the Russians than Manju-yama.

Finally in this tactical connection, nothing could be more depressing to any believer in cavalry or mounted infantry than to mark the absence on the part of the Russians of any idea

of using these arms under modern conditions. I consider that good opportunities were offered to cavalry, which did not disdain to fight dismounted, by the conditions of the fight of the 1st September. With my memories of South Africa still green, I could not refrain from constantly looking across to the low hills east of Wu-hsien Shan and Ta-yao, which were separated from us by a flat valley from two to three miles broad. I was instinctively waiting to hear the crackle of musketry, and to see some hundreds, perhaps thousands, of bold horsemen gallop across and have a try to capture General Kuroki and his staff on the Swallow's Nest,* and to burn the pontoon bridge at Hou Kuan-tun. It is true that the hills were piquetted from Sha-kan (F/G 5) northwards by three companies of infantry which had been dropped by the 12th Division for the purpose as it advanced. Also that the Japanese cavalry was somewhere a little east of Sha-kan. Still the hills were rideable in most places, and three companies were altogether too weak a force to hold them effectively. The Japanese cavalry was some way off, certainly quite out of sight. The enterprise was feasible. I could name several Boers and one or two Britishers who could have done it, and once arrived at the Swallow's Nest there was little to prevent them doing what they liked for a brief period. But the accomplishment of such a feat demands initiative, quickness, audacity on the part of the leader. For the men too is required a training which makes them fine dashing horsemen in the saddle, and good solid infantry the moment their feet touch the ground.

I will conclude the story of this eventful day by giving an extract from my diary, written about midnight when heavy firing was still going on at Manju-yama. On reading it now I can well recall both my over-confidence in the morning when the passage of the river had been so wonderfully successful and my reaction into too great a depression when it became clear how small were the numbers which were available, under the conditions of the Japanese strategy, to press this advantage. "Depressed by to-day's events which disclose a half-hearted, " dangerous plan of operations. If we fail to-night at Manju-yama we may be pushed into the river to-morrow, or driven " off our communications on Pen-hsi-hu. Seems to me Kuro-patkin can keep Oyama in play as long as he likes, first " with his fortifications, secondly with the Tai-tzu Ho, long " enough anyway to swallow us up completely. To do the big " thing the Japanese are aiming at here they need every man " of the First Army and at the very least a full division of " the Fourth Army."

2nd Sept.

I rose on the morning of the 2nd September before dawn and crossing the pontoon bridge at Hou Kuan tun got on to the top of the Swallow's Nest again before any of the Head-Quarters

* Marked Chinese Fort (F, G 4) on Map 34.

except a colonel had arrived. One of the first to put in an appearance was General Kuroki, who seemed in good spirits. He admitted he had not slept as long as the fusilade about Manju-yama lasted, but when it ceased, being confident that such cessation was equivalent to a Japanese success, he had a good sleep until morning. The 2nd Division artillery had advanced and was firing on hill 131, and sometimes endeavouring to find the Russian batteries, but, I think, without success. The *kaoliang* hid all infantry movements except on the hills where, on Manju-yama, I could see the Japanese and, on the northern slopes of 131, irregular swarms of Russians running from cover to cover to reinforce their comrades on the top. The Russian guns were firing principally at Manju-yama and Hsi Kuan-tun.

At this hour, *i.e.*, up to 8 a.m. or 9 a.m., all was quiet in the direction of Wu-hsien Shan. The muffled sounds of a distant cannonade came over mountain 151 (E 4) from the Liao-yang direction. News had come to hand from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters saying that the Japanese forces in the south were pressing the enemy hard and forcing them back to their last line of defence close to the city. The Second Army reported that it was its intention to push forward during the day to the south bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. As the Second Army seemed to be making such rapid progress General Kuroki felt it was incumbent upon him to emulate its achievements and conform to its advance with the least delay possible. The advance of the Fourth Army practically cleared the enemy from the front of the Guard Division and the general commanding felt he could now make its services available wherever he liked.

At 8 a.m. the Major-General commanding the Guard Division received the following order:—

"The First Army after taking mountain 131 intends to take up the line extending from San-tao-pa (D 3) on the north to Lo-ta-tai (D 4) on the south. Accordingly the Guard should now cross the river near Ku-cheng-tzu (E 5) and try to take mountain 151 (E 4 west)."

At 10 a.m. the commanders of the 2nd and 12th Divisions also received orders as follows:—

"(1) The main force of the enemy is retreating towards Mukden. The Umezawa Brigade is advancing on the coal mines and the Guards on 151. (2) The First Army is to pursue the enemy with its main force. (3) The 12th Division will pursue towards San-tao-pa. The 2nd Division after taking 131 will then advance towards Lo-ta-tai."

Now this was asking a great deal of the Army; for I could see that the progress through the *kaoliang* was not likely to be very rapid. Mountains 151 and 131 would need a good deal of taking, and it was clear at a glance that 151 reproduced all the difficulties of the Ya-lu crossing on a greatly accentuated scale, whilst the volume of fire both from guns and rifles poured on

a Japanese detachment which about 8 a.m. effected a lodgment on the northern skirts of 131 literally spoke volumes as to what awaited them if they desired to go up higher. If the Russians had been demoralized by the successes of the previous day all would have been possible, but there was no sign of any such thing. They have exhibited the same characteristics in all the battles in which the First Army has been engaged. Just at the stage when they ought to become demoralized, they begin for the first time to fight with energy. By that time it is too late for them to retrieve the day, as they have lost the key to the position, but in any case they resolutely refuse to permit themselves to be hustled. The detachment I could see clinging on to the skirts of 131 consisted of six companies sent out by the 2nd Division to take the hill after they had successfully occupied Hei-ying tai. The northern ridge of 131 ran up in a succession of three underfeatures or knolls. As far as the top of the second knoll the progress of these men was comparatively easy, but there they stuck fast, the Russians on the summit being in great force and full of fight. Eventually the Russian guns from the north and north-east of Hei-ying-tai got the exact range of the attackers and so pelted them with shrapnel that, about 4 p.m. they had to be withdrawn with heavy loss into the village. The Japanese guns were unable to assist their infantry as the Russian artillery was altogether too much for them. This was partly owing to the greater number of Russian guns and to their longer ranging power, but partly also to the fact that the Japanese had to husband their ammunition.

I think I mentioned in one of my previous reports how the officer on the General Staff who is in charge of communications said that in this battle every shot fired from a Japanese gun seemed to take a day off his life. The 2nd Division and the left brigade of the 12th Division were certainly having their fill of fighting, and the one bright spot of the situation in this part of the field was that the 3rd Brigade had returned from co-operating with the Guard and had joined the 15th at 9.30 a.m.

Whilst these hard knocks were being given and received all around about Manju-yama, 131 and Hei-ying-tai, the right brigade of the 12th Division was dealing most effectively with the enemy coming down from the north. I know every inch of the ground, and it is difficult to understand how the Russians, who were fighting so stoutly on 131 and about Manju-yama, could belong to the same army as those who made such a feeble resistance on the Colliery Hills. From the Japanese position on Wu-hsien Shan to the village of Ta-yao (F 3) is about half a mile, the ground all about the village being much cut up with nullahs and favourable to the development of an attack. North of Ta-yao come the Colliery Hills. These may be likened to a plateau or raised causeway about one hundred feet high, half a mile broad and two and a half miles

long, running due north and south. On this causeway and forming part of it are two or three groups of round, bare hills each rising about one hundred feet above the plateau. The causeway ends at the northern end by a single round hill which takes me ten minutes to climb every morning at present. The hills are steep, especially near their summits, which afford no cover, but along their flanks there are nullahs and a good deal of cover from fire.

On the 2nd September these hills stood up naked, all but a little grass, from a sea of *kaoliang* capable of affording cover to an elephant. The Russian force holding them was at least as strong as the Japanese at Wu-hsien Shan. I have already said I cannot quite understand how the Russians gave way so easily, and I must not enter into much detail or trench on Captain Jardine's province. Briefly however, I think the Russians must have avoided the *kaoliang* at the foot of the hills after their first unexpected *rencontre* and dispersion by the Japanese infantry between Wu-hsien Shan and Ta-yao, and must have concentrated on the high ground. Then the Japanese pushing forward under cover were able to outflank the defenders. Captain Jardine also tells me that the Japanese mountain battery made splendid practice. During the incident he describes the Cossacks with their standard appearing at one side of the plateau whilst the Japanese had just ascended on to the other, he told me also that the Cossacks had hardly shown themselves, when a shrapnel passed over the heads of the Japanese who were two hundred yards south and exploded amongst their adversaries. This sent some of the Cossacks to the right about. The next shell put all the men to flight and three officers only were left with the standard; then came a third shell and that cleared the plateau. The Japanese losses were comparatively slight and the Russians did not lose many men either. How Orlov's division suffered the losses it is reported to have suffered, unless his troops fell foul of one another in the *kaoliang*, is a mystery.

On the afternoon of the 2nd the position was as follows:-- The pressing danger from the north had been altogether averted by the 23rd Brigade's easy success at the Colliery Hills. The six companies of the 2nd Division who had endeavoured to capture hill 131 had been repulsed. Some fifty or sixty of the enemy's guns had appeared at Ta Ta-lien-kou (F 3) as well as forty guns at Hsia-fu-tun (E 4), a little west of Manju-yama. There were also eight of the enemy's guns just north of San-fang-kou.* Two or three Russian divisions were in position opposite the Japanese front, and behind them was a big force, whilst again, still further in the background, great columns could clearly be seen retreating towards the north. A staff officer remarked when speaking of this phase of the operations, "Being confronted by a force of this magnitude it was quite impossible

* About 1½ miles south-west of Hsia-fu-tun (E 4).

“ for us to continue our advance, however much we might have
“ wished to do so. He never felt more vexed or disappointed
“ than on that day. Having suffered so much for so many
“ days in succession, our men were almost exhausted especially
“ as, since the 1st September, they had had but little to eat.”
In another connection he said, speaking of the 2nd September,
“ It was as hard a day for our troops as it is possible to imagine,
“ spent as it was in working through *kaoliang* exposed to the
“ enemy’s terrible fire This was no doubt the
“ hardest day we ever had.”

Towards evening the Russian fire increased in intensity until it can only be described as terrific. The air seemed alive with shrapnel. This was a prelude to the grand climax of the battle, which was marked by the Russians definitely assuming the offensive. The subject is alluring, but it has been well treated by Captain Vincent, and I am desirous of keeping this report as much as I can upon broad general lines. Suffice it then to say that by mutual consent both sides concurred in making Manju-yama the key to the situation, and that from dusk till 3 a.m. on the 3rd September it was the scene of a series of desperate encounters. At one time the Russians were successful in the bloody conflict which swayed to and fro over this historic mound, but eventually they were forced to leave its corpse-strewn slopes in the hands of the Japanese. It is admitted on all hands that defeat or victory hung evenly balanced in the scale for many hours. To make this clear an officer of the General Staff may again be quoted. “ We
“ should never have repulsed the enemy had not the 3rd
“ Brigade arrived by then. If we had not had the help of the
“ 3rd Brigade, I think myself the fight might have had a
“ different ending.” As the commander of the 15th Brigade told Captain Vincent that the 3rd had not been engaged on that night, I asked a staff officer to be kind enough to explain to me the true state of the case. He said, “ The 3rd Brigade did not
“ fire a shot, but its arrival as a reserve to the divisional general
“ enabled him to send every man of the 15th into the firing line
“ instead of keeping some of them in hand under his own
“ orders.”

The reasons why Manju-yama, which is, after all, but an insignificant, turtle-backed hillock, acquired such importance, were, I think, partly justifiable, partly exaggerated. With Manju-yama in their possession the Russians could have brought up their guns on to the low ridge or col which connected it with 131 and thence have supported effectively a further advance of their infantry. There was no other equally suitable position, and even if they could not have distinguished the enemy’s troops in the *kaoliang* over most of the country, the Japanese guns could have been engaged with advantage, whilst here and there they might have been able to detect the presence of the other arms. For an infantry position the importance

of Manju-yama was greatly discounted by the *kaoliang*. At other times of the year the command, though less than one hundred feet, would have given a fine field of rifle fire over the flat plain which stretched east, west and north of it; but a field of fire ceases to possess much value when the objective cannot be seen. As far as taking aim at anything a few hundreds of yards distant, this was no more possible than if the theatre of operations were enveloped in thick mist. On the other hand, whoever occupied Manju-yama could be seen from almost everywhere.

It was this conspicuous visibility of Manju-yama which caused, I believe, the combatants to concentrate their efforts upon it. Companies launched out into the *kaoliang* converged upon Manju-yama like moths to a candle. It appears to me that with a knowledge of the ground, and steady troops piloted by capable officers, the true line of the Russian attack from the west should have been through the *kaoliang*, north of Manju-yama—perhaps a few hundred yards north of it. One of the 12th Brigade* regiments was absorbed into the maelstrom of the Manju-yama struggle. Between Wu-hsien Shan and Manju-yama, a distance of three miles, there were only three battalions. A blow struck against their extended line with a momentum equal to those showered upon Manju-yama must, it appears to me, inevitably have pierced it. In that case the position of the Japanese on Manju-yama, with 131 on one flank, and a Russian force (invisible in the *kaoliang*, and indistinguishable from their own men) marching on past the other flank, would have been impossible, and they must have fallen back.

There is one more point to be noticed before I pass on. Captain Vincent has referred to the incident of the commander of the 15th Brigade sounding the "Cease fire" on the night of the 2nd September to disentangle his men, or rather to enable himself to disentangle his ideas of where his men were. This is often quoted by the Japanese with the pride and satisfaction which the general showed when speaking of it to Captain Vincent. For instance, a staff officer, after narrating the circumstances, drew a moral. He said: "Such an example shows the advantage of peace training. That one sound on the bugle should stop every man's fire during a desperate conflict by night could only result from long and careful training in times of peace." As is well known, the Devons, Manchestersters, and Gordon Highlanders did precisely the same when I sounded the "Cease fire" during the last stage of the battle of Elandslaagte. This gives me courage to express a very strong opinion that it is utterly wrong and dangerous ever to blow a bugle during a battle. Next time the 15th Brigade meets those Russians in a night attack a Russian bugler may

* The left brigade, 12th Division.—IAN H.

blow the Japanese "Retire." What will these brave soldiers do then who have been so highly praised for their prompt obedience to a bugle call?

On the left the unfortunate Guard Division which was always getting very hard nuts to crack, could not make any progress against the mountain 151. I have already pointed out that the attack on that mountain reproduced the difficulties of the passage of the Ya-lu in an aggravated form. When it is remembered that the crossing of the Ya-lu took some ten days of anxious, painstaking preparation, including collection of bridging materials, reconnoitring for fords and digging gun pits, not only for the artillery of the First Army, but for the twenty powerful field howitzers which were lent to it, then I think it will be agreed that the Guard is not to blame for being unable, with its own unassisted resources, to capture hill 151 at only a few hours' notice. The only thing General Kuroki could do in face of this very natural failure was to bring the Guard over to his own side of the river as rapidly as possible. However, there still was an idea that it could carry hill 151 if it tried hard enough, for the order which was despatched to the division at 7 a.m. on the 3rd September emphasized the fact that it was to cross for the purpose of attacking 151, and that it was to lose no time about it either.

Unfortunately, the general commanding the First Army could get no news from the forces to the south of Liao-yang, as the telegraph communication was interrupted owing to the wire being cut. It was quite natural that the wire should be cut, and the only wonder is the Russians cannot arrange to have it cut oftener. But it will surprise British officers, accustomed to their own very perfect system of signalling whereby even small units can communicate with one another at great distances, to learn that Japanese Armies within twenty miles of one another were unable to work in concert because a telegraph line had been cut. This undoubtedly weak point is due to the Japanese having concentrated their attention so entirely on continental armies, which are no better off than themselves in this respect. But then continental organizations are not intended to work in uncivilized countries of vast extent like the armies of Great Britain, and this is the reason why, notwithstanding we have so much to learn from Japan, she has a little to learn from us also. However this may be, General Kuroki did the best he could, that is to say, he reposed confidence in the last news he had heard, and expected the Second Army to reach the Tai-tzu Ho on the 2nd September. It was this belief which had actuated him in pressing forward so keenly on the northern flank.

3rd Sept.

I was on the Swallow's Nest Hill by daylight on the 3rd September, and found that for once the gaiety of the Headquarters Staff had given way, not to gloom, but to evident anxiety. I did not speak a word, except to say good morning,

to either General Kuroki or the Chief of the Staff the whole day, but the remark of a certain junior officer will show how some of their thoughts were tending. He said: "The 2nd Division had a terrible time last night. If the Russians had been able to hold on to Manju-yama, the whole of the 2nd Division might have been ruined. I would like to see two more bridges built forthwith in case of accidents, and the whole of the Guard Division brought over here as quickly as possible."

There is very little to tell about this day's fighting. The firing was as heavy as ever, but the Russians did not seem in the least inclined to retire, and the Japanese were obviously too weak and too exhausted to go on. The Guard had made no serious attempt to carry hill 151. Personally, I do not think it was possible to take any positive step towards crossing a river of unknown depth and swiftness under the shadow of a steep mountain bristling with rifles and guns, until at least the Japanese artillery had shown that it was able to hold its own with the Russian batteries and to support its own infantry. The contrary proved to be the case, the Japanese guns being unable to cope with those of the Russians, and there was nothing for it, therefore, but to renounce all idea of breaking in the Russian flank defence in the direction of 151. Accordingly the Guard received another order, to the effect that it was to leave three batteries of artillery, with an escort, at Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) so as to occupy the attention of the enemy whilst the main force of the division came round to join Army-Head-Quarters in the neighbourhood of Hou Kuan-tun (F 4). This order was dated 8 p.m. on the 3rd September.

On the same date the Umezawa Mixed Brigade, the composition of which was given at the beginning of this report, fought a successful action against a Russian regiment with a battery and some Cossacks to the north of Ping-tai-tzu (J 1). It will be remembered that on the 30th this force received orders to attack Pen-hsi-hu, and then to march across westwards and join hands with their comrades to the north of the Tai-tzu Ho. Umezawa captured Pen-hsi-hu at daybreak on the 31st August. On the 1st September he was told more specifically to move north, and endeavour to surprise the enemy about the Colliery Hills. On the 2nd he accordingly moved north-west of Pen-hsi-hu, driving some of the enemy's outposts before him. He was then on the point of marching to the Colliery Hills, when a new enemy appeared to the north of Ping-tai-tzu, causing him to retrace his steps and attack them, with the result already stated. Having carried this little engagement to a successful conclusion, Umezawa left two battalions and two guns to contain the defeated Russians and to make head against any reinforcements they might obtain, and moved westwards to carry out his orders.

It was not until 11 p.m. on this day, the 3rd September, that General Kuroki got news of how things were going to the south of Liao-yang. He then learnt for the first time that the Second and Fourth Armies had not been able to take all the defences on the south side of the city until 5 p.m. that day. Then, for the first time, it was realized that the whole of the plans and attacks of the First Army had been based on a misconception of the true state of affairs.

Thus ended another exciting day ; a day of plenty of fighting, but no progress except what was made by the far-away Umezawa detachment on the right flank. A staff officer said, speaking of the situation on the evening of the 3rd September : " It was " still our expectation that we would be able to make a more " successful attack upon the enemy's rear on the 4th September, " as we hoped then to be reinforced by the Guard. We were " filled with sadness at seeing the enemy escape away under " our very eyes, and we keenly felt that if we had only had the " whole of our own First Army with us we might have been " able to render a better account of the enemy."

4th Sept. On the morning of the 4th September, the scene of action was obscured by a heavy mist, and west of Manju-yama the smoke of the great fire burning in Liao-yang mingled with it, reproducing a very fair imitation of a London fog which hung over the front of the Russian line of battle. This was a piece of bad luck for the Japanese, as it rendered it most difficult for them to gauge the situation, or to ascertain whether the enemy were standing fast or retreating. Between 10 a.m. and midday news came in from the south of Liao-yang to the following effect : The 5th Division had carried the position in front of them at midnight and the Second Army was also attacking the enemy to their front and meant to force them back during the night. The 2nd Guard Infantry Brigade joined Head-Quarters about midday. At 1.30 p.m. the Commander of the First Army heard from the general officer commanding the 2nd Division that the enemy had fallen back from hill 131 and that he had taken possession of it. The Russian fire had also markedly diminished in intensity, although there were still eight of their guns at Hsia-fu-tun (E 4) which caused some trouble. However, the evacuation of 131 could only be interpreted as an unqualified intention of immediate retreat on the part of the Russians and accordingly the following orders were issued " to ensure a rapid pursuit " :—

" The First Army will now pursue. The 2nd Division will advance to Lo-ta-tai (D 4). The 12th will get into touch with the right of the 2nd Division, and will march to San-tao-pa (D 3), leaving a portion of their force to occupy the Coal Mines and to keep a look-out for the enemy to the north of them. The 2nd Guard

Brigade and the 29th Regiment will take up a position at Hei-ying-tai (F 4) and hold fast there as a general reserve. The Commander of the Army will also go to Hei-ying-tai (F 4)."

These orders were issued at 2 p.m., and the general officer commanding the Guard Division (who was marching round to join Head-Quarters and had by this time reached a point a little to the north of An-ping (F 6) got copies as well as a memorandum informing him of the intentions of General Kuroki. At 5.10 p.m. intelligence was received that the Second and Fourth Armies had occupied all the enemy's positions south of Liao-yang. News also came in from the officer commanding the Guard Cavalry that the enemy who had been in occupation of hill 151 had all retired. The Guard Cavalry had accordingly occupied the valley between 131 and 151.

Now that all the high ground had fallen into the hands of the Japanese, there was no necessity to bring the Guard Division up to Army Head-Quarters. It was accordingly halted near An-ping, and ordered to march on to the line Liu-chia-fang (E 4)-Tsao-chin-tzu (E 4) before 8 o'clock next morning.

On the evening of this day, the 4th September, General Umezawa reached San-chia-tzu (F/G 2), whilst the Russians still remained in possession of Temple Hill (F 2). Their strength was one brigade with sixteen guns, so there was rear guard fighting from 3 p.m. onwards into the middle of the night. The losses were trifling on either side. With regard to the action taken on their orders by the 2nd and 12th Divisions, a staff officer said, "The 2nd and 12th Divisions received their orders at about 2.30 p.m., and began to act upon them at once, but owing to all sorts of difficulties, could not advance as quickly as had been hoped. It was 10 p.m. before the 12th Division actually began to move forward. The 2nd Division began to move at 6 p.m., but what with darkness and the thick *kaoliang* it was impossible to tell the true direction of the enemy, and the advance had to be suspended. We learnt on this occasion that it is impossible to march against a moving objective in the dark and through *kaoliang*. To attack a shifting body of troops such as retreating Russians, where there are no mountains to give the direction, is altogether too difficult in high crops and at night."

The 2nd Division had passed through a terrible time during the night of the 2nd, and on the 3rd it had been subjected to a heavy fire, but not to heavy fighting or losses. The 3rd Brigade must have been fairly fresh on the morning of the 4th. The 12th Division, especially the 23rd Brigade, had done very little on the 3rd and had had a quiet night. At 2.30 p.m. these two divisions got orders intended to ensure "a rapid pursuit." They were to march respectively to Lo-ta-tai and San-tao-pa. That

is to say the 2nd Division was to march five or six miles and the 12th Division nine or ten miles. The direction was due west, and if the orders were carried out the Japanese must cut right into the Russian line of retreat, which ran north. It was perfectly obvious that if the two divisions succeeded in occupying Lo-ta-tai and San-tao-pa, any Russian troops remaining south of those points would be cut off, and probably captured or destroyed. There was nothing equivocal about the order and from the elevations of Manju-yama and Wu-hsien Shan the two divisions could see exactly what they had to do.

Why, then, did they not do it? This is the sort of question which a practical soldier finds it easier to answer than an armchair strategist. My reading of it is this. The Japanese had fought like heroes for nine or ten days and had never faltered or grudged their lives when asked to drive back the enemy. If the enemy was to stand and fight, they would attack them again with equal impetuosity. But he was going. Then, in God's name, let him go! No troops in the world could have surpassed the fighting of the Japanese between the 25th August and the 4th September, and no troops in the world, I believe, who had been through what they had, but would have hesitated to come to close quarters with those retiring Russians. Not to win a victory, for that was won, but merely to pile up still more corpses all along the Mukden highway. For it must be remembered the Russians were by no means demoralized. On the contrary they were very fierce and full of fight and they looked most formidable. There was no disorder. Every mile or two they halted and reformed their troops and retired in echelon from one point of vantage to another, a method to which the country lent itself very well.

* * * * *

At 6 p.m. the 2nd Division began to move on Lo-ta-tai, but what with darkness and the *kaoliang*, and one thing or another, it very soon halted and slept where it was till morning, when it moved on, and quickly coming in contact with the Russian rear guard inflicted some damage upon it with its artillery. The 12th Division began to move forward with its right wing at 10 p.m. and first took the village of Hsiao Ta-lien-kou (F 3), very easily. Then, finding it impossible to do anything in the *kaoliang* it turned north and got on to the raised embankment of the railway opposite Ta Ta-lien-kou (F 3). This railway line would have led it to a point three miles north of San-tao-pa, the village to which it had been ordered, but the difference was in the right direction, seeing it had started six or seven hours later than was intended. It was not destined to go far, however, and for a full account of the confused fighting, firing and bayonet charges, which arrested all thoughts of pursuit until daylight, I beg to refer to Captain Jardine's account. He was

not the only witness now of the doings of the 12th, as he had been joined by another military attaché, but these two officers were the only foreigners present on this occasion.

I add one small detail, of no military value but interesting withal, as told me by Captain Jardine. When one side charged the others always charged to meet them. The effect was curious. In the midst of the loud rattle of musketry, drums and bugles would sound the charge. The firing would absolutely cease and then the other side could also be heard cheering wildly. The Russians use the "Hoorah!" The Japanese "Wa-a-a!" The two sounds are so similar that the Russian prisoners have said that they thought the Japanese cheer was "Hoorah." Captain Jardine said that the effect of these cheers mingling with the bugles and drums was most strange, sounding like a prolonged wail.

By daybreak on the 5th September the Russians had withdrawn, and as the Japanese had no cavalry there was not much prospect of their being again able to close with the enemy. In any case there was no serious attempt made to do so except by the mountain artillery which was fresh after a comfortable night in Ta-yao village and pushed along at a great pace. It was, however, too late and the Russians had fairly got away during the night. I agree with Captain Jardine in his views on this engagement. I believe myself, not from anything I have heard but from my own ideas, that the commander of the 12th Division did not wish to expose his men to the fire of the superior Russian artillery by attacking during the day. He probably considered that by postponing the hour of his advance and taking a more northerly direction than that laid down in his orders, it would come to very much the same thing in the end. By a coincidence the same thoughts seem to have passed through the mind of the general officer commanding the 2nd Division, which was fortunate, as either acting alone might have found themselves isolated. In war, however, time often counts for half the battle, and in this case it was everything. 5th Sept.

On the afternoon of the 4th September, some part of the fruits of victory, above and beyond the occupation of an important town hitherto denied to them, was still within reach of the Japanese army. I admit these fruits were not to be plucked without further desperate fighting and exhausting efforts. Still, they were there, obviously there, and equally obviously becoming less and less tangible with every hour that passed. A prompt advance by the 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade, and one more hard fight, might have resulted in the cutting off of a part of the Russian rear guard. At 10 p.m. the propitious moment had passed and it was already too late.

On the afternoon of the 4th September, I think that British mounted troops, trained as they were by many painful experiences in South Africa, might have managed to work through the Russian flank guards and have done something to annoy the retreat and perhaps bring some of the retiring infantry to bay until the infantry could come up with them. At any rate, they would have tried. I admit even this would not have been an easy task in view of the great numerical superiority of the Cossacks, but the Russians were concentrated on roads and in villages, and I think something might have come of it had it been attempted.

On the 5th September the Umezawa Brigade advanced and took up the line San-kuai-shih Shan (F 2)-Tu-men-tzu Shan (F 2), when they were engaged by a regiment of infantry, a regiment of lancers, and two batteries. The fighting went on for some hours without much loss or any results to either side.

So ended the battle of Liao-yang.

In the meantime the Fourth Army had occupied Fen-shang (D 4). None of the Second Army crossed the river except two battalions which passed over the railway bridge. The reason the Second and Fourth Armies were so long in crossing was that they had trusted to being able to ford the river which floods had rendered unfordable, and their pontoons were not ready. It must be allowed that this river, spanned by several temporary, and easily destructible, bridges gave an important advantage to Kuropatkin in conducting his retreat. The open nature of the country and the fact that several very tolerable tracks ran northwards parallel to the main road and the railway were also great factors in his favour. Nevertheless, it was to the steadiness of his infantry that he was chiefly beholden for the successful extrication of his army.

Accurate statements regarding the strength of the Russian forces at Liao-yang will doubtless be forthcoming from the British military attachés who accompanied that force. Still it may be interesting if I give the Japanese estimates.* On the 24th and 25th August there were three divisions of Russians opposed to the First Army. On the 26th, however, the troops in front of the Guard Division kept increasing as they drew reinforcements from Shou-shan-pu as well as from An-ping. Thus by the 27th the Russians had increased to a strength of 65 battalions and 120 guns. The Russian force consisted of the 2nd Army Corps of Sharpshooters, the 10th Army Corps of the line, as well as one-half of the 17th Army Corps of the line. From the 27th onwards, they began to give back a little in front of the main force of the First Army, and in that part

* The estimate referred to treats of the grand totals, and not only of the First Army and its opponents.—IAS H.

of the field their forces were decreased to a strength of two divisions. There were still two divisions in front of the Guard. After the crossing of the Tai-tzu Ho the enemy the First Army encountered was drawn from the 3rd, 9th, 35th and 54th Divisions of the line and the 2nd and 12th Regiments of Sharpshooters and Moscow picked men; that is to say, a grand total in strength of three and a half divisions, most of the divisions named being considerably below strength. Behind these troops were at least three more divisions, according to the Japanese account, and if this is correct, there is small wonder that the First Army could not do much after the 1st September.

Some time after receiving the foregoing information I asked what the relative strengths of the Russians and Japanese were. I was told, "We have been studying this matter ever since the fight and the conclusion we have come to is that the Russians were somewhat, but not much, in superior strength to ourselves."*

From the 24th August to the 5th September the casualties of the First Army amounted to 6,500 officers and men.† During that period the same army buried 2,400 of the enemy, from which it seems reasonable to suppose that his casualties cannot have fallen far short of 10,000.

The damage done by shell fire was comparatively small, first, because guns could not be used freely or effectively in the steep mountains; secondly, because after the 1st September, the Russians were so much superior in artillery that the Japanese avoided the duel altogether. Not only were the Russians superior in number and power of guns, but the Japanese of the First Army were forced by their long and difficult line of communications to husband their ammunition most carefully.

* * * * *

All the Japanese are agreed that the Russians at Liao-yang worked their guns in an entirely new way. Their batteries were always concealed and so well concealed that the Japanese artillery often failed to locate them and had no scope for their high-explosive shells. This change of system was due to Kuropatkin's orders, copies of which were found at Liao-yang, impressing on the artillery the necessity for carefully watching the Japanese, and copying their tactics and methods. A Japanese staff officer said to me on this subject, "I think this indirect fire chiefly benefits the attacking force. The defenders usually have to fire on an advancing target and for that purpose indirect fire is not much use. I think indirect fire is only good against a stationary object, so gunners on the defensive must always use direct fire. Attacking gunners should always use indirect fire, the defensive artillery always direct, but I would like to know your opinion." I said, "I think it

* See here Maps 26 and 28.

† For losses of Second and Fourth Armies, see page 268.

“ rather dangerous to generalize too much and I do not like to
“ speak offhand. As you give me the opportunity, I would,
“ however, like to say that, whereas the Japanese are lavish
“ with the lives of their brave infantry, and think but little of
“ a battalion losing two hundred or three hundred men, yet,
“ when it comes to artillery, they wrap them up in cotton wool
“ often to the extent of not giving the infantry the full support
“ they are entitled to expect.”*

* * * * *

* I can only speak, of course, of the First Army.—IAN H.

(27) The Battle of Liao-yang.—First Japanese Army. Operations of the Guard Division from the 23rd August to the 5th September 1904.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.

Plates.

General map - - - - - Map 34.
The attack on the Russian right flank at Ta Hsi-kou „ 35.

1. After the battle of the 31st July the First Army was unable to take full advantage of its victory, as, constituting only the right wing of the combined forces, it had to wait for the centre and left (the Fourth and Second Armies) to come up into line. Marshal Oyama did not consider himself to be quite strong enough to advance and fight what he hoped would be a decisive battle at Liao-yang without further reinforcements of infantry and artillery, and these could not arrive before the middle of August. The First Army therefore remained on the line it had taken up after defeating the Russians at Yang-tzu Ling (G 9), and threw up strong entrenchments along its front. Since the battle of the Ya-lu, whenever there has been a halt of any duration the First Army has always strongly entrenched its position, a measure of safety not only against attack, but also in the event of a retirement becoming necessary.

2. In August the general line occupied by the Japanese Armies was as follows* :—

First Army.—A line extending from Chiao-tou (J 6) on the right, through Yu-shu-lin-tzu (J 5), to Tien-shui-tien (G/H 8) and Ta-wan (G 9) on the left.

Fourth Army.—Hsi-mu-cheng,† with detachments to the north and north-east.

Second Army.—Main force in and about Hai-cheng (A 8).

3. Opposite the First Army, the main force of the Russians occupied the long ridge running from the Hung-sha Ling (F 5)

* See Map 34.

† About 30 miles south of letter B, at bottom margin of Map 34.

on the left *viâ* the Han-po Ling (F 6), the Kung-chang Ling (F 7), and Ta tien-tzu (E 7/8), to Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8) on the right. The left flank of this force rested on the Tai-tzu Ho, but further east, at Pen-hsi-hu, there was a strong detachment of the three arms; while beyond the right flank there was a detachment of cavalry and infantry at Ta-lien-kou (D 9).

Opposite the Second and Fourth Armies the enemy's forces were disposed as follows:—Their main force was at An-shan-tien (A 8), and had taken up a position across the railway along the ridge Teng-yao-pu (5 miles west of An-shan-tien)—An-shan-tien—Hou-chia-tien (A 8): there were also about 30,000 Russians near Sha-ho (B 6) and Pan-chia-lu (B 6). Their outpost line was on the ridge through Ssu-fang-tai (A 7).

4. The position and distribution of the First Army was as follows:—

- (1) The Umezawa Brigade, with one field battery, was at and about Chiao-tou (J 6).
- (2) 12th Division—Main force at Yu-shu-lin-tzu (J 6).
- (3) 2nd Division—About Tien-shui-tien (G 8).
- (4) Guard Division—About Ta-wan (G 9).

5. The Guard Division was therefore on the main road which runs from Feng-huang-cheng *viâ* the Mo-tien Ling (J 9) to Liao-yang. This road is known as the Mandarin Road, and it crosses the Yang-tzu Ling (G 9) a couple of miles west of Ta-wan. During the halt following the battle of the 31st July the Guard held this pass, and had strongly entrenched the line of hills on both sides of it, adding to infantry trenches, positions for artillery and roads to move it on.

6. About the middle of August everything was ready for a general advance. The reinforcements had reached Hai-cheng (A 8), and as there had been no rain to speak of for over a month, the difficult lines of communication of the First Army were in good working order, and supplies, &c. were coming up all right. Marshal Oyama therefore ordered the Armies to advance, and time the attacks thus: First Army to advance on the enemy's position about Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) on the 17th August; the Fourth and Second Armies to advance to the attack of An-shan-tien (A 8) on the 20th.

7. But this was not to be, as heavy rain fell, making the roads in front impassable and turning the mountain streams in rear into torrents, which washed away the many bridges on the lines of communication. The rain began in earnest on the 14th, and went on for five days, heavily at times, as, for instance, on the 16th, when an exceptionally heavy shower fell. This shower only lasted ten minutes, but immediately afterwards the small stream in the Ta-wan (G 9) valley, already swollen, suddenly rose three or four feet, and came down in a torrent for half an

hour, washing away the temporary bridges and flooding the divisional head-quarters, kitchens and stables. The advance was therefore postponed for six days, and began, for the First Army on the 23rd, and for the Second and Fourth Armies on the 26th.

8. The difficulties of the country were such that the only decent road along which field artillery could move was the Mandarin Road, and, partly on this account, partly on account of the task assigned to the division, three batteries of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (2nd Division) were attached to the Guard, which already possessed seven batteries, its own six and the Hijikata Battery, which was armed with six captured Russian field guns. As a considerable force of Russian cavalry was also reported on the extreme Russian right, and as the left flank of the Guard was *en l'air*, two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment were also attached to it. Not only had the cavalry with the Guard to watch the left flank of the Army, but it had also to feel for, and gain touch with, the right of the Fourth Army during the advance through the mountains.

9. The task assigned to the Guard was to contain the enemy about Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) while the 2nd and part of the 12th Divisions broke his centre in a night attack on the 25th/26th August. The paragraph in Army Orders specially referring to the Guard Division was:—"No. 6. The Guard Division will "attack the enemy on the Liao-yang road and at Ta-tien-tzu "from the early morning of the 26th." There is no mention in this order of its being only a containing action, but I presume that was explained to the general officer commanding the Guard personally.

10. The general officer commanding the Guard Division had learned from his scouts that there were small parties of hostile cavalry and infantry near Hou-chang-tzu (F 8) and Hsia-ma-tun (E 8), and on the precipitous ground S.W. of Erh-tao-kou (F 8), and, further, that at Lang-tzu Shan (E/F 8) and Tung-hsin-pu (E 8) there were large detached posts. This he concluded was the Russian outpost line, but further attempts at reconnaissance were frustrated by the vigilance of the enemy. He therefore determined to take possession of the heights north of Hou-lang-kou (F 8) and west of Pien-yao-wan (E 9), and, having driven in the enemy's outposts and occupied the hills north of Erh-tao-kou (F 8) and Ta-hou (E 8), to prepare positions for his artillery and then commence his attack. His task was a difficult one. The enemy's right was at Ta Hsi-kou (D 8), and the ground opposite the division precluded the idea of a frontal attack. The only alternative was, in his opinion, a flank attack against the Russian right, and this he decided on: but to carry it out the portion of the division told off to make the turning movement would have to execute a flank march in the presence of the enemy, and would be exposed to attack

from Ta-lien-kou (D 9), while the front of the division would be, temporarily at any rate, dangerously extended.

23rd Aug.

11. As mentioned, the Mandarin Road was the only good one leading on Liao-yang, but even the best of Manchurian roads need repairs after rain, if for use by anything except those wonderful travellers, Chinese carts. In the present instance it had to carry sixty guns to start with, and as the Guard had a good deal further to go than the other divisions, and also had the road to repair, the general had to make an early start from Ta-wan (G 9) in order to be in position to play his assigned part in the combined operations on the 26th. He therefore led off very early on the 23rd August, by sending on an advanced detachment of a battalion and some cavalry, which at 10.30 a.m. occupied Hou-lang-kou (F 8) and the heights in front of it, covering the engineer battalion, which set to work repairing the road from Yang-tzu Ling (G 9) to that village. The division began its advance the same afternoon, the Hijikata battery, however, leaving at 9 a.m. to enable it to clear the Yang-tzu Ling (G 9) in good time. The divisional staff marched at 7 p.m., and the five foreign attachés with the division marched at 3.30 a.m. on the 24th; there was bright moonlight and warm weather.

12. As mentioned in previous reports, the country west of the Ta-wan valley (G 9) undergoes some change; not that the hills diminish in number or size, but the valleys are wider and longer, the hill-sides are almost devoid of wood, cultivation is more extended, the rivers are broader and deeper, and there is a general feeling of less stuffiness and more elbow-room. The hills are steep and stony, often rocky, and clothed with grass and short scrub, mostly hazel and oak; they rise occasionally over one thousand feet above the valleys, their average rise being probably about four hundred feet. The soil in the valleys is red and rich; the crops are luxuriant, the valleys and low spurs being covered in August and early September with beans, millet, and *kaoliang*, the latter predominating, and growing twelve to fourteen feet high by the end of August. The Yang-tzu Ling (G 9)-Hou-lang-kou (F 8) valley is stony at its upper end, and on approaching the latter village is from one thousand to one thousand two hundred yards wide; the stream, twenty-five to sixty yards in width, runs in a pebbly bed, and just beyond Hou-lang-kou joins the east branch of the Tang Ho, which runs in a flat cultivated valley, half to three-quarters of a mile wide. This latter stream is of respectable volume, fifty to one hundred yards wide, and in dry weather up to a man's waist, except at the fords, which are numerous. One feature of the hills here is the way they sometimes drop the last fifty, one hundred, or one hundred and fifty feet over a bluff or low precipice into a valley.

13. This was the sort of country the Guard Division had to work through during its final advance on Liao-yang, though as they approached the plains the hills became gradually barer, steeper, and more stony before taking their final plunge of some four hundred feet into the fertile Liao-yang plain. This plain stretches as far as the eye can reach to the north and west, a vast sheet of *kaoliang* and beans, unbroken except by the many prosperous villages, a few low kopjes, and the broad bed of the Tai-tzu Ho.

14. The roads are of the usual description, rough and stony in the subsidiary valleys, hard and rutted, or deep and holding in the main ones. The red soil is as hard as a rock in dry weather or frost, and the deep uncompromising ruts are very bad for wheels which do not fit them; with heavy rain the surface becomes, in the first instance, exceedingly slippery, while later the bottom falls out of long stretches of road. The only difference between the Mandarin Road and others is, that there is some attempt to grade it over the passes, and that in the main valleys there is a large choice of equally indifferent tracks, the "road" being sometimes one hundred yards wide. The Russians had done something to improve the roads, but the Japanese had to do a good deal more as they advanced.

15. At dawn on the 24th the Guard Division stood on a line along the heights on the east side of the Pien-yao-wan valley (E 9), disposed thus:— **24th Aug.**

2nd Brigade (less one battalion)*—From north of Hou-lang-kou (F 8) to east of Hsi'-ma-tun (E 8).

1st Brigade (less one battalion)—From the left of the 2nd Brigade to east of Pien-yao-wan (E 9).

Guard Cavalry—Two squadrons, with one company of infantry, on the left of the 1st Brigade.

Reserve—2 battalions, 2 squadrons 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 10 batteries, and the Engineer Battalion, at Hou-lang-kou (F 8) and Niu-ti-pai (F 8); three or four batteries were in position across the mouth of the valley at the west edge Hou-lang-kou (F 8), well concealed in the *kaoliang* fields on the level.

Divisional head-quarters at Hou-lang-kou (F 8).

16. We, the foreign attachés, arrived at Hou-lang-kou (F 8) at 7.30 a.m. Our short march of eight or nine miles had taken us over the Yang-tzu Ling, a pass something over two hundred feet high; the ascent was by a well graded road, but the descent was a steep one. From the foot of the pass the road was poor, but passable owing to its stony nature; there were occasional soft stretches, in one of which, about half way, we found one of Hijikata's guns, the only one with a small pair of leaders, stuck.

17. The division remained in the position indicated while reconnaissances were being carried out by cavalry and infantry,

but later in the day was gradually pushed forward, and by daybreak on the 25th was occupying a line from San-niu-pu (E 8) through Erh-tao-kou (F 8) south-westwards, covering about four miles. The only resistance they met with was from three Russian battalions (29th Regiment), which showed front from Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8), some desultory firing ensuing. Early in the afternoon we were informed that the enemy was withdrawing from the front of the division to his main position behind the line Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8)-An-ping (F 6), but at 8 p.m. he was reported to be returning to the line Ta-tien-tzu-Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8). Further, I was confidentially informed that the Russians much over-estimated the strength of the division. This was probably due to its early and isolated start, and its threatening position on the Russian right flank.

25th Aug.

18. At dawn on the 25th a couple of batteries were still in position on the west edge of the village, and at 6 a.m. we heard infantry fire from the west side of the Pien-yao-wan valley (E 9), while guns opened from both flanks at 6.15 a.m. We went first to the saddle one and a quarter miles north of Hou-lang-kou (F 8), whence we could see infantry and field artillery in position south-west of Erh-tao-kou (F 8), and then we rode *via* Hsia ma-tun (E 8) to the left wing of the division, and found the divisional staff on the low pass between the latter village and Tung-hsin-pu (E 8). A field battery was in action on the pass, engaging some Russian guns which we could not see, but whose shells were bursting occasionally in the valley behind the battery. We were asked to remain under cover of the hills for a time, but at 10.30 we were permitted to climb hill 161 (E 8) and establish ourselves in the trenches, from which the infantry had pushed on. Thence we could see the Japanese and Russian positions.

19. The Japanese infantry was then occupying a line from Erh-tao-kou (F 8) to Tung-hsin-pu (E 8). The division had advanced in the early morning from the position it had occupied the preceding night, driving back the enemy's advanced posts from the hills above Tung-hsin-pu (E 8) and east and south-east of Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8). There had also been some unimportant fighting north-east of Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8). The Guard Cavalry (two squadrons) had advanced towards Ta-lien-kou (D 9), but had been checked two and a half miles south-east of that village by a force of the enemy consisting of five or six squadrons and a battalion of infantry, which, however, were seen returning on Ta Hsi-kou (D 8) at 1 p.m. Several reports came in during the day that the enemy in front of the division was increasing in strength.

20. We could now see where the artillery fire came from. In reply to the battery on the pass south-east of Tung-hsin-pu (E 8), the Russians unmasked a battery of eight guns entrenched on an elevated spur one thousand five hundred yards north of

Pei-tzu-ha (D/E 8). Meanwhile the Hijikata battery had come into action (its first engagement) on a low roll of ground half a mile south-west of Erh-tao-kou (F 8), and in reply to its fire another eight-gun battery was unmasked from an entrenched position on a high ridge north of Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8). We could also see small groups of Russian infantry retiring across the valley from Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8).

21. The division was now occupying its assigned line, and as the enemy had to some extent revealed his dispositions, the general was able to make his arrangements and issue his orders for the attack which, according to General Kuroki's orders, the division was to deliver on the following day. He therefore told off his troops as follows:—

- (1) *Right Wing*, under G.O.C. 2nd Brigade.—2nd Brigade (less 1 battalion); 1 troop cavalry; the Hijikata Battery and 6th Battery 2nd Artillery Regiment; 1 company engineers; $\frac{1}{3}$ Bearer Company; $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 2 Field Hospital. To occupy the enemy north of Ta-tien-tzu.
- (2) *Left Wing*, under G.O.C. 1st Brigade.—1st Brigade and 1 troop cavalry. To cross the valley under cover of darkness and attack the enemy south of Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) at daybreak.
- (3) *The Reconnoitring Detachment*.—2 squadrons Guard Cavalry and 2 squadrons 2nd Cavalry. The former to advance on Ta-lien-kou (D 9), reconnoitre south-westwards, and try and gain touch with the Fourth Army; the 2nd Cavalry to advance to Hei-lin-tzu (D 8), and reconnoitre north-westwards.
- (4) *Independent Artillery*.—The Guard Artillery Regiment and 4th and 5th Batteries 2nd Artillery Regiment to take up a position round to Tung-hsin-pu (E 8), and open fire at dawn. (We saw some of the gun pits being prepared on the afternoon of the 25th, east of Tung-hsin-pu, the working parties being shelled by the Russian guns.)
- (5) *Reserve*.—1 battalion 2nd Brigade; 2 troops Guard Cavalry; 1 battalion engineers (less 1 company). To rendezvous east of Tung-hsin-pu.
- (6) *Divisional Head-Quarters*.—East of Tung-hsin-pu, with the reserve.

22. Nothing further occurred on the 25th beyond the occasional exchange of long-range artillery fire, but as the Guard Division was the only one that had moved, the Russians, in response to its advance, concentrated a strong force near Kao-feng-ssu (E 8). During the night of the 25th/26th August the 2nd and 12th Divisions advanced to the attack, while the left wing of the Guard crossed the valley preparatory to attacking the Russian flank three thousand yards north of Ta Hsi-kou (D 8) in the small hours of the morning.

23. As will be seen from the map,* the portion of the Russian position opposite the Guard lay across the two considerable valleys down which flow the east and west branches of the Tang Ho. From Ta Hsi-kou (D 8) to Pei-tzu-ha (D/E 8), the hills along which it lay are of fair height and run in long spurs down to the valley. East of the Pei-tzu-ha-Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) road is a low broken plateau covered with crops. Strong entrenchments were dug along the edge of this plateau. The valley of the West Tang Ho is flat and cultivated, and from half a mile to a mile across; the river flows in a broad bed of sand and stone, sometimes in two channels, and is sixty to one hundred yards wide, and two feet deep at the fords. Entrenchments ran all along the west edge of the valley. The soft roads in the valley ran through long stretches of *kaoliang*, which hid every movement, even from the hill tops. Between the East and West Tang Ho valleys the Russians had occupied and strongly entrenched the crests of a precipitous ridge rising one thousand feet above the rivers. The eastern valley is of the same description as the western one, and east of it again the Russian position followed the crest of the still higher ridge which the 2nd and 12th Divisions were attacking. The road from Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) to Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) runs in a deep, narrow valley, across which the Japanese right and Russian left faced each other. From the Japanese position the hills ran down in long irregular spurs to the west valley.

26th Aug.

24. The left wing crossed the valley during the night to attack the Russian right north of Ta Hsi-kou (D 8), and from that direction we heard heavy rifle fire, which commenced at 4 a.m. and continued throughout the day. During the morning it pushed on and got to the position shown on the map,† but beyond that it was unable to advance, owing to the strength of the enemy's position, the difficulties of the ground, and the lack of artillery support. In spite of very heavy losses, it held on gallantly during that day and the following night, and was still occupying the same position when day broke on the 27th. It was not till midday that I was able to make out this wing, some eight thousand yards from Point [1] (E 8), the hill on which we were posted, its thick firing line on the spur running down to the valley between Pei-tzu-ha (D/E 8) and Hsiao Hsi-kou (D 8), its supports in the valley behind it. The right of the firing line was nearly three hundred feet above the valley, and in front and above it I could make out the Russians who were holding up the attack. The situation reminded me very much of that above Shui-te-yang-tzu on the 31st July.‡

25. From our first station, Point 161 (E 8), we could see the infantry of the right wing holding the ridge south of Ta-tien-tzu,

* See Map 34.

† The red line on square E 8

‡ See page 197.

between three thousand and four thousand yards to our right front. Companies were lying at intervals along the reverse slopes, with firing lines entrenched along the crest and the reserves in the valley below.

26. In the valley at Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) we could see a large mass of Russian infantry, a regiment at least, resting and cooking, the men being taken down to the river in detachments; small columns of different arms, cavalry predominating, were constantly passing up and down that part of the valley.

27. Directly it was light enough to see (6.10 a.m.), the eight Japanese batteries on the left opened fire, concentrating on No. 1 Russian battery (north-west of Hsiao Hsi-kou) (D 8), which had been unmasked the previous day. At 6.15 a.m. the latter replied, and five minutes later two other Russian batteries, Nos. 2 and 3, opened from the lower ground between No. 1 and Kao-feng-ssu. These new batteries proved the undoing of the Japanese, as they were so admirably concealed that I never saw a movement near them during the battle, and the Japanese artillery positions had been chosen without reference to them. Their bright flashes alone showed whereabouts they were in the *kaoliang*, and hardly a shell went near them all day. It is hard to explain why the Japanese guns could not touch them, and the only reason I can give is that the positions they were committed to, and which they could not change under fire, did not admit of it; either there were hills in the line of fire, or else the nearest heights for observation were, in the absence of any system of signalling, too far away for the proper control of indirect fire.

28. In reply to the fire of these eight batteries, No. 1 fired away bravely for a long time, but towards mid-day its fire grew slacker, and early in the afternoon it ceased altogether, and the guns were, I think, withdrawn.

29. The eight batteries on the left were disposed in three groups:—

(1) The three batteries of the 2nd Guard Artillery "Battalion," on the right, east of Tung-hsin-pu (E 8), were, one of them along the lower edge of a copse on a forward slope, the other two behind a low ridge on the left front of the first. I was informed afterwards that the position of these batteries had been badly chosen, and that they could employ nothing but indirect fire all day. The Russians seemed to find it equally difficult to locate them, and, either for this reason or through bad shooting, they seemed to suffer but little, though a heavy fire was often directed at them.

(2) The three batteries of the 1st Guard Artillery "Battalion" were placed behind a low ridge north of Tung-hsin-pu (E 8), and well to the front, too much so, in fact, for within a quarter of an hour of

the commencement of the artillery fight they had to cease firing, and as far as I could see did little except at intervals during the rest of the day.

- (3) The 4th and 5th Batteries of the 2nd Artillery were in an excellent low position south of Tung-hsin pu, well screened by trees. A great many shells were fired by the Russians beyond them and to their left, and as there was no other target visible in those directions, these shrapnel must have been meant for them. It was not till 9.40 a.m. that No. 1 found them by firing, so it seemed to me, salvoes, with long intervals for communication with some observation station at a distance; whether these two batteries were able to fire at Nos. 2 and 3 I do not know, but I think not; the range, too, was over five thousand yards. Between 12 and 1 p.m. they tried to assist the advance of the left wing by firing salvoes at the Russian infantry in front of it, but their shrapnel were very short and ineffective, due to the range, which I estimated at over five thousand yards, and which on the map appears to be nearly six thousand yards.

30. On the right there were only two Japanese batteries in action, as on that flank no advance was intended. The Hijikata Battery was in the position it had been occupying on the 25th, while 6/2nd Artillery was on a low ridge one thousand two hundred yards in front of it. Both these batteries opened at 6.20 a.m., the former at a range of about seven thousand yards, firing slowly at No. 4 battery, the one unmasked on the ridge above Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) on the previous day. No 4 did not reply till 7.40 a.m., when it made the same mistakes in observation as on the 25th, bursting a large number of shrapnel in the valley between the two batteries.

31. For three hours a heavy artillery duel went on on the left, the Japanese concentrating a steady, accurate fire of high explosive and shrapnel against No. 1. At 9.15 a.m., the latter's fire slackened somewhat, but only for a few minutes, and then it went on again, as related, against 4.5/2nd Artillery. The Russian fire was *very* heavy, but a great deal of it was inaccurate, the shells bursting too high or too low, or both. The bright flash and the dust raised on discharge by both Russian and Japanese guns was most marked, even in the brightest sunshine. After a lull at 9.15 a.m. the duel gathered strength again, and at 9.55 a.m. was as heavy as ever on the left. So it continued, with one or two pauses, throughout the day, and was heaviest of all between 2 and 4 p.m., by which time the Russian artillery had thoroughly asserted its supremacy, receiving, after 4 p.m., but scant reply from the Japanese guns, though it continued searching the hills and firing at any target, however small, till 8 p.m. The duel on the right was never serious, and practically ceased between 9.15 and 1.15 p.m. At the latter

hour it was reopened by the Japanese guns, and when No. 4 answered it did better than before, and burst some good shrapnel in front of 6/2nd Artillery.

32. At noon the Russian artillery south of Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) had, we were afterwards informed, increased in strength to thirty-eight guns. Personally, I do not think there were ever more than twenty-four guns in action there, eight in each of the three batteries; and about this time No. 1 had ceased firing, and its guns were, I think, withdrawing. Nos. 2 and 3 positions, contained pits and epaulments for twenty-six guns, but I never could see more than four firing in the former and eight in the latter, though there were probably eight in each. We were also informed that sixteen guns had been in action on the hills north of Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8), after midday, but as we had moved forward to Point 1 (E 8) at 9.45 we were unable to see the Russian batteries on the right at that time.

33. After midday the situation became precarious. The enemy was increasing in strength, and seemed to be about to take the offensive against the left wing, which had suffered heavily, two companies having been almost annihilated. We, ourselves, could see more infantry collecting in the valley near Kao-feng-ssu (E 8). In answer to an application for reinforcements, General Kuroki had informed the general by wire that the Army reserve, consisting of the 29th Regiment (two battalions), was being sent to him, but that as they had marched straight from Feng-huang-cheng* and only reached Tien-shui-tien (G 8) at midnight 25th/26th, he must not expect them at Tung-hsin-pu (E 8) before 6 p.m., and then in a somewhat exhausted condition.

34. Under these circumstances the general decided to try and relieve the pressure on his left wing by making a frontal attack against the batteries which were dealing such destruction across the valley, and so, by occupying him in front, prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right. He therefore ordered three battalions to advance across the valley south of Kao-feng-ssu (E 8)—one battalion (I./4)† from the right wing through Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8), and two battalions through Kotta-ssu (E 8). These last were a battalion (II./2) of the left wing, which had remained in position near Tung-hsin-pu, and the divisional reserve (I./3).

35. The order for this advance was apparently received by the right wing after 1 p.m., for at 1.30 p.m. we saw I./4 collecting its companies and preparing to go forward. The advance began at 2 p.m., and Nos. 2 and 3 batteries, perceiving the movement, poured the hottest fire of the day on the Japanese artillery before turning their attention to the infantry. After

* 50 miles south-east of Tien-shui-tien (G 8).

† 1st Battalion 4th Regiment.

the latter began descending the valley in their advance we could see nothing of them, with the exception of one company (5/2), which formed the link between the wings of the attack, and which took post on the lower end of a long sloping spur, lying down behind the slight wooded rise in which it terminated. At 3.20 p.m. this company, then lying in a loose mass, was discovered by No. 3 battery, which, at about three thousand yards range, fired a number of well-aimed shrapnel at it, which looked annihilating, but which, we afterwards heard, only wounded seven men.

36. Between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m. the artillery and musketry fire was tremendous all along the line, the Russian gunners choosing infantry targets whenever they appeared; one of the batteries above Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) also turned its fire on to the ridge held by the right wing. At 3 p.m. the fire slackened a bit, but ten minutes later heavy rifle fire broke out from near Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8); whereupon the Russian guns covered the environs of the village with a sheet of bursting shrapnel, and a triangular fight took place, the Russian artillery devoting its whole fire to the Japanese infantry, and the Japanese artillery, temporarily relieved from the attention of the Russian guns, doing its best to silence them. Even then No. 3 battery was practically untouched. No. 2 battery was evidently firing at the Japanese infantry at Ko-ta-ssu (E 8), though hills hid that part of the valley from our view. At 3.30 p.m. this heavy firing was still going on; but at that time the Japanese infantry did not apparently look so formidable, as the Russian gunners began switching on to artillery targets again, and by 4 p.m. were once more devoting their whole attention to them. It was at 4 p.m. that I at last saw a few Japanese shrapnel get near No. 3 battery; their direction was good, but they were short and high. During this fighting the infantry of the right wing, in order to assist the attack, had thickened its firing lines, and was firing long-range volleys, though at what targets we could not see.

37. At 3.45 p.m. we had moved forward about one thousand yards to a knoll, Point 2 (E 8), whence we could overlook the valley.

38. At 4.10 p.m. No. 3 battery again shelled the Japanese infantry about Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8) for a few minutes, but at 4.15 p.m. the Russian gunners, having thoroughly asserted their supremacy, began searching all the hills in their front. At this moment a heavy thunderstorm broke and shut out all distant view, yet till 5.30 p.m. the Russian shrapnel kept bursting over the hills; while at 4.45 p.m. a battery, possibly No. 1, which had been withdrawn, opened up the valley, from a position in the valley bottom near Kao-feng-ssu (E 8), against the Japanese infantry near Ta-hsiang-tun. After 4 p.m. the Japanese artillery fired but little, but the Russians kept it up till 8 p.m., in spite

of darkness enhanced by heavy thunderstorms. It was difficult to see across the valley after 5.30 p.m.

39. The frontal attack had therefore failed, though, no doubt, it had helped to relieve the pressure on the left wing. The two battalions on the left had advanced in widely extended order, but had been unable to get beyond Ko-ta-ssu; the battalion on the right had not been able to get beyond a point south-east of Ta-hsiang-tun owing to artillery fire, frontal and flanking.

40. Night found the Guard Division in this uncomfortable situation. The left wing was holding a position like an inverted U, the two ends of which rested on Ta Hsi-kou (D 8) and Hsiao Hsi-kou (D 8). The Russian infantry were all round the curve of the U, and made frequent attacks, but the Japanese, though they could make no headway, held on gallantly and repulsed them all.* The reinforcements had arrived at Tung-hsin-pu (E 8). We were informed in the evening that opposite each wing the Russians had had during the day quite double the Japanese strength in infantry, and that they were being continually reinforced. Prisoners afterwards stated that the 54th Division had arrived opposite the Guard during the day.

41. The general had been informed of the successful advance of the 2nd and 12th Divisions, and as this would bring them more or less on the flank of the force in his front, he felt the relief, and quite expected the latter to fall back. At the same time, in case it should not do so, he issued orders for the attack to be continued at dawn on the 27th, and, under cover of darkness, he re-arranged his artillery. He advanced the two batteries with the right wing, and on the left he placed two batteries of the 2nd "Battalion" Guard Artillery Regiment, and two of the 2nd Artillery Regiment, together in a more forward position west of Tung-hsin-pu, whence they could assist the advance of the left wing and cope with batteries Nos. 2 and 3. It rained heavily during the evening and night.

42. The 26th had been a great day for the Russian artillery. It had certainly had great good luck in the choice of the positions of Nos. 2 and 3 batteries, and fortune had been correspondingly unkind to the Guard, but when all is said and done the Russian gunners had thoroughly established their supremacy, had staved off a frontal attack of infantry, and had left their own infantry free to cope with the Japanese left wing. They achieved this at a tremendous expenditure of ammunition, a goodly proportion of which was wasted owing to wild shooting at the beginning and end of the day. I was unable to form any estimate of the amount expended by Nos. 2 and 3 batteries, as on reaching the position with the advanced troops on the following morning the Chinese had already cleared up the

* The Russians did not make a counter-attack on the left wing during the night.—C. V. H.

empty cases. At No. 1, however, I counted one hundred and seventy empties behind No. 8 gun pit, which looked undisturbed.

43. The left wing had a very hard time in carrying out its flank attack. Owing to the width of the valley at Tung-hsin-pu (E 8) it had to rely almost entirely on itself, as it was beyond efficient supporting range of the guns, which, owing to the superiority of the Russian artillery, were unable to move forward to its support during the day. It held on gallantly for over twenty-four hours to the position it reached early on the 26th, in the face of superior and increasing forces, and though it would have been more satisfactory to General Kuroki if the Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) position had been captured, yet the very audacity and tenacity of this attack must have contained a large force of the enemy, and made the advance of the 2nd Division correspondingly easier, which was, after all, what was intended. The losses of the left wing were heavy, amounting, as far as we were permitted to know, to about eight hundred. One company lost half its effectives, and was brought out of action by a young lieutenant.

44. I know but little about the action of the right wing beyond the volleys I saw fired in support of the frontal attack, but I think they did but little, as their rôle was a passive one, and the Russians showed no enterprise in that part of the field. The right wing losses were reported to be about one hundred.

45. I have heard the question raised by Japanese officers as to whether the Guard could have carried out its task of containing the enemy if they had refrained from an actual infantry attack on the 26th, and had merely demonstrated from the east side of the valley. Personally, I do not think they could have. The valley was broad, and in daylight the situation was an open book to the Russians. If no Japanese force had been across the valley on the morning of the 26th, the Russians would have seen that business was not meant, and they might with safety have weakened their right, or, at any rate, have refrained from reinforcing it. An attack across the valley in daylight would have been costly to the Japanese, and could have been met by a comparatively small force. If the general had begun by merely demonstrating, and found later that the situation demanded an attack being undertaken in earnest, it would very likely have come too late, and also it would have cost more lives than the advance in the hills to which the left wing was committed, by having been sent across the valley at night.

27th Aug.

46. Before dawn on the 27th we were in position on Point 1 (E 8) again. It was misty and cloudy, and daylight brought no view across the valley. Rifle fire began at dawn, but it was not till 8.30 a.m. that the weather cleared sufficiently

to enable the Japanese artillery to see the Russian position. At that hour some guns opened fire from their new position near Tung-hsin-pu, this time against No. 2 battery, and also against the hill sides north-west of Kao-feng-ssu. They fired for ten minutes without reply. As far as we could observe ourselves, the situation was as follows:—The left wing* was in the position it had been occupying when night fell, with Russian infantry still opposite it; when the weather cleared the batteries west of Tung-hsin-pu were able, from their new position, to support it, and it advanced about midday. The left of the right wing was still in its same position, but the trenches nearer to, and west of, Lang-tzu-shan were empty.

47. Between 9 and 10 a.m. there was a good deal of musketry fire out on both flanks, while the left of the right wing fired volleys at the high ridge in its front and into the valley towards Kao-feng-ssu. A thin, hazy smoke from these volleys showed in the damp air, the only time I have noticed it. The guns also fired occasionally at the hill sides and trenches between Kao-feng-ssu and Ta-hsiang-tun, without reply. It was evident that the Russian artillery had retired, and as at 10 a.m. we could see long columns of Russian infantry moving down the valley to, and past, Kao-feng-ssu, it looked like a general withdrawal. We therefore went forward to Point 2 (E 8), and at 11 a.m. were informed that the infantry was about to advance to clear up the situation. It was also evident that the Russian infantry had only begun to retire after daylight, as the left wing had not advanced, and there were still a few Russians on the east side of the valley; these latter we could see, at 11 a.m., doubling one and two at a time across the valley from the north end of Ta-hsiang-tun, and, with bullets splashing round them, stumbling through the river, which, owing to the rain, was well over their waists. At the same time we saw columns of infantry retiring along the San-chia-kou (D 7) and Ma-shou-kou (D 7) valleys, the Japanese batteries, a couple of which had by this time got down into the valley near Ta-hsiang-tun, shelling them at long range. At about midday the leading Japanese infantry, one company, crossed the valley from the south of Ta-hsiang-tun. In the firing line intervals varied from three to fifteen paces, according to the ground, while the supports were extended at from one to three paces. They were preceded by a thin screen of scouts, some four hundred yards in front of whom two men crossed the river and reconnoitred for fords. There was no opposition, and the men waded the river, which was up to their waists.

48. At 1 p.m. a battalion of the right wing (III. 4) started across the valley north of Ta-hsiang-tun, being directed towards

* The action of the left wing on 26th and 27th forms the subject of a subsidiary report in Appendix, page 372.—C. V. H.

the low bluff which the enemy was still reported to be occupying. By this time the first infantry to cross had occupied No. 1 battery and adjacent slopes. III./4 found the bluff unoccupied, and its leading company advanced towards the spur which runs down north-east to the village of Kao-feng-ssu. At 2.10 p.m. heavy volleys were fired at it from the spur and from the ridge on the north side of the San-chia-kou (D 7) valley, which were occupied by a Russian rear guard of two battalions. A rear guard action ensued; two batteries opened fire over the heads of the Japanese infantry from the valley south of Ta-hsiang-tun, while a company of the 29th Regiment came up and reinforced the right. The general had sent this regiment forward to give it a chance after its fine march. Further to the left the line was prolonged by companies of the right wing, which had advanced over the valley and come up into line. The leading company of III./4 advanced, and pushed the rear-most Russians off the spur, and at 2.35 p.m. the Russian volleys ceased opposite the right, but it was not till 3.45 p.m. that the steep ridge above San-chia-kou was finally crowned by the Japanese infantry, who, after a tremendous climb, found it deserted.

49. In the meantime the remaining three battalions of the right wing had advanced, two against the Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8) ridge and one east of Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8), and pushed back the Russians, large groups and bodies of whom could be seen retiring down the valley beyond Kao-feng-ssu, and along the heights bordering it on both sides. The division bivouacked in the areas shown in the sketch,* on the line beyond which they had driven back the enemy.

50. In the afternoon we examined the Russian artillery positions. No. 1 battery consisted of eight gun pits, twenty to twenty-five yards apart; the spur on which they were dug was a very narrow one with precipitous sides, rising eighty feet above the plateau. A road for guns had been made up to it, and infantry trenches dug along the front and flanks of the gun pits. The pattern of pit was the normal one, varying slightly with the ground. The whole spur was pitted with the craters of high-explosive shell and sown with shrapnel bullets, but the gun pits had hardly suffered at all. The only *débris* left by the battery on its withdrawal were:—

- (1) A broken wheel in one gun pit;
- (2) Four dead horses on the reverse slope;

* Not reproduced. II. and III. 3rd Infantry were shown at Ta-tien-tzu; the 2nd and 4th Infantry Regiments and I. 3 at Kao-feng-ssu; and the 1st Infantry Regiment at San-chia-kou; with the Hijikata Battery, the 3rd Engineer Battalion, the Guard Artillery Regiment, 4.5 2nd Artillery Regiment, two battalions of the 29th Reserve Regiment, and the Guard and 2nd Cavalry Regiment from right to left in rear.

- 3) Two dead horses in a group of trees five hundred yards behind the battery, where many horses had evidently been picketted;
- (4) 400 rounds of unexpended gun ammunition in trays; and
- (5) A broken pole and a dead gunner on the road at the base of the spur, evidently casualties during withdrawal.

In No. 2 Battery were ten gun pits for indirect fire; they had all been used, but though there may have been a whole battery (eight guns) occupying them I never saw more than four firing at one time. In No. 3 battery were twenty-four gun pits, sixteen in the front line and eight for indirect fire behind the right.

At 5 p.m. we met the general on the plateau; he shook his head at No. 3 battery, and told us it had done him a lot of harm on the previous day, and that his guns could not find it. We followed the divisional staff to Chi-ta-ssu (E 8) and bivouacked there. The day had been dull but fine.

51. On the night of the 27th the General Officer Commanding the First Army received information from General Headquarters that the Russians were retiring from the front of the Fourth and Second Armies towards Liao-yang, and that those Armies were following him up. He therefore issued orders for the First Army to advance on the morning of the 28th to the line Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5)-Ta-shih-men Ling (E 6)-Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7), the portion of this line assigned to the Guard being from Ta-shih-men Ling (E 6) to Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7). The General Officer Commanding the Guard Division distributed his troops for this advance as follows:— 28th Aug.

- (1) *Right wing*, under G.O.C. 2nd Brigade.—2nd Brigade (less 1 battalion); 1 troop Guard Cavalry Regiment.
- (2) *Left wing*, under G.O.C. 1st Brigade.—1st Brigade (plus 1 battalion 3rd Regiment); 1 troop Guard Cavalry Regiment; 3 batteries Guard Artillery Regiment; 1 company engineers.
- (3) *Reconnoitring troops*.—2 squadrons Guard Cavalry Regiment; 2 squadrons 2nd Cavalry Regiment; 2 sections of the 29th Regiment.
- (4) *Independent Artillery*.—3 batteries Guard Artillery Regiment; 3 batteries 2nd Artillery Regiment.
- (5) *Reserve, with Divisional Head-Quarters*.—29th Regiment, less 2 sections; 2 troops Guard Cavalry Regiment; the Hijikata Battery; 2 companies engineers; 1 bearer company.

52. We were not informed what the original lines of advance assigned to the two wings were, but they were probably right wing *via* Ssu-chia-tzu (D/E 7) on Ssu-fang-tai (D 7) and left wing *via* Liao Ling (D 7) on Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7)

Whatever they may have been, fresh orders had to be issued when, at noon, General Kuroki was informed by General Headquarters that the First Army was to be ready to move to the Tai-tzu Ho and cross that river. The Guard Division was then ordered to move to a line extending from the hill north-west of Cha-lu-tzu (D 6) on the right to Meng-chia-fang (D 6) on the left, while the 2nd Division was ordered to collect its main force at Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) and send a detachment towards the right of the Guard. This detachment consisted of no less than 1 brigade of infantry, 1 mountain battery, and 1 company of engineers, the whole under Major-General Matsunaga, commanding the brigade.

53. In consequence of this change of plan, the ultimate direction given to the right wing of the Guard was *viâ* Ma-shou-kou (D 7), Hou-shou-kou (D 7), and Ssu-fang-tai (D 7), on Tsui-chia-ho (D 6); and to the left wing, *viâ* Liao Ling (D 7) and Hsiang-shan-tzu on Meng-chia-fang (D 6). The reconnoitring troops were directed to move on the left of the division and link it with the right of the Fourth Army, while the corps artillery, reserve, and divisional head-quarters followed the right wing. On this day the division gained touch, through its cavalry, with the right of the Fourth Army, which was at Kung-hsin-tai (C 7).

54. On the morning of the 28th there was a thick mist, and owing to supply and other difficulties the division could not move till 10 a.m., at which hour it assembled about Kao-feng-ssu (E 8). In spite of the mist, which did not clear till 8.30 a.m., heavy musketry fire began down the valley, north of Kao-feng-ssu (E 8) at 6 a.m. and continued uninterruptedly all day, the Russians fighting a succession of rear guard actions and occupying three positions.* During the day we accompanied the left wing, and from near Point 169 (D 7) had a good view of the actions fought in the second and third positions. Our route took us along the San-chia-kou (D 7) valley, which is of the same description as others, but only from three hundred to six hundred yards wide, while at Kao-feng-ssu it is a gorge one hundred and fifty yards wide only; the branch we followed terminated in the Liao Ling, a low pass with a short defile at the top. Beyond Liao Ling the valley was half a mile wide, flat and wet, while from Wei-chia-kou (C 6) roads run to the plains through a succession of high hills, some stony or rocky, others rounded like the South Downs. The rendezvous of the left wing was a village about four miles west of Kao-feng-ssu.

55. At the time (9.45 a.m.) when we started from Kao-feng-ssu some guns of the corps artillery opened fire from the main

* The first position was just south of Hou-shou-kou (D 7), front about 2 miles long; the second, right south of Wang-ma-tsai (D 7), left near Tang-ho-yen (E 7); the third, right at Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7); the left south-east of Ssu-fang tai (D 7).

valley, north of Kao-feng-ssu, against the Russian first position. On arrival at the rendezvous we found the 1st Brigade gathering there, the men looking wonderfully fresh and cheery in spite of the bad time they had had on the 26th. They were carrying their *tentes-abri* over the left shoulder, blue sling-bags over the right, and entrenching tools fastened to the latter. Their packs and cloaks were miles in rear, but, as one of the men was heard to remark, "they wouldn't want them again, as they would soon be in Liao-yang." From the rendezvous the 2nd Regiment advanced beyond the Liao Ling towards Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7), crowning the heights on both sides of the valley, while the 1st Regiment occupied the hills north of San-chia-kou (D 7), joining up with the left of the right wing.

56. When we reached Point 169 (D 7) the Russians were holding their second position, and we were informed that there was more than a brigade of them in position on the hills north of Hou-shou-kou (D 7). At 3 p.m. the 29th Regiment and four guns joined in the attack with the right wing, and at 3.15 p.m. the Russians began retiring in a quiet and orderly manner to their third position beyond Wang-ma-tsai (D 7), and also along the Mandarin Road *viâ* Hsiao-ling-tzu (E 7). The right wing, owing to the hills and bad roads, had only managed to bring four guns into action, but these did good work as long as the Russians held the crests; when the latter retired the shrapnel sent after them went wide owing to the want of a system of rapid communication between the battery and some elevated point of observation at a distance. This want was much emphasized in the advance of the First Army through the mountains.

57. At 5 p.m. a heavy infantry action was going on, the Russians holding on to their third and last position near Wang-ma-tsai, the four guns joining in again at 5.40 p.m. At the same time a single gun joined in from Liao Ling. With much expenditure of labour on the part of the engineers, who had to make a road for it, this gun had been dragged up on to a commanding spur; and I think it contributed considerably towards the withdrawal of the Russians, the last of whom disappeared at 6 p.m., when the action ceased. The hills on which this fighting had taken place were steep and stony, their general formation reminding me of an exaggerated edition of the hills about Campbellpore and Attock, though the slopes were green instead of brown, and oak and hazel-scrub took the place of thorn bushes and mimosas.

58. The right wing pushed on and bivouacked in the areas shown in the sketch.* The left wing reached Wei-chia-kou (C/D 6), the cavalry linking its left with the right of the Fourth

* Not reproduced; it showed (*see* D. 7) round Ssu-fang-tai, the 3rd and 4th Infantry Regiments; round Hsiang-shan-tzu the 1st Brigade, 2nd Guard Artillery and Guard Engineers; the two cavalry regiments at X; and the remainder of the force round Wang-ma-tsai.

Army at Kung-hsin-tai (C 7). Owing to the presence of a strong force north-east of Hsiang-shan-tzu, the division had been unable to get as far as the line assigned to it, which turned out to be a very strongly entrenched position, portions of which, with their well-marked trenches, we could see from Point 169 (D 7) through gaps in the hills. The Matsunaga detachment halted at Tang-ho-yen (E 7) and San-chia-sai (E F 6), but during the night attacked and established itself on the ridge (Point 243) (E 6) east of Ta-shih-men Ling. Hearing in the evening that the commander of the left wing, with the remainder of his troops, was going to move on during the night from Liao Ling to Hsiang-shan-tzu (D 7), we obtained leave to accompany him, and marching at 9.15 p.m. by bright moonlight, reached Hsiang-shan-tzu at 10.50, and bivouacked.

29th Aug.

59. Early on the 29th we left our bivouac and went on to Wei-chia-kou (C/D 6), where about 9 a.m. we made our first acquaintance with the Fourth Army, a party of its cavalry passing through the village on its way to Meng-chia-fang (D 6). Later we went to the top of Point 3,* and got a good view of the Russian position and glimpses of the Liao-yang plain beyond. All along the Russian position, on the hills north of Meng-chia-fang (D 6) and Hsui-chia-ho (D 6) working parties were busy adding to the trenches already constructed. On the hills west of the Wei-chia-kou-Meng-chia-fang road we could see the infantry of the left wing of the Guard and of the right wing of the Fourth Army (10th Division) taking up their positions and digging trenches. Three thousand yards north of Wei-chia-kou, the Meng-chia-fang road crosses a low saddle; behind this epaulments were being constructed for the three batteries of the Guard Artillery with the left wing, while one thousand two hundred yards further to the north-west three batteries of mountain artillery of the 10th Division were coming into position behind another column. The Japanese infantry had been pushed on to a knoll, apparently about one thousand two hundred yards south-west of Meng-chia-fang on the left, while to the north and north-east we could see detachments lying behind the crests from one thousand six hundred to two thousand yards to our front. A captive balloon, British shape, was up in the plains a long way off to our left front. There was no firing, the lull before the storm, so we returned across the hills to divisional head-quarters at Ssu-fang-tai (D 7), which we did not find till 7 p.m.

60. At 9 a.m. the right wing occupied the hill north of Ssu-fang-tai (D 7), and could see the Russians digging further trenches on the hills north of Hsui-chia-ho and Meng-chia-fang. The enemy's strength in front of the Guard was estimated at one and a half divisions, but no positions for artillery could be located. The left wing, in conjunction with the 10th Division,

* About 1½ miles east of Wei-chia-kou (C D 6).

Fourth Army, occupied the heights south of Meng-chia-fang. The Matsunaga detachment occupied Ta-shih-men Ling. The only troops of the Guard engaged on this day were the Hijikata battery and one field battery (1/Guard Artillery), which were put in position behind a low col on the east Hsui-chia-ho road, two thousand yards north of Ssu-fang-tai (D 7). These two batteries opened fire against the Russian working parties, and kept them off till dark. On the night of the 29th the artillery (three batteries) and cavalry (two squadrons) of the 2nd Division, hitherto attached to the Guard, were ordered to rejoin their division. Two batteries and one squadron joined the Matsunaga detachment, the remainder marched *via* An-ping (F 6) on Hou Kuan-tun (F 4).

61. On the morning of the 30th the dispositions were as **30th Aug.** follows:—

- (1) *Right Wing*.—The Hijikata battery and 1st Battery Guard Artillery as on the 29th; 2nd and 3rd Batteries Guard Artillery one thousand five hundred yards to their left, the other side of a high col; 4th Regiment across the east Hsui-chia-ho (D 6) road, about one thousand eight hundred yards in front of the right batteries; 3rd Regiment and one battalion 29th Regiment across the west Hsui-chia-ho (D 6) road, the same distance in front of the left batteries.
- (2) *Reserve* (1 battalion 29th Regiment) in the valley on the left of the left batteries.
- (3) *Divisional Head-Quarters* on the saddle on the west Hsui-chia-ho (D 6) road.
- (4) *The Left Wing* on and to the west of the Wei-chia-kou-Meng-chia-fang road.
- (5) *The 10th Division, Fourth Army*, prolonged the line to the left.
- (6) *The Second Army* prolonged the line of the Fourth Army to the left, its right division facing Shou-shan-pu (B 5).
- (7) On the right of the Guard, the Matsunaga detachment was on the hills east of Wang-pai-tao (D 6).

The situation warranted a hope that Kuropatkin would stand and give battle, and Marshal Oyama had resolved to fight a decisive action and try and bring the first phase of the operations to a close.

62. The task of the Guard Division on the 30th was as follows:—

The right wing, in conjunction with the Matsunaga detachment, to attack the enemy's position above Hsui-chia-ho (D 6);

The left wing, in conjunction with the 10th Division, to attack the hills above Meng-chia-fang.

63. Opposite the Guard the Russian position from Cha-lu-tzu (D 6) to Meng-chia-fang (D 6) ran practically east and west.

occupying, as it were, the chord of a segment of a circle of which the Japanese held the arc; a broad, cultivated valley, into which spurs ran down from the south, lay between them.

Behind the Russian position lay the plain. The hills were steep and stony, but green, being covered with short coarse grass, and the Russian trenches stood out brown and unpromising against their green background. In the Hsui-chia-ho valley were large stretches of *kaoliang*, which extended up the lower slopes of the hills. Hsui-chia-ho consists of villages, East, Centre, and West, the two former prosperous places with several substantial stone houses and flourishing vegetable gardens, all untouched by the hand of war. Strange to say, although lying at the foot of the Russian position, it was one of the few villages I had seen from which the Chinese had not removed the majority of their women. This fact, which I discovered on entering the village on the 1st September, says much in favour of the Russian treatment of Chinese.

64. The most prominent hills in the position were the two due west of Cha-lu-tzu, each surmounted by a tumulus (D 6), but the source of great strength was the long deep ridge which ran from the south end of West Tumulus Hill across the front of East Tumulus Hill. This ridge was a good bit lower than either of them, but it screened the valley which separated them, and formed excellent cover for reserves; it was strongly entrenched. The Mandarin Road runs in a deep gorge-like valley, the long stony ridge on its east side rising to about the same height as the Tumuli Hills. Between these hills, and over the lower ones west of them, we could see the Liao-yang plain stretching to the horizon, and could catch a glimpse of Liao-yang itself and the Tai-tzu Ho, with camps at intervals along its left bank. We could also see Shou-shan-pu (B 5).

65. The Japanese estimated that there were between twenty and thirty guns in position opposite the right wing of the division.

- (1) A battery of 15-cm. (5·9-inch) guns or howitzers somewhere in or beyond the Cha-lu-tzu (D 6)-Sha-pu valley (D 5);
- (2) A battery of field guns on the heights north of Cha-lu-tzu*;
- (3) A battery of field guns somewhere in the gorge between the Tumuli Hills; and
- (4) A battery of field guns on the Hsui-chia-ho-Shih-chang-yu (D 5) road.

Of these Nos. (1) and (3) were hidden from us by hills; No. (4) was, I think, on the 30th on the ridge north-east of Meng-chia-fang, but retired that evening into the plain, where we could see it next day firing over the ridge in its front into the

* See paragraph 76.—C. V. H.

Hsui-chia-ho valley. The positions of the batteries opposite the left wing were west of the Meng-chia-fang-Shih-chang-yu road, midway between these villages.

66. Between 6.30 and 7 a.m. the artillery fighting began on the left of the division, and shortly afterwards the four Guard batteries on the right opened fire also. From Point 5 (D 6), which we reached at 9.30, after having tried another hill, Point 4, we got a fine view of the battlefield of the Guard and of the Second Army. The artillery duel on the left of the division about Meng-chia-fang was very heavy, the Russian batteries north of that village firing a prodigious number of shells at the Japanese batteries in their front. A regular canopy of bursting shrapnel hung over the Wei-chia-kou valley (C/D 6) all day, and though the Guard batteries continued to respond to it, I fancy they were unable to achieve much, as the infantry of the left wing made little or no progress all day.

67. The artillery fighting on the right wing was somewhat of a fiasco. The Russian batteries were so well hidden behind mountains, or in such distant positions, that the Japanese batteries could not locate them or else could hardly reach them; but, on the other hand, the Russian gunners, hampered by the hills which concealed them, never succeeded in finding the well-chosen and somewhat low-lying positions of the Japanese batteries. During the whole of the 30th and 31st the Russian artillery wasted an enormous amount of ammunition, firing all over the hills in search of the Japanese batteries, which they never effectually found, and the latter, therefore, were able to devote their whole attention to the trenches in their front and to the support of their infantry. Between 9.20 and 11.30 a.m. the battery between the Tumuli Hills (D 6) fired ineffective *rafales* about the valley in which the Hijikata Battery and 1st Battery of the Guard Artillery was in position; it then ceased fire, and later on, about 1 p.m., the battery north of Cha-lu-tzu (D 6) took up the refrain and peppered the valley all round the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the Guard Artillery without doing any damage, certainly none to the batteries. The Russian guns were, however, able to bring a cross-fire to bear on the valley about East Hsui-chia-ho, which must have produced a good deal of effect about the position occupied by the 4th Guard Infantry Regiment.

68. The chief incident in the day's fighting on the right was the attack of the 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment. As previously mentioned, the right wing was, in conjunction with the Matsunaga detachment, to attack the Russian position above Hsui-chia-ho. The orders received by the officer commanding the 3rd Regiment were to attack that portion of the enemy's position represented by trenches "a," "b," and "c" (D 6), and he was informed that the 1st Brigade would attack on his left and the 4th Regiment on his right. He waited patiently for

the attack of the 1st Brigade; but its advance was checked by the overwhelming fire of the Russian batteries north of Mengchia-fang, so at 11.30 he decided to wait no longer, but to go on his own account. The 2nd Battalion 29th Regiment had been put at his disposal, and the orders he issued for the attack were to the following effect:—

II./3 to advance against trenches “e” and “f.”

I./3 to advance on its right against “c” and “d.”

II./29 to advance through Hsui-chia-ho Central against “c.”

III./3 to remain in reserve.

69. At midday the leading troops of II./3 had reached the position shown on sketch.* In front of their right was a shallow valley, in their centre the ground sloped up to West Tumulus Hill, while in front of their left was a broad, gently sloping valley. There was a copse of firs opposite and within two hundred yards of the centre, and a smaller copse on their right flank. Here this battalion remained for the rest of the day, unable to advance on account of the scathing fire to which it was exposed from the trenches above it, the occupants of which could see every man in the Japanese line. Shortly after the battalion reached this line, the 2nd and 3rd Guard Batteries, seeing that its advance was stopped, shelled “e,” with the result that its occupants, after a very few rounds, evacuated the trench and doubled back over the hill; “f” was also evacuated, I think, about the same time. The 2nd and 3rd Guard Batteries then turned their attention to the battery on the Shih-chang-yu (D 5) road, which was somewhere on the ridge near “j.”

70. At 12.35 p.m. the Russians holding “d” doubled to the rear without artillery inducement, and at the same time we saw I./3 advancing in very extended lines of groups in the broken *kaoliang* covered dead ground on the lower western slopes of the Hsui-chia-ho valley, towards Hsui-chia-ho Central. At 12.45 p.m. the Russians sent reinforcements to “g” and “h”; we could see them on the sky-line north of “h” coming down from the West Tumulus, and the Japanese guns shelled them as long as they were visible.

71. By 1 p.m. the leading troops of I./3 had occupied a nullah just above Hsui-chia-ho Central, on the Shih-chang-yu road, and the battalion gradually worked up to the same valley and collected there, till at 3 p.m. it was all concentrated in the valley, with a thick firing line engaged in a heavy fire-fight with the trenches above it. I think its fire must have been directed against “c,” the trench it had been ordered to attack, and which was being attacked at the same time by II./29 which had lain for some time under cover on the north side of Hsui-chia-ho Central. From our position, a spur of the hill

* See red block on square D 6 with its right flank on West Hsui-chia-ho.

we were on hid the attack of II./29 from us, and we were so absorbed watching I./3 that we were not aware it was going on till "c" was actually captured.

72. During this time (1 to 3 p.m.) the 2nd and 3rd Guard Batteries had been trying to assist the advance of II./3 by shelling the trenches above it; but it could not get on, though it held on gallantly in its terribly exposed position, its only shelter being the rough trenches it was able to make under the galling fire it was subjected to. It suffered heavy losses, especially in the two centre companies opposite the wood, so much so that not only had the two sections in reserve to be pushed into their firing line, but men had to be withdrawn from the flank companies to reinforce them.

73. Shortly after 1 p.m. the battery north of Cha-lu-tzu opened fire, and tried to stop the fire of the 2nd and 3rd Guard Batteries, but the range and the well-chosen positions of the Japanese guns were too much for it, and though it almost reached them, at 1.45 it appeared to give it up and to content itself with shelling the valley in their front, the Hsui-chia-ho valley, and the hills generally. The Hijikata Battery and 1st Guard Battery had been shelling trenches "a," "b," and "c" to assist the advance of II./29, but when the Russian battery opened fire they switched on to it for a short time, dropping some high-explosive shell about it.

74. At 3.30 p.m. I./3 extended to its left along the subsidiary valley it was in, and swarmed up the hill to trenches "d" and "f," the leading company with one section of II./29 making for "d," the next for "f." The leading sections went up as fast as they could climb the steep hill, in any formation, every man eager to be first, and reached "d" at 3.55 p.m. and "f" at 4.5 p.m. As mentioned, these trenches had been evacuated, and I do not think the companies suffered, as the advance was unchecked and seemed to take place in dead ground. I only saw one or two men left on the slopes. In the meantime II./29 had captured "c" and at 3.40 p.m. had pushed its firing line to the crest a few yards above it; beyond this it could not advance owing to fire from "b" and "g." On reaching "d" and "f" the leading troops pushed out beyond them; those at "f" were able to remain a few yards forward, but those at "d," owing to the heavy fire from "g" and "b," had to come back behind the trench, and line a nullah first below it, where a road, unmarked on the map, ran. Two companies here carried on a tremendous fire-fight with "g," which, together with "b," again received reinforcements.

75. In the meantime the officer commanding had ordered his reserve battalion (III./3) to advance through Hsui-chia-ho Central against "b" and "c." At 3.30 p.m. the battalion deployed two companies north of the village, and later two companies advanced to attack "b," which trench they eventually

took, so we were informed, but at what time I do not know, though it must have been after 6 p.m. Beyond "b" they could not go, as the Russians held on to "a" and the trenches east and south of it; the opposing lines were here only from one hundred to two hundred yards apart. At 5.30 p.m. the Japanese in front of "c" had been reinforced and the line extended to the right, and at 6 p.m. further reinforcements were sent up to that trench, and ascended the hill in the same loose swarms that all the troops had used. As the attacking force was in a somewhat perilous position, shortly after 6 p.m. the last two companies of the divisional reserve were ordered by the general commanding to Hsui-chia-ho Central to reinforce, but they took no part in the action.

76. In the meantime the battery north of Hsui-chia-ho had been burning much powder uselessly, but at 5 p.m. really seemed to have found the 2nd and 3rd Guard Batteries, and fired two rounds per gun rapidly at them with percussion shrapnel. It then seemed dissatisfied again, and, after firing a few more rounds with a shortened range, went on slowly with a very short and high time shrapnel. I think its difficulty was that the range was beyond the power of its fuzes. The 2nd and 3rd Guard Batteries took no notice of it, and continued firing at "g" and "h" and at the battery on the Shih-chang-yu road. The Hijikata Battery and 1st Guard Battery also continued shelling the trenches in front of them.

77. This was the situation at 6 p.m., when we had to return to Ssu-fang-tai (D 7). The weather, which had been bright in the morning, got bad about midday, and during the afternoon and evening there was a high, cold wind and heavy showers. All through the day the artillery duel on the left of the division had been very heavy, though it slackened about 6 p.m., but it was nothing compared to the artillery fighting we could see raging round Shou-shan-pu (B 5). The balloon was up at intervals during the day over Liao-yang.

78. Subsequent information regarding the course of the attack of the 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment was as follows:—The officer commanding wished to continue his attack and assault "a" and the trenches south and east of it by night, but the general considered this would be too costly, as the Russians could reinforce these trenches to any extent by the valley and zigzags behind them, and the attack of the regiment was unsupported on the flanks, as will be explained. The general therefore ordered the withdrawal of the regiment to the line of the main Japanese position. This was a very difficult operation in the face of a strong, well-posted enemy who was fighting obstinately, and it was, moreover, very much against the wishes of the officer commanding, and his officers and men engaged, that the dearly-won position should be given up. However, it had to be done, though the officer commanding would not leave

till he had sent back his dead and wounded. He began transporting them to the south of Hsui-chia-ho at 10 p.m., and did not finish till 3 a.m., after which, in spite of several counter-attacks from "a," which was being continually reinforced, he withdrew his regiment behind Hsui-chia-ho and led it back to the position it was to occupy. During the withdrawal the 29th Regiment suffered much. The losses of the 3rd Guards were very heavy, including no less than 20 officers. Most of these losses occurred in the 2nd Battalion, which battalion, together with the companies of the 1st Battalion on the left flank, fired away half of the 400,000 rounds expended during the day by the regiment.

79. It was not the fault of the officer commanding the 3rd Guards that the attack had to be abandoned. He himself considered that he could not only have held on, but that he could have captured "a" and the trenches south and east of it during the night, and he conducted the dangerous operation of withdrawing his men in a manner which earned the well merited praise of the commander of Guard Division. He has since been given a brigade. The abandonment of the advantage gained was rather a serious matter, for it left the Russians in undisputed possession of a very strong position from which to contain the Guard while the interval between that division and the main body of the First Army was widening; and I think there was a good deal of anxiety on the following day lest Kuropatkin should make an attempt to thrust forward into the gap thus left. Had the 3rd Guards only held on in the night, there is good reason to think that the position, already half won, might have been carried by the morning, and the Russians would then have had to evacuate the whole line of hills north of Hsui-chia-ho and Meng-chia-fang. More troops might then have been freed to join the main force of the Army in the outflanking movement it was engaged on, and which eventually proved beyond its strength.

80. The failure of the 4th Guard Infantry Regiment and of the Matsunaga Detachment to support and prolong the attack to the right was apparently due to a lack of distinctness in the orders issued to Major-General Matsunaga. The detachment, as previously mentioned, had been sent from the 2nd Division to act in co-operation with the Guard, but from what I can gather it still remained under the orders of the general officer commanding the 2nd Division, who, on the afternoon of the 30th, was sent some six miles away on the Tang Ho, *en route* for Lien-tao-wan (F 5). When the 3rd Regiment advanced to the attack, the 1st Brigade on its left and the 4th Regiment on its right were to have advanced simultaneously. The 1st Brigade was unable to do so owing to the overwhelming artillery fire directed against it, and the 4th Regiment could not get beyond East Hsui-chia-ho owing to the strength of the position in its front, coupled with a cross-fire of shrapnel which

came at intervals from the battery north of Cha-lu-tzu, the battery on the Shih-chang-yu road and, I think, occasionally from the battery at the Sha-pu (D 5) road. If the Matsunaga detachment had advanced at the same time, the 4th Regiment would in all probability have been able to get on, but it did not move, and when an officer of General Kuroki's staff who was detached to the Guard Division staff rode on his own initiative to Major-General Matsunaga and explained the situation, he found the general had just received orders to rejoin the 2nd Division with his detachment, but on learning the position of affairs he agreed to attack and try to relieve the pressure on the 3rd Guard. Simultaneously the general officer commanding the Guard Division received a message from General Kuroki placing the Matsunaga Detachment under his orders. All this, however, came too late, as darkness set in just after the detachment began to advance, and so the projected attack was abandoned, and the 3rd Regiment withdrawn.

81. During the day a good many shrapnel were fired at the saddle on which the divisional staff was posted by the battery on the Shih-chang-yu road. One of these killed a staff officer and wounded six men.

31st Aug.

82. Very early in the morning we reached Point 5 (D 6). At the foot of the hill I met an officer who told me that the previous day's attack had proved ineffective, and that the troops had been withdrawn. This was our first intimation of it, and, sure enough, on reaching the top of the hill, we could see that the only traces of the Japanese on the Russian hills were the light trenches they had thrown up, and that the right wing had been withdrawn and was holding a line from about Point 243 (E 6) and passing just south of West Hsui-chia-ho, to a point half a mile west of Meng-chia-fang, which had been strongly entrenched. I gathered that the division was to play a purely defensive rôle during the day.

83. The artillery on the left of the division had got to work before daybreak, and at 7.30 a.m. a heavy duel was going on there again, while a severe infantry engagement was also, I could hear, in progress. The only signs of life opposite the right wing of the Guard came from the battery in the gorge between the Tumuli Hills. This battery had, I was informed, fired at the Hijikata Battery and 1st Guard Battery the previous morning, but had never got within five hundred yards of them. This we had seen ourselves. I was also told that the battery on the Shih-chang-yu road had withdrawn, that the battery above Cha-lu-tzu had disappeared, and that the batteries with the right wing did not expect to have much firing to do that day; they had had no casualties on the 30th. The only battery that fired against the right wing during the day was the battery in the gorge, and its shooting, which was ignored by the Japanese guns, was as erratic as that of the battery north of Cha-lu-tzu had been the previous

day. The methods of these two batteries were so similar and ineffective that I think they were one and the same. The guns in the gorge had ceased fire for over one-and-a-half-hours on the 30th before those north of Cha-lu-tzu opened, while on the 31st the latter never appeared at all.

84. The general situation, as revealed from Point 5, was as follows:—

- (1) Eight or ten miles away to our right we could see shrapnel bursting on the hills on the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, fired apparently from the south bank.
- (2) In front of the right wing of the Guard Division all was quiet with the exception of the fire of the battery in the gorge and an occasional burst of musketry from the advanced troops of the 4th Infantry Regiment near East Hsui-chia-ho.
- (3) Opposite the left of the Guard and right of the Fourth Army a heavy artillery and infantry fight was going on.
- (4) All round Shou-shan-pu, and in the plain to the north and north-west and west of it, innumerable shrapnel were bursting.
- (5) The balloon was up for a short time above Liao-yang, but about 11 a.m. it descended near the railway station, where it was apparently deflated, as we saw it no more during the battle.
- (6) Long lines of trucks were standing on the railway line north of the town.
- (7) About 10.30 a big fire broke out just north of the town, and later in the day three were started on its north and north-west outskirts where the Russian quarter was.

85. These fires were beyond the reach of the Japanese shells, and I speculated at the time as to whether Kuropatkin had begun burning stores and store-houses prior to a retreat. The question as to when he began to retreat is a vexed one, the Japanese asserting that he began on the 30th, Kuropatkin himself reporting that it was not till the 3rd September that he decided to do so. Whether he was merely removing and burning stores, &c., in case he should later be obliged to retreat, or whether he had already made up his mind to do so, is a question for the future military historian of the campaign, but the fact remains that:—

On the 31st these four large fires broke out round the Russian quarter, and the balloon disappeared.

On the 1st a large number of the trucks had already gone, and I saw one long train steam north during the very short time I had for observation.

On the 2nd several more fires broke out, more trains steamed north, columns of carts and infantry were crossing the

river all day, and most of the troops* bivouacked along the river bank had disappeared, after removing one of the bridges.

On the 3rd, from a very early hour, columns of carts were crossing the river in a continuous stream, while store-houses were deliberately burned down.

86. At 11.30 a.m. we became aware of a Russian working party which had extended across the gorge between the Tumuli Hills (D 6) and was engaged digging a trench. The men were invisible to the right group of guns owing to the ridge which screened them, but they were visible from our hill, and an artillery officer who was up there told us that he was going to observe for 1st Guard Battery, which was about to open indirect fire on them. It was not till 12.30 p.m. that the battery opened, and got its range in four shots; it then verified with three more percussion shrapnel, and then fired three half-battery salvoes, at the first of which the Russians retired at the double. The observing officer shouted and signalled with his arms to the battery 350 feet below him, *via* a non-commissioned officer posted half-way down the steep slope. The whole action of the battery was slow; three-quarters of an hour must have elapsed between the receipt of the order by the battery and the first round, and the intervals between salvoes were too long for such a fleeting target. However, the target was not an important one, the shooting was good, and the deliberation in firing may have been partly due to the great necessity for husbanding ammunition.

87. During the afternoon the situation remained unchanged in front of the right wing. Opposite the left wing there was a lull in the fight, broken by occasional *rafales* from the Russian guns. I could, however, make out that some Japanese infantry had made a considerable advance along the ridge, north-west of Meng-chia-fang, and were occupying some trenches they had thrown up on a knoll about one mile south of Meng-chia-feng (D 6). The big fight during the day was that which raged round Shou-shan-pu, and beyond it as far as the eye could reach; the hill was, we learned next morning, captured at 3 a.m.

88. About 4 p.m., Russian infantry patrols of from two to five men came down and examined the ground held by II./3 on the 30th, and took their first look at a Japanese trench. They wandered about undisturbed, and many Russians could be seen walking about their re-occupied trenches and the hills above. There seemed to be a sort of armistice in front of the right wing. Later, between 6 and 7 p.m., there was a heavy artillery engagement near Meng-chia-fang. During the day the 29th Regiment of the Matsunaga Detachment had been withdrawn, and sent to reinforce the 2nd Division, reaching it the following

* This may only have been Stakelberg's corps resting before attacking Kuroki's right — C. V. II.

day (1st September). The passive rôle assigned to the Guard had enabled General Kuroki to transfer this regiment to the right. Night found the division still occupying the position described in paragraph 82.

89. On arrival at Point 5 (D 6) at daybreak we found the **1st Sept.** situation to be as follows:—All was silent in our front; the right wing of the division was still holding its entrenched position, but we could see Japanese infantry occupying points on the ridge south-west of Meng-chia-fang on the extreme right of the line of hills lately held by the Russians. It appeared to me that the Russians had evacuated the whole position in front of the Guard, but none of the troops on our hill had any information to that effect, and one officer positively asserted that the contrary was the case, and that an attack was expected, the previous day's anxiety being, no doubt, reflected in his opinions. Later on all doubts were set at rest, when lines and columns of infantry advanced along the ridge, moving across the Japanese front and within range of their guns, in march formations, and along the exposed slopes. This and the sight of three Chinamen walking about the silent Russian trenches was sufficiently convincing. Up to 8.30 a.m. the troops on the hill were without the necessary information, and were still lying behind the crests and improving their trenches.


90. There was no artillery fire going on out in the plains, no signs of life in Liao-yang, and most of the railway trucks had gone from the north of the town. Only away to the east, where the 2nd and 12th Divisions were, could we hear the guns going, their fire increasing in severity as the morning went on. Knowing nothing about the situation beyond the capture of Shou-shan-pu and knowing nothing about the strong, semi-permanent works and entrenchments concealed in the *kuoliang* round Liao-yang, it seemed to me as if Kuropatkin had evacuated the town, and was now merely engaged in warding off General Kuroki's attempt to cut his line of retreat. This illusion was soon dispelled, the battle beginning all round the town during the morning.

91. Shortly after 8.30 a.m. the leading Japanese infantry coming from Meng-chia-fang along the ridge had reached the saddle over which the Shih-chang-yu-Hsui-chia-ho road passes, and we then went to rejoin Divisional Head-Quarters in the saddle south-west of us. From 9 to 9.15 a.m. 1st Guard Battery fired slowly at the hills about Cha-lu-tzu without eliciting any response, and about 9 a.m. West Tumulus Hill (D 6) was crowned by the Japanese infantry, which belonged, I think, to the 10th Division. At 10.30 we reached Divisional Head-Quarters, where the divisional reserve, one battalion, was collecting.

92. At 11 a.m. we were informed that the enemy had retired on Liao-yang, and that Divisional Head-Quarters would shortly advance. We were asked to follow them after a short interval.

At midday we went on, and riding through Hsui-chia-ho Central, went to examine the Russian position and the trenches attacked by the 3rd Guards. The following points were of interest:—

- (1) The lower trenches were all of the same profile, though rock sometimes prevented the necessary depth being reached.




- (2) Most of them were traversed at intervals of from 15 to 25 yards, according to their liability to enfilade, the traverses being 10 feet long and 9 feet thick.
- (3) The interior slope was revetted with sods, the exterior roughly with brushwood, stones, or *kaoliang*.
- (4) The brown parapets were very conspicuous on the green hills.
- (5) There was no head-cover.
- (6) The soil was hard clay, shale, and rock, and the trenches must have taken a lot of labour.
- (7) Trench "a" (D 6) was 100 yards long.

"	"b"	"	200	"
"	"c"	"	200	"
"	"d"	"	100	"
"	"e"	"	140	"
"	"f"	"	75	"

All were traversed except d.

- (8) Trenches "a," "b," "e" were, where possible, of the usual profile, but they were irregular and shallow in parts owing to rocks.
- (9) In trench "c" were the bodies of seventeen men, nearly all killed by the layonet during the counter-attacks on withdrawal. These were the only dead left when the attack was withdrawn.
- (10) The higher the trenches the shallower they became; those half-way up West Tumulus Hill had no eighteen inch trench at the bottom, while higher still they were 3 feet by 3½ feet shelter trenches.
- (11) In "g" and "h" the enormous number of empty cases testified to the severity of the fire, while the quantities of unexpended ammunition reminded me of the trenches at Paardeberg after the surrender.

- (12) Some of the main trenches were linked by half-hour shelter trenches, or by a row of those shelters, which seem to be the one form of hasty entrenchment taught to all Russian infantry.



- (13) The whole hill-side was sown with Japanese rifle and shrapnel bullets, the former nearly all stripped by the stones. On the lower slopes we found half a dozen 15-cm. shrapnel cases.
- (14) All the lower trenches were commanded by others above them, at ranges of from 200 to 800 yards.

93. On ascending to the West Tumulus we got a splendid view of the town and plain of Liao-yang and of the valley of the Tai-tzu Ho. We were unable to remain at the West Tumulus, and I only had time to observe (1) that the big fire which had broken out on the 31st was still burning; (2) at 3.30 p.m. a long train steamed north across the railway bridge; (3) there were masses of troops bivouacked along the right bank opposite the town; (4) there were five bridges, besides the railway bridge, spanning the river, the nearest to us (east) being a pontoon bridge to Mu-chang (D 5); (5) artillery fighting had begun once more south-west and south of the town, B/1, B 2, and B 3,* firing shrapnel at infantry we could not see on account of the *kaoliang* and the trees round the villages, and receiving shrapnel from Japanese guns we could not locate for the same reason. The flash of the Russian guns was, however, distinctly visible.

94. During the morning the Guard Division advanced, and at night occupied a line running from the ridge one mile north-east of Wang-pao-tai, past the north of Cha-lu-tzu to Shih-chang-yu, and thence to the ridge north-west of the last named. Early in the morning the general commanding had advanced what remained to him of the Matsunaga Detachment, as the first move in the attack he intended to deliver against the Russian position, but on finding that the ridge had been abandoned, he decided that he could dispense with the detachment, and it was sent back in the afternoon to rejoin the 2nd Division, which it reached at 9.30 the next morning, as heavy fighting was going on on Manju-yara, and all available troops were badly wanted there by General Kuroki.

95. We learned in the afternoon that the 10th Division had advanced to the attack of Yeh-fang (C D 5) at the south-east corner of Liao-yang, and that to assist the attack four batteries

* See squares C 4, C 5, and D 5 of Map 34.

of the Guard Artillery had come into action in a position south of Kao-li-tsun (D 5) and had shelled the enemy's guns near Yeh-fang and Mu-chang. This was all the fighting the division did on the 1st September, the 10th Division having advanced across its front and left nothing to do towards Liao-yang. Our information in the evening was to the effect that there was still a big force of Russians in Liao-yang, though the bulk of their army had withdrawn to the right bank; that the bridge at Mu-chang had been broken or removed, and that heavy fighting was expected on the morrow.

2nd Sept.

96. On the morning of the 2nd September the Second and Fourth Armies had reached the last Russian line of defence round Liao-yang, and the Second Army hoped to reach the Tai-tzu Ho that day. This was the information General Kuroki received in the morning, and as the other Armies seemed to be getting on so well, and as the 2nd and 12th Divisions were now in a good position to operate against Kuropatkin's line of retreat, all seemed well, and it remained for the First Army to push on. The Guard therefore received the following order at 8.30 a.m. :—

"The First Army, after taking Hill 131 (E 4), intends to move to the line San-tao-pa (D 3)—Lo-ta-tai (D 4). The Guard Division will therefore, if possible, cross the Tai-tzu Ho, near Ku-cheng-tzu, and take Hill 151 (E 4)."

97. But Kuropatkin was not so easily to be disposed of. The semi-permanent entrenchments round Liao-yang, at which thousands of Chinese coolies had been working for three or four months, were very formidable, and remained concealed in the *kaoliang*. Only where it was absolutely necessary to clear a field of fire had the *kaoliang* been touched, and then it was, as a rule, only bent waist high. Ridges (E 4) 151 and 131 had strong trenches along them, and working parties were hard at work adding to them; they were occupied by both infantry and artillery, the guns on 151 commanding the valley across which the Guard had been ordered to endeavour to advance. An attack on 151 further included the passage of the Tai-tzu Ho, broad and unbridged. The day, therefore, turned out one of disappointment to the Japanese, none of their Armies making the progress expected.

98. How the general officer commanding the Guard Division viewed General Kuroki's order, and what messages passed between them, I do not know; but we were informed early in the morning that the division would occupy a position with its right resting on the Mandarin Road, with the object of attracting to its front and containing as many of the enemy as possible, and so of relieving the opposition to the divisions on its flanks. To force the passage of the river in the face of a strong position, a re-arrangement of the division, more especially of the artillery, would be necessary, and fords would have to be found, and these and other measures could hardly be carried out in

broad daylight under the eyes of a strongly posted infantry and artillery. Beyond some artillery firing on the lines of that of the previous day, the Guard therefore did nothing on the 2nd; but during the day the commander made the following dispositions for the morrow :—

- (1) *1st Brigade* to occupy the line Shui-yu (E 5)—Hu-ta-chieh (E 5), one battalion north of the former, the remainder south of the latter village.
- (2) *2nd Brigade* to occupy a line west of Hu-ta-chieh, with a detachment at a point half a mile north of Kao-li-tsun (D 5) on the Mandarin Road.
- (3) *Reserve*, one battalion from each brigade at a point 1,200 yards east of Cha-lu-tzu (D 6).
- (4) *Artillery*.—Five batteries to occupy a position in a basin in the hills, near the cross roads, 1,800 yards south-west of Hu-ta-chieh; heavy field artillery and one field battery to take up a position on the Mandarin Road east of Kao-li-tsun.

These positions were all occupied on the night of the 2nd.

99. As the division was not taking any active part in the day's fighting, I spent a very interesting day watching Liao-yang and the bridges from West Tumulus Hill (D 6). At 8.30 a.m. the situation appeared to be as follows :—

- (1) Bridge near Mu-chang (E 5) had been removed; the other four and the railway bridge were intact.
- (2) B/1* (two batteries a few hundred yards apart) was engaged in a duel with unseen batteries to the south-west of it.
- (3) Russian working parties were busy at entrenchments on the two low hills (Z) north of Mu-chang (E 5).
- (4) A long train with two engines was crossing the railway bridge to the right bank.
- (5) Another big fire was burning in the plain just beyond the town.
- (6) Infantry of the 10th Division was advancing in columns from the hills towards the south-east corner of the town and disappearing from view in the *kaoliang* and villages.
- (7) Japanese shrapnel were bursting over Hill 131 (E 4).
- (8) The masses of troops had gone from the right bank.

The whole action of the Russians during the day gave one the idea that Kuropatkin had no intention of letting the Japanese get into the town yet awhile, or interfere with his retreat, which seemed to be going on quietly and uninterruptedly.

100. From about 10.15 a.m. there was a heavy infantry engagement in front of the Russian entrenchments south-east of the town. The Japanese attack there seemed to receive but

* On square C 4 of Map 34.

little artillery support in the morning except from the two Guard batteries, and it was not till about 1 p.m. that some batteries of the Fourth Army opened fire from a position on our left, which we could not locate, against B/3* and B/4*. All day long this attack of the 10th Division was subjected to a tremendous frontal and flanking fire of shrapnel from B/3, 4, 5, and 6,* which came into action, the first three about 11 a.m., the last at 12.30 p.m. The whole fight was concealed from our view by the crops and village trees, and all we were aware of was the incessant rolling of musketry, the flashes of the Russian guns, and the bouquets of bursting shrapnel. The artillery of the Guard and 10th Divisions did their best, but the ranges were too great, and the Russian gunners paid them but little attention, and devoted their fire to the Japanese infantry, apparently with success, as the attack made no headway.

101. During the time we were on the West Tumulus Hill (D 6), 8.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m., many long columns of one-horse transport carts left the town and crossed to the right bank by bridges B and C, probably also by A, which was hidden from us by the railway bridge; another long train went away over the railway bridge, and four fresh fires broke out. At 11.30 a.m. a long column of cavalry, with some guns, crossed the railway bridge to the left bank; it took forty-five minutes crossing in half sections, and must have been about a division. A field battery also crossed to the left bank by bridge D at 10 a.m. All day long the fighting raged round the south and west sides of the town.

102. At 11 p.m. a tremendous artillery and infantry fire broke out between our bivouac at Wang-pao-tai (D 6) and the south-east edge of the town, and continued till 11.40 p.m., after which it gradually died away. I believe it was an abortive night attack made by the 10th Division, but we never got any details of it.

3rd Sept.

103. During the night of the 2nd 3rd September the Guard Division occupied its assigned position, and at daylight its batteries opened fire, Hijikata firing principally at Yeh-fang (C/D 5) and the hills north of Mu-chang (D 5), the right group at the Russian batteries to the east, higher up the river.† The easternmost of the Russian batteries was, we were told, armed with 15-cm. guns or howitzers.

104. General Kuroki was labouring under the idea that the Second Army had reached the Tai-tzu Ho the previous night as expected, and as communication with General Head-Quarters had broken down, he had not yet been informed of its failure to do so. He consequently wanted to do all in his power to push on his Army against the line of retreat of the Russians, whom

* On squares C 5 and D 5 of Map 31.

† The Russian batteries were thus placed: One battery south of Yeh-fang (C D 5), three north of Mu-chang (D 5), three north of, and one to the north-east of, San-wang-tzu (D E 5).

he pictured retiring in confusion before the victorious advance of the Second and Fourth Armies. But the 2nd and 12th Divisions were so completely held in check by the superior force in their front, that a successful advance of the Guard against Hill 151 (E 4) was the only thing that would enable him to get on. At 7 a.m., therefore, on the 3rd September he despatched an order to the Guard Division, to push on the attack against Hill 151 as quickly as possible. But Kuropatkin was not to be denied. He meant to withdraw his army in safety, and also, if possible, to crush the 2nd and 12th Divisions. Although unsuccessful in the latter part of his programme, he continued during the 3rd to hold those two divisions in check, and he gave the Guard no opportunity of crossing the river in its front.

105. At 9 a.m. we were informed that the Guard was going to advance against Hill 151 should a favourable opportunity occur, but that reconnaissance of the river for fords was not possible owing to posts of Russian infantry along the right bank. Information about the enemy was to the effect that he had retired before the advance of the Second and Fourth Armies, but was defending the town with a strong force; but that his main forces were on the right bank between Hsin-cheng (D 4) and San-wang-tzu (D/E 5). Later in the morning a staff officer told us that though they had been unable to reconnoitre the fords themselves the enemy's cavalry patrols had shown them where they were. The general further calculated that the Russian artillery in position against the division consisted of two eight-gun batteries opposite the right, the one to the north-east being a 15-cm. battery, and fourteen to eighteen guns opposite the left a fairly correct estimate, I think. The fire against the right group of Japanese batteries was very heavy; the Russian batteries being dispersed, the Japanese concentrated in a confined position; but the centre of the division was not so severely shelled, while the two batteries on the left received but little fire all day. All day long the right group of batteries was subjected to this crushing fire, and could produce but an inadequate effect in reply, but the demonstration made by the division had the effect of drawing a very considerable force of the enemy from the north and north-east to Hill 151 to oppose a possible attack on that hill. The pressure on the 2nd and 12th Divisions was thus to some extent relieved, and they were able to hold on though they made no headway.

106. At 9.45 a.m. we were permitted to go to the top of the hill east of the Mandarin Road, Point 6 (D 5), and thence the situation about Liao-yang appeared to be as follows:—

- (1) South of Liao-yang the infantry did not seem to have made much headway, though the 10th Division batteries were occupying more advanced positions.
- 2) A tremendous artillery fight was raging all round the south-west and north-west of the town.

- (3) The 2nd and 12th Divisions were also having a severe artillery action.
- (4) The Russian batteries B 3, 5, and 6* were all hard at it and were joined a little later by B/4.*
- (5) The bridges were all intact.
- (6) There were still some lines of trucks between the station and the river, and long trains were standing on each side of the bridge.
- (7) There were no fires burning.
- (8) There was a great collection of one-horse transport carts on the left bank by bridge C.
- (9) A continuous stream of one-horse carts was crossing bridge A, and another was passing the river at ford G (C/D 4).

107. During the day the fight raged round the town, with occasional lulls, and by midday the Japanese shells were creeping further forward, and I could see them bursting over the town itself and even near the river bank north of the town. B/3, 4, 5, and 6* spent most of the day shelling the 10th Division attack on the south side of the town, taking it in front and flank, but the two latter batteries fired now and then at the two batteries on the left of the Guard. The Russian batteries higher up the river fired mostly at the right group of Guard batteries, but sent occasional *rafales* at the Guard infantry in the Cha-lu-tzu (D 6)-Sha-pu (D 5) valley.

108. About 10.30 a.m. long columns of transport carts began crossing bridges B and C to the right bank, and during the morning thousands crossed at A, B, C, and G; they continued crossing at intervals during the afternoon, even the railway bridge being used for the purpose. Bridge D was kept open, and was very little used during the day except for artillery ammunition supply, wagons for which crossed and re-crossed during the afternoon. Some infantry also retired across bridge C and the railway bridge between 12.30 and 1.30 p.m. while a body of cavalry, about a regiment, retired over the latter. Two long trains left between 1 and 1.30 p.m. No less than six fires broke out between 11.30 a.m. and 4 p.m.; some long white sheds were fired, and a big fire broke out near the foot of the tower and burned furiously for the rest of the day. The latter conflagration came from burning storehouses and sacks of flour and grain, which smouldered for a fortnight. At 2.30 p.m. I also noticed parties of men at work along bridges C and D, who seemed to be preparing them for demolition. The only time I saw a heliograph at work was on this day; it was being used near the tower. The impression I gained during the day was that Kuropatkin's artillery was enabling him to conduct a very masterly retreat. At 5 p.m. we had to leave our hill and return

* See squares C 4, C 5, and D 5 on Map 34.

to Divisional Head-Quarters at Wang-pao-tai (D 6). The day had been hot, as had also the two preceding ones (1st and 2nd). There had been some showers on the afternoon of the 31st, but after that the weather was fine and hot till the 5th.

109. That night we were informed that the 2nd and 12th Divisions had had very hard fighting, and that about a brigade of the Guard had been sent to reinforce them. The reasons for this move were as follows:—During the day General Kuroki discovered that the 2nd and 12th Divisions could make no progress, opposed as they were by a very strong force with a powerful and ever-increasing artillery, and further that the Guard could not be expected to attack Hill 151 with any certainty of success. What he does not appear to have grasped, though the commander of the Guard Division must have enlightened him on the situation, was that there was still a strong force of Russians in Liao-yang who were holding up the right of the Fourth Army, and that until the latter could oust the defenders from their entrenchments the enemy were not likely to give the Guard the opportunity it was waiting for, to attack to its front across the river. During the day, however, the reports from the Guard Division must have put him in possession of the information that neither the Fourth nor Second Armies were within measurable distance of the river, a fact he would have learned from General Head-Quarters if communication had not been cut. As it was all important, if Kuropatkin's line of retreat was to be interfered with, that the outflanking movement of the 2nd and 12th Divisions should get on, General Kuroki decided to reinforce them with the bulk of the Guard Division, leaving only a small force to contain the Russians on Hill 151.

110. So at 8 p.m. that evening (3rd September) he issued an order to the commander of the Guard Division directing him to leave three batteries and some infantry to draw the attention of the enemy in his front, and to bring the rest of his division round as quickly as possible to Army Head-Quarters at Hou Kuan-tun (F 4). The commander of the Guard Division had evidently anticipated this order, as when it arrived he had already begun making arrangements to carry it out; and to deceive the large Russian force he had attracted to the line Mu-chang (D 5), Tai-tzu-kou (D 4), Hsia Miao (E 5), Ta-tzu-pu (E 4), he was leaving two batteries in position on the right, Hijikata on the left, and a battalion of infantry to link and protect them—a very small force on a broad front. That evening he despatched six battalions* which he was able to collect in daylight unperceived by the enemy, under the commander of the 2nd Brigade; and the remainder of the division, excluding the screen left in position, he withdrew under cover of darkness and despatched early the next morning (4th September). By the time, however, that

* 4th Regiment, one battalion 3rd Regiment, two battalions 2nd Regiment. They arrived on the morning of the 4th Sept.—C. V. II.

these reinforcements became effective, Kuropatkin had practically completed his withdrawal from Liao-yang, and the First Army had lost its opportunity of getting across his line of retreat.

111. It was only at 11 p.m. that communication with General Head-Quarters was restored. General Kuroki was then informed that the enemy's last line of defences had been pierced only at 5 p.m., and that the city was entered only that night. The Second and Fourth Armies, therefore, did not reach the left bank of the river until the morning of the 4th.

4th Sept.

112. The movements of the Guard Division subsequent to the 3rd September had no effect on the course of the battle. It was only on the early morning of the 4th that we heard of the above events. We were also told that the 3rd Guard Regiment and Divisional Head-Quarters were about to follow, and that we were to accompany them. Our march was to be *via* An-ping (F 6).

113. We started at 8 a.m., and marched along the Mandarin Road *via* Hsiao-ling-tzu (E 7) to near Tang-ho-yen (E 7), and then up the left bank of the Tang Ho to An-ping, which we reached about 1 p.m. A description of the Tang Ho valley has already been given; the river was about a hundred yards wide, and fordable in many places. An-ping is a substantial "town," with many stone houses, but the only wall is round the *Yamen*. Divisional Head-Quarters halted at An-ping till 4.20 p.m. waiting, I think, for orders from Army Head-Quarters as to its direction and destination.

As the enemy was withdrawing from his front, General Kuroki issued orders to the 2nd and 12th Divisions at 2.30 p.m. to advance to the line Coal Mine (F 3)-San-tao-pa (D 3)-Lo-ta-tai (D 4), and the Guard Division was informed of this and ordered to march to Kuan-tun (F 4), *en route* for Hei-ying-tai. This was our destination when we left An-ping, but at 5.10 p.m. General Kuroki heard from General Head-Quarters that the enemy had evacuated Liao-yang completely. He also heard that Hill 151 (E 4) had been abandoned by the Russians, and that the Guard Cavalry had occupied the Liu-chia-fang Pass (E 4). There was therefore no further necessity to reinforce his right, as the retreating enemy had slipped past him, so he ordered the Guard, which by this time was well north of An-ping, to bivouac for the night at Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5), cross the Tai-tzu Ho near Shang Miao (E 4) early the following morning, and occupy Liu-chia-fang (E 4) and Tsao-chin-tzu (E 4) by 8 a.m. Divisional Head-Quarters reached Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) in the darkness at 8.20 p.m., after a twenty-mile march, and bivouacked. Between An-ping and Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) the Tang Ho was forded twice, one of the fords being one hundred and fifty yards wide and about two and a half feet deep.

5th Sept.

114. The division marched in the small hours of the morning, Divisional Head-Quarters moving off at 5.50 a.m. by

the light of a waning moon. The previous evening the general commanding had sent orders to the detachment he had left opposite Hill 151 (E 4) to move up the river *via* Hsiao-tun-tzu (E 5) during the night, and to rejoin Divisional Head-Quarters, the infantry of the detachment crossing to the right bank near Shang Miao (E 4), and occupying the heights of Liu-chia-fang (E 4), so as to cover the crossing of the division at the same point. Just before dawn Divisional Head-Quarters struck the valley of the Tai-tzu Ho, and at 6 a.m. reached the pontoon bridge which had been thrown across the river just above Shang Miao. The artillery was engaged in crossing when we arrived, and by 7 a.m. the remainder of the division was across. Divisional Head-Quarters then followed.

115. The valley of the Tai-tzu Ho is here about a mile wide and quite flat. Half this width is taken up by sandy, pebbly river bed, the other half by cultivation. The usual steep, stony, scrub-covered hills rise from one hundred and fifty to four hundred feet abruptly from the valley edges. The river, in the then prevailing dry weather, was from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty yards wide and three or four feet deep at least. The bridge had been thrown during the night by the 12th Division, the pontoons having been prepared near Tiao-shui-lou (F 4), and floated down to Shang Miao (E 4). It was ready a short time before we arrived. It was 120 yards long, of which 100 yards was pontoon bridge laid on twenty-nine pontoons, and 20 yards trestle bridge of regulation materials. There was an eight to nine feet roadway.

116. After crossing the river we marched through Shang Miao and along the broad valley between Hills 131 (E 4) and 151 (E 4) to Liu-chia-fang. At Shang Miao a tremendous thunderstorm broke; the rain came down in torrents for half an hour, and went on at intervals for another hour. The surface of the deep-rutted, sun-baked mud road became intensely slippery and, while our horses had great difficulty in keeping on their legs, the artillery was almost brought to a standstill at every slight rise; slippery sides and holding bottom made every small nullah an obstacle. At 9.30 a.m. we debouched from the hills at Liu-chia-fang. In front of us lay a line of low heights and beyond them the Liao-yang plain stretched to the horizon. After some delay Divisional Head-Quarters moved on to Lo-ta-tai (D 4), and at 2 p.m. we were given the following information:—

- (1) The enemy has retired north and north-west, his main force probably in the former direction, and one or two divisions in the latter.
- (2) About a mile in front of the Guard Division is a Russian cavalry regiment, which will soon be driven off.

- (3) A considerable force of the enemy is collected at Yen-tai (E 2), and is entraining there.
- (4) Liao-yang has been taken, and yesterday (4th September) the Second and Fourth Armies advanced past the town to the river.
- (5) The 2nd Division is on our right, the 12th Division on their right, Army Head-Quarters probably at Hei-ying-tai (F 4).
- (6) The division is somewhat out of touch with Army Head-Quarters, so orders and information are delayed.
- (7) The Guard Division was hurried over to the east with the object of making the enemy stand and fight there, but it arrived too late. The general commanding the 2nd Brigade arrived yesterday (4th September), with six battalions in rear of the 2nd Division, but was not engaged.

Between 9 and 11 a.m. we had heard the 2nd Division guns shelling Yen-tai, but the Guard met with no opposition, and were not engaged all day. Divisional Head-Quarters returned at 5 p.m. to Chang-shui-tun (D/E 4), where they billeted.

117. Thus ended the operations which, begun on the 23rd August by the Guard Division, culminated on the 4th September in the withdrawal by Kuropatkin of his whole army, and in the occupation of Liao-yang by the Japanese. The Russians left no prisoners and but few stores in Marshal Oyama's hands; judging by what we subsequently saw and heard, it was the prestige more than the *moral* of the Russian Army that suffered from his retirement. The retreat was conducted in a very able manner, the Russian artillery contributing most conspicuously to the success of the operation.

118. The losses of the Guard Division, including the 29th Regiment, between the 23rd August and 6th September, amounted to 91 officers and about 2,500 non-commissioned officers and men.

119. The force at General Kuroki's disposal for his out-flanking movement was quite inadequate for the purpose; in fact, on the night of the 2nd/3rd September its very existence depended on its retention of Manju-yama (F 4). Seeing that the task was beyond its strength, should not General Kuroki have ordered the Guard to do on the 2nd what he ordered them to do on the 3rd, *i.e.*, leave a screen opposite Hill 151, and march round to reinforce the right? I heard this question raised by a Japanese staff officer, and it is an interesting one to consider. To put it in another form, would the addition of another division to the force which had crossed the river have made such a certainty of its success that General Kuroki could have afforded to take the risk of uncovering the

flank of the Fourth Army, and to leave a gap of over twelve miles between it and the next troops on its right? The other conditions affecting the question were (1) that Kuropatkin was retreating, or at all events the Japanese were convinced he was, and (2) that he was still keeping the Fourth and Second Armies at arm's length.

120. On the morning of 6th September I rode with two 6 Sept. other attachés to visit Liao-yang. On reaching the river at B we found the bridge had been destroyed, and we were also told that bridges C and D had been broken up and burned. The four bridges A, B, C, and D were strong wooden bridges for wheeled traffic, laid on piles or frames where the river bed was shallow, and on big, roomy native boats where the channel was deep and swift. They had been most thoroughly destroyed, as the charred ends of piles and wrecked boats sticking out of the water testified. The river was from three hundred and fifty to four hundred yards wide, and to some extent in flood from the previous day's rain; the long winding ford near bridge B was over three feet deep in parts, and as the current was very rapid we decided to cross at the railway bridge, some three thousand yards lower down. The railway bridge is about five hundred yards long, a deep lattice-girder construction resting on stone piers; the rails are laid on the top, which is over thirty feet above the water, and boarded flush with the rails for its whole breadth, providing a roadway fourteen or fifteen feet wide; a hand-rail ran along each side. We found the bridge had been sufficiently destroyed to stop pursuit, that is to say, the roadway had been burned, the rails broken and twisted, and the hand-rail thrown down; the framework of the bridge was uninjured. On the north side of the railway bridge and close alongside it were the charred remains of bridge A.

121. We left our horses and had a precarious walk across on an outside girder, and on reaching the far side found Japanese soldiers at work temporarily boarding the roadway from the left bank, pushing trucks full of planks up from the town by hand for the purpose. We walked along the line to the vicinity of the station, and then turned down into the Chinese town. The Russian quarter was gutted and burned, but the Chinese quarter was untouched, and trade with the victors was brisk. Roads there were none, and the whole of the open ground on which the Russian quarter stood had been turned by the previous day's rain into a vast sea of mud, cut up by deep wheel tracks. There were large quantities of expended artillery cartridges along the line near the town, and a few piles of sacks of flour and grain were burning near the west foot of the tower, while others beside them were intact. These were the only abandoned stores I saw, a comparatively negligible quantity when the strength of Kuropatkin's army is considered.

122. That the heavy storm described did not burst till the 5th was probably fortunate for the Russians, as the deep

holding roads near Liao-yang must otherwise have hampered their retreat, and obliged Kuropatkin to prolong the battle or sacrifice some of the stores which he succeeded in carrying off.

APPENDIX.

ATTACK ON THE RUSSIAN RIGHT FLANK AT TA HSI-KOU (D 8) BY THE LEFT WING OF THE GUARD DIVISION ON THE 26TH AND 27TH AUGUST 1904.

1. After the action at Tung-hsin-pu (E 8) on the 25th August, the left wing of the Guard Division (the 1st Brigade commanded by Major-General Asada took up the line Ta-hou (E 8)-Tung-hsin-pu (E 8) and bivouacked. From reports received by the G.O.C. Division it appeared that :—

- (a) The Russians were holding the line Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8)-Ta-hsiang-tun (E 8)-Pei-tzu-ha (D/E 8)-Ta Hsi-kou, and were strongly entrenched.
- (b) A force of between 3,000 and 4,000 cavalry, with a few companies of infantry and some mountain guns, had moved from Lao-tien-tan (D 9) and Ta-lien-kou (D 9) to Ta Hsi-kou.
- (c) The trenches north of Ta Hsi-kou were being prolonged to the west.

2. Knowing this, Major-General Asada proposed to the general commanding the division that his brigade should concentrate on the hill south of Ta Hsi-kou during the night, and attack to the north before dawn. The general concurred, and at 7 p.m. issued orders for the attack to be carried out. General Asada therefore concentrated his brigade before 3 a.m. on the open ground south of Hei-lin-tzu (D 8), despatching patrols to the front from each regiment to drive back the Russian outposts and so conceal his dispositions.

3. Major-General Asada had five battalions at his disposal, the II./2 having been left in position north-east of Tung-hsin-pu (D 8), and his orders for the attack were as follows :—

- (1) 1st Regiment (less one battalion) to start from the village 2,000 yards south of Ta Hsi-kou at 3 a.m., and attack the highest hill south of San-chia-ku (D 7).
- (2) 2nd Regiment (two battalions) to start at 4 a.m. and attack the ridge north of Hsiao Hsi-kou (D 8), advancing along the valley 800 yards north of Hei-lin-tzu.
- (3) II./1 to remain in reserve.

4. The 2nd Regiment reached Ta Hsi-kou* at 5 a.m. without opposition and sent two companies on to ridge A, and one company to col (a), the rest of the regiment remaining in the valley west of A. Col (a) was occupied by a few Russians, who retired. At 6.30 a.m. the officer commanding the 2nd Regiment extended I./2 and III./2 along the ridge north of B., whereupon the Russians opened artillery fire from (e); the Japanese guns near Tung-hsin-pu replied, and for a while silenced the Russian guns. At the same time a Russian battery came into action on hill (d) and fired at the infantry, and a battalion opened fire from hill (b). To the latter the Japanese did not reply.

5. The 1st Regiment arrived at C at 3.30 a.m. The object of the regiment was to occupy ridge D; and to guard its left flank and assist its advance, the 12th Company was sent out to the left with orders to advance *via* C on E. When the leading battalion (the 1st) reached Ta Hsi-kou, about forty of the enemy opened fire on it from the village, but as it was still dark the battalion went straight on towards D, the 1st and 4th Companies leading. As these two companies arrived at D, a Russian company appeared on hill C, and took them in flank and rear, but simultaneously the 12th Company attacked the right flank of the Russian company and drove it away northwards. I./1 was therefore able to continue its advance till it was perceived by the battery at (d), which opened a hot fire on it. The battalion therefore took cover in the valley, sending only the 4th Company on to ridge D. Meanwhile the 12th Company pushed on northwards and, on reaching the road just south of knoll E, found E was held by the enemy. So the company fixed bayonets, charged, and took the hill; but the Russians who retired from it faced about again at F, and were reinforced. The 12th Company therefore found itself in a tight place, and it lost so many men that it had to entrench at E. The officer commanding the 1st Regiment, seeing this, ordered the 9th Company to reinforce, and the 10th and 11th Companies to advance as regimental reserve along the valley towards E.

6. Major-General Asada reached col (a) at 7 a.m. Thence he could see that the guns at (d) were mountain guns, that hill (b) was unentrenched, but held by more than a battalion, and that Hill 201 was occupied by the enemy. At 7.50 a.m. the I./2 advanced past A against (e), and at 8 a.m. reached B, suffering heavily from the artillery at (e) and the infantry at (b) and (c).

7. Previous to this, Major-General Asada had perceived what a difficult place (b) was to attack, so had ordered the officer commanding the 2nd Regiment to co-operate with the 1st Regiment in its advance against it. The officer commanding 2nd Regiment therefore ordered III./2 to attack (b), while the 1st faced (c); but as soon as III./2 began its advance, it received such a hot fire from (b) and (c) that it could make no

* See Map 35.

headway. At the same time (about 7 a.m.) the enemy received reinforcements, and a stationary fight took place.

8. At about the same time also the 1st Regiment extended the 1st Company to the right of the 4th on col (a), and both companies fired at (b). The guns at (d) shelled the col, and the infantry at (b), extending to its right, tried to surround the two companies at (a). The officer commanding the 1st Regiment therefore gave his remaining two companies to the officer commanding III./1 to secure his position at E. At 8 a.m. the 1st and 4th Companies advanced from (a) against G under a heavy fire, the 2nd and 3rd Companies going round by col H, the object of the battalion being to protect the left flank of the 2nd Regiment. At 8.20 a.m. the 1st and 4th Companies reached G, but their situation was a very precarious one, and they suffered very heavily, as the enemy had the command. The officer commanding III./1 seeing that he must support the 1st, attacked the Russians at F and drove them back; but in a few minutes reinforcements appeared at (f) and engaged the battalion. The position at F was a much lower one than that at (f), and a narrow one into the bargain, and to make matters worse, the Russians at (f) extended to (k) and surrounded the battalion.

9. At 8.30 a.m. Major-General Asada sent up a company of his reserve to the officer commanding the 1st Regiment, who immediately reinforced his front line and tried to advance against (b). But it was an impossible task, owing to the difficult ground and heavy fire. At 9.15 a.m. Major-General Asada reported the situation to the commander of the division, and asked for artillery support. III./1 was fighting at F till 11 a.m., and tried many times to assault (f), but without success; eventually, seeing the enemy advancing from Hill 201 against his left, he sent the 11th Company to M to protect his flank, and remained where he was. Major-General Asada, seeing this, sent a detachment to C to watch the enemy, and two of his last reserve companies to occupy D. The situation was so precarious that the general stopped the attack, and ordered the troops at F, G, E, and M to retire on D. They retired in good order, and occupied the position shown on the sketch.

10. At 2.30 p.m. Major-General Asada received a message from the commander of the division to the following effect:—
“If the enemy’s position is too difficult to attack, you may content yourself with retaining your present position. But you must hold on to that. I think I can send you the divisional reserve to reinforce your brigade. It will be with you by 4 p.m.” A short while after this it became very dark, and heavy rain fell, blotting out objects even close at hand. The Russians seized the opportunity to advance. The men of some companies had but few cartridges left, and the enemy was increasing in strength; so the outlook was not a bright one for the Japanese, but they put their trust in the bayonet and

awaited the enemy. Thus two hours passed, and at 5 p.m. reinforcements in the shape of two companies arrived. At the same time the rain and the Russian attacks ceased. So Major-General Asada ordered the position to be entrenched and to be held during the night.

11. During the night the Russians remained inactive, but at **27th Aug.** dawn on the 27th they opened fire against the 2nd Regiment, their strength in that direction being apparently the same as on the 26th. Opposite the 1st Regiment, however, the Russians had retired from (f) during the night, but though the guns at (d) had changed their position to one that could not be located, they continued firing. Also at 10 a.m. the Russians reappeared at (d) and opened a hot fire against the 1st Regiment.

12. From reports received Major-General Asada learned that the main body of the enemy had retired already; so he resolved to advance. He therefore ordered the 2nd Regiment to threaten the enemy in front and the 1st Regiment to advance against Hou Hsi-kou *via* Hill 201. At 2 p.m. the 1st Regiment occupied 201, and the general sent the following orders to the 2nd Regiment:—

- (1) The enemy seems to be retiring.
- (2) The left wing will pursue from Hou Hsi-kou.
- (3) Leave a portion of the regiment in your present position and come to me at col (a) with your main body.

13. On receipt of these orders, the officer commanding the 2nd Regiment ordered I./2 to remain in position south-east of H, with instructions to contain the enemy in his front, but to advance to Hou Hsi-kou as soon as the situation admitted; he himself went to (a) with the 3rd Battalion. At 2.30 p.m. Major-General Asada left (a) for Hou Hsi-kou with his main force.

14. After taking 201, the 1st Regiment advanced and arrived at Hou Hsi-kou at 5 p.m. I./2 was also shortly able to join in the move to the north-west, and at 6 p.m. the main force of the left wing was at Hou Hsi-kou. Thence it advanced to San-chai-kou, where it was stopped by order of the commander of the division.

15. The strength of the enemy opposed to the left wing on the morning of the 26th was five or six battalions with fourteen guns. Later this force increased to fourteen battalions.

16. *Ammunition.*—On going into action the men had about two hundred rounds apiece. During the action, about thirty rounds per effective rifle were obtained from the dead and wounded, and fifty rounds from the battalion ammunition ponies. At night supplies were brought up from the ammunition column.

**(28) Battle of Liao-Yang.—First Japanese Army.
Operations of the 2nd Division from the 23rd
August to the 5th September 1904.**

REPORT by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery,
12th November 1904.

Plates.

General map	-	-	-	-	-	Map 34
Battle north of the Tai-tzu Ho,	31st August	-	-	-	-	Map 36
" " " "	1st Sept.	} Tracings to place on Map 36	{	"	36A	
" " " "	2nd "			"	36B	
" " " "	3rd "			"	36C	
Panorama, rear guard action, 28th August	-	-	-	-	Panorama 3	
" battle of 30th and 31st August	-	-	-	-	" 4	
" turning movement north of the Tai-tzu Ho	-	-	-	-	" 5	

Since the battle of the 31st July at Ta-wan (G 9),* the head-quarters of the 2nd Division to which I was attached had been at Tien-shui-tien (G 3). The disposition of the division previous to the 25th August was as follows:—

15th Brigade (Major-General Okasaki), head-quarters at Ta Hsi-kou (G 7).

3rd Brigade (Major-General Matsunaga), head-quarters at Hsieh-chia-pu-tzu (G 8).

The Japanese sentry line occupied the long ridge running south from Tung Huang-ni-kou (H 7) to Wu-chia Ling (G 8) and the high ground between this place and Ching-shih-ling (G 8).

The Russians (10th European Corps and 3rd and 9th East Siberian Divisions) were occupying an extended line along the high mountain ranges from Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7) to a hill north-east of Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8), the average distance between the opposing forces being about five thousand five hundred yards. The Japanese and Russian patrols fired at each other daily, but nothing of any importance took place.

18th Aug.

About the 18th August the Russian forces increased considerably near Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7), and General Kuroki determined to attack with his centre (i.e., the 2nd Division) while demonstrating with the 12th Division on the right and the Guard Division on the left, using the 2nd Division as a wedge to drive

* See Map 34.

into the Russian line. It was especially necessary to drive the Russians off their position on the An-ping road. It was a very bold scheme to undertake in such a difficult mountainous country, especially as field artillery could not be used in the district through which the 2nd Division would have to operate. There is a ridge marked 260 (F/G 7) on the map parallel to the Russian main position south of Hsia Hsi-kou (G 7), which had to be passed before the main position could be attacked. This ridge was daily occupied by Russian patrols, but little resistance was expected there. With regard to the main position there were no suitable places from which artillery fire could be brought to bear on the Russian trenches, and thus prepare for the infantry attack in the ordinary way. It was, therefore, decided that an attack in daylight would be too sanguinary, and preparations for a night attack were begun. The difficult nature of this part of the country for any sort of night operations has to be seen to be fully realized. Long steep ridges, surmounted by rocky peaks, deep ravines and gullies, an absence of roads, and the mountain paths difficult even for pack animals. The Russian position being on a continuous ridge with difficult approaches was peculiarly unsuitable for attacking by night.

Extract from First Army orders, dated Chin-chia-pu-tzu **22nd Aug.** (H 9), 5 p.m., 22nd August:—

No. 5.—The 2nd Division, less its cavalry and field artillery, will attack the enemy holding the line Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7) and the hill marked 300 (F 7) before dawn on 26th August. One battery of mountain artillery will be handed over by the 12th Division.

No. 6.—The Guard Division will attack early in the morning of 26th August along the main Liao-yang road at Ta-tien-tzu (E 7/8). The 2nd Division cavalry and three batteries 2nd Division field artillery will be attached.

The 29th Reserve Regiment, in reserve along the line of communications, was called up, and after a very rapid march reached Tien-shui-tien (G 8) on the night of the 25th–26th.

On the 24th August a reconnoitring party of about a company was sent, and “in order to deceive the Russians,” patrols had been despatched in various other directions, for instance, from Kou-tai (F 8). These patrols had no difficulty in pushing back the Russian piquets and non-commissioned officers’ parties. During the few days previous to the 25th, therefore, the Japanese had pretty well taken stock of the Russian position, and felt confident of knowing how to attack it, however dark the night.

Following a week’s downpour in the middle of August, the weather was now bright and clear. *Mangetsu*, too, the harvest moon of Japan, around which so many superstitious hang, would

be at its full about the 26th, and would help to light up the difficult paths by which the troops would have to advance.

The 15th Brigade (16th and 30th Regiments) received orders to march from Tung Huang-ni-kou (H 7) by the road running due west to Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7). The 1st Battalion 16th Regiment was thrown out to the left to keep touch with the 3rd Brigade and the 2nd Battalion 30th Regiment formed the brigade reserve.

The 3rd Brigade was ordered to march by the road Wu-chia Ling (G 8)—Hsia Hsi-kou (G 7), from which direction the main attack was to be made. No. 5 mountain battery 12th Division accompanied this brigade.

As the Russians were unable to see over the ridge on which the Japanese sentries were posted, the Japanese were enabled to lay their telephone lines, and so communicate along a wide front.

25th Aug.

At 4 p.m. on the 25th, the right wing of the 2nd Division assembled according to orders on the road just south of Tung Huang-ni-kou (H 7), while at the same time the left wing, *i.e.*, the 3rd Brigade, was ready to start as follows:—the 4th Regiment from Wu-chia Ling and the 29th Regiment from Hou-wu (G 8) on the left.

At 5 p.m. the advance to the second points of assembly began. The right wing to Ho-chia-pu-tzu (G 6), and the left wing to Shang Weng-chia-pu-tzu (G 7), the 4th Regiment on the right and the 29th Regiment on the left over the eastern slopes of hill 260 (F/G 7).

In front of the left wing (the 3rd Brigade) small parties of Russians were posted on the high hill 260 and across to another hill east of it called by the Japanese Yuwai-yama. As far as could be judged, there were about one hundred Russians on the latter place, one section on 260 and one and a half sections in between. Major-General Matsunaga, therefore, ordered his brigade to drive the Russians back, and the attack began at 11 p.m., the position being occupied about midnight. The right column reached Ho-chia-pu-tzu at 11.30 p.m. so that both had taken up the positions ordered by 12.30 a.m. on the 26th. The reserve also moved on during the night from Wu-chia Ling, where the divisional head-quarters camped on the evening of the 25th.

On the evening of 24th August at Tien-shui-tien, the six foreign attachés received orders to the effect that the Divisional Head-Quarters would move at 1 p.m. next day, and that we also were to be ready to start at the same time with three days' rations and no baggage.

On the evening of the 25th we bivouacked near San-tao-ling (G/H 7) some five miles north of Tien-shui-tien. At 6 p.m. General Kuroki and Lieut.-General Nishi, commanding the 2nd Division, arrived, escorted by a squadron of cavalry, the

horses of which looked extremely well after their month's rest at Tien-shui-tien. I noticed that they were all geldings, and therefore quiet and docile compared to the squealing, biting transport stallions. Bivouacking alongside of us was a battalion of the 30th Regiment and a bearer company. The men of the former all wore white bands on their left arms, so that they could be distinguished in the darkness. Major-General Matsunaga afterwards told me that though these white bands are difficult to see on a dark night, and may be seen by the enemy in bright moonlight, yet they give the men great confidence, and for this reason alone are well worth carrying. After sunset troops were continually moving to the front, including some mountain artillery of the 12th Division, which climbed up the steep ascent to the pass. It certainly was a country for mountain guns alone. The absolute silence of the Japanese troops at night is very striking, always provided the above-mentioned transport stallions are nowhere near. The men squat down where they halt, and never seem to wish to move about, talk, or do anything but sit still. On this night especially, when it was felt throughout the Army that a night attack was impending, the stillness was almost oppressive. One saw the bayonet points sparkling in the moonlight above the crops where the arms were piled, and then the troops moved on like ghosts, now with their bayonets in the scabbards, as the order had gone round that owing to the moonlight bayonets were not to be fixed until the enemy could be plainly distinguished.

It was the intention of the divisional commander to attack **26th Aug.** the Russian position at 4.30 a.m. on the 26th with the right wing a little in advance of the left. At 3.30 a.m. the left brigade was in and around Hsia Hsi-kou (G 7), and the right brigade a little in advance to the north-west of it.

From Hsia Hsi-kou (G 7) three roads or rather valleys radiated towards the Russian position. Along these three paths, Major-General Matsunaga determined to send three columns.

Right column,	7 companies,	4th Regiment.
Centre	„	7 companies, 4th and 29th Regiments.
Left	„	7 companies, 29th Regiment.

Two more companies, which had been left on hill 260, were to follow later. Each column left a reserve of two companies, and the 1st Battalion 4th Regiment remained with the General at Hsia Hsi-kou as brigade reserve.

As the Russian position in front of the 3rd Brigade was so very long, Major-General Matsunaga determined to attack the right half first, and having taken that, push his whole force against the left half.

Now and then, before 3.30 a.m., firing could be heard intermittently all along the line, but at 3.30 a.m. the noise of firing

became continuous from the Russian side. The Divisional Head-Quarters, being in telephonic communication with both wings, knew at once of everything that was taking place. Strict orders had been issued that there was to be no firing before the troops were in position ready for the attack. About 3.30 a.m. when all were in their places, a part of the right wing opened fire, and created a diversion in the Russian lines. This was the signal for a continuous fire from the Russians along the whole length of the position.

Up till now the light of the full moon had made the Japanese advance comparatively easy, but when approaching close to the Russian lines, the advantage of the moonlight was chiefly on the side of the Russians, as it enabled them to see and fire at the Japanese.

By 4 a.m. there was a general movement all along the Japanese line. The infantry formation varied considerably according to the ground.*

At about this time the Russians advanced and opened fire from two spurs north-west of Hsia Hsi-kou. Major General Matsunaga had intended to advance by the path in the valley between these spurs, so sent a battalion of the 4th Regiment to attack the Russians and clear the way. He also issued a special order that there was to be no firing until close up to the Russian trenches, a matter usually left to subordinate commanders, and, as stated before, bayonets were not fixed owing to the moonlight. In order to surprise the Russians, if possible, the battalion moved very cautiously. At 4.15 a.m. two companies crept up to within fifteen yards of the Russian trenches on the spur nearest Hsia Hsi-kou, fixed bayonets, charged with loud shouts of *Banzai*, and drove the Russians off without firing a shot.

At the same time the other two companies attacked the second spur, which is higher than the former, more rocky and difficult. After a desperate fight, in which nearly all the officers were killed or wounded, the companies occupied the spur. The Russians, however, made two determined counter-attacks, but were repulsed. The general himself went to their assistance with the reserve battalion.

By 4.40 a.m. all this part of the Russian line was taken with small loss, and the 15th Brigade came up on the right with little difficulty, as the Russians had commenced to withdraw in front of it early in the action. At 5 a.m., when dawn was breaking, the 3rd Brigade was pouring a heavy fire into the retreating Russians from the top of the ridge. A large body of the latter, however, had taken up a second position on spur X (F 7), and were returning the fire with interest across the

* The following forms were used: A line of scouts followed at 40 to 50 yards distance by companies (1) in columns of fours; (2) in section columns of fours at double deploying interval; (3) in line of sections, with intervals of a section front between sections.—B. V.

intervening valley. It was from this fire that most of the Japanese casualties of the day took place.

Divisional casualties on 25th-26th August :—

700: including 10 officers killed and 23 wounded
(1 battalion commander killed and 2 wounded).

The battalion on the left of the Japanese line now found a "very stubborn enemy" on the rocky mountain T (F 7), who refused to retire. The top of T itself and the ridge to the north-west of it were strongly entrenched. The Russians, who had been steadily improving their entrenching work since the battle of the Ya-lu, had here constructed deep and narrow works affording excellent protection against rifle or shrapnel fire.

About 7 a.m. the Japanese mountain battery, which up to 3 a.m. had been on hill 260 (G 7), came into action on the main ridge near where the An-ping road crosses it, and opened a brisk fire towards the north and west. At about the same time two Russian field batteries appeared in the valley near Tse-kou (F 7), and shelled the Japanese at about 3,000 yards range. Major-General Matsunaga now saw that his left battalion was unable to advance, so sent two companies from the reserve to reinforce it.

At dawn on the 26th the attachés were informed that the intention of General Kuroki was to occupy all the high ground east of the Tang Ho (F 5) that day, also that there were altogether about five Russian divisions in front of the First Army. It was also stated that an attack had been expected against the right of the 12th Division.

As a matter of fact the 12th Division that morning took North Pa-pan Ling (F 5/6), the extreme right of the Russian position (Russian left), which was the primary cause of the Russian retirement.

Of the 2nd Division field artillery, three batteries had been lent to the Guard and the other three remained behind south-west of Tung Huang-ni-kou (H 7), from which position they could not advance in time to take part in the fight, owing to the difficulties of the road.

About 8 a.m. I was on the top of hill 260, whence General Nishi and the divisional staff were watching the operations. At this time the Japanese troops were massed behind the ridge in front. The 15th Brigade could be seen on the high mountain to the right, heavy rifle fire was going on, and wounded were being carried down in stretchers. Russian shrapnel were bursting over the heads of the mountain gunners who were well entrenched on the ridge, but the Russians had over-estimated the range and their fire was doing no damage.

The hills were comparatively bare of trees or scrub except on the lower slopes of hill T, where a battalion of the 29th Regiment was to be seen in a long snake-like line slowly working its way

to a point just south of T (F 7) where its progress was stopped completely by the Russian fire from the trenches across the valley at about five hundred yards range. With the exception of a few on hill T, not a Russian could be seen anywhere, they lay low in their trenches, firing all the time. About 9 a.m. the fire became hotter, and the Japanese were unable to advance in any direction. I heard afterwards that there was only one battalion of Russians holding hill T, but it fought stubbornly, and if any of the 29th Regiment showed their heads they received a shower of bullets. About this time the officer commanding the mountain battery detached two guns to the bottom of the valley close to Hsia Hsi-kou where they came into action in the middle of a *kaoliang* crop, and at 10 a.m. opened an oblique fire on the Russian trenches at about 1,800 yards. The other four guns also loaded up and remained stationary behind the hill to the left of where they had been in action. The Russians still occasionally rained shells over the now empty gun pits. Until I moved down the spur to near where the two guns in the valley were it was impossible to detect them, and probably the Russian infantry also failed to discover them owing to the high crops. The effect of the fire of these two guns was very great, and soon drove the Russian infantry out of their trenches.

At 11 a.m. there was a general cessation of fire in front of the 2nd Division, but the noise of gun and rifle fire could still be heard in the direction of the Guard on our left and of the 12th Division on our right. The various parts of the 2nd Division could now be seen advancing in Indian file up the numerous spurs, a little Japanese flag leading each party. One man ran out several hundreds of yards ahead of the 29th Regiment and planted his flag on the highest point of the rocky mountain T at 11.15 a.m. At 11.30 a.m. the Russian artillery again opened a rapid fire on the mountain artillery position, but nobody was there.

At 11.50 a.m. the mountain battery returned to its old position on the ridge, but the Russians still continued to burst their fuzes too long. At the time there was very heavy firing in the direction of the 12th Division.

It was the intention of General Kuroki to pursue in full force, but the Guard not having taken the heights north of Lang-tzu-shan (E/F 8), prevented this.

It was now necessary to turn the Russians out of a strong position which they held on Hill 300 (F 7), the highest and most difficult mountain in the district. About 4 p.m. a heavy down-pour of rain began, clouds obscured the hills and the ground became sodden and boggy in a few minutes.

An officer's party was despatched to reconnoitre Hill 300, but in the mist the officer mistook a nearer hill for 300 and reported that the Russians had retired. Thunderstorms and rain prevented the attack in any case, so the 2nd Division remained for the night on the captured Russian position.

I walked in pouring rain to the village of Ho-chia-pu-tzu (G 7) and had some difficulty in finding shelter, as all the houses were crammed with wounded and troops. Numbers of wounded Japanese were being brought in, all soaked to the skin. The soldiers too looked pale and tired after their night's exertions. Their knapsacks had been left behind as usual before the attack, and their thin khaki was wet through.

The orders for the next day were to pursue, and it was only discovered after the orders had been issued that a mistake had been made about Hill 300. Supplementary orders were therefore issued to the 3rd Brigade to capture the hill in the morning by an attack from the south, while the mountain battery bombarded it from the east.

The morning of the 27th broke wet and so foggy that the advance had to be delayed. A company was sent out at dawn to reconnoitre Hill 300. The fog prevented the artillery from firing, but favoured the infantry, who got close up to the Russians on the hill. At about 9 a.m. they rushed it and drove the enemy off, the latter retiring in two directions, namely to San-chia-sai (E 6) and Tang-ho-yen (E 7). **27th Aug.**

I spent the morning of the 27th in the village, the surrounding hills being closely wrapt in mist. I spoke to many of the wounded soldiers, who came down to the stream to wash. They told me that the reason why so many officers were hit was that in the bayonet attacks at night the officers led their men with drawn swords and were almost certain to be hit. It was interesting to see these wounded soldiers who must have spent a wretched night crowded together in dirty Chinese houses, hobbling down to wash, apparently in the best of spirits. Many had been hit in the legs and hopped down on one leg with the help of a stick. Others had been wounded about the neck and shoulders, presumably when lying down to fire. In one case the bullet had entered at one side of the jaw and come out at the other; the man's head was bandaged up, yet he came down to wash himself like the rest. They are splendid material these infantrymen of the 2nd Division.

That morning I was attracted by large volumes of smoke near the village, and found a fatigue party under a sergeant engaged in burning the dead. The process is as follows:—A shallow grave is filled with wood, on this the corpse is placed with more wood on top, the whole is then set fire to. The sergeant told me that the burning operation takes twelve or thirteen hours, but if paraffin is used it can be done in half the time. He pointed to one pile and said that it was the Colonel of the 4th Regiment.

This process, which I saw almost daily from this date, entails a lot of labour in cutting and gathering the large amount of wood which is required, and seems to be a demoralizing sort of task for the fatigue parties. A bone and the scalp of each man is kept and forwarded to his relations in Japan.

At 1.30 p.m. General Nishi and the divisional staff passed through Ho-chia-pu-tzu (G 7), and we followed them up a steep mountain path through dense fog to the Russian position of the previous day. Guns were occasionally to be heard to the north, but in front of the 2nd Division it was quite impossible to see anything. Some fifty or sixty Japanese dead were laid out by the side of the path.

On the evening of the 26th the field batteries were brought from the Guard Division to Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7), arriving after midnight, having had a very difficult march. They came into action south-west of the pass at 1 p.m. on the 27th, and opened fire in the direction of An-ping.

About 2 p.m. the fog began to lift in places, and one got an occasional glimpse of the Tang Ho, near An-ping. A battalion of the 30th Regiment, which up till now had been sitting with piled arms on the ridge, began to move down the steep slopes in front. I watched it file past and thought I had never seen a more business-like looking lot of men. They appeared to be all the same size, make and shape. The knapsacks had been left behind, each man carrying the long blue cotton bag containing entrenching tool and food over one shoulder and the *tente-abri* over the other. Haversack, water-bottle, rifle, bayonet, and ammunition completed their outfit. About half were now wearing khaki putties instead of white canvas gaiters.

About 4 p.m. the mist cleared and a wonderful panorama spread itself before us. At least one Russian division could be seen encamped in the valley of the Tang Ho, opposite An-ping, and a very long column was retiring down the river towards Kang-chia-tun (E/F 5). Russian troops could also be seen on various high points in front of the 12th Division, whose shells were to be seen bursting among them. At 5.20 p.m. the 12th Division guns ceased firing temporarily and large masses of Russian troops appeared north of An-ping apparently retreating before the 12th Division. They crossed the river by a bridge and fords, and continued their march towards Liao-yang. At 5.30 p.m. two Russian batteries on the western bank of the Tang Ho, near the main camp, which was now packing up, opened fire against the 12th Division. Their shrapnel burst in groups of four or eight, generally too high, but ranging must have been very difficult, firing as they were from low grounds into the mountains. The fuzes were altered by groups. At 5.45 p.m. large bodies of Russian infantry in close order offered a splendid artillery target as they filed out of the valley near An-ping and forded the river. The Japanese mountain battery which had advanced an hour previously was not near enough, however, to take advantage of this. At 6.45 p.m. all the Russians had crossed the river, and the two batteries still continued a rapid fire against the heights on the right bank, which now appeared to be in the possession of the Japanese. The whole afternoon's performance had been most picturesque. The lifting of the veil

of mist, the Russian camp packing up, and the whole force moving off, covered by the rear guard artillery.

The fog on this occasion perhaps saved the Russians from a serious defeat, hampering as it did the Japanese advance and favouring the Russian retirement. We gathered, however, that the Guard Division had not been able to advance as far as expected, so in any case the 2nd Division would have had to have held back a little.

Extract from orders: First Army Head-Quarters, 2 p.m., 27th August 1904:—

“The 2nd Division will take up a line from Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) along the high ridge running south-west to the main Liao-yang road.”

Later the 2nd Division was ordered to occupy Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) with its main force, and to extend to the left to get in touch with the Guard Division. On the evening of the 27th the 2nd Division advanced as follows:—The 29th Regiment moved along the ridge south-east of San-chia-sai (E 6); the 4th Regiment through Ta-ping-kou (F 7), where the Divisional Head-Quarters spent the night; the 16th Regiment and 2nd Battalion 30th Regiment by the Tse-kou (F 7)—An-ping valley. The rest of the 30th Regiment was in reserve.

This movement as far as the river bank was completed during the night.

About 6.45 p.m. I climbed down the mountain to the valley near Tse-kou, and there saw the main force of the division pressing on through deep mud. All along the valley were the sites of Russian encampments, the scattered farms being quite deserted. At Tse-kou I caught up the divisional staff, and marched behind it in the darkness up the roadless valley to the small straggling village of Ta-ping-kou. Heavy rain again came on, which made the track very slippery and difficult for the infantry. Some six battalions spent the night in the open, bivouacking along the valley. At 2 a.m. we received orders that the Divisional Head-Quarters would march at 5 a.m. At 4 a.m. the troops all down the valley had fires alight and were cooking their food. On these occasions each man seems to make his own little fire and cook for himself, the mess-tin being well adapted for this purpose. Rice is prepared in the lower part, water is boiled in the water-bottle, and the tray is used for meat or other delicacies. The large Chinese boilers, which are to be found in every house, have been greatly utilized by the troops for boiling rice and water in large quantities.

About 7 a.m. on the 28th I was permitted to climb the highest hill in the neighbourhood overlooking the valley of the Tang Ho. From this hill (marked 28 on Square F 7) a perfect view was obtained later on of the Russian position on the left bank of the river. Up to about 9 a.m. mist again rather obscured the view, though the rain had quite cleared off. The divisional commander had hoped to make a vigorous attack at dawn on

28th Aug.

the Russian trenches across the river and with a view to this the artillery took up its position during the night as follows:—three field batteries which had advanced down the Tse-kou valley came into action on a low spur south-east of An-ping, the officer commanding being on a higher point for observation purposes, connected with his batteries by a chain of men thirty to forty yards apart to pass orders. The mountain battery was in a well-chosen position behind the crest line of a knoll due south of San-chia sai (E 6). The river was found to be fordable only in a very few places, and therefore an artillery preparation near the fords was necessary before the infantry attack. The mist, however, prevented the guns from opening fire until 9 a.m., when a Russian battery west of San-chia-sai commenced to search the low hills near the Japanese mountain battery, which at once returned the fire. A Russian heliograph, the first I had seen during the war, was visible on Shou-shan-pu south of Liao-yang, through a gap in the hills.

The Japanese and Russian positions were as shown on the map.*

At 10.10 a.m. the Japanese mountain battery opened on the Russian infantry, in a deep shelter trench near the river bank, which had been firing long-range volleys at the Japanese infantry. The range was about 2,200 yards, and the shrapnel burst close down over the trench. After about ten rounds the Russians began leaving the trench and running up the slopes of the hill behind. They were all wearing grey coats with black trousers, and were led by an officer in a white coat. The mountain battery was, however, very economical with its shrapnel and did not kill many.

At 10.50 a.m. the Russian artillery at last discovered the position of the Japanese mountain battery, and got in some effective *rafales*, which drove the Japanese gunners to cover in their detachment pits. At 11.25 a.m. a company of Russian infantry appeared over one of the undulations north of San-chia sai. The men advanced in close order, shoulder to shoulder, kneeling down to fire volleys across the river, the officers kneeling in rear. I was watching them intently with my glasses when a shrapnel from one of the Japanese field batteries burst on graze some fifty yards in front of their right. Up they got at once, first the right then the left, and ran back over the rise in any formation. The Japanese gunners, who from their low position in the valley could only see their heads as they crossed the rise, thought that they had advanced, and plastered the dip in which they ought to have been with shrapnel. This was the second example of the moral effect of shrapnel fire on infantry which I had seen that day. The Japanese field batteries now turned their attention to searching the various Russian trenches in front, and concentrated their

* See Map 34, where the general line occupied by the troops is shown round San-chia-sai (E 6).

fire on point "A" (E 6). At 11.30 a.m. the Russian artillery reopened a rapid fire on the mountain battery and neighbouring hills. This was taken as a sign by the divisional staff that the enemy meant to retire, in fact a long column was already to be seen winding its way towards the pass in the high ridge to the west. Orders were at once telephoned to the infantry to attack. A few minutes later I saw a company deploying from the entrance of the valley opposite San-chia-sai, and moving in extended formation through the *kaoliang* crops towards the river. On reaching the open sand this company lay down with about two paces interval between the men, and fired across the river at the Russians who were still in the village of San-chia-sai. Another company came up in support and laid down in its turn. The leading company then got up and rushed towards the river. It was here some seventy yards wide, and the open space, including the sand, about three hundred yards. The men dashed in up to their armpits, holding their rifles and pouches above their heads, and made their way across with difficulty. Bullets could be seen splashing in the water among them, fired from the heights north of Tan-shan (E 6).

At 12.30 p.m. they reached the opposite bank, near San-chia-sai, and formed up under shelter of the village, the Russian rear guard leaving it at the same time. About twenty minutes previously the leading troops of a long Japanese column entered An-ping. I also saw at least three limbers trot down the opposite valley and halt behind the Russian gun position. I mention this as an officer of the staff assured us that there were no Russian field guns against the 2nd Division that day, but only a mountain battery.

About three companies of Japanese infantry now began working up the ridges north-north-east of San-chia-sai in very scattered formation, evidently under heavy rifle fire from the heights north-west of the valley. At 1.30 p.m. the Japanese west of San-chia-sai were shelled by Russian artillery, from some point to which it had retired further up the valley. From this time onward the Japanese infantrymen worked steadily up the hills north of San-chia-sai, from three points at which they had crossed the river, doubling along in groups, and utilizing the unevenness of the ground in order to expose themselves as little as possible to the continuous Russian fire from the heights. If it had not been for the little Japanese flags which each group carried it would have been difficult to have distinguished them from the Russians. The latter were now streaming over the passes on the high ridge, as shown in the panorama.* At 2.45 p.m. the Russians opened a heavy rifle fire from the hill north of Tang-ho-yen (E 7), but it was soon silenced by a few rounds of shrapnel from the Japanese mountain battery. This firing probably came from some of the Russian troops who were retiring before the Guard, but who,

* Panorama 3.

finding their comrades in full retreat from San-chia-sai, turned off west towards Wang-pao-tai (D 6).

At 3 p.m. all firing in front of the 2nd Division ceased. The artillery of both sides had been very economical with their ammunition. The last of the Russian troops retired very leisurely from San-chia-sai and the trenches scattered about the hills near there, offering very tempting artillery targets. The Japanese mountain battery, however, only fired occasional shots, doing very little damage.

That evening the 2nd Division had orders, as previously mentioned,* to occupy the high ridge from Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) to Point 243 (E 6). Owing to the resistance met with during the day, however, it was impossible to carry out the above orders. The 3rd Brigade captured Point 243 by a night attack with some fighting, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the strength of the enemy, the 15th Brigade was unable to get beyond Tsao-chia-yu (E/F 6) that night.

At about 7 p.m. I left the old Chinese bandits' redoubt from which I had had such a splendid view all day, and followed the divisional staff across the Tang Ho to San-chia-sai. The river at the ford where the infantry had crossed was up to my horse's girths, and very rapid. San-chia-sai is a well-built village of about one hundred and fifty houses.

29th Aug.

At 5 a.m., on the 29th August, we marched to point "A" (E 6) and waited there with the divisional staff till noon. The Guard Division was behind again, so the left wing of the 2nd Division had to wait for it to come up. There appeared to be some anxiety about it, and orders were issued by the divisional staff to the left brigade as follows: "If the Guard Division goes on, then go on too, keeping touch." Japanese could be seen filing along the heights to the west, over which we had seen the Russians retreating the day before. The right wing of the division reached Shih-chu-tzu at noon without resistance. On Hill "A" I had a conversation with a senior officer. He did not credit rumours that had got about that the Russians were already in full retreat from Liao-yang, and gave it as his opinion that there would be a great battle in the course of the next few days.

Looking at the ground over which yesterday's fight had taken place, one wondered why the Russians had exposed themselves so much to view, as a more perfect piece of country for defensive operations could not possibly be conceived. The river and open valley formed a semicircle in front; there were plenty of lateral communications: undulations, kloofs, and dongas affording excellent cover: good advanced positions and, finally, the great ridge formed a perfect main line of defence with its north end on the river and the south in high and difficult mountains. As the 12th and Guard Division had not threatened

* See page 385.

the flanks, it is hard to understand why the Russians were driven out so easily.

At noon we rode with the divisional head-quarters staff through a charming country to the well-built village of Kang-chia-tun-shan (E 5). The crops in this particular district looked very rich and flourishing. *Kaoliang*, drooping millet, maize, cotton, beans of many description, egg plants, &c. were in profusion.

On the afternoon of the 29th two Russian batteries opened fire on the right wing from an entrenched position near Sha-pu (D 5), on the south bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. Another battery was sent to a low hill north of Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) near the junction of the rivers, from which an effective flanking fire was brought to bear on the Japanese troops. Though the Russians appeared to be retiring on Liao-yang, the 2nd Division was unable to push on in pursuit independently of the Guard Division which was still behind. Even at night the Russian artillery fired at the Japanese cooking fires, especially after midnight when there was a good moon. There were, however, only about seven casualties from this fire.

The division was to have remained in the position taken up on the 29th, during the 30th as well, but on the morning of the 30th we were told that orders had come, presumably from the First Army Head-Quarters, at An-ping, to retire the right wing and reserves to the following position, the 3rd Brigade to a place between Ta-shih-men Ling (E 6) and Point 243 (E 6), the 15th Brigade to between Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) and Kang-chia-tun (E/F 5), and two squadrons of cavalry to An-ping.

On the evening of the 29th, when going over the scene of a skirmish between the Japanese advanced guard and the Russian rear guard, near Kang-chia-tun-shan (E 5), I happened to see the divisional commander going out with two companies of infantry presumably to reconnoitre the Russian position. He succeeded in drawing fire from the Russian artillery, and having apparently satisfied himself about the position of their guns he returned to camp.

On the 30th, although the right brigade was ordered to retire as mentioned above, the left brigade had to advance in touch with the Guard Division, which was moving forward towards Cha-lu-tzu (D 6). The 3rd Brigade on the morning of the 30th had its left centre on the saddle called Ta-shih-men Ling (E 6). During the morning the 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment and one battalion 29th Reserve Regiment belonging to the 2nd Division attacked and took possession of a portion of a hill north of Hsui-chia-ho (D 6), but the 3rd Brigade was unable to advance in support owing to the strong resistance it met with in front of Ta-shih-men Ling. The isolated position of the 3rd Guards now became critical, and the other battalion of the 29th Reserve Regiment was sent to reinforce it.

30th Aug.

An officer of the First Army Head-Quarters Staff, who was watching the operations of the Guard Division, went to the commander of the 3rd Brigade, and explained to him the situation of the 3rd Guards, but found that he had just received an order to rejoin the 2nd Division. Major-General Matsunaga, however, determined to advance if possible to assist the 3rd Guards, and about the same time Lieut.-General Hasegawa, commanding the Guard Division, received an order placing the 3rd Brigade under his command. The 3rd Brigade advanced, but darkness prevented it from doing anything. During the night the Russians made several counter-attacks and the 3rd Guard Regiment was obliged to fall back.

31st Aug. The whole of the 31st was spent by the Guard Division in shelling the Russian position with a view to attacking on the 1st September. During the night of the 31st Major-General Matsunaga led the 29th Regiment across the Tai-tzu Ho, and rejoined the 2nd Division on the morning of the 1st September. Early on the 1st the detachment of the 2nd Division, now consisting of the 4th Regiment and two field batteries, which was still under the orders of the commander of the Guard Division, was advanced, but the Russians had retired during the night. In the evening the detachment was allowed to leave the Guard Division.

Now, having finished with the somewhat complicated operations of the 3rd Brigade in connection with the Guard Division, the main account of the 2nd Division will be continued.

30th Aug. On the evening of the 29th the 2nd Division staff knew that the division would have to cross the river and move north through Hei-yu (F 5), and that preparations were being made to cross the Tai-tzu Ho behind the line taken up by the 12th Division. The route had been thoroughly reconnoitred, but as yet it was not known when the movement would begin.

At 5 p.m. on the 30th orders arrived from First Army Head Quarters at An-ping to commence the operation. At that time half the division was still with the Guard, namely, the 3rd Brigade, two field batteries, one mountain battery (12th Division), one company of engineers, and two squadrons of cavalry, the last-mentioned having been sent away on the 23rd August.

The engineers were at once sent out to prepare the roads. Some rain fell, making the road very bad in places, but the engineers did good work during the night in laying down *kaoliang*, branches, stones, &c.

At 10 p.m. on the 30th the division assembled at Ku-sao-cheng (F 5), on the north bank of the Tang Ho, having crossed by a ford three or four feet deep. The orders were to follow the 12th Division across the Tai-tzu Ho, but owing to the block on the road the departure of the 2nd Division was delayed till 2 a.m. on the 31st. At 9 a.m. the 2nd Division began to

31st Aug.

cross the Tai-tzu Ho at Lien-tao-wan (F 5). The river was impassable for artillery, so a pontoon bridge had to be constructed near Hou Kuan-tun (F 4). Russian cavalry patrols watched the crossing, but offered no resistance.

During the 31st four batteries of the 2nd Division artillery took up positions, as shown on map,* to cover the bridging operations and the crossing of the 12th Division. An artillery duel took place, but the Japanese had not yet learnt the Russian artillery positions, which were very well concealed. These batteries crossed the river by the pontoon bridge during the night.

At Lien-tao-wan the stream is about seventy yards wide and four feet deep, and fairly rapid. The infantry forded it, arm in arm, with difficulty.

The hill just east of Kuan-tun and north of the first pontoon bridge was occupied by the 2nd Division soon after daybreak on the 31st. This hill, on which is an old Chinese fort, is called in Chinese Yen-chao-cheng (Swallow's Nest), and from here General Kuroki and staff watched the operations during the first days of September. From this hill the 15th Brigade extended to its right as far as Kao-li-tsai, and waited there till noon for the 12th Division to move on. Infantry patrols were pushed out in front, but so far nothing was known of the Russian dispositions, owing to the high *kaoliang* and broken configuration of the ground. Russian cavalry patrols had been seen, but they all retired, as shown on the map. The 15th Brigade then received orders to push on towards Huang-ku-fen, and to take up a line between that village and the river.

By 8 a.m. on the 1st September the four batteries which had crossed during the night had taken up a position along a low ridge east of Huang-ku-fen. Here they had made very complete gun epaulments, with deep pits for the detachments, officers and wagon numbers, with an infantry trench all along the ridge a few yards in front of the guns. The night of the 31st was very dark, and the high crops made it difficult to reconnoitre, so that it was not till early on the 1st that a battalion of Russian infantry was discovered to be entrenched west of Huang-ku-fen, quite close to the Japanese outposts.

The 15th Brigade had orders to march on the morning of the 1st in the direction of Hei-ying-tai, in conjunction with the 12th Division on its right. It consisted of five battalions and one company, as two companies 16th Regiment were still south of the Tang Ho, near Shih-chu-tzu (E 5), where they had been left to cover the artillery which had been in action near Tiao-shui-lou on the 31st. Also, one company 30th Regiment had been left at Kou-wai, near the ford.

At 5 a.m. the 12th Division began to advance in a north-westerly direction, and at 6 a.m. the 15th Brigade also began to

1st Sept.

* See Map 36.

move. The advanced guard at once encountered the Russian battalion, and was fired on by a Russian battery north of Hsi Kuan-tun. At 6.30 a.m. the Japanese artillery opened fire, and the duel, which lasted throughout the 1st September, commenced.

The commander of the 15th Brigade halted it east of Huang-ku-fen, and ordered the 30th Regiment to go round by the right and turn the flank of the Russian battalion from the north. When the Russians saw this movement they retired. The brigade then deployed in the *kaoliang*, with two battalions 16th Regiment on the left, the 30th Regiment on the right, and two companies 16th Regiment as brigade reserve. By 8 a.m. the Russian battalion had completely retired, and its position occupied by the 15th Brigade, without as yet any casualties. The 12th company 16th Regiment was placed on the road near the river with some cavalry to prevent any Russians from coming from Hsi Kuan-tun.

A strong mixed force of Russians now appeared in front of the 12th Division, and the whole Japanese force remained stationary till about noon.

Up to this the divisional staff had very little knowledge of the Russian dispositions, beyond the fact that they were apparently holding the line Hill 131, Manju-yama (Rice Cake Hill) and Yen-tai coal mines.* The Russian battery north of Hsi Kuan-tun on the ridge connecting 131 with Manju-yama, and another further west behind a knoll, opened a rapid fire on the Japanese batteries, which were out-ranged, the distances being 5,500 and 6,000 yards.

I will now hark back to the morning of the 30th, when the 2nd Division staff returned from Kang-chia-tun-shan (E 5) to Tsao-chia-yu (E/F 6),† and venture to give an account of my personal experiences, though only indirectly connected with the story of the 2nd Division.

30th Aug.

On the morning of the 30th I was permitted to climb to the highest point in those parts marked "30" (E 5).‡ From this point a most perfect panorama of the plains of Liao-yang, of the city itself, and of the positions then being attacked by the Guard, the Fourth and Second Armies, could be seen. From dawn till dark, a continuous bombardment between the semi-circle of Russian batteries south and south-east of Liao-yang and the Japanese went on. The hills in front were very strongly entrenched, and certainly would have been most difficult to capture had the 2nd Division advanced instead of moving north across the river. The Russians were evidently expecting a frontal attack, and were fully prepared for it, with three batteries in position on the hills and another by the river near Sha-pu (D 5). They occasionally searched the hills with shrapnel, but of course without response, as with the exception

* Square F 3 on Map 34.

† See Map 34.

‡ See Panorama 4.

of a few piquets of the 16th Regiment the 2nd Division was far behind, preparing to cross the river. All day long the shrapnel of the Second and Fourth Armies could be seen bursting over Shou-shan-pu (B 5) and the hills to the east of it. There was little movement among the Russian troops, which could be seen distinctly in the villages and camps around Liao-yang. Frequent railway trains were moving slowly in both directions, and a big conflagration broke out early in the day near the railway station, but appeared to be extinguished about midday. A Russian captive balloon occasionally ascended.

Not knowing of the contemplated movement across the river, I thought the 2nd Division must be resting previous to making a night attack. A strong east wind had been blowing all day, and towards evening heavy driving rain came down, probably brought on by the constant firing. That night (30th to 31st) I spent in Tsao-chia-yu,* and returned at daybreak to the same excellent point of observation. The Russian position in front was apparently unchanged, the camps were still there, the bombardment in front of the Second and Fourth Armies continued, and there was no sign of a Russian retirement as yet. On our side of the field absolute quiet prevailed. The Russian infantrymen were sitting on the parapets of their trenches, or walking about to stretch their legs after the long night's vigil in expectation of a night attack. It seemed now that Kuro-patkin really meant to fight it out at Liao-yang, and that it was now too late for the huge army which could be seen in the plains below to get away. Considering that in Europe, with trains of one hundred axles, one of which carries a battalion, a squadron, or a field battery, three days are allowed for an army corps to entrain, and that on the Manchurian railway the trains are only made up of thirty-three axles, which means a much longer time for the entrainment of an army corps, it seemed to us that this was going to be the decisive battle of the war.

Looking down on the city of Liao-yang and its surroundings it was easy to understand why the Russians found it such a convenient station for military purposes, though by no means a good defensive position. The Russian guns, wagons, hospital carts, kitchen wagons and men are more suited to the plains than the mountains. It was with enormous expenditure of labour in road-making that their field guns were dragged through the hills, and after every battle we found telegraph, kitchen and other wagons left behind. The railway and river made Liao-yang an ideal cantonment and military base for such an army as the Russian.

At 8.20 a.m. on the 31st, under cover of two batteries in position, a Russian reconnaissance in force was sent out apparently to find out what had happened to the 2nd Division. It consisted of a troop of cavalry, three companies of infantry and battery of artillery. They advanced in a leisurely manner as

* (E/F 6), see Map 34.

far as the village of Ta-tun-tzu (E 5), where the battery came into action on the sand of the river bed and searched the surrounding hills with shrapnel. Meeting with no response the party retired again towards Liao-yang.

The bombardment continued all the 31st. A battery in front of my position kept firing *rafales* into the Wang-pao-tai (D 6) valley, up which the Guard Division was advancing. Fires broke out at several villages west of Liao-yang and at the railway station. About 12.45 p.m. the artillery duel between the 2nd Division artillery and the Russians north-east of Hsia-ping-tzu (E/F 4) began. In the afternoon rain was brought on as usual, and the scene south and south-east of Liao-yang became inexpressibly wild, due to the dark clouds overhead, the flashing of the guns in the Russian position, the white smoke of thousands of shrapnel, the darker smoke from the various conflagrations scattered about the plains, and the river showing up like a silver streak in the general blackness. To the east and south-east, thousands of peaks very similar in size and shape, characteristic of the Manchurian mountains, made up a most striking scene.

On the evening of the 31st I rode through An-ping on my way to rejoin the 2nd Division. The Japanese had already turned one of the chief buildings into a supply dépôt, but there were no troops there nor in the surrounding villages. In fact there were only two companies at Shih-chu-tzu (E 5) to prevent a cavalry raid down the river valley across the First Army's line of communications. A long train of "military coolie" carts was passing through An-ping, the first I had seen for about six weeks. Many of the men had bare feet, and some had worn-out straw sandals. All looked healthy but very tired.

From An-ping I rode in a northerly direction over the road by which the 2nd and 12th Divisions had recently passed. It looked as if many army corps had marched over it, and was really nothing but bog. I passed crowds of one-horse transport carts halted along the road, the ponies feeding between the shafts and the drivers cooking their food, or asleep under the carts. Considering the state of the roads, it was wonderful how the divisions had pushed along in twenty-four hours.

As it was impossible to pass the troops in the darkness, I waited till daybreak by the side of the road, and then continued my way across the Tai-tzu Ho, catching up the Army Head-Quarter Staff and the other attachés at the fort on Swallow's Nest Hill* about 8 a.m.

After fording the river at Lien-tao-wan (F 5), the Army had marched through deep sand to Kuan-tun (F 4); so that altogether the movement to a flank by the 2nd and 12th Divisions was a very fine performance. The pontoon bridge was now in full working order, and another was being made half a mile further down the river.

* Chinese Fort F/G 4 on Map 34.

When I arrived at Swallow's Nest Hill, on the 1st of September,* the artillery duel was in full swing. The Russian shells were bursting over a parallel ridge, which they had mistaken for the one on which the batteries were. The Japanese guns being unable to reach the Russian artillery, except with high-explosive shell, concentrated their fire round the village of Hei-ying-tai. At 9.30 a.m. I was informed that the Russian strength in front was not known as yet, that the Second and Fourth Armies were pressing the Russians from the south with all their force, and that several long trains had been seen leaving Liao-yang for the north. Large bodies of Russian infantry also had been seen in the vicinity of Hou Hei-ying-tai. 1st Sept.

At 11.30 a.m., just after the Japanese reserves, which up till now had been under shelter of the ridge near the guns, moved forward, the Russian artillery began to search the place in which they had been with shrapnel. Fortunately for the Japanese reserves, who moved in close order, the Russian gunners failed to see them, though their faded khaki cap covers were very conspicuous in the sunlight.

For the following account of the movements of the 15th Brigade I am indebted chiefly to a Japanese officer who was kind enough to give us some information about it afterwards.

At 1.30 p.m., 1st September, the commander of the 12th Division informed the 15th Brigade that a large force of Russians was marching towards the right of the 12th Division from the Yen-tai coal mines,† and that before the Japanese line could advance as ordered it would be necessary to reconnoitre the strength of the Russians. Major-General Okasaki, the general commanding the brigade, replied: "I am too near the Russian position and cannot remain here under fire, but must advance and continue fighting." He also said that he knew of the general Japanese plan of operations, and that as the Second and Fourth Armies were pressing the Russians from the south the First Army ought to do its best to push forward.

At this time there appeared to be only a small force of Russians on Manju-yama, about one thousand yards in front of his advanced guard, so he determined to attack the hill. Before doing so he sent to the officer commanding the 2nd Division artillery, who was not under his orders, to ask him to concentrate his fire on Manju-yama. He also sent a message to the Divisional Head-Quarters to say that he was going to attack, and a request to the commander of the 12th Division to allow the mountain artillery to fire at the hill. The officer commanding the 2nd Division artillery replied: "Yes; but it will be necessary to advance to another position, an operation very difficult at present owing to the Russian fire."

* See Map 37 (tracing to be placed over Map 36) and Panorama 5.

† F 3 on Map 34.

Before the batteries advanced I saw them digging gun pits in the new position about eight hundred yards nearer the enemy.

In this way the time from 1.30 to 4 p.m. passed. Two more Russian batteries also opened fire, one from near Hou Hei-ying-tai and the other from west of Hsia-fu-tun. Major-General Okasaki saw therefore that if the hill was taken, his troops would find themselves under a cross fire from three directions.

At 4 p.m. the Army Head-Quarters informed Major-General Okasaki that his dispositions had been approved of, and that it had been decided to occupy Manju-yama that day. Also that the left brigade of the 12th Division (the 12th, Kigoshi) had been ordered to assist in attacking the hill. The orderly had taken the wrong road, so the message arrived late.

One of Major-General Kigoshi's adjutants then came up for instructions, and Major-General Okasaki told him that he thought his brigade could take the hill without assistance, but that he hoped the 12th Brigade would watch his right flank and if possible get close enough to the Russian battery near Hou Hei-ying-tai to make it retire.

From 6.30 to 8 p.m. the Japanese field and mountain artillery poured a heavy fire of shrapnel and high-explosive shell on to Manju-yama, and Major-General Okasaki hoped that this would make the Russians retire, but instead of this they were reinforced.

Just before dark there was very heavy gun and rifle fire on Manju-yama. Every flash of gun or bursting shrapnel showed up like electric light against the sunset, the long red streaks of which pointed northwards in the direction of the Russian retreat. The flashes of Russian batteries, which had baffled detection during the day, could now be seen distinctly. The advanced guard of the 15th Brigade was now at the foot of the hill, but in spite of frequent attempts it was unable to effect a lodgment on the slopes. When night fell, the darkness before the moon rose was intense, the artillery ceased firing, and the main body of the 15th Brigade commenced to advance through the high crops of *kaoliang*. It was exceedingly difficult to keep touch and not to lose direction, especially as the 15th Brigade men, who were used to mountains, had never experienced the twelve-feet high *kaoliang* before. Major-General Okasaki therefore adopted the formation laid down for movements in woods, &c.:—One company extended in line, followed by the other three companies of a battalion in section columns at deploying intervals, each officer marching by compass. When the brigade arrived where the *kaoliang* was cut, he halted it and sent on the front line.

The ground in front of the 16th Regiment on the left was very broken and difficult owing to numerous ravines, while that over which the 30th Regiment had to advance was comparatively easy. The 30th Regiment was therefore ordered to attack as soon as the moon rose, about 10 p.m.

Almost immediately after the moon began to rise, the general heard the noise of the charge of the first line of the 30th Regiment, and then shouts of *Banzai*. A message came to say that the 30th Regiment were in possession of the north-east part of the hill. He now ordered the 16th Regiment to attack, and after a short while he received another message saying that they had occupied the south-west portion of the hill. In the darkness the 16th Regiment did not know that the 30th Regiment had taken the other half of the hill, and asked for permission to take it also.

Before the attack the brigade had received reinforcements of three companies of the 4th Regiment, 3rd Brigade, and now Major-General Okasaki had ordered these three companies to support the 30th Regiment on the right. Finding, however, that the 30th Regiment had taken their part of the hill, he sent them to the 16th Regiment, where they remained. All this took place between 11 p.m. and midnight, the 30th Regiment capturing their part of the hill half an hour before the 16th Regiment.

On the top of Manju-yama is a small knoll with a trench round it. The adjutant of the 30th Regiment rushed out from the firing line to this knoll and stayed there by himself until shot in the side and killed. His orderly then dashed out to secure the adjutant's letter case, which he had been told contained important documents, and was severely wounded, but lived.

A few minutes after midnight two Russian battalions made a counter-attack against the right of the 30th Regiment. The attack lasted about half an hour, when the Russians retired leaving a lieutenant-colonel and many men dead. In one little place there were forty dead Russians.

Major-General Okasaki now sent out some officers' patrols to find out where the Russians were retiring to, and these patrols reported that they had fallen back on Hsia-fu-tun and Hou Hei-ying-tai, where they had apparently halted.

The 30th and 16th Regiments were now ordered to entrench along the crest of the hill and to dig deep pits as protection against the artillery bombardment which it is certain they would receive in the morning. The hill is very rocky and therefore difficult to entrench.

Patrols also brought information that the Russians had evacuated the eastern part of the Hill 131 near Hsi Kuan-tun. An officer's patrol was sent to verify this, and reported that the position in question was unoccupied.

Okasaki then sent three companies of the 1st Battalion 4th Regiment to this point, with orders to retire in case the retention of the position should prove difficult. This party occupied the small knoll south-west of the village between 7 and 8 a.m. on the 2nd. Some hours before this Major-General Okasaki, having seen that his troops were well entrenched, went down to rest in a temple at the foot of the hill.

2nd Sept.

At 8 a.m. on the 2nd September,* Major-General Okasaki went to the top of Manju-yama, and was joined there by an officer of the First Army Head-Quarters Staff with a message from General Kuroki to say that the latter was very satisfied with the occupation of the hill. Major-General Okasaki replied that it was very necessary to do something against the Russian artillery. There were sixteen guns north of the hill and three howitzers on a spur of Hill 131, near the river, also two or more batteries near Hsia-fu-tun. The three howitzers, he said, were especially dangerous as they enfiladed the hill, and the trenches were little protection against their high-angle fire. At this moment the Russian artillery from between Hsia-fu-tun and Hou Hei-ying-tai opened fire, the first shell falling a little short but slightly wounding his adjutant. Then all the Russian guns from the north and west, followed a few minutes later by a field battery and the three howitzers from the south, rained shrapnel on to the hill. It was certain death to expose oneself. All the soldiers lay in the bottom of the trenches, and though the fire was accurate, it caused little loss. Altogether forty Russian guns concentrated their fire on the hill for about twenty-five minutes, during which time the Japanese lay like stones in their trenches. Then the Russian artillery began to distribute its fire on other parts of the field, but some guns always continued to fire at Manju-yama, making it impossible for the men to get food, fire, or water. They had to stay in the trenches and eat uncooked rice. The general was certain that this bombardment was preparatory to an infantry attack either then or during the following night.

At 11 a.m. the Russian line extended right across Hill 131 from Hsia-fu-tun to the artillery position on the southern slopes. Major-General Okasaki sent orders to the three companies of the 4th Regiment on the knoll south-west of Hsi Kuan-tun to retire, as the Russians were in a semicircle facing Manju-yama, and reinforcements were arriving at Hsia-fu-tun evidently with a view of attacking the hill.

Again all the Russian artillery concentrated their fire on the unfortunate Manju-yama, and the Japanese artillery could not change its position in order to try to get within effective range of the Russian guns. The general now felt sure that the Russian attack was about to commence, so taking with him the brigade reserve, consisting of the 2nd Battalion 30th Regiment, he went to the left of the 16th Regiment. He then saw that the Russian infantry at Hsia-fu-tun had halted and was firing long-range volleys towards the hill. At the same time he received a message from the officer commanding the three companies of the 4th Regiment on the knoll asking for permission not to retire, and saying that though there were three Russian battalions against him, he had repulsed them several times. Major-General Okasaki replied, "Not possible," and

* See Map 38 (tracing to be placed over Map 36).

added that he was sending two companies to cover his retreat. At 4 p.m. this force was withdrawn with difficulty and with a loss of 270 men. In the afternoon the three companies of the 4th Regiment were sent back to Huang-ku-fen, and the divisional staff put them into the divisional reserve, at the same time sending up the 1st Battalion 29th Regiment to reinforce the brigade.

The Russians advanced to the knoll lately occupied by the Japanese, but were driven back by the fire of three field batteries north of Huang-ku-fen. Major-General Okasaki, seeing that the Russians hesitated to come on, thought of attacking, and went to the top of Manju-yama. From there he saw, however, that the Russians occupied a line from Hill 131 to Hsia-fu-tun and thence north round his right front, and he decided that it was impossible for him to attack. After 6 p.m., the artillery fire against Manju-yama ceased, so the general filled up the trenches with men and placed the newly arrived 1st Battalion 29th Regiment as a reserve to the 30th Regiment. The company of the 30th Regiment which had been left behind at Kou-wai also rejoined during the day.

At daylight on the 2nd, I went to the 2nd Division artillery position of the day before and found two batteries were still there, the other two having advanced the previous evening. It was a well-chosen position though too far from the Russian batteries. The ridge was just high enough to permit of a view over the high crops between it and Manju-yama. I spoke to some artillery men who were engaged in burning the body of a sergeant-major, the only man killed in the batteries the day before. There were only six other casualties in spite of the thousands of shell which the Russians had fired at them. The ground from two hundred to three hundred yards behind the position was strewn with Russian shrapnel cases, fuzes, and broken bits of shell.

I then went back to the Swallow's Nest Hill, which was the only position in the neighbourhood from which a good view over the crops could be obtained. General Kuroki and staff were still there, all looking towards the north-west, as if expecting an attack from that direction. In the evening Russian infantry could be plainly seen ascending the north slopes of Hill 131, being shelled as they went by the two advanced batteries of the 2nd Division artillery. With the exception of these Russians and the Japanese on Manju-yama, the high crops hid all infantry movements from view. During the day I spoke with several wounded soldiers on their way back from the front, but most of them had very confused notions of what had taken place during the night, beyond the fact that Manju-yama had been captured by them. Some soldiers of the 4th Regiment said that their company had made a counter-attack from the knoll near Hsi Kuan-tun, but when close to the Russian trenches had run out of ammunition. The company

would not retire, however, but remained under fire until nearly all were killed or wounded.

The 29th Regiment, which had marched 27 miles in twenty-four hours over the worst of roads, rejoined the division from the Guard, looking wonderfully fit in spite of their exertions in the heat. In some of the companies of this and other regiments I counted from two hundred to two hundred and twenty men. Recruits and reserves had joined during the long halt at Lien-shan-kuan,* but considering the hard work since then, the average was good.

During the night of the 2nd to 3rd September the Russians made five attacks on Manju-yama.

(1) About 5 p.m. one battalion of Russians attacked from Hou Hei-ying-tai, and at the same time the Russian line advanced from Hill 131. The former was stopped with the bayonet, and the latter by rifle fire half-way.

(2) Between 7 and 8 p.m. two battalions made a very determined attack against the left of the 30th Regiment, but were repulsed. The brigade reserve (the 1st Battalion 29th Regiment), however, had to be called up to assist.

(3) After a few minutes two more Russian battalions made an attack against the 16th Regiment under cover of artillery fire. The Russians reached the top of the hill, which is a plateau some twenty yards wide. From here they were repulsed with the bayonet by the first line, but only fell back to a line from one hundred to five hundred yards from the hill and continued firing.

During the pitch darkness before the moon rose, some Russians crept up the west slope of Manju-yama, and threw some magnesium balls connected by string on to the crest of the hill, lighted them and retired. Volleys were poured into the Japanese trenches now brilliantly lit up.

It was almost certain death to expose oneself, so the Japanese soldiers endeavoured to extinguish the lights by throwing stones, but without success. Then a soldier dashed out from the trench shouting his name and regiment according to the Japanese custom, and put out the lights with the butt of his rifle. He returned safely in spite of the rain of bullets.

About this time, when it was still dark, Major-General Okasaki went to the top of the hill, and saw that the two lines of rifle flashes were so mixed up that it was impossible to tell which were which. Towards Hsia-fu-tun a Russian band was playing a march, and at about 9 p.m., in the direction of Hou Hei-ying-tai, the singing of the Russian national anthem could be distinctly heard. The general thereupon ordered the Japanese trumpeters to sound "Cease firing." The Japanese obeyed the order immediately, and then he was able to see exactly where the Russians were by the flashes of their rifles.

* Near the Mo-tien Ling.

He called to his men in a loud voice and said: "When my soldiers are so well disciplined as to cease firing during a night attack, it is impossible that the Russians can ever retake Manju-yama. I am here to see you. Never can they retake the hill." The soldiers then shouted *Banzai!* Some of the officers then came to the general and asked for leave to continue firing, as the Russians "were within the distance when fire is permitted by the Regulations." The general answered: "It is foolish to fire when you cannot see the enemy; wait until he is nearer, and then fire."

(4) At 10 p.m. the Russians made a fourth attack against the right of the 16th Regiment. They crept up close and threw hand-grenades into the Japanese trenches. The Japanese held their own, though the two lines swayed backwards and forwards along the crest of the hill, sometimes going half-way down the eastern slope. It was a very determined attack, but, finally, the Russians retired, leaving the colonel of the 123rd Regiment (probably Milkov) killed, and about 300 dead.

(5) After a short pause, about 2 a.m. on the 3rd September, there was a fifth attack against the 30th Regiment, which was repelled by the front line without the assistance of the reserve. The colonel of the 30th Regiment now came to Major-General Okasaki, and told him that a large Russian force was advancing. They went to the top of the hill together, and saw in the moonlight a long black line at the foot of the hill, enveloping it on both flanks. The colonel now proposed a counter-attack with the 30th Regiment against the Russian left. At this time there were in all about six and a half battalions of Japanese on or near the hill. Both regimental and brigade reserves were now brought up to the firing line, and the 30th Regiment was moved to the extreme north end of the hill. At 2.30 a.m. the colonel, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions 30th Regiment, began an attack on the Russian left, the whole Japanese line firing at the same time. Seeing this movement, the Russians retired on the line Hsia-fu-tun-Hou Hei-ying-tai. The colonel now proposed pursuit, but Major-General Okasaki, not knowing the general situation, considered it advisable not to do so. He sent out patrols, which reported that the Russians had halted at Hsia-fu-tun and Hou Hei-ying-tai. Thus ended one of the most exciting nights of the whole war, and one of the most important. A night which increased the respect of the Japanese for the fighting qualities of the Russians a hundred per cent.

A Japanese staff officer afterwards told us that it was probably Kuropatkin's intention to throw a strong force against the First Army, and to drive it back on the river, outflanking it to the north. To do this he had to use Manju-yama as a pivot on which to wheel to his right, and therefore must recapture it. Kuropatkin may have thought that he could crush the First Army during his retreat, and had he captured Manju-yama would have doubtless launched a large force against it. Being

unable to capture it, however, he did not dare to detach a force against the extreme Japanese right, and his only alternative was to retire on the morning of the 3rd. The same staff officer said that the retention of Manju-yama was a very "touch and go" business, and that he felt very nervous about it.

3rd Sept.

In the early morning of the 3rd September,* the 3rd Brigade assembled north-west of Huang-ku-fen for the purpose of assisting the 15th Brigade and attacking the Russians at dawn, but it arrived too late to take part in the night's fighting. The 2nd Division artillery had also advanced during the darkness, and at daybreak opened fire from two positions north-west and south-east of Huang-ku-fen respectively. At the same time the Russian howitzers retired and, as the general said, "made it more agreeable for the troops on Manju-yama." The Russian artillery north of the hill, however, kept up a steady fire all through the 3rd. That evening the 15th Brigade received orders to hand over the position held by them to the 3rd Brigade, and to move to the right of the latter. For three days they had been marching and fighting in the great heat, with nothing but a little bad water to drink and no time to cook. This change began at 11 p.m., and both brigades were in their new positions by 2 a.m. on the 4th.

During the three days' fighting the casualties in the 15th Brigade were—

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Total.
Killed - -	11	228	239
Wounded - -	33	1,012	1,045
			<u>1,284</u>

Casualties in regiments: 16th Regiment, 368; 30th Regiment, 671; 29th Regiment, 245.

The Staff did not know the strength of the Russian force attacking Manju-yama, but thought there were about three regiments and forty guns. The few wounded prisoners taken said four regiments and more than forty guns.

The disadvantage of a rice emergency ration was fully brought home to the men on Manju-yama, as they were unable to cook. Biscuit would have been all right.

At daybreak, on 3rd September, I joined the 2nd Division staff at the first artillery position, but could get no news of what had happened during the night except from wounded soldiers who were coming back in large numbers. They all owned to having had a terrible night on Manju-yama when "thousands of Russians" had attacked them. When asked whether either side retired, one man said, "No, but the Japanese still hold the

* See Map 39 (tracing to be placed over Map 36).

hill." Others said they had been driven to the bottom, but had again retaken it. All spoke of the bombs or hand-grenades about the size of oranges which the Russians had used with such effect, and thought that such terrible weapons were not fair-play, as the Japanese had none.

That morning I went over one of the divisional field hospitals (there are four in the 2nd Division with a capacity for 200 wounded each) which had just been established in the village of Kao-li-tsai. Numerous wounded were being brought in, each with a red label giving name, company, regiment, wound, and an index number which had been attached to his coat by a doctor at the dressing stations. All appeared to have been very well bandaged and attended to before their arrival at the field hospital, where each man received a fresh label (white) giving similar information. The rifles and pouches were also labelled with the men's names and registers.

Though the night had been clear with a waning moon, the morning of the 4th broke with a dense mist and, in consequence, comparative silence. At 11 a.m. the commander of the 2nd Division received a report that the Russians seemed to be retiring. The commander of the 3rd Brigade seeing no Russians on Hill 131 sent one regiment to occupy it, while the other remained on the col between it and Manju-yama to which two batteries also advanced. **4th Sept.**

Orders to pursue reached the 2nd Division head-quarters at 2.30 p.m. on the 4th, but no attempt at pursuit was made that day. The troops were tired out, wounded had to be collected, dead had to be buried, &c., and the 15th Brigade had not yet recovered from its recent exertions. The 3rd Brigade received orders at 4 p.m. to pursue, but did not start till next morning, when the advanced guard at Hsia-fu-tun fired on the retreating Russians.

In the early morning of 5th September, in pouring rain, I walked to the top of Manju-yama before the debris of the battle had been cleared away. Along the crest-line were Japanese trenches and deep holes which had been excavated with difficulty in the rocky soil. Walking over to the western slope I saw the ground literally covered with Russian dead, while rifles, bayonets, drums, caps, boots, &c. were scattered all over the place. The dead were lying in every attitude, some evidently having been shot while advancing, others while retiring. Many were dressed in blue cotton trousers and shirts. A stone pillar in the centre of the plateau, on top of the hill, had been peppered by hundreds of bullets. A Japanese soldier told me that it had been mistaken all through the night of the 2nd for some "brave Russian." Two hundred and thirty Russian corpses were dragged off the top of the hill by Chinese with ropes, and piled at the bottom with a thin covering of earth. **5th Sept.**

The numbers on the Russian caps which I saw on Manju-yama and neighbourhood were: 23, 35, 121, 123, 138, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139. On the col were eight well-made gun epaulments, from which an excellent view could be had over the country between there and Swallow's Nest Hill.

When the Army halted, the 2nd Division took up its position in the general alignment between Yen-tai coal mine* and the railway.

* F 3 on Map 34.

**(29) The Battle of Liao-yang.—First Japanese Army.
Operations of the 12th Division from the
25th August to the 5th September 1904, with
a short Account of the Movements of the
Umezawa Brigade in the Final Advance on
Liao-yang.**

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers, Yen-tai
Colliery, December 4th, 1904.

Plates.

General Map	-	-	-	-	Map 34.
Disposition of the 12th Division, 31st August (night) and 1st September	-	-	-	-	Map 37.
Disposition of the 12th Division, 2nd September	-				Map 38.
The 12th Infantry Brigade during night of 4th- 5th September	-	-	-	-	Map 39.

The 12th Division was on the extreme right of three Japanese Armies, and started its movement from its position, near Yü-shu-lin-tzu (J 5),* which it had taken up after the action near that village.

On its right rear was the Umezawa Brigade (a mixed one including six battalions) posted near Chiao-tou (J 6), south of the Tai-tzu Ho, facing Pen-hsi-hu (J 3), in readiness to act when required. Six thousand of the enemy were known to be in Pen-hsi-hu with some guns.

On the left (south-east) of the 12th Division was the 2nd Division, and beyond that again was the Guard Division, the three comprising the First Army.

These relative positions were maintained throughout the eleven days' fighting.

The line of communications of the 12th Division and Umezawa Brigade was as formerly,† *i.e.*, *via* Chiao-tou, Pei Fen-shui Ling Pass, Sai-ma-chi, Ai-yang-cheng, Kuan-tien-shan, and the Ya-lu.

The 12th Division was strengthened by the addition of one regiment of Guard reservists (transferred from the Umezawa Brigade). For the first few days of the advance guns were lent and interchanged between the division and the Umezawa Brigade. For instance, one battery of mountain artillery was lent to the brigade throughout the operations, but on the 25th,

* See Map 34.

† See Map 33.

26th, and 27th August two guns of this battery acted with the division as well as a field battery from the brigade. One mountain battery was lent to the 2nd Division until the morning of the 1st September.

After the action of Yü-shu-lin-tzu the Russians in front of the 12th Division had retreated to what one may term the outer line and the extreme left of their defensive positions in front of Liao-yang, where they were attacked on the night of the 25th August.

The position (defensive and outpost line) taken up by the 12th Division after the action of Yü-shu-lin-tzu until 25th August was as marked on the sketch,* the 23rd Brigade (Major-General Kigoshi) occupying the hills north of Lao-kuan Ling (H 5), and the 12th Brigade (Major-General Shimamura, late Major-General Sasaki) the hills to the south of it. Three batteries were on the defensive line day and night.

24th Aug.

On the 24th August the general staff, and principal commanding officers of units went to the top of a high hill, affording a good view, and planned the attack, deciding what the movements of each regiment were to be. This night many officers waited on till dark, and until the moon rose (the next night was full moon) to see what the ground and the points to march on looked like.

The forces of the enemy against the 12th Division (as was afterwards discovered) on the 25th and 26th were four and a half regiments of the 9th and 31st Divisions, the latter being on the extreme Russian left, and against the 23rd Brigade.

As far as the 12th Division was concerned, for movement of troops and transport, the country between its position and the Tai-tzu Ho was much the same as it had been ever since the division had entered Manchuria. The tops of the hills had, however, more natural cover than had been the case up to the 25th August, that is, many hills had rocky summits, but I saw none, except North Pa-pan Ling (F 5), that were as rocky as the ordinary Natal kopje. Trees were fewer also, and what trees there were were on the lower slopes only and round the villages in the valleys. In the narrow valleys were crops, for the most part *kaoliang* (almost ripe), planted in drills, and twelve feet to fourteen feet high. This *kaoliang* is not as thickly planted or as obstructive as sugar or *bajra* in India, so that it is practically no obstacle to cavalry.

The roads or tracks by which the division marched after leaving the Sai-ma-chi-An-ping (F 6) road at Han-po Ling (F 6) were worse than ever, and as no wheeled vehicle was able to negotiate the Hung-sha Ling (F 5), the transport had to travel *viâ* An-ping to reach Hei-yü (F 5) (head-quarters on 29th August). The track from Li-tzu-yen (G 5/6) to Piao-kou (F 5) over the Hung-sha Ling is wide enough for horses in single file in most places.

* See Map 34.

Very little water was found along the route taken by the division, except at the village wells, where it was plentiful—a great contrast to the country we had left behind us. Had it not been for the rain, which caused it to rise a foot, the Tai-tzu Ho would have been fordable in many places. Its width varies very much, but in places where it is a single stream it is seldom less than one hundred yards wide. (In peace time there is regular trade by junks between Liao-yang and Pen-hsi-hu.) The banks are never more than three feet high, and during the greater part of the year water only fills a small proportion of the bed. Owing to the unusually small quantity of rain that had fallen in August the river was much narrower than usual, and ran for the most part between temporary banks of sand formed by the rush of water when it was last in flood. At the ford near Lien-tao-wan (F 5) hilly country adjoins the river on both sides, the ground on the right bank being, perhaps, rougher and more intersected than that on the left bank.

The country to the east and north after crossing the ford to the right bank possesses the same characteristics as that through which the division passed after leaving Sai-ma-chi, but after one has passed the hilly ground at Yen-chao-cheng (G 4), and proceeded in a north-westerly direction, the hills are merged in undulating ground, which in turn becomes a plain stretching far away to the north and north-west. This undulating and flat country is in August and the first week of September a sea of *kaoliang*, which forms four-fifths of the crops. Water is scarce everywhere except in the villages, where there are generally at least two wells. It is, when the *kaoliang* is uncut, far from an ideal country for cavalry opposed to infantry; but although this crop "gives away" the cavalryman when ridden through, by reason of the noise it makes, the country, generally speaking, is very rideable when there has been no rain. With the *kaoliang* down, this flat and undulating country is suitable for the movements of cavalry, and were there a certain amount of woodland it would be called a good cavalry country. The roads through this part of the country after rain are well known to be even worse than the hill roads, for the water does not drain off so quickly.

At 7.30 p.m. on the 25th August Lieut.-General Inouye with **25th Aug.** the reserves of the division (two battalions Guard reservists and one field battery from the Umezawa Brigade) started west from the village of Lien-shan (one and a half miles east of Yü-shu-lin-tzu (J 6)). At 8.30 p.m. the 23rd Brigade (right wing), composed of the 46th and 24th Regiments, 14 mountain guns, and 2 squadrons, left its defensive line north-west of Lao-kuan Ling (H 5). The 46th Regiment made North Pa-p'an Ling, and the 24th Regiment Kitsuritsudan (F/G 6) its objective. Two of these fourteen guns were lent by the Umezawa Brigade. The reserve of the right wing was two companies 24th Regiment, one battalion 46th Regiment, one company of engineers, and half

a bearer company; it followed the 24th Regiment. Watching towards Pen-hsi-hu (J 3) was stationed the 3rd Battalion of the 47th Regiment. This battalion rejoined the division two or three days later.

At midnight the general and divisional reserves, having halted at Lao-kuan Ling (H 5) village, took the An-ping road and, crossing the Lan Ho near Ku-chia-tzu (G/H 6) by a ford one hundred yards wide but not deep, halted under some heights on the left bank and waited until dawn.

That part held by the enemy against the right wing (23rd Brigade) was a sort of miniature Drakensberg as seen from the Ladysmith side—a ridge with a top of serrated rocks 1,600 feet above the level of An-ping (F 6), and 800 feet above the village of Li-tzu-yen (G 5/6) at its foot. That part of the ridge or chain of hills against which the left wing (12th Brigade) was directed was of the same nature but more broken and irregular, and therefore more favourable to the attack. The position of the enemy opposed to the 12th Division ran north-east and south-west. Its rocky top reminded one of South Africa; it is razor-shaped, with spurs jutting out to the front and rear. The ridge is devoid of scrub within one hundred feet of the top, but there is much on the lower slopes. The slopes and face of the ridge or range are devoid of natural cover, such as stones, &c., until within thirty to forty yards of the top. Of course the shape of the ground sometimes afforded good cover from fire from certain directions. There were some trees on the lower slopes, and crops (twelve feet high, *kaoliang* chiefly) in the valley in front of the position and on the lowest slopes of the ridge. Walking up to the top from the front is easy at first, but is practically climbing (or using hands as well as feet) for the last one hundred and twenty yards. I tested this practically on the 28th September. The ground in front of the position over which the Japanese had to advance was composed of smaller hills separated by narrow valleys, generally devoid of trees, and often under-features of the main ridge. The valleys were covered with *kaoliang* and contained few cottages. The Russians held the very summit of the ridge, in some places using trenches, but more often *sangars*, or the natural cover afforded by the rocks as was the practice in South Africa. The field of fire was decidedly good, but there was a certain amount of dead ground, often within one hundred yards of the *sangars*. In fact the characteristics of the Russian position were identical with those of many in the late South African War. Inter-communication along the position was bad, as the top of the ridge, being razor-shaped, is generally less than twenty yards wide, and walking is bad on it and below it. No obstacles were used. The Russian gun position (for six guns) on the Hung-sha Ling (F 5) was a good one as regards its front for a range of 2,500 yards and over, but under that range the guns could not fire on the attack without exposing themselves very much.

Their field of fire to left and right was practically *nil*, as, being on the pass, the ground to their left and right was higher and rose abruptly at once. The line of retreat was steep, and the road bad, so considerable effort must have been made to get them into position in the gun pits, which were of good pattern and strong. Four gun pits were on the north side of the path as it crossed the ridge, while two were on the south side.

The extreme left of the Russian position was on North Pa-pan Ling (F 5) with the Tai-tzu Ho flowing at its foot, and the Lan Ho to its left front—a fairly secure flank, one would have supposed, especially as there were Cossacks on the right bank of the former river. From North Pa-pan Ling the position stretched to the Han-po Ling (F/G 6), against which the left wing directed its attack, joining up with the right of the 2nd Division attacking Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7).

Three thousand six hundred yards in rear of North Pa-pan Ling, with a valley intervening, was the hilly ground north of the village of Piao-kou (F 5). This ground was about four hundred feet above the valley, and on it the Russians had two guns, which, with the six guns on the Hung-sha Ling, made up the battery used against the 12th Division right wing. With these two guns were also the Russian reserves, amounting to two or three battalions.

The position on the North Pa-pan Ling cannot be described as possessing a good way of retreat. The rear slope was as steep as the front one, and no doubt gave excellent cover during the action to the men not actually fighting; but as the field of fire from the top against an enemy who had just abandoned it is an excellent one, guns on the hilly ground north of Piao-kou would be of the highest value in the case of a retirement.

The ground over which the infantry of the Japanese right wing would have had to advance, had the attack been made by day, was favourable at first, but in the final stages—within 2,500 yards of the enemy's infantry—very heavy losses must have been incurred, for it meant crossing a valley and ascending a long, steep slope under fire. Artillery positions, too, were difficult to find, for the Russian position dominated the ground to its front for thousands of yards.

The ground over which the infantry of the left wing would have had to advance by day was more broken and intersected, thereby yielding more cover and opportunities to the attack, but again, in the same way, artillery positions were the difficulty. Added to this, the attack would have had to face an artillery far more numerous than that which confronted the 23rd Brigade.

Consideration of these things, and a glance at the map, will explain why the Japanese determined on a night attack.

As mentioned above, the right wing of the 12th Division (46th and 24th Regiments, with 14 guns and 2 squadrons) left its defensive line north-west of Lao-kuan Ling (H 5) at 8.30 p.m.,

on the 25th August, in two columns. At about 10 p.m. the right column (46th Regiment) drove off the enemy's advanced observation post on the Lan Ho opposite Ta-tzu-pu (G 5), and crossed the river. The two squadrons which were with the 46th Regiment crossed the Lan Ho a little south of its junction with the Tai-tzu Ho near Chang-chia-pu-tzu (G 5) and took up positions to watch the right flank and north bank of the latter river. Forty reservist cavalymen kept touch with them to the east, who in turn were in contact with the Umezawa Brigade. The left column (24th Regiment), which moved *via* Ku-chia-tzu (G/H 6) across the Lan Ho, occupied the One Tree Pass (G 5) at 11.45 p.m., where emplacements were made for the guns (2 batteries mountain artillery). In the meantime the 46th Regiment was moving on to attack North Pa-pan Ling in two places. At 1 a.m., 26th August, one battalion having deployed at the foot of Suribachi-yama (G 5) (prominent under-feature and spur of North Pa-pan Ling), had reached the top of it, the enemy making a stout resistance. The 3rd Battalion of the 46th climbed the north-east end of North Pa-pan Ling, and reached the top at 1 a.m.; it met with small resistance, as the enemy seems to have taken it for a patrol only. This was the initial mistake made by the Russians, and had far-reaching consequences. The bayonet only was used, and the Japanese proceeded to drive the Russians before them along the ridge until they were level with the 1st Battalion that had taken Suribachi-yama, and had reached a narrow causeway ten yards in width and forty yards long, the other side of which was an abrupt, very steep rise, covered with rocks, on which the Russians had many men. Here they remained until daybreak. The six Russian guns on Hung-sha Ling opened fire at 3.15 a.m.—a round every half minute until dawn—by way, I suppose, of encouraging the infantry, for although there was a full moon they can have had no real target.

At dawn the Japanese guns at One Tree Pass found that they could not possibly reach the Russian position, so moved to a position which brought them nearer. The guns (they had great difficulty all day in getting good positions) changed position four times on the 26th, and the Russian guns on Hung-sha Ling never properly detected them until they occupied their last position, which was in rear of the hill south of the pass (Hung-sha Ling)—range about 3,000 yards. The Japanese right wing artillery casualties all day were four men wounded. In each position they used indirect fire. The Japanese infantry of the 23rd Brigade had captured a great part of the enemy's position before dawn, but the remainder was so strong they were not in occupation of the whole until the afternoon of the 27th. This initial success caused the first retirement of Kuropatkin's Armies. Before dawn the two mountain guns which accompanied the 46th Regiment were in position on North Pa-pan Ling; a heavy musketry continued

26th Aug.

between the Japanese infantry north of the causeway and on Suribachi-yama and the Russians on a steep rocky point (marked "a" south-west corner of G 5) south of the causeway. One company of the 3rd Battalion 46th Regiment had been posted on the rear slope of North Pa-pan Ling in line with its battalion on the ridge. At 6 a.m., when it was just light, two or three Russian battalions in reserve on the hills north of Piao-kou advanced, and with two guns (apparently the remainder of the battery in position at Hung-sha Ling) opened fire on the 3rd Battalion, and especially upon the company on the exposed slope, which alone was withdrawn to the crest. The two mountain guns at the north-east end of the ridge at once opened on the two Russian guns, which after an hour were silenced, but the Japanese guns remained in the same position all day until 5 p.m. and, firing from time to time, prevented the Russians from making a counter-attack from that quarter.

Between 7 a.m. and 10.40 a.m. part of the 24th Regiment occupying Kitsuritsudan (F,G 6) attacked the enemy west of Ta Han-po-ling (G 6), during which time the latter and the ground to the south of it were taken by the left wing 12th Brigade.

To return to the 46th Regiment. At daybreak the Japanese saw what a hard nut they had to crack. To move further along the ridge the narrow causeway had to be crossed, which was swept by fire from the high rocky point "a" on the far side. This point was both precipitous and rocky, especially where it joined the causeway. Roughly speaking, at dawn the Japanese faced the causeway, and also lay among what rocks afforded them cover on the south-east slope at the foot of the rocky point "a," which of course they had reached under cover of darkness. To reach the top of the rocky point meant using hands as well as feet everywhere. This being the state of affairs, the Japanese did not succeed in driving the Russians off the rocky point until 3.20 p.m. All the morning the enemies faced each other, sometimes being only five yards apart, when to show a head meant death. From time to time the Russians rolled down rocks and stones, killing and maiming many of their enemies. Four or five attempts in all were made to rush the place, but it was not until 3.20 p.m. that the Japanese made a supreme effort and carried it.

A private soldier who belonged to the leading company told me the following when I visited the spot on the 28th: "I was in the last charge when we took the point. The lieutenant in command with the other officer, when the bugle sounded, got up first to lead us on. They were both shot at once. We used the bayonet only. It was so steep in places that the men had to help each other up by forming a sort of ladder one on the top of another. I don't know how long we fought to get the top, but it did not seem to take long to do it. One bullet cut my jacket here (pointing to a hole in the back

" of his jacket). The sergeant and a Russian ran their bayonets " into one another at the same moment." On the Japanese gaining the rocky point, hot fire was opened on them by a Russian battalion down the slope in rear of the guns and by three companies still remaining among the rocks between the rocky point and the guns. The Russian battery was barely under fire from the rocky point, but about 3.45 p.m., when heavy rain came on, the gunners abandoned the guns and went down the hill. This was the state of affairs at nightfall.

On visiting the spot the situation at dawn and during the day of the 26th August appeared to me very like that at Waggon Hill on the 6th January, 1900. The same kind of ground, the same proximity of the enemies one to another, the same method of attack, *i.e.*, scaling the heights by night and getting into a position by dawn from which it was extremely hard to advance. The Japanese were Boers and the Russians British, but this time the Boers won. Of the two, I should say, the Russian position was the more difficult to take. Owing to the lack of room, the frontage of the firing lines must have been very small, but doubtless the men were closely packed together—I am referring to the fighting at the rocky point. Shell marks from the Japanese guns were plentiful, for the rocks were broken in all directions on and round the rocky point. It seems to me the Russian guns held on to encourage their infantry on the ridge, and particularly those on the rocky point. When the latter was taken, then the key of the position was gone, and the retirement of the Russians was merely a question of time. That the guns could have been got away before the rocky point was taken I have no doubt. Afterwards their withdrawal was practically impossible, for the Japanese infantry would never have suffered it to be done before their very eyes. The horses of the battery were well under cover during the fight, and it would have been merely a question of letting the guns down the steep track by ropes. Such a procedure early in the afternoon would probably have lost the entire ridge as far as the Hung-sha Ling before dark, but at the same time it must have been evident to the Russian officers that some time or other the remainder of the ridge must be lost, whether the guns retreated or not.

Shortly after 4 p.m. the 24th Regiment attempted to take the south end of North Pa-pan Ling (*i.e.*, that part south of the Hung-sha Ling). To do this they required the help of the artillery, but at 4.40 p.m. heavy rain coming on hindered the guns, so the attack was not pushed home.

The state of affairs at nightfall of the 26th was therefore as follows:—The right column occupied the north-eastern part of North Pa-pan Ling as far as and including the rocky point about one hundred and thirty yards from the Russian guns on the Hung-sha Ling, but the ground from the rocky point to the south-west was still in the hands of the Russians, for the left column had not gained ground to any appreciable extent.

On the 27th August at 2 a.m. a company of engineers (in reserve) began to improve the track from Li-tzu-yen (G 5/6) to the Hung-sha Ling for the guns to get into position on the latter as soon as possible. They worked to within five hundred yards of the top by dawn. At 6 a.m. the 24th Regiment resumed its attack on the south-west part of North Pa-pan Ling, but found it such difficult work that it did not take it until 3 p.m. One of the two batteries attempted to ascend the track from Li-tzu-yen to the pass in the darkness, which was aggravated by a fog, but failed. The Russians, who still held on to their position near their guns at nightfall of the 26th, slipped away in the early part of the night. At dawn it was seen that none of the enemy were in rear of the pass, so the battery never took up a position on it, although gun pits were made. At 4 p.m., the 24th Regiment, having united with the left wing (12th Brigade), advanced to the range of hills running south-west to An-ping from the Hung-sha Ling. **27th Aug.**

The Russians opposing the 23rd Brigade on the 25th, 26th, and 27th August belonged to the 31st Infantry Division, under General Mau.

During the three days the casualties of the 23rd Brigade amounted to over 400, of which 8 officers and 95 non-commissioned officers and men were killed.

Of the Russians the Japanese buried 135 dead.

Six guns, 180 rifles, and two large artillery telescopes were taken.

On the 25th August, at 8.30 p.m., the left wing (12th Brigade, **25th Aug.** i.e., 14th and 47th Regiments) advanced from its defensive line in two columns *via* Li-pi-yu (H 6) and Ssu-tien-tzu (H 6).

The right column was: the 47th Regiment (less 3rd Battalion) 20 cavalry, and 50 engineers. This 3rd Battalion formed part of the general reserve, as mentioned before. The left column was: 14th Regiment less 1st Battalion, one squadron, and 50 engineers. Reserves of right column were: 1st Battalion 47th Regiment, 50 cavalry, and 100 engineers. Reserves of left column were: 1st Battalion 14th Regiment, 20 cavalry, and one company of engineers.

The right column crossed the Lan Ho close to the main road near Ku-chia-tzu (G/H 6), and marched on Han-po Ling (G 6). The left column, crossing the Lan Ho, moved towards Chi-pan Ling and Pa-pan Ling (G 6), not to be confounded with North Pa-pan Ling. The right column deployed two battalions in line, the right one of which took the hill north of Hsiao Han-po-ling (G 6) and the hill range extending from it northwards without resistance at 1 a.m. The left battalion of the right column met the enemy at 1.30 a.m., and drove him from his position with the bayonet. Here the right and left columns joined up and moved on Ta Han-po-ling. As soon as the left battalion had advanced six hundred yards, it found the enemy was strongly posted at Ta Han-po-ling, and resisted its advance **26th Aug.**

most determinedly (about 4 a.m.). This being reported, the commander of the division ordered the two battalions of Guard reservists from the reserve to reinforce,* but ere they arrived the two battalions of the 47th had driven the enemy in front of them off Ta Han-po-ling. The reinforcements coming up, the right column was able to follow the enemy through San-chia-tzu, and occupy the hilly ground north and south of that village shortly before 8 a.m.

The enemy, on being driven back, concentrated and was reinforced near An-ping (F 6).

The early employment of the whole divisional reserve is noticeable.

At dawn on the 26th the three mountain batteries with the left wing took up a position south of Ta Han-po-ling, the Russian guns being near An-ping. Not long after 8 a.m. it was seen that the enemy was in motion to make a counter-attack on the position just taken up by the left wing, and that he had artillery in position north-east and south-east of An-ping, so the right column waited near San-chia-tzu, and prepared to meet him. Two of the mountain batteries also were now in position at Ta Han-po-ling, and opened fire on the now advancing infantry of the enemy.

During the night the left column (14th Regiment), driving two companies away close to the village of Chin-chia-pu-tzu (F 6), which lies about three thousand yards west of Pa-pan Ling at 1.40 a.m., had taken the hill south of Hsiao Han-po-ling (G 6) at 2 a.m. After rallying there it separated into two parties and moved along in close order between Pa-pan Ling and Chi-pan Ling. Meeting the enemy in considerable numbers in the hills to their front, who opened a hot fire on them, they drove him off that ground by 5.20 a.m. without firing a shot, causing him to retreat down a valley running westwards. The left column then rallied again. At 10 a.m., seeing movements of the enemy near An-ping (as mentioned above), and more guns at the foot of the hills south of that place, the commander of the left wing brought up the brigade reserve (1st Battalion 14th Regiment), and posted it between his right and left columns to oppose the enemy's advance. At 3.30 p.m. the guns of the enemy amounted to thirty-four, and against them the Japanese had only two mountain batteries in action in the afternoon, for no good position could be obtained for the third, the field battery lent by the Umezawa Brigade.

By good luck, however, the Russian guns did not concentrate their fire on the Japanese batteries, but fired in all directions, sometimes on places where there were no Japanese at all. Naturally they did little damage. Meanwhile the Japanese rifle fire effectually prevented the Russians advancing, although

* The order was given them just before 5 a.m. They were at that moment on the left bank of the Lan Ho, half a mile from Ku-chia-tzu (G, H 6).—J. B. J.

they made many attempts to do so, after gathering quietly on the hills south-west and north-west of San-chia-tzu (G 6). At the latter they were warmly received by the left column of the right wing (24th Regiment), then in occupation of Kitsuritsudan and could advance no further (time 4.30 p.m.). No further advance was made by either opponent, but the Russian guns still kept up their fire until the heavy rain before mentioned came on, when they were able to fire only at intervals. Fighting ceased in the evening, both remaining in their positions. During the night part of the enemy retired to the north-west of An-ping. The Russian guns (except sixteen) were withdrawn.

During the morning of the 26th the enemy's force against the left wing was two regiments of 9th Infantry Division and an unknown quantity of the 34th, 35th, 36th, and 126th Regiments, plus guns—two of them supposed to have been mountain. Prisoners stated that their force that morning comprised the whole of the 9th Division, one regiment of Cossacks and sixteen field guns. The reinforcement in the afternoon is unknown, but it is supposed to have been composed of troops who were in the morning in front of the Guard Division, and could be spared, as the Guard made little progress. On the 25th and 26th August the left wing (12th Brigade) lost two officers and 31 men killed, while six officers and 208 men were wounded. The Russian casualties unknown, but 320 of his dead were found. Some Russian prisoners included a lieutenant-colonel over sixty years of age. One Russian gun was captured at Han-po Ling.

The 2nd Division at early dawn of 26th took the hill Kung-chang Ling (F/G 7) and the hill running south-west from it. Afterwards the field guns were unable to advance owing to the steepness of the mountain road, and so the fighting was done entirely by the infantry, but it did not succeed in reaching the required place to attack the enemy's right flank at An-ping. This was an additional reason why the Russians were able to reinforce their troops in front of Han-po Ling against the left wing of the 12th Division.

It was known that part of the enemy's force in front had withdrawn during the night (26th–27th), but the sixteen remaining guns (eighteen had been withdrawn) were more powerful than those of the attackers. The onward movement of the 2nd Division being arrested, they were unable to take up their proper position in line with the 12th Division, and the left wing of the latter was obliged to wait. During the forenoon artillery fire was intermittent.* At 3 p.m. the Russian artillery on the hill north-east of An-ping showed signs of retiring so it was determined not to await the 2nd Division's movement any longer, and to resume the attack on the hill north-west of

27th Aug.

* At 1 p.m. the two battalions Guard reservists [divisional reserves] returned to Shang Shou-keng (G 6) and bivouacked.—J. B. J.

San-chia-tzu (G 6). The Japanese guns at Han-po Ling changed position to the east of San-chia-tzu, and directed their fire principally on the Russian infantry north-west of that place. On this the left column of the right wing (24th Regiment of the 23rd Brigade) uniting with the right column of the left wing (47th Regiment of the 12th Brigade) pushed on. Between 5.25 and 6 p.m. the 24th Regiment took the highest hill to the north of San-chia-tzu, and the 47th Regiment occupied the ground north-west of San-chia-tzu, and was in line with the 24th Regiment. The 14th Regiment (left column of left wing) took the enemy's gun position north-east of An-ping. Ousted from his positions the enemy's main force retired to the plain of the Tang Ho, part of it entering the hilly country on the left bank (west) of the river. Meanwhile the 2nd Division had advanced and occupied positions south and south-west of An-ping. The fighting on the 27th August was not severe anywhere, the Russians being evidently prepared for a retirement, presumably because their extreme left had been turned by the 23rd Brigade. The Japanese troops bivouacked this night on the positions they had taken.

The line occupied by the 12th Division on the night of the 27th was:—Right wing from the north end of North Pa-pan Ling (next the Tai-tzu Ho) through the Hung-sha Ling and rocky hills south of it; the left wing, that line prolonged towards An-ping, joining up with the 2nd Division on its left. The divisional reserve camped with the commander of the division in and about Shang Shou-keng (G 6). The two mountain guns that fought on North Pa-pan Ling on the 26th returned to the Umezawa Brigade.

The artillery with the 12th Division on 25th, 26th, and 27th August was as follows:—4 mountain batteries and 2 guns (26 mountain guns), and 1 field battery (reservist); total, 32 guns.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the General Staff Officer in his lecture to the foreign attachés did scant justice to the work done by the right wing of the 12th Division on the 25th and 26th. All he said was, "The right wing of the 12th Division was also fiercely engaged at the Hung-sha Ling and "could not make headway." This was true as far as it goes, but he did not mention that by the time the right wing had reached the Hung-sha Ling over three thousand yards of the enemy's extreme left had been taken and his positions turned.

28th Aug. The orders issued by the General Officer Commanding the First Army were as follows:—

On the 28th the 12th Division will occupy a line between Ying-shou-pu (F 4), Tiao-shui-lou (F 4), and Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5), while the 2nd Division will move up on the left of the 12th Division, and occupy a line across the mountain chain running south-west from the hill south of Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5).

Patrol work on the 27th had made it clear that no force of any size was in front of the 12th Division, whereas in front of the 2nd Division in the hills, and especially on that hill south of Shuang-miao-tzu, the enemy was very strong. On the latter hill trenches had been prepared weeks before; added to this, in the corn fields west of Shuang-miao-tzu scouts reported the presence of about a division of the enemy. Between Shuang-miao-tzu and Liao-yang, along the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, large bodies of the enemy were perpetually going and coming. That the movements of the two divisions might be simultaneous, it was soon apparent that the 12th Division must wait, so it only moved forward as far as the hills west and north of Hei-yü (F 5). This movement began at 7 a.m. and was completed at 3.30 p.m. without hindrance from the enemy, whose scouts fell back to the north-west. In the course of the day the reservist field battery (sent by the Umezawa Brigade) was transferred to the 2nd Division; the position of the 12th Division north of Hei-yü was as marked on the map (F 5); right wing: 3 battalions of 46th Regiment and 2 battalions of 24th Regiment in front line; left wing: 2 battalions of 47th Regiment and 1 battalion of 14th Regiment in front line; two batteries were with each wing.

In the meantime the 2nd Division was endeavouring to drive the enemy off its front and take up its line as mentioned above. In the evening the 12th Division waited no longer, but moving forward again occupied its appointed line, *i.e.*, Ying-shou-pu (F 4) to west Shuang-miao-tzu (E 5) between midnight and 2 a.m. (29th). Here the left wing had one battalion in front line and the right wing had five battalions in front line. Information up to 10 p.m. (28th) disclosed the fact that there was no strong force of the enemy along the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho from a point four miles or so west of Pen-hsi-hu (J 3) down stream to Hei-ying-tai (F 4). Although the 12th Division had no fighting on the 28th, the 2nd Division in reaching its appointed line suffered considerable loss. Thus both divisions attained their objects.

The commander of the 12th Division and the reserve started from Shang Shou-keng (G 6) at 10.30 a.m. (28th), the latter having been under arms since 5 a.m., and marched to Li-tzu-yen (G 5/6), where they halted until 10.15 p.m. At that hour they moved over the Hung-sha Ling, and camped for the night in and about Piao-kou (F 5).

The line of the 12th Division being the same as on the 29th Aug. previous day, and all the enemy in front of it having crossed to the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, many patrols were sent on the 29th August to reconnoitre the banks and search for fords and a suitable spot for a pontoon bridge. The enemy's cavalry and infantry, though not numerous, were distributed along the right bank from Manju-yama (F 4) (called by some officers Karakasa-yama and Jingasa-yama, both of which names mean "Umbrella Hill"), up stream, which somewhat hindered patrol

work. Since the 26th, owing to the rain, the Tai-tzu Ho had risen a foot, so only two fords could be found, one near Lien-tao-wan (F 5) and the other near Manju-yama. For the pontoon bridge three likely places were discovered, two near Hou Kuan-tun (F 4) and one at a point one thousand yards up stream from Manju-yama. It must be mentioned here that the many junks that ply on the river from Pen-hsi-hu down stream had been taken or destroyed by the Russians weeks before, so pontoons were a necessity; they had accompanied the 12th Division from Sai-ma-chi—carried on pack ponies. The enemy having brought guns to the slope or spur running from Hill 131 (E 4) down to the river, which fired from time to time during the day on the hills south-west of Ying-shou-pu (F 4) and Tiao-shui-lou (F 4), caused the commander of the division to choose the ford at Lien-tao-wan (F 5) for crossing, the timing of which movement was to be regulated by the progress of the Second and Fourth Armies.

The 2nd Division in the meantime was unable to reach the bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, as it met with strong resistance and was continually enfiladed by guns on the north bank of the river.

The commander of the 12th Division and the reserve in the course of the day marched to Hei-yü (F 5) and took up their quarters for the night.

30th Aug.

On the 30th August both divisions were still in line. The 12th Division sent strong infantry patrols across the river, and a small party was posted on the Chinese fort hill at Yen-chao-cheng (G 4), on the north bank. The right wing of the 2nd Division did not move, but the left wing, together with the Guard Division on its left, continued the combat of the previous day. Severe fighting took place, and at the same time a strong force of the enemy attacking the left of the Guard and right of the Fourth Army were repulsed with much loss. At 7.30 p.m. four field batteries of the 2nd Division arrived at Hei-yü (F 5) from the west.

The purpose of the 12th Division was to cross the river during the night and seize a position on the north side, by which it would threaten the Russian left and rear, and so relieve some of the pressure on the Second and Fourth Armies. Part of the 2nd Division was also to cross on the 31st by day. The crossing was smoothly effected, with practically no interference from the enemy.

The casualties of the 12th Division up to this time were:—

14th Regiment	-	-	158	including	26	killed.
17th	"	-	82	"	22	"
24th	"	-	51	"	4	"
46th	"	-	440	"	109	"
Artillery	-	-	6	"	0	"
Engineers	-	-	3	"	1	"
Bearer Company	-	-	1	"	0	"
			<hr/> 741	"	<hr/> 162	"

At midnight of the 30th the advanced guard under Major-General Kigoshi started across the Tai-tzu Ho by the ford near Lien-tao-wan (F 5). Its composition and order was as follows:—Cavalry patrol, 46th Regiment, two battalions 24th Regiment, and two batteries mountain artillery. The two squadrons that had been watching the banks of the Tai-tzu Ho since the night of the 25th crossed the river further up stream and hurried in the direction of Ping-tai-tzu (J 1) in order to keep touch between the right of the division and the Umezawa Mixed Brigade. The latter was ordered to march north in the early morning (31st) from its position south of Pen-hsi-hu. 31st Aug.

After going three or four miles the advanced guard met with three squadrons of Cossacks and fifty infantry, whom it drove northwards, and halted. The Umezawa Brigade, crossing Tai-tzu Ho at 4 a.m. near Wo-lung-tsun ($7\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of Pen-hsi-hu) (J 3), drove the enemy out of Pen-hsi-hu after occupying Wei-ning-ying (7 miles north-east of Pen-hsi-hu) (J 3).

One-and-a-half battalions were temporarily left behind to hold the line Ying-shou-pu-Tiao-shui-lou-Shuang-miao-tzu with the four field batteries of the 2nd Division mentioned above. The Divisional Head-Quarters left Hei-yü at midnight of 30th with the reserve (2nd Regiment Guard reservists, 14th Regiment and 11th battery) and had crossed the river by the Lien-tao-wan ford by daylight, halting twice by the way. It having rained the day before, the roads were in a bad state, so the 2nd Division field artillery (as mentioned above, they had arrived at Hei-yü some hours before, and after a rest were ordered to take up positions on the Ying-shou-pu-Tiao-shui-lou-Shuang-miao-tzu line), which was at first travelling along the same road as the reserve, progressed very slowly, guns getting stuck in the mud and their horses being too weak to move them. Like most Manchurian roads, it was a mere track, and its course led over very rough country. I noticed in consequence that there was a great deal of confusion and shouting, which was not lessened by horses getting entangled at times in the telephone wire that had been carelessly laid too close to the road. I believe it was necessary for these guns to move along this road at the same time as the 12th Division reserve, because after resting the horses at Hei-yü, there being no other road, there was little time before dawn for them to get into position above the river and bring fire to bear on the enemy north of it. The road from Hei-yü to the ford at Lien-tao-wan had been carefully marked with small white posts, with writing on them to explain the way, for although there was a moon the sky was cloudy. The ford also was marked with posts. The water was up to the men's chests when they crossed.

What struck me very much as we rode along was the casual way in which everyone lit matches, smoked, and shouted from one part of the column to another. On inquiring afterwards, I

was told that they had information that the enemy's force in the neighbourhood was weak. Of course the hills to a great extent hid the movement, but even when halted at the ford for an hour no precautions for secrecy were taken. About daylight, or perhaps a little later, the crossing of the whole division had been smoothly effected; on reaching the right bank the advanced guard moved along the hills overlooking the river towards the Chinese fort on the hill above Yen-chao-cheng village (G 4), while marching in rear of it three companies (two of the 2nd Regiment and Guard reservists, one of the 47th Regiment) piquetted them from as far up stream as Sha-kan (F/G 5), thereby securing the crossing and right flank of the division until the Umezawa Brigade from Pen-hsi-hu had come up and joined hands. A few Cossacks were encountered by these three companies, but were soon driven off. A staff officer told me afterwards he himself saw about six hundred Cossacks, but they made little or no attempt to interfere with the movements of the division.

The orders to the advanced guard were to occupy the line Kang-yu (G 3)-Huang-ku-fen (F 4).

Between 7 and 8 a.m. on the 31st the advanced guard occupied a line from the Chinese fort near Yen-chao-cheng stretching in a north-easterly direction; facing north-west on the left was the 24th Regiment, on the right was the 46th Regiment. Between 8 and 9 o'clock the advanced guard had moved on steadily to a hill east of Huang-ku-fen (F 4), the Cossacks falling back without attempting to hinder them. By 11 a.m. General Kigoshi had occupied a line as on the map (F 4), and the 14th Regiment (of the 12th Brigade) had come up in line on his right and occupied the high ground north-west of Kang-yu (G 3). This regiment was shortly afterwards joined by the 47th Regiment and three batteries, so the two brigades were now in line, the 12th forming the right wing and the 23rd the left wing. As ordered by 2 p.m. the right wing occupied a line between the hill north-west of Kang-yu and a hill north-east of Huang-ku-fen, while the left wing occupied a line from the latter place to the river, as marked on the map. All this was done with little interference from the Cossacks. In the front line of the division were:--Right wing: two battalions 14th Regiment on the right, and one battalion 47th Regiment on the left; left wing: two battalions of 24th Regiment and two battalions 46th Regiment. Each wing (or brigade) had a reserve of $1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions.

At 1.30 p.m. preparations were begun to throw a pontoon bridge at Yen-chao-cheng (G 4) under the old Chinese fort. By 2 p.m. the 15th Brigade (2nd Division), under Major-General Okasaki, had crossed the river by the Lien-tao-wan ford, and had rendezvoused near Kao-li-tsai (G 4), after which it at once took up the line as marked on the maps* on the left of the

* Maps 34 and 37.

12th Division. At 2.30 p.m. an artillery duel commenced between the 2nd Division field batteries south of the river and a Russian battery north of it. It lasted an hour. The above movements being observed by the Russians, they brought up guns to the spur running south-east of Manju-yama, and increased their force on and about that hill, so that it amounted to more than a brigade, bringing up troops from a point four miles west of Lo-ta-tai (D 4). The guns of the 12th Division engaged the Russians, and firing, at first heavy, went on until dark. Another column of the enemy also appeared near the Yen-tai (F 3) colliery railway station, having moved eastward along the branch line to it, but it did not take the offensive against the 12th Brigade. Small parties of Cossacks appeared now and then during the afternoon on the right of the 12th Division, but were easily driven off. The position all day of the commander of the 12th Division and reserve was at Yen-chao-cheng, where also they bivouacked for the night.

At 3.30 p.m. (31st) the first of the pontoons arrived at Yen-chao-cheng, and at 6.30 p.m. the bridge was ready for traffic. The length of the bridge was 160 yards; 110 men were employed on it. The forty-four pontoons, of which thirty-five were used, were floated down river from Ku-chia-tzu (G/H 6) on the Lan Ho, covered by the advance of the Umezawa Brigade and the cavalry. The banks of the river, although of sand (formed by the rush of the water when in flood), hid the pontoons from observation for the last mile above Yen-chao-cheng, and the hill on which the Chinese fort stands concealed all preparations. It is noticeable how well timed this operation was with the movements of the Umezawa Brigade and the 12th Division. The colonel of engineers superintending the bridging said it was a much easier business than that over the Ai Ho at the battle of the Ya-lu.

Putting aside the fact that Kuropatkin made no attempt to interfere with the crossing and movements of the 12th Division on the 31st, the failure of the Cossacks to harass it is most remarkable. The ground was most favourable, and some hundreds of Cossacks are known to have been in the neighbourhood.

The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division was ordered on the 1st September to attack Manju-yama, and the 12th Division to advance in line with it, *i.e.*, on its right. In accordance with this plan, the right wing of the 12th Division without much opposition took Wu-hsien Shan (F 3) before 8 o'clock in the morning. The four 2nd Division field batteries from south of the river, crossing by the pontoon bridge, replaced the mountain batteries of the 12th Division before daylight. The latter then rejoined the 12th Division. The advance of the 2nd Division was very much hindered by the enemy's guns close to Manju-yama, and north-west of Hsia-fu-tun (E 4), which outranged the Japanese batteries, so that at dusk the Japanese firing line was

1st Sept.

still some hundreds of yards from their objective. Owing to the slow advance of the 2nd Division, and a threatened attack on its own right, the 12th Division did not advance more than a mile on the 1st, the reserve (2nd Regiment Guard reservists and one battery) and divisional staff remaining near Kang-yu (G 3). The two squadrons which had crossed the Tai-tzu Ho on the night of the 30th August held more or less the same ground as they had on the 31st. There was very little musketry all the morning in front of the 12th Division, but at 2.45 p.m. two Russian guns (thought to be horse artillery) appeared on one of the Colliery Hills, 1,800 yards to the north of Wu-hsien Shan, accompanied by Cossacks, and shelled the ground in rear of the right flank of the 12th Brigade, but owing, no doubt, to the *kaoliang* never found a target. At 3.10 p.m. a Russian horse artillery battery (six guns) appeared on the same hills, but about 1,400 yards further away, and shelled intermittently during the afternoon. At 5.5 p.m. musketry increased in front of the 12th Brigade (it had one battalion of the 47th Regiment and one battalion of the 14th Regiment in reserve), and it became clear that the Russians were making a counter-attack. At 5.20 musketry was general along the front of the 12th Division. At 6.40 two Japanese troops from the east of Wu-hsien Shan made their way through the *kaoliang* and intersected ground, and opened fire on the enemy on the Colliery Hills on his left flank. No Japanese guns replied to the Russian horse artillery. At sunset the situation in front of the 12th Division was unchanged, the enemy's rifle fire dying away. At dusk the 24th Regiment (of the 23rd Brigade) was on the right of the 15th Brigade, *i.e.*, immediately to the north-east of Manju-yama, and took considerable part in the fighting during the night, losing 156 men killed and wounded.

It was noticeable all day how the Japanese guns made no headway against the Russian artillery, which was well posted and out-ranged them.

2nd Sept.

On the 2nd September* the two squadrons of the division moved north and joined up with the Umezawa Brigade. All was quiet in front of the 12th Division in the early hours of the morning, but towards 9 a.m. the guns on the Colliery Hills opened fire in various directions, seemingly finding it hard to locate their enemy. At 10.10 a.m. a Japanese infantry patrol sent forward from Wu-hsien Shan very quickly proved how close the enemy was to the Japanese lines in the *kaoliang*, for very heavy rifle fire broke out and lasted some five minutes. At 10.50 a.m. a mountain battery from the west arrived at Wu-hsien Shan, and at 11.3 a.m. came into action (indirect fire) against the six horse artillery guns on the Colliery Hills. The gun emplacements of the battery had been prepared beforehand. At this time musketry in front of the right wing had died down. At

* See Map 38.

11.45 a.m. the Wu-hsien Shan battery had silenced the Russian battery, making very good practice. The Russian guns failed entirely to locate their adversaries. At 12.45 p.m. the Japanese battery resumed and shelled the Russian guns heavily, but there was no reply. It was at this time that the 12th Brigade advanced against the Colliery Hills, the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Regiment making the summit of the range its objective, under the cover of the Wu-hsien Shan battery. At 2 p.m. I saw the leading company of this battalion charging up the Colliery Hill nearest Wu-hsien Shan.* At 2.5 it had reached the crest, and dismounted Cossacks (I could detect them by the standard they were carrying on a very long lance) appeared for the first time at the other end of the plateau, some two hundred yards away, but the Wu-hsien Shan guns firing shrapnel, scattered them at once down the reverse slope. At this moment a Japanese, with the battalion flag, fifty paces in front of his comrades, waved to them to come on, and surging over the plateau they took the first hill. At 2.15 p.m. the Russian guns west of Ta-yao opened on the Japanese attack with shrapnel, but with little effect, as an officer of the leading company told me. As the Japanese infantry continued to advance along the Colliery Hills, the battery on Wu-hsien Shan moved forward, and, with another, taking up a position north-east of Ta-yao (prepared beforehand) shelled the ground in front of them. No Russian guns answered them. At 3 p.m. the divisional reserve and staff left the neighbourhood of Kang-yu (G 3)† and moved to Wu-hsien Shan, one company being detached at the same time along the Pen-hsi-hu (J 3) road. I heard some sniping going on in that direction. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Regiment was steadily driving the enemy northwards off the Colliery Hills, and at 5.20 p.m. had taken the whole range, when it halted. In this action the force of the enemy consisted of the 11th and 54th Regiments, six guns and Cossacks. As is usually the case with the Russians, their front line had begun to retire before the reserve had come up, the latter forming a large proportion of their force.‡ This evening the 3rd Battalion 14th Regiment held the north end of the Colliery Hills, and the brigade reserve was in the village of Ta-yao. During the action the 8th Company of the 47th Regiment on the left (south-west of Colliery Hills) pressed on without orders and tried to capture the Russian guns. It was nearly surrounded, but eventually extricated itself, with forty-seven casualties, including two officers killed. An officer of the leading company of the 3rd Battalion 14th Regiment told me this as a great joke. The divisional reserve remained at Wu-hsien Shan, except one battalion, which camped at

* A "swarm" will correctly describe their formation at that moment.

—J. B. J.

† See Map 34.

‡ Vide Battle of Yu-shu-lin-tzu, 31st July. See p. 210.

Tsao-kou (F 4) with the commander of the division. The bulk of the enemy's force defending Colliery Hills retired north-westwards. The Russian gun pits on the Colliery Hills were well constructed, but their infantry trenches were very feeble—a marked contrast to those of the Japanese, which were dug as soon as night fell. These were carefully made along the tops of the hills so as to give protection from shrapnel fire from the west.

On the left of the 12th Division during the day the 2nd Division attempted to take Hill 131 (E 4) to the south-west of Manju-yama, but failed, although some companies of the 4th Regiment held part of it for some hours. Throughout the night of the 2nd the front of the 12th Division was fairly quiet, but the Russians made strenuous efforts to recapture Manju-yama, and the rifle fire, which we could hear most distinctly at Tsao-kou, was very heavy indeed until 2 a.m. (3rd September), and intermittent from that hour until daylight. The 24th Regiment of the left wing (23rd Brigade) assisted the troops on Manju-yama, holding the ground immediately north of it. Many times the adversaries crossed bayonets, and after a bloody fight lasting all night it was, at daylight even, unknown who held the hill. The Japanese, however, maintained their positions.

3rd Sept.

3rd Sept.

At dawn the 15th Brigade and the 12th Division awaited the arrival of the remainder of the 2nd Division. The 15th Brigade was busy most of the day in burying the dead on and about Manju-yama. The Guard Division was expected to join up with the two other divisions on the morning of the 4th, when the whole of the First Army would be on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. In front of the 12th Division the situation did not alter all day, but the outposts of the opposing forces exchanged shots from time to time. During the night of the 3rd, part of the divisional reserve was at Wu-hsien Shan and part with the general at Ta-yao. This evening we heard that the total force of the enemy against us this day was $2\frac{1}{2}$ divisions.

At 4 a.m. on the 3rd the Umezawa Brigade attacked a force of the enemy near Ping-tai-tzu (J 1), and by 3 p.m. had driven it northwards. Leaving a detachment at that place, the brigade then moved in the direction of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 2), a village on the right flank of the 12th Division and north of the Colliery Hills. All day, large columns of the enemy were seen moving in the direction of Mukden.

4th Sept.

There was a foggy morning on the 4th September. The Guard Division not having arrived as was expected, the 12th Division stood fast. The 2nd Division occupied Hill 131 without much difficulty. Columns of the enemy continued to retreat northwards all day. Until 7.30 p.m. all was quiet in front of the 12th Division, but at that hour the Russian guns west of Manju-yama opened on the left wing of the 12th Division, but

with little result. At 4 p.m. the Umezawa Brigade, arriving at Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 2), joined up with the 12th Division. At 4 p.m. the division received orders to advance, but as there was very little water for the men to cook their rice or to drink, the advance was postponed until the night. This reason having been given to me by a staff officer in reply to my query, "Why did you not hurry on and harass the retreating Russians?" I then said, "Why not have given them biscuits?" to which he replied, "Our men do not like the biscuits." He laughed very much when I pointed out to him, that I myself, being a European, was not over enthusiastic about rice, and much preferring bread or biscuits had had little of the latter since leaving Feng-huang-cheng. The true reason for the non-advance of the division at 4 p.m. I shall not attempt to conjecture here, but by this postponement all hopes of cutting off any troops of the enemy in retreat were practically abandoned, for the night advance, later, in the *kaoliang*, even if successful beyond expectation, could hardly have been expected to substantially hinder the Russian retirement.

The brigades of the 12th Division were ordered to advance westwards at 10 p.m.—the right wing (the 12th Brigade, less one battalion which remained behind on the northernmost Colliery Hill) on the villages of Chung Ta-lien-kou (E 3) and Hsiao Ta-lien-kou (F 3), and the left wing (the 23rd Brigade) on its left but in a westerly direction, and keeping touch with the 2nd Division, which had also received orders to advance. Both brigades moved without guns, which were posted in Ta-yao (F 3) during the night. The bulk of the fighting this night took place between the two villages of Hsiao Ta-lien-kou and Chung Ta-lien-kou. The former was known to be held by a small body of Russians, and it was supposed that the latter would also have a considerable force in its vicinity. As a matter of fact, this supposition turned out to be more than correct, for two regiments (3rd and 12th) of the enemy advanced from Chung Ta-lien-kou and opposed the right wing, having been evidently detached from the troops in retreat as a flank guard. The ground between the two villages is rather undulating, and eighty-five per cent. of it was covered with high *kaoliang*. The Russian post at Hsiao Ta-lien-kou had put the east side of it in a state of defence by digging trenches thirty yards in front of it, and also loopholing the mud and brick walls on that side. *Kaoliang* grew within one hundred yards of this side of the village. A dark night and a sea of *kaoliang* are not calculated to facilitate night operations.

At 9.30 p.m. in the rain (it rained at intervals during the night), half a company of the right wing, after dispersing two or three outlying standing patrols, crept up to within convenient distance of the Russian post at Hsiao Ta-lien-kou, charged it with the bayonet, and after a short fight drove it off in the direction of Chung Ta-lien-kou. Covered by this half company,

5th Sept.

the right wing (four battalions, with one battalion in reserve) assembled at the north-east end of Hsiao Ta-lien-kou.* At 12.30 a.m. (5th) the five battalions approached the railway. Two battalions of the 14th Regiment crossed it, and, with three battalions of the 47th on the south side of it, moved slowly along the line, which runs in a north-westerly direction. The leading battalion of the 47th, and both battalions of the 14th, were deployed in night attack formation, but the remainder were in column. Owing to the night being cloudy with rain at intervals, and the difficulties of the *kaoliang*, there must have been frequent halts and delays, for the brigade did not come in contact with the Russian force advancing from Chung Ta-lien-kou and Tung Ta-lien-kou, as marked on the map, until 2 a.m.

In the meantime the commander of the 12th Division with the reserve had left Wu-hsien Shan at 10.20 p.m. (4th), and after we had halted several times† we finally, about 2.30 a.m., arrived at the position shown on the map and remained there until dawn. It was not many minutes after our arrival that heavy rifle fire broke out to the north-west, which continued for perhaps five minutes, when it stopped, and by the drums, bugles, and shouting we knew a charge was taking place. A minute or so later and after a few dropping shots, the rifle fire was resumed, and went on practically all night, except when the bayonet was used. As marked on the map, the brigade advanced along the railway with a patrol on the road south of it, behind which, at a convenient distance, marched a bearer company and a few pack ponies. The enemies discovered one another at a hundred paces, but, of course, were entirely ignorant of each other's strength and dispositions. Fire was at once opened by both sides, and about two companies of Russians on the road south of the railway, charging blindly down it upon the Japanese patrol, scattered it and threatened the bearer company and pack horses, which disappeared more or less into the *kaoliang*. These two companies in turn were charged by a party detached from the reserve battalion which, passing through the intervening *kaoliang*, charged them in flank and dispersed them. Under cover of the two companies that charged down the road, the Russians extended their right and tried to outflank the Japanese left (south of the line), and so the action became general. Three or four determined bayonet charges (the second was at 3 a.m.) took place before dawn, the Russians, as is their custom, meeting charge with charge, but further than this I found it impossible to get accurate information as to what really happened after the first ten minutes or so. The *kaoliang* is not ideal ground for night fighting, so confusion was worse confounded. As an officer said, "The Russians were charging sometimes in any direction like a bull."

* See Map 39.

† The road was piquetted every 250 yards with two or three men to show the way.—J. B. J.

A wounded private I met on the road at daybreak said, "We bumped into one another sometimes—chest to chest."

Towards 4 a.m. some troops of the 23rd Brigade came up and turned the Russian right, inflicting severe loss on them. The action lasted until dawn, and was severely contested, but when day broke most of the enemy had retired, and the remainder rapidly fell back in a north-westerly direction. Pursuit was ordered at dawn, and the two battalions of the Guard reservists, composing the divisional reserve, were ordered forward. These men had been listening to all this fighting, and were straining like greyhounds in the leash, so although the general knew the Russians had made good their retreat, he thought an advance would please them. At 6.10 a.m. the five* mountain batteries passed along the road after the infantry at a trot. It took some time to rally the brigade at dawn, but it was known the enemy with guns had reached and were holding a hill seven thousand yards away to the north, so the Japanese hurried on in pursuit. It proved to be a small rear guard, which rapidly retreated to the north, and active pursuit was abandoned, as no cavalry was available. Two hundred and eighty of the enemy's dead were found. Japanese casualties amounted to something short of 300.

It is hard to understand the reason for making night attacks in such a country. The difficulty of keeping direction or finding the way in the *kaoliang*, especially on a dark night, is so great that even if the brigade had been successful beyond expectation, I doubt very much indeed whether anything like an organized pursuit would have been possible before dawn, and then, as actually happened, it would have been too late. It must be allowed that in this action the Russians lost much more heavily than the Japanese, but it is clear that in such night fighting the superior fighting skill of the latter is much discounted.

Perhaps the explanation may be found in the superiority of the Russian artillery, which influenced beyond measure the eleven days' fighting.

From the morning of the 31st August, when the division crossed the river, up to midday 5th September, its casualties amounted to 800 odd.

The Umezawa Brigade 31st August to 7th September 1904.†

The position of the mixed brigade under Major-General Umezawa on the 25th August is mentioned early in this report,‡ together with the estimated strength of the Russians at Pen-hsi-hu (J 3).

It was not until the 27th August that the enemy at that place showed certain signs of retreating.

* The battery lent to the 2nd Division had been returned on the morning of 1st September.—J. B. J.

† See Plate 34.

‡ Page 405.

31st Aug. The strength of the brigade was as follows:—Six battalions, six mountain guns, and two squadrons cavalry.

Marching from the neighbourhood of Chiao-tou (J 6) at 4 a.m. on the 31st August, three battalions crossed the Tai-tzu Ho, near Wo-lung-tsun,* and drove the enemy, consisting of one hundred Cossacks, out of Wei-ning-ying.† On the arrival of the Japanese, these men were asleep in the village, but the majority of them managed to escape by the windows of the houses to Pen-hsi-hu. Sixteen Cossacks were killed. Forty horses and nine prisoners were captured. The three battalions then pushed on to Pen-hsi-hu, arriving there at 5.40 p.m. The remaining three battalions with the guns and cavalry waited south of the river, opposite Pen-hsi-hu, and both forces entered that place almost simultaneously, the enemy having retired north. Late in the evening one battalion occupied the Ta Ling (J 3) (north of Pen-hsi-hu), while another formed outposts across the Ta Ling-Pen-hsi-hu road. The remainder halted in Pen-hsi-hu.

1st Sept. On the 1st September the brigade did not advance.

The country the brigade was to march through is, if anything, more rough and wild than that south of the river. Pen-hsi-hu itself is built in a long winding ravine, the hills of which on either side are bare and craggy. This ravine opens abruptly on the bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. The road is a fair one all the way, having no doubt been much improved by the Russians, and the two passes, Ta Ling and Yao-chien Ling, are not difficult—the former is a very easy one. The Tu-men Ling (H 3) Pass is higher and more difficult than either.

2nd Sept. On the 2nd September the brigade advanced and occupied Hsia Ta-chieh (H 2) (N.W. of Pen-hsi-hu), taking the course as marked on Map 34.

3rd Sept. In the early morning of the 3rd September the brigade moved north and was opposed the other side of Shang Ping-tai-tzu (J 1) by the enemy, who took up a position at Hsia Ping-tai-tzu (J 1). The enemy's strength was: one regiment infantry, one battery, and Cossacks. General Umezawa made a frontal attack with his main force, while three companies made a detour to the west round the high mountain, Shan-cheng Shan (H 2). From 5 a.m. until 3 p.m. fighting went on, after which the enemy fell back down the Sha Ho (H 1), the three companies firing on the enemy's guns as they retired along the road from their position on a hill between Hsia Ping-tai-tzu and Pien-niu-lu-pu (J 1). Japanese casualties were 40. Two battalions and two mountain guns were then left in and about the two villages of Ping-tai-tzu, and the brigade marched south to Yao-chien Ling (H 2), where it halted for the night.

* 7½ miles south-east of Pen-hsi-hu. † 7 miles east of Pen-hsi-hu.

At 6 a.m. on the 4th September the brigade (now four **4th Sept.** battalions, four guns, and two squadrons) started from the Yao-chien Ling and moved west. At 12.30 p.m. San chia-tzu (F/G 2) was reached, a body of Cossacks retiring north-east as soon as the Japanese guns opened on them (in close order), killing three or four men. The hill of Ying-yang-ssu (F 2) and the village of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 2) were occupied as soon as reached, and so the brigade joined up with the 12th Division. All night bodies of the enemy attacked from the direction of Tu-men-tzu Shan (F 2) with rifle fire, but there was no casualty on the Japanese side, although the enemy's force was much superior.

As soon as the brigade arrived at Pan-la-shan-tzu its line of communication became Pen-hsi-hu-Hsiao Lien-chai (J 3)-Yao-chien Ling (H 2)-Pan-la-shan-tzu.

On the 5th September the brigade advanced and took up **5th Sept.** the line San-kuai-shih Shan (F 2)-Tu-men-tzu Shan (F 2), when it was again attacked, the enemy bringing up guns. The firing went on through the night and the enemy's guns shelled occasionally, but the Japanese casualties were only 32. It was noticed that the Russians had one squadron at Shuang-tai-tzu (F 1) and one thousand Cossacks at Tou-shan-kou (F 1).

On the 6th September the enemy's guns fired from Fan-chia- **6th Sept.** tun (F 1) in the early morning, but soon retired northwards.

On the 7th September the enemy retired from Shih-li-ho **7th Sept.** (E 1) northwards, but the one thousand Cossacks remained at Tcu-shan-kou (F 1). The Ping-tai-tzu detachment rejoined the brigade this day.

(30) The Battle of the Sha Ho.

LECTURE given by a General Staff Officer of the First Japanese Army, reported by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, 2nd February 1906.

*Plates.**

General situation early in October 1904	-	Map 40.
Positions, 8th to 10th October 1904	-	" " (A).
Positions, 11th and 12th October 1904	-	" " (B).
Positions, 13th and 14th October 1904	-	" " (C).

I. *Preliminaries.*

1. The battle of Liao-yang ended on the 6th September.

Of the three Armies, the First Army was then concentrated on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho,† and the Second and Fourth on the left bank, round Liao-yang (B 6). Here they set about recovering their fighting strength, and making preparations for future movements.

The First Army lay with its right on the Yen-tai Colliery (E 4), its left on the Liao-yang-Mukden road; the Fourth Army pushed forward a small detachment to a village about 5 miles north of Liao-yang; the Second Army pushed out a detachment to Ho-kung-pu (B 4), on the right bank of the Sha Ho, half way to the Hun Ho; the cavalry of the Second Army (Major-General Akiyama) was at Hsiao-pei-ho,‡ at the junction of the Tai-tzu and the Hun.

2. On the right of the First Army was the 12th Division, and on the left the 2nd Division. The Guard was in second line.

The Umezawa Brigade was at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), watching the Mukden-Pen-hsi-hu (H J 5) road; after the battle of Liao-yang, it had been brought to the hills north of the Yen-tai Colliery (E 4), but on the 8th September it marched to Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), arriving there the next day.

The only map then available was a very bad one on a scale of $\frac{1}{200,000}$, compiled from the reports of scouts and from Chinese maps, and consequently highly imaginative. It is not probable

* For a detailed map of the ground see Map 41, the squares on which are numbered similarly to those on Map 40.

† See Map 40.

‡ Not on Map 40; is 20 miles west by north of Liao-yang.

that the Russians on their part had any reliable maps, in fact their official reports issued after the battle of Liao-yang mention this. The lack of accurate information resulted in the Umezawa Brigade being sent too far ahead of the main body; the district east of the Colliery was a *terra incognita*, and the distance from Yen-tai (D 4) to Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) proved to be much greater than was thought.

3. About the middle of September the preparations were nearly complete. Bridges had been thrown over the Tai-tzu, the railway had been repaired, and rail-head was expected to reach Liao-yang by the end of the month.

Junk transport from Ying-kou* to Hsiao-pei-ho† was found to work hopefully. So the Armies were all moved across the Tai-tzu, and the following line was taken up:—

First Army. Right on the Colliery, left on Ta Yin-cheng-tzu (D 4/5).

Fourth Army. Right on Lan-ni-pu (D 5), left on Nan-tai (C 4).

Second Army. Right on Ta Chi-tai-tzu (C 4), left on San-tai-tzu (B 4).

On the 16th and 17th September the Second Army was moved across the Tai-tzu; as was also one division of the Fourth Army, the remainder being retained south of the river. On the 17th, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, under H.I.H. Prince Kannin, began arriving at Liao-yang from Japan and was assigned to the First Army.

At the same time, the distribution of the First Army was slightly changed, and the Guard Division was moved up to the left of the front line. By this time reconnaissances had made the character of the region east of the Yen-tai Colliery (E 4) much clearer, and as it would have been dangerous to leave that large tract of country undefended, the First Army extended its right so as to include it. After the battle of Liao-yang it was thought that the Colliery was the end of the world, but the First Army had discovered a fresh continent beyond it. Tactically it was perhaps unwise to move the division in second line up to the front, but it was necessary to do so in order that the 12th Division might extend to the right. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was also told off for duty on the right wing. It arrived at Ta-yao (E 5) on the 31st September; and making its headquarters there, began reconnoitring north of the Colliery and kept touch with the Umezawa Brigade at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3).

4. After the battle of Liao-yang, the enemy's cavalry occupied positions near Shih-li-ho (D 3), Shen-tan-pu (B 2), and Chang-tan (A 2). In front of the First Army, it had detachments at Ta-shan-kou (E 3), Feng-chi-pu (G 2), and Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2); and also near Kao-kuan-sai (K 3/4).

* For Ying-kou, see Map 1.

† Not on Map 40; is 20 miles west by north of Liao-yang.

After the middle of September, the Russians became more active, and detachments of infantry and artillery appeared in front of the Japanese line.

The Russian main body was concentrated about, and north of, Mukden. Reinforcements arrived there daily; and after the middle of September large numbers were moved eastwards to Fu-shun.* At the same time the entrenching of the left bank of the Hun, between the Fu-shun railway and the river, and also of the hills along the north bank of the Hun was begun. But no troops except cavalry were moved down south-west.

17th Sept.

5. On the 17th September, the Umezawa Brigade fought a small engagement. It was attacked by a force consisting of one brigade of infantry, 8 squadrons, and 8 guns. The action only lasted during the day and the enemy then retired towards Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2). It was probably a reconnaissance in force on the part of General Stakelberg.

Information then arrived that a large force of Russians was advancing from Fu-shun* towards Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2), and it therefore became necessary to reinforce the Umezawa Brigade. The garrisons of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) and Chiao-tou (J/7) also had to be strengthened, as the enemy's cavalry began to press towards those places down the Tai-tzu. A regiment of infantry and 2 batteries of the 12th Division were therefore sent to reinforce Major-General Umezawa, and the troops on the First Army lines of communication were ordered to concentrate as many men as possible at Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) and Chiao-tou (J 7).

22nd Sept.

On the 22nd and 23rd September the Russians became still more active, and the pressure on the Japanese line increased very much, more troops being concentrated against its right. A Russian force, consisting mainly of cavalry, advanced from Kao-kuan-sai (K 3/4) and along the Tai-tzu against the right flank of the Umezawa Brigade.

6. The Japanese right being thus threatened, the First Army had again to alter its distribution, and the following moves took place:—The front occupied by the Guard Division was handed over to the Fourth Army, and the First Army took ground bodily to the right; at the same time the 12th Division, which was on the right, was brought back into second line. This redistribution was completed by 1st October.

1st Oct.

At this time, the Fourth Army only had one division in the front line.

The Second Army was concentrated in the area shown in sketch,† and had thrown out three detachments to—

(1) Ta Tung-shan-pu (C 3).

(2) Liu-tiao-chai (C 3).

(3) Kuan-yin-kou (B 3).

* Not on Map 40; about 20 miles north of Sung-shu-chu-tzu.

† See Map 40.

The cavalry on the left of the line was moved to Niu-chu (A 3), whence it reconnoitred both banks of the Hun.

The Fourth Army sent an advanced detachment to Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), about two and a half miles south of Shih-li-ho.

An advanced post of the First Army was stationed on the hills north of Yen-tai Colliery (E 4).

During the early part of October, constant skirmishing took place in front of the three detachments of the Second Army, on the main Mukden road and in the hills in front of the First Army. The Russians increased daily in strength, and on the 5th October the advanced detachments could no longer hold on to their positions, and were ordered back to the main line. A considerable force of the enemy, about 20,000 infantry, was known to be located about San-chia-tzu (C 2). On the right bank of the Hun, however, the Russians were not so active, and though the Japanese cavalry met the Russians about Chang-tan (A 2), only affairs of patrols resulted.

5th Oct.

II. *The Battle.**

1. Opinion in the Japanese Armies was somewhat divided as to whether the Russians would take the offensive or not; but on the 6th October a strong force of the enemy appeared in front of the Umezawa Brigade, and began to entrench; scouting parties also penetrated to Wai-tou Shan (G 3) and Shang Liu-ho (F 4) and tried to cut his communications with the main body. The cavalry of the First Army was also checked in its reconnaissances by superior forces of the enemy.

6th Oct.

According to intelligence received on the 6th October the Russians between Mukden and the Hun began crossing that river on the 3rd October, and on the 5th there were only a few troops left on the right bank. Of the Russians about Mukden, the majority were reported to have moved south-eastwards towards the Japanese right.

The staff of the First Army was of opinion that the Japanese right was the proper point to be attacked, and such being the case, the question arose—"How is the Umezawa detachment to be treated?" Should it be recalled from its dangerously isolated position, or should the main line advance to its support? To withdraw it involved the loss of morale which a retirement brings with it, and also the carrying out of a very ticklish operation, as the detachment was almost surrounded. Further (the lecturer added), the Japanese are not good at retirements. On the other hand, to advance to the line of the Sha Ho meant the exposure of the left flank of the First Army, and the consequent necessity for an advance on the part of the other Armies which were not in a position to move at

* Map 40 A shows the first stage of the battle.

once. So (with tears of regret, so said the lecturer) Major-General Umezawa had to be ordered to fall back to the hills about Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5).

General Kuroki reported to Manchurian Head-Quarters that no doubt existed of the enemy's intentions, and he advised a concentration behind the line of hills which runs from Yen-tai Colliery to Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5). Before receiving a reply, in order that everything might be in readiness he issued the following anticipatory orders:—

7th Oct.

First Army Orders, Feng-shen (C 6), 2 a.m., 7th October 1904.

- (1) The enemy who was in the valley of the Hun, east of Mukden, is gradually advancing southwards. The heads of his columns must have reached the line Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2)—Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2)—Feng-chi-pu (G 2) on the 6th October.
- (2) The First Army will occupy a line running from near Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5) on the right, *vid* the hills south of Yin-chiang-pu (G 4) to the Colliery (E 4) on the left.
- (3) The Umezawa Brigade will occupy a position about Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5) as soon as possible.
- (4) The 12th Division, starting to-day, will occupy the hills south of Yin-chiang-pu (G 4).
- (5) The Guard Division, starting to-day, will concentrate near Chang-hai-tun (F 5) and entrench a position on the hills north of that village. A detachment of the Guard Division will be left on the heights north of the Colliery as hitherto.
- (6) The 2nd Division will concentrate in its present position.
- (7) The 2nd Cavalry Brigade will reconnoitre towards Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) (between the First and Fourth Armies).
- (8) The general reserve will rendezvous at Ta-yao (E 5) by the 8th October.
- (9) I am at Feng-shen (C 6).

Manchurian Head-Quarters approved of the First Army's proposal, Marshal Oyama deciding to keep his troops in hand as much as possible and to take the first opportunity of seizing the initiative and delivering a counter-attack. The Second and Fourth Armies were ordered to remain concentrated in the positions then occupied by them.

The movements commenced on the 7th October, as ordered.

The Fourth Army extended to its right to fill the gap in the line left vacant by the withdrawal of the Guard.

Between the 6th and the 8th there were no important changes in the situation in front of the Japanese line, though the activity of the Russians increased. A report reached General Kuroki on the evening of the 7th, from the officer commanding the Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) garrison, to the effect that 2,000 Russian cavalry

with five or six guns were coming down the Tai-tzu, and that the head of the column had arrived at San-chia-tzu (L 4) on the evening of the 6th. There was then only one Japanese infantry battalion at Pen-hsi-hu, but at that time no one expected that a big fight, such as took place later on, would be fought there.

Major-General Umezawa was in such close contact with the enemy at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) that he could not withdraw by day. He therefore commenced the movement at nightfall on the 7th, and before daybreak on the 8th October his force had reached its allotted position.

On the 8th the new dispositions of the First Army were **8th Oct.** completed as ordered.

2. At 1 a.m. on the 8th, the Russian detachment advancing along the Tai-tzu towards Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) was reinforced by three battalions of infantry, and became a mixed force consisting of three battalions, 2,000 cavalry, and five guns. A portion of this force crossed to the left bank of the river with the object of surrounding Pen-hsi-hu, and the Japanese advanced posts therefore had to fall back gradually to the main line of defence. At Chiao-tou (J 7) there was only a very small detachment (one section of infantry), but at both Chiao-tou and Pen-hsi-hu many stores had been collected, while telegraphic communication with the Umezawa Brigade could only be maintained through Chiao-tou. The retention of both these places was therefore very important, the more so as the strategical value of Pen-hsi-hu was great and its loss would endanger Liao-yang. Pen-hsi-hu had to be held at all costs, and Major-General Umezawa therefore sent a regiment of infantry and two guns there, a very admirable decision considering the large force of the enemy he had in front of him; for when he withdrew from Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), the Russians had followed hard on his heels. By the evening of the 8th the enemy had almost completely surrounded Pen-hsi-hu.

First Army Head-Quarters moved to Ta-yao (E 5) on the 8th. The First Army had been, as yet, but little pressed in front.

In front of the Second Army, the detachment at Ta Tung-shan-pu (C 3) was attacked by superior forces on the 8th and was compelled to fall back to the main line. But the enemy withdrew again, and that night Ta Tung-shan-pu was reoccupied.

The Fourth Army was not much pressed in front.

3. *First Army*.—On the 9th the Russians closed round **9th Oct.** Pen-hsi-hu (H J 5) and began attacking the Umezawa Detachment, though they had not as yet begun to bring pressure to bear on the front of the First Army. As their strength round the right flank was estimated at not exceeding one division, General Kuroki determined to send the 12th Division to drive them off. Its commander was therefore ordered to leave what

troops he considered necessary in position, and to march with his main body to the assistance of Major-General Umezawa, the latter officer being placed under his command.

On the morning of the 9th the Russians continued enveloping Pen-hsi-hu and interposed between that place and Chiao-tou (J 7), on the left bank of the Tai-tzu, a force composed of a battalion, 200 or 300 cavalry, and two guns. The same day they severed communication, telegraph communication included, between the two places; but, as on the same day a fresh line of communication had been established between First Army Head-Quarters and Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5), the right flank was not entirely isolated. The appearance of the enemy south of Pen-hsi-hu was naturally somewhat alarming to the garrison of that place, but the troops there were determined to defend their position to the last man.

The General commanding the Line of Communications ordered a body of about 300 recruits who were coming up from the rear to march to the front with all speed, and he sent one of his adjutants to take command of the detachment.

The commander of the 12th Division left four battalions, one troop cavalry, one battery and one company of engineers in position, and, with the rest of the division marched off for Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5) on the afternoon of the 9th.

On the morning of the 9th, the Russians advanced rapidly against the front of the main Japanese line and about a division of them moved on to Shang Liu-ho (F 4) and Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4). In the direction of Pen-hsi-hu the enemy was being continually reinforced and more than two regiments of cavalry crossed to the left bank of the Tai-tzu.

The danger to Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou becoming imminent, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was despatched to the right, with orders to advance quickly to Chiao-tou, to co-operate with the garrison, to reconnoitre the enemy there, and, if possible, to drive him back. When H.I.H. Prince Kan-nin received this order, the bulk of his brigade was engaged in reconnaissance, so he despatched a regiment he had in hand on the evening of the 9th, and, with the remainder of the brigade, started early on the 10th.

By the evening of the 9th, the strength of the enemy opposed to the First Army was as follows:—

On the left bank of the Tai-tzu—about one brigade.

East of Pen-hsi-hu—at least one division.

North of the Ta Ling and Tu-men Ling (H 4)—one brigade.

In front of the main Army—about two divisions on the line Yao-chien Ling (G/H 4)—San-tai-tzu (F 4).

4. *Fourth Army.* On the 9th, a superior force of the enemy, advancing along both sides of the main road, attacked the advanced detachment at Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), which withdrew, fighting, to the main line. The troops which had been left south of the Tai-tzu had (on the 7th) been brought up to near Lo-ta-tai

(D 6). The Fourth Army expected the main Russian attack to commence on the 10th.

Second Army. In front of the Second Army the position was not threatening. The advanced detachments were driven in on the main line, but as they were weak this was to be expected.

5. The following are the main points of the orders issued by Marshal Oyama on the 9th at 10 p.m. :—

- (1) I intend to attack the enemy before he has fully concentrated his forces, and to occupy the line Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2)—Feng-chi-pu (G 2)—Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2).
- (2) First Army. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade will attack the enemy, and advance on Shih-chiao-tzu (H 3/4). The main body will attack towards Feng-chi-pu (G 2), when Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) shall have been taken by the Fourth Army.
- (3) Fourth Army. The Fourth Army will advance on the morning of the 10th and attack the enemy at Huang-hua-tien (E 2).
- (4) Second Army. The Second Army will advance towards Pan-chia-pu (E 2) and Ta-ping-chuang (C 2), in touch with the Fourth Army. The main body of the Second Army to be concentrated behind its right.

These orders indicate a wheel of the Japanese left to its right, the left flank advancing north-east.

A counter-attack was therefore decided on, on the night of the 9th, but as the right flank of the First Army was in a very dangerous position, the staff officers of that Army wished that decision had been arrived at earlier. They had not grasped that the country there was so strong, and were very anxious about their right flank. The defence of Pen-hsi-hu naturally called for all the efforts of its garrison, of the Umezawa Brigade and of the 12th Division, but the configuration of the country was also of great assistance to the defenders. The only matter of regret was that the First Army had not sufficient numbers for the length of front it had to guard. If numbers had been sufficient, it could have withstood any attack, in whatever strength made, and Pen-hsi-hu would have been quite safe.

On the receipt of Marshal Oyama's orders, General Kuroki issued orders as follows :—

First Army Orders, dated Ta-yao (E 5), 9th October, 11.30 p.m.

- (1) The enemy's movements in our front, right, and right rear are developing. He is gradually advancing, and at least four divisions have been seen. A force of about one division was advancing along the Mukden road on Liao-yang, but it has now received further

reinforcements, and the head of the column has arrived near Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3). The enemy west of the main road has advanced to the line Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2)—Liu-tang-kou (D 2). His main force is at Liu-tang-kou and San-chia-tzu (C 2).

- (2) The Fourth Army will advance at daybreak on the 10th and will attack the enemy at Huang-hua-tien (E 2), the Second Army will advance to the line Pan-chia-pu (E 2)—Ta-ping-chuang (C 2), in touch with the Fourth Army
- (3) The First Army will attack the enemy in its front when the Fourth Army arrives near Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3). Then it will advance towards Feng-chi-pu (G 2).
- (4) The 12th Division will continue to carry out its present task, and, after driving off the enemy, will advance towards Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2).
- (5) The Guard and 2nd Divisions will stand fast for the present.
- (6) The general reserve will rendezvous at Hui-yao (F 5) by 4 a.m. on the 10th.
- (7) The 2nd Cavalry Brigade will have its main body near Kan-sha (F 6). Its duty is to protect the right rear of the Army and watch the roads in the Tai-tzu valley.
- (8) I am at Ta-yao (E 5).

The situation at Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) on the 9th was as previously mentioned, very precarious. That evening the Japanese lost a portion of the position east of Pen-hsi-hu, and also the hill north of San-tao-hua-tzu (H/J 5). Just as the position was in great danger of capture, Major-General Shimamura arrived with a regiment of infantry and a battery of the 12th Division, and these reinforcements enabled the defenders to hold on. At the same time severe fighting was going on at the Ta Ling and the Tu-men Ling (H 4). At 6 p.m. the main body of the 12th Division arrived and immediately entered the fight.

10th Oct.

6. About this time a reserve brigade was landing at An-tung. It was given to General Kuroki, and was hurried up towards Lien-shan-kuan,* marching day and night. By the morning of the 10th there were about 300 men at Chiao-tou (J 7), who while defending the place did their best to re-open communication with Pen-hsi-hu. At 9 a.m. the head of the leading regiment of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade reached Chiao-tou, and a little before noon the main body of the regiment arrived there; this made the situation somewhat better. The troops at Pen-hsi-hu attacked the Russians in the lost positions during a dense fog early in the morning and drove them out. The lost position north of San-tao-hua-tzu (H/J 5) between Pen-hsi-hu and Hsiao Lien-chai (H 5), was also retaken with the bayonet at 11 a.m. The

* Not on map; about 30 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu.

Russians made repeated attempts to retake these positions, but without success.

The Russians who crossed to the left bank of the Tai-tzu came round south of Pen-hsi-hu. They did not attack Chiao-tou, but with their backs to that place advanced against Pen-hsi-hu. Had they first gone and taken Chiao-tou and then come to Pen-hsi-hu, they might have been more successful, but as they did not, the Japanese were able to hold on to Chiao-tou with a handful of troops. The arrival of the cavalry regiment had therefore been of much effect. The main body of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade reached Kan-sha (F 6) at 11 a.m.

About the Ta Ling and the Tu-men Ling (H 4) the battle raged all day, but though there was some musketry, it was mainly an artillery fight.

From the information received from various sources up to 3 p.m., the situation appeared to be as follows:—

In front of the First Army the enemy was concentrating his forces in the Shang Liu-ho valley (F 4). His front line was on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), and he was entrenching the hills on the south side of the valley.

The Fourth Army was held up by the Russians at Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) and had not made the progress expected. By 3 p.m. the right column had occupied the hills north of the Yen-tai Colliery (E 4).

In front of the Second Army fighting was also going on, and progress was slower than expected.

Under these circumstances, the First Army had to give up any idea of advancing on the 10th.

As regards the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, it had originally been ordered to move as a whole to Chiao-tou (J 7), and to drive off the enemy there; but at 11.30 p.m. on the 9th fresh orders had been issued, instructing it to remain at Kan-sha (F 6). The reason for this was that General Kuroki thought that Chiao-tou was bound to be taken by the Russians, and if the cavalry got there after the place had fallen, it would be in a dangerous predicament. He therefore thought it safer to send the cavalry to Kan-sha to protect his right rear. Later, however, he heard that Chiao-tou was safe and looking forward to the arrival of the cavalry, so on the night of the 10th he issued fresh orders sending the brigade on to Chiao-tou with orders to re-establish communication with Pen-hsi-hu.

7. First Army Orders, dated Ta-yao (E 5), 10th October 10 p.m.

- (1) The enemy in front of the First Army is entrenching a line from the hill north of Mien-hua-pu (G 4) to San-tai-tzu (F 4). His advanced troops are on the hills south of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) and north of Chien-tao (F 4). The right division of the Fourth Army is occupying the hill north of Ying-kuan-tun (E 4) and

- will attack the enemy in its front to-morrow (11th), keeping touch with the First Army.
- (2) The main body of the First Army will advance to a line from the hill north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) to the hill north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4) early to-morrow morning.
 - (3) The 12th Division will continue to carry out its present task and, if possible, will send a detachment to attack towards Yao-chien Ling (G/H 4), as the main body advances.
 - (4) The Guard Division will drive the enemy off Hill 238 (F 4) before daybreak (11th), and then advance and attack the hills north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4).
 - (5) The 2nd Division will occupy the height north of Chien-tao (F 4) before daybreak, and then the hills north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4).
 - (6) The general reserves will concentrate south of Hui-yao (F 5) by 4 a.m. (11th).
 - (7) At 8 a.m. I shall be at Kuei-tzu Shan (a hill south of Yen-tai Colliery (E 4)).

On the 10th, the Second Army, after driving off some weak detachments of the enemy, reached the line Ta Tung-shan-pu (C 3)—Shu-pei-tai (C 3), its line being drawn across the Sha Ho. The left division of the Fourth Army occupied Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) after dark.

The position was then as shown in the sketch.*

That night the orders from Manchurian Head-Quarters were to the following effect:—The object of the Japanese Armies is to attack, wheeling to the right. Each Army to act in accordance with yesterday's orders.

Early on the 11th the general reserves of the First Army advanced from Hui-yao (F 5) to Chang-hai-tun (F 5).

11th Oct.

8. In front of the First Army the attack was timed to commence between 3 and 5 a.m. The plan of the attack was as follows†:—

2nd Division. The right brigade (Matsunaga) to occupy San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4); after which the main body of the division was to advance from Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4) against Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4).

Guard Division. To take the hill north of Lao-chun-yu (G 4) and another hill north-west of Lao chun-yu and then to advance towards Mien-hua-pu (G 4).

12th Division. On the right, if circumstances permitted, the 12th Division was to push on towards Shih-chiao-tzu (H 3/4).

When this plan was put into execution, it was found that it could not be carried out in its entirety.

* See Map 40 A.

† See Map 40 B.

The Russian infantry on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and the hills in front of the Guard resolutely stuck to their positions; and as the slopes were very steep, and the ridges held by the Russians ran north and south, the Japanese were unable to deploy more than a very small number of troops. So day broke without the plan having been carried out; and the 12th Division, instead of taking the offensive, had to remain on the defensive.

9. In front of the Guard the Russians brought 24 guns into action near Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4). In front of the 2nd Division the following Russian artillery was in action:—

Three batteries east of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4); three batteries west of that hill; one battery north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4); one battery north of San-tai-tzu (F 4). All these batteries were in entrenched positions, and the Japanese guns could not reply effectively on account of the length of the ranges and the difficulty of finding positions on the very unsuitable ground.

At about 9.30 a.m., 7 battalions of Russian infantry advanced from San-tai-tzu (F 4) to San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). Another strong column had reached Shang Liu-ho (F 4) at about 8.30 a.m., and it also advanced on San-cheng-tzu Shan and the ridge to the east of it. Further to the right, severe fighting was going on in front of the 12th Division, it had begun at daylight.

Under these circumstances, the commander of the 2nd Division decided not to wait for the successful advance of his right brigade, but to advance with his main body and attack the enemy on the hills north of San-tai-tzu (F 4) in his front. Four batteries of the 2nd Division artillery were then in action at the foot of the hills west of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). At 3.40 p.m. he began his advance. The situation being as described, the general reserves of the First Army were ordered to reinforce the 2nd Division. After 3 p.m. the Russian artillery in action west of San-cheng-tzu Shan began withdrawing, and the guns were taken to the rear, one at a time. At 4.40 p.m. Major-General Okasaki, who commanded the main body of the 2nd Division, occupied Temple Hill (F 3/4). At 6.30 p.m. General Kuroki issued orders to the effect that the advance and attack were to continue during the night.

10. When this latter order was issued, the following information came in from Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5):—

The enemy round Pen-hsi-hu has increased in strength to about one and a half divisions. The right and centre of the Shimamura Detachment are being hotly attacked; Major-General Shimamura has deployed all his troops and is fighting a desperate battle. The commander of the 12th Division has sent him one battalion, his very last reserve. The enemy round the Ta Ling

and Tu-men Ling (H 4) is in very superior strength, and severe fighting is going on. The 12th Division therefore wishes to call up a battalion of the Kigoshi Detachment (the troops left in the first position when the division was sent to the right) to Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5).

From this report, the situation round Pen-hsi-hu appeared so precarious that Major-General Kigoshi was ordered to leave only a single battalion in position, and to advance with the remainder (3 battalions and 1 battery) to the assistance of the 12th Division.

11. During the day the Second and Fourth Armies were fighting continuously, but they were able to get on to a certain extent, as the enemy in their front was inferior in strength. So on the whole some little advance was made, though nothing striking was effected.

12. At 8 p.m. firing had ceased in front of the Guard. Five Guard battalions were holding the front from the hill south of Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) to the right of the 2nd Division; while on their right, $5\frac{1}{2}$ battalions held the hills north of Lao-chun-yu (G 4). At the latter village was a reserve of $1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions.

The left wing of the 2nd Division was occupying a line from Temple Hill (F 3/4) to San-tai-tzu (F 4), confronting the enemy, who was in superior strength on the hills north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4). One and a half battalions of the Matsunaga Brigade, which had advanced with Major-General Okasaki, had reached a point east of San-tai-tzu. Four and a half battalions under Matsunaga were just advancing to attack San-cheng-tzu Shan with the bayonet. As the right wing of the Fourth Army was a good bit behind the left of the 2nd Division, Major-General Okasaki was hotly attacked from San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) and the hills north of Hsiao-ta-kou.

The Second Army had got on well, but the Fourth slowly. So the Fourth Army was ordered by Manchurian Head-Quarters to advance against the right of the enemy confronting the 2nd Division.

Up to the evening of the 11th the estimated strength of the enemy in front of the First Army was as follows:—

Two army corps and 80 guns in front of the 12th Division.

Three divisions in front of the main line of the Army (Guard and 2nd).

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade reached Chiao-tou (J 7) at 11.30 a.m. on the 11th; and that evening 360 infantry and engineers arrived there from Lien-shan-kuan,* and were put under the orders of the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. At the same time a detachment of troops of the Korean garrison was coming up from Sai-ma-chi†; and the Reserve Brigade

* 30 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu.

† 30 miles south-east of Chiao-tou.

previously mentioned was marching up from An-tung and was expected to arrive in a few days' time. Major-General Kigoshi, at the same time, was marching eastwards on Hsiao Lien-chai (H 5) with his detachment (3 battalions and one battery). The fighting at Pen-hsi-hu on the 11th was of a desperate nature and the Shimamura Brigade had a very hard time. That night, the commander of the 12th Division heard of the danger to the right flank and sent thither a company of infantry and a battery from his last reserves.

13. The Matsunaga Brigade of the 2nd Division occupied San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) at 1 a.m. on the 12th, after a severe fight, and pushed on after the enemy. **12th Oct.**

At 2.30 a.m. the Guard Division advanced and its right wing (1st Brigade) reached the hill north of Mien-hua-pu (G 4) at 7 a.m.; this wing continued its advance till the afternoon, when it reached Ma-erh Shan (G 3). The left wing (2nd Brigade) occupied the hill south of Pa-chia-tzu at 5.30 a.m. after a desperate fight, mainly with the bayonet, and, pressing on, occupied the hill north of Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) at 7 a.m.

Major-General Okasaki advanced at 3.30 a.m., and at 5.20 a.m. occupied the hill north of San-tai-tzu (F 4).

But at Pen-hsi-hu the enemy's attacks became more and more determined; and about 5 a.m. he delivered several assaults which, however, the garrison was able to repel. At the Ta Ling also the enemy delivered an assault, and captured a portion of the position; but the Japanese counter-attacked and recovered it half an hour later. At the Tu-men Ling (H 4), the Russians brought up some howitzers which gave the Japanese a lot of trouble.

At 6 a.m. the 2nd Cavalry Brigade moved out from Chiao-tou against the flank and rear of the enemy surrounding Pen-hsi-hu, taking with it the 360 men of the infantry and engineers. At 11 a.m. the brigade came in contact with the enemy, and as the latter were in close formation the brigade was able to use its machine guns with great effect—so much so that the Russians south of Pen-hsi-hu began retiring eastwards, part of the brigade following them up. While this was going on, a regiment of infantry was hurrying up from An-tung and was expected at Lien-shan-kuan* at noon, and at Chiao-tou by the evening of the 13th at the latest. On arrival at Chiao-tou it was to come under the command of the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

At the Tu-men Ling (H 4) the situation was as bad as ever. The single battalion left in position by Major-General Kigoshi had even to be called on, and it was ordered, if it could possibly be spared, to march eastwards and rejoin the 12th Division. The gap thus left was to be filled by the combined divisional cavalry of the Guard and 2nd Divisions.

* Not on map; 30 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu.

14. At 12.30 p.m. the following report was received from the Guard Division :—

“The troops following up the enemy have occupied the hill east of Tu-men-tzu (F 3). At Lien-hua Shan (F/G 3) there is still a considerable force of the enemy. On the hills north-west of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) there were still some bodies of the enemy, but the fire of our guns has dispersed them towards the north.”

From the Fourth Army information was received to the effect that the infantry of that Army had occupied the hill north of San-chia-tzu (F 3) at 10.30 a.m.

Events proved that both these pieces of information were untrue, but at the time there were no means of ascertaining this as the only maps available were so imperfect and misleading. Acting on this information, however, it appeared to the First Army staff that as the Fourth Army had pushed on well, and as the Guard was at Ma-erh Shan (G 3), the enemy in front of the Guard and 2nd Divisions would now retreat and that some troops might be spared to march to the assistance of the 12th Division and relieve the situation in that part of the field. Major-General Matsunaga was therefore sent with $4\frac{1}{2}$ battalions of his brigade and two batteries, and ordered to march off to the east and attack the enemy surrounding Tu-men Ling (H 4) in flank. The gap left by Major-General Matsunaga was filled by two battalions from the reserves. It was not till that night after Major-General Matsunaga had left, that the First Army staff discovered that the right of the Fourth Army was still a long way behind Okasaki's left and that the Guard had not yet occupied Ma-erh Shan (G 3). As the operations were crowned eventually with success, no fuss was made about this faulty information, but if defeat had followed, somebody would have suffered. The Russian reports show that they too suffered in the same way, but when maps are faulty it is difficult to blame the reporters.

At about 1 p.m. (12th) information came in that a force of Russians was advancing westwards from Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) and reinforcing the enemy in front of the Guard. (Later it turned out that Kuropatkin had ordered Stakelberg to reinforce the centre of the army.) In front of the 2nd Division also the enemy's strength increased, and so the Japanese attack made, for the time being, but slow progress.

Major-General Matsunaga had to wait till sunset to commence his flank march, and he carried it out by night.

The Fourth Army, instead of having reached the hill north of San-chia-tzu (F 3), had not yet reached San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3).

The Second Army was fighting a winning battle at Pan-chia-pu (E 2) and advancing towards Sha-ho-pu (E 2) taking 28 guns.

15. At 3.30 p.m. Marshal Oyama issued orders, the main points of which were as follows:—

- (1) I intend to push the enemy in front and pursue him to the line of the Sha Ho.
- (2) The First Army will advance to the line Shang Chia-wen (G 2)—Hsing-lung-tun (F 2). To cut the enemy's line of retreat, Major-General Matsunaga's movement, as ordered by General Kuroki, must be carried out very rapidly.
- (3) The Fourth Army will advance to the line Pu-tsao-kou (F 2)—Chang-ling-tzu (E 2).
- (4) The Second Army will occupy a line from Sha-ho-pu (E 2) to Lin-sheng-pu (D 2), across the Mukden road.

On the night of the 12th the situation of the First Army was as follows:—

The 12th Division was holding its position well. In the evening the Russians at the Tu-men Ling and Ta Ling (H 4) seemed to be withdrawing, but the division was unable to follow them up as it was strung out along a front of over twelve miles; and as the troops had been dribbled into the fight, units were all mixed up, and the rearrangement for pursuit was a difficult job, which would take time. So the division had to remain in position.

Major-General Matsunaga rested to let his men eat their suppers at Mien-hua-pu (G 4), and after midnight marched on towards Yao-chien Ling (G/H 4).

16. To take the Matsunaga Detachment first.* It marched through the night, and at about 4 a.m. on the 13th reached the fort of Yao-chien Ling (G/H 4). During the night heavy rain fell, and it was so dark that the column more than once lost its way. On reaching the col at 4 a.m. fire was opened on it from the hills above, and flashes of lightning showed that the column had arrived at a col down in a valley, and that the nearest Russians were only one hundred and fifty yards away. Further movement in the dark was out of the question, but as, at the same time, there was no position which could be occupied and held, Major-General Matsunaga decided to try and break through at Yao-chien Ling in the morning. The situation was a nasty one, as the country was very difficult and only fit for the movements of small bodies; so the general ordered his troops to lie down under the steep slopes of the hills, and bringing two batteries into action at the entrance to the valley, he waited for daylight. 13th Oct.

The Guard began advancing at 6 a.m., and sent a regiment of infantry towards Wai-tou Shan (G 3), while the main body began moving north-west towards Hsing-lung-tun (F 2). But just as the movement began, the enemy came up from Ta-tzu-pu

* See Map 40 C.

(G/H 3); and as he was also in superior force at Chien Shan (F 3) and Lien-hua Shan (F/G 3) the advance came to a halt.

Further west a strong force of Russians advanced at 6 a.m. against Major-General Okasaki's front, and a hot artillery and infantry fight began at once. The commander of the 2nd Division therefore decided to try and capture the hill north of San-chia-tzu (F 3) (Okasaki-yama)* that day, and began the operation at 7 a.m. At 2.30 p.m. the commander of the Fourth Army sent to say that he had taken the hill north of Yang-cheng-chai†; but he was again wrong in his information, as Major-General Okasaki was then fighting there.

Major-General Matsunaga, when day broke, found himself surrounded and in a fix. All his infantry lay flat on the steep slopes and his artillery fired from a position just east of Yin-chiang-pu (G 4). Thanks to the guns, the infantry, though unable to advance, managed to remain in position. A force of the enemy advanced at about 1 p.m. against Matsunaga's left, and at the same time another force advanced from Wai-tou Shan (G 3) against the right of the Guard. As previously mentioned, the gap between the Guard and the Matsunaga detachment was filled by a force of cavalry from the 2nd and Guard Divisions, under command of Colonel Kase, commanding the Guard Cavalry Regiment. This cavalry also had some hard fighting. Major-General Matsunaga being in danger, the commander of the 12th Division reinforced him on the right with a battalion which had been over the ground before and knew it.

17. At 3 p.m. Marshal Oyama issued the following order:—

“ In order to render the operations of the First Army more effective, I am sending the 5th Division to reinforce it.”

The situation of the First Army was not so desperate as to necessitate this, but the addition of a division would of course enable it to effect more. The 5th Division began arriving at First Army Head-Quarters in the evening. It was less one regiment of infantry.

18. On the right, the Russians had begun retiring from Pen-hsi-hu on the afternoon of the 12th; but at the Ta Ling and Tu-men Ling (H 4) they still stood fast on the 13th, and even brought up more guns on the 13th.

Major-General Okasaki had begun fighting at 6 a.m. After fighting for every inch of ground, he took Okasaki-yama (F 3) at 5 p.m. This was one of the hardest actions of the war, and both sides tried every drill-book dodge. He then went on and took Lien-hua Shan (F/G 3).

The left wing of the Guard Division had been unable to take the hills north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) after a desperate

* North of San-chia-tzu is a misleading description of Okasaki-yama if Map 41 is correct (see square F 3).

† Not on Map 40; it is just east of San-kuai-shih Shan (E F 3).

fight. Its right wing had been obliged to fall back in line with the left.

The 5th Division, on arrival, was ordered to remain at San-tai-tzu (F 4) as the Army reserve.

19. A little after 11 p.m. the following orders were issued by the First Army Head-Quarters :—

- (1) The enemy in front of the 12th Division is still in position, and his guns there were reinforced to-day. Near Feng-chi-pu (G 2) and Ta-tzu-pu (G/H 3) there is a large force of the enemy, his front line close to ours.
- (2) The Army will advance and attack towards Feng-chi-pu (G 2). The Guard and 2nd Divisions will advance on Feng-chi-pu, the former on the east side of the Shang Liu-ho (F 4)—Feng-chi-pu road, the latter on the west side of it. The 5th Division to be in reserve at Shang Liu-ho.

20. On the 13th the Second Army attacked Sha-ho-pu (E 2), but the Russians kept it at bay. Hitherto the Second Army had pushed on well, but Sha-ho-pu stopped it effectively.

The Fourth Army was fighting near Tung-shan-pu (E/F 3), its right touching Major-General Okasaki's left. Its task for the 14th was to attack the right of the Russians opposing the First Army.

21. The Russians had apparently begun retreating during the night, for when day broke on the 14th everything was quiet in the Japanese front. The orders to the commander of the 5th Division were :— 14th Oct.

“The enemy seems to have retired. The 5th Division will therefore pursue towards Wai-tou Shan and push him back to the Sha Ho.”

Major-General Matsunaga's orders were :—

“The enemy seems to have retired and the 5th Division has been ordered to pursue towards Wai-tou Shan (G 3). You will advance to Upper Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) and intercept his retreat.”

The Guard and 2nd Divisions were ordered to pursue the enemy to the line of the Sha Ho. In this pursuit General Kuroki meant to push on and capture the hills north of Pien-niu-lu-pu (H 3), that is, on the north bank of the Sha Ho. It was in these latter hills that the Russians entrenched themselves after the battle, and from which they were able to defy the First Army during the battle of Mukden. No fresh order was issued to the 12th Division, as its task remained unchanged.

22. The First Army proceeded to carry out its orders. At 12.20 p.m. the 5th Division reported that the enemy was retreating in front of it, and that it would cross the Sha Ho valley to the hills south of Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2). This, however, it

was prevented from doing, as orders came from Manchurian Head-Quarters that the Japanese Armies were to remain on the south bank of the Sha Ho, and that the battle was to be put an end to as soon as possible. The First Army therefore halted on the south bank of the river, the whole line reaching it before evening.

The Matsunaga detachment reached Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) at 4 p.m. The advanced guard of the 12th Division reached Shih-chiao-tzu (H 3/4) about the same time, and took the pass leading thence to Hsiang-shan-tzu (H 4). The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was at San-chia-tzu on the Tai-tzu. From 4 p.m. there was heavy rain and storm.

15th Oct.

23. The following orders, issued by Manchurian Head-Quarters, were received at First Army Head-Quarters at 5.30 a.m. on the 15th October:—

- (1) The First, Second, and Fourth Armies have driven the enemy in their front northwards. The enemy on the Fu-shun* road was driven towards Mukden and Fu-shun on the 14th.
- (2) It is the Marshal's intention to re-arrange and redistribute the troops, which have now been fighting since the 10th October, and to be ready for the next advance.
- (3) The First Army will re-arrange its troops south of the line Shang-chia-wen (G 2)—Hsing-lung-tun (F 2), and reconnoitre towards Mukden. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade to concentrate near Pien-niu-lu-pu (H 3) and reconnoitre towards Fu-shun.*
- (4) The 5th Division will return to the Fourth Army.
- (5) The Fourth Army will occupy a line from Pu-tsao-kou (F 2) to the hill north of Chang-ling-tzu (E 2), and reconnoitre towards Mukden.
- (6) The Second Army will re-arrange its troops on the line Sha-ho-pu (E 2)—Lin-sheng-pu (D 2), and send a detachment to watch the district west of the Hun.

24. In compliance with these orders, the 12th Division assembled near Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), while the Matsunaga Brigade handed over its position to the 12th Division and withdrew some distance. During the day, the Russians withdrew to the right bank of the Sha Ho and began entrenching the hills along it. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with its head-quarters at San-chia-tzu (L 4), reconnoitred northwards.

Although in front of the First and Fourth Armies there was only some desultory fighting going on, in front of the Second Army the battle still raged. About one division of the enemy held its ground near Sha-ho-pu (E 2) and another near Lin-sheng-pu (D 2). The fighting was hot, but the advantage lay with the Japanese. The Russians appeared determined to defend the line of the Sha Ho.

* Not on map; is about 20 miles north of Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2).

On the night of the 15th the line indicated in the orders was taken up by the First Army. Three of the battalions which had been sent to the 2nd Division from the general reserve of the Army were sent back in reserve, and the 5th Division was ordered to return to the Fourth Army on the following day (16th).

25. The 5th Division rejoined the Fourth Army, leaving, **16th Oct.** however, one battalion at Chien Liu-yu (G H 3) with orders to rejoin the division when relieved by a battalion of the Guard. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade pursued to Kao-tai Ling, 5 miles north-east of Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2), but being stopped there by superior forces, it retired and collected at Kao-kuan-sai (K 3/4).

Major-General Matsunaga was recalled and reached the 2nd Division at 2 p.m.

As the 5th Division had left to rejoin the Fourth Army and as the Japanese forces had halted on the south side of the Sha Ho, the Russians took heart of grace once more and about a regiment of infantry advanced towards Wai-tou Shan (G 3). At Liu-chang-tun, a village south of Ta Shan (F 2), there was also a strong force of about a brigade in front of the left of the 2nd Division; also about a division in front of the right of the Fourth Army, and another strong force a bit further west again. It almost looked as if the enemy meant to take the offensive again.

At Wai-tou Shan (G 3) there was only the battalion of the 5th Division, too small a force to face the advancing Russian regiment, so the three battalions of the Army reserve (two battalions 29th Reserve Regiment and one battalion 39th Reserve Regiment) under Colonel Kani were sent to reinforce it, and the force was further increased by a regiment of the Guard. Colonel Kani, therefore, had under his command six battalions, and, in addition a mountain battery, left by the 5th Division, was placed at his disposal. This battery had been lent to the Guard and had not yet returned to its division. These reinforcements arrived at Chien Liu-yu (G H 3), but too late, as the Russians had occupied Wai-tou Shan before they became available.

26. On the 17th the enemy still remained close to the **17th Oct.** Japanese front, and till the 20th the latter had to remain in battle formation and the troops were unable to obtain proper rest.

The Reserve Brigade hurried up from An-tung, and its advanced guard reached Pen-hsi-hu (H J 5) on the 14th. It was then put under the commander of the 12th Division, and the Umezawa Brigade was sent back to Pa-chia-tzu (F G 4), to act as the First Army reserve. It arrived there on the 17th, and the same day the battalion left by the 5th Division was sent to rejoin its division.

This was the situation until the 22nd.

27. The Second Army attacked Sha-ho-pu (E 2) as mentioned, but the attack was unsuccessful, and the Army only succeeded in taking the portion of the village lying on the south bank of the river. At Lin-sheng-pu (D 2), however, it was more successful, and the Russians there were driven back. In order to assist the attack on Sha-ho-pu, the Yamada Regiment (Fourth Army) was ordered to move against the flank of the Russians defending that place on the 15th, and to take and occupy Wan-pao Shan (E/F 1). This detachment succeeded in taking Wan-pao Shan on the 15th, after a desperate fight. Fighting continued all through the 16th, but Sha-ho-pu remained untaken, and during the night of the 16th a strong counter-attack drove the Yamada Detachment back. At the time this counter-attack was delivered by the Russians, Colonel Yamada was facing Sha-ho-pu from the east, and was about to retire in accordance with orders which had been sent him. The Russian counter-attack took him in the rear, and in his hasty and unavoidable retreat he lost 14 guns and 300 rounds of gun ammunition.*

28. The battle of the Sha Ho may be considered to have ended about the 20th October. From the 22nd the Japanese Armies began entrenching their positions and preparing for the next advance. The First Army at first occupied a line pushed well forward to the Sha Ho, but for reasons of supply this line was subsequently drawn a bit back, along the main line of hills on the south side of the valley. This line was occupied through the winter and until the battle of Hei-kou-tai.

During the winter the Second Army was in much closer contact with the Russians than the First Army was, and its troops consequently had a harder time.

29. The following is a careful estimate of the strength of the Russian forces engaged in the battle, based on information obtained from prisoners, captured documents, &c. :—

- (1) Against the right of the First Army—against the flank, a detachment under Stakelberg; among those attacking Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5)—3rd East Siberian Army Corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian Divisions) and Rennenkampf's Cavalry Division.
- (2) Against the Ta Ling, Tu-men Ling (H 4) and Wai-tou Shan (G 3)—the 1st East Siberian Army Corps (5th and 9th East Siberian Divisions).
- (3) Against Lao-chun-yu and Mien-hua-pu (G 4)—the 1st Siberian Army Corps (1st and 9th East Siberian Divisions) and the 5th East Siberian Division.
- (4) Against the right of the 2nd Division—the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.
- (5) Against San-tai-tzu (F 4)—the 71st Division.

* This affair happened at the place known to the Russians as Putilov Hill.

- (6) Against San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) and Temple Hill (F 3/4)—the 1st Army Corps (22nd and 37th European Divisions).

Total strength—about 10 infantry divisions and one cavalry division.

13. The First Army lost about 8,000 men, killed, wounded and missing, the Second about the same number, and the Fourth Army, one of whose divisions served part of the time with the First Army, over 5,000 men. The enemy's total casualties are not known, but the First Army buried 5,500 dead whom the Russians had left on the field.

"The battle of the Sha Ho was fought against the Russians on the offensive, and we met them and fought it out. It appears that before the enemy could succeed in breaking down our right, his own centre was broken. The Russians seemed to be preparing to retire to a position on the Hun; but as our Armies stopped on the Sha Ho, they came back and stayed there too. We much regretted not being able to advance further than the Sha Ho, but there were many reasons why we should not do so. These will appear when the battle of Mukden comes to be studied. We were not really prepared for a further advance at the time."

(31) Battle of the Sha Ho.—Second Japanese Army.—Operations from the 5th September to the 19th October 1904.

REPORT by Lieutenant-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O.,
General Staff; Tokio, 23rd January 1905.

Plates.

General Map	-	-	-	-	Map 41.
Sketch of positions of 3rd and 6th Divisions at 12 noon 12th October	-	-	-	-	Map 42.

Appendices.

Accounts by officers of attacks on 12th October on Erh-tai-tzu and Lang-tzu-chieh	-	-	Appendix 1.
Account by an officer of attack on Shih-li-ho	-	-	2.
Order of battle, Second Army	-	-	3.

Covering Letter.

In submitting the attached report upon the operations of the Second Japanese Army from the 5th September to the 19th October 1904, I have the honour to draw attention to certain points, of which some will be more fully dealt with at a later period when fuller information has been obtained.

1. *Use of Entrenchments.*—A perusal of the report will show that the Japanese made use of entrenchments in attacking the Russians and in defending themselves against counter-attack as freely in the battle of the Sha Ho as in that of Liao-yang. Perhaps the fact that the soil of Manchuria is very easily turned is in a measure responsible for the many lines of trenches which mark everywhere the exact positions where the Japanese infantry have been—a remark which might also be applied to the Russians—but these same trenches show a fixed determination on the part of their makers to hold fast to that which they have won, and if it can be avoided, not to give back one foot of ground. In some European armies there might be scruples in ordering troops which had fought all day to dig at night, but none such exist in the Japanese army, and for the infantry to pass the hours of darkness in preparing for the engagement of the morrow is a matter of common

occurrence. These trenches stand as a proof of that patience and deliberation which characterize the Japanese infantry attack—qualities, which, coupled with careful training and unsurpassed bravery, seldom fail to overcome every obstacle.

2. *Russian Measures of Security.*—In the operations round Liao-yang and those to the north of that place, the Russian outposts do not always appear to have exercised great vigilance, nor to have been thrown sufficiently to the front to guard against a hostile approach against their positions under cover of darkness. Had the banks of the Sha Ho and Shih-li Ho been properly watched, the turning movement of the Japanese, which placed a portion of their troops in prolongation of the Russian flank and behind it, might have been prevented, or a counter-operation undertaken with good results.

The surprise at Hung-ling-pu on the morning of the 13th October, recalling that of Beaumont in the Franco-Prussian war, was discreditable, but the Russian Army is not the only one which has been guilty of such errors during recent years.

3. *Co-operation of Artillery with Infantry and Concentration of Fire.*—There are several examples in these operations of effective artillery and infantry co-operation, notably at Shih-li-ho and La-mu-tun, where a force of guns greatly superior in number to those of the Russians was brought up by the Japanese, and their fire concentrated along a comparatively narrow front. Under cover of this fire the infantry succeeded in both attacks, while the dust thrown up by high-explosive shells helped to hide the troops and diminish losses. In cases where this superiority of artillery was absent, the attacks were costly, took longer to execute, and were sometimes unsuccessful.

4. *Movement of Infantry under Shrapnel Fire.*—During these operations some examples came under my own observation—on one occasion at very short distance—of the comparative immunity of infantry from loss when moving, even in close formation, under the fire of the Russian Q.F. field gun.

On the 12th October, after Yin-te-niu-lu had been taken, the I. and II., 23rd Regiment,* were ordered to take part in the pursuit, advancing from Erh-tai-tzu to Lang-tzu-chieh for that purpose. These two battalions advanced, one following the other in the same formation, viz., each company formed in fours with the three sections wheeled towards the front and keeping at section distance from each other.

As the leading battalion approached Hsiao-tung-tai, which was then being shelled by the enemy from the direction of Lung-wang-miao, the guns were turned upon it. Immediately its companies, still keeping their original formation, were deployed to right and left of the leading company, and the

* 1st and 2nd battalions of the 23rd Regiment. This notation is used throughout the narrative.

whole doubled to the river bank. The rear battalion, on reaching the spot where the other had come under fire, conformed to its movements. The Russian shells were bursting low, and there was every reason to suppose that the losses, theoretically, ought to be heavy, but only five men in the two battalions were struck.

On the 13th, a brigade of the Fourth Army advancing towards Chang-hu-tun, north-east of the hill of Huang-pu Shan, doubled in fours across the open for a distance of about one thousand five hundred yards under a continuous fire of shrapnel from its right front, the shells apparently bursting right among the men, not one of whom fell. The brigade was wearing packs, and the whole distance was covered without a pause at a run much faster than a double, until the shelter of a village was reached. Considering the pace, there was wonderfully little disorder in the ranks.

The result of much experience under shell fire has not led the Second Army to extend its infantry when so exposed, and the custom, by day, is not to halt, lie down and await artillery support, but to double forward to the nearest cover, a course which proves not only safer, but has the great virtue of improving *moral*.

On the 11th October, during the lull which followed the Russian counter-attack from Nan-kuan-tzu upon the troops of the 3rd Division, two Russian batteries—both afterwards captured—opened a fire of salvoes on the ammunition ponies of a battalion which was busily digging trenches a few hundred yards to the south of that village. Many of the shells fell among the animals, who broke loose and bolted. Not one was touched, and the Japanese soldiers did not for a moment lose their heads, but ran after their chargers and caught them near Shuang-tai-tzu. The Russians for the next quarter of an hour directed their fire at a small clump of trees between where the ponies had been and the firing line, which was about three hundred yards in front of the clump. At that place was the battalion dressing station, and though many of the shells struck the trees and brought down branches, the men laughed and joked, and, except that they stood behind the trunks of the trees—which would have given better cover if their diameter had been greater—displayed complete indifference.

5. *The Japanese Infantry Attack.*—Without at present going into details, there are a few points of interest in connection with the method of attack as practised in the Japanese Army.

No attack is undertaken without many and careful reconnaissances of the ground to be passed over, and the condition and position of the enemy. These reconnaissances are undertaken both by day and night, and as each company of three sections in the Japanese infantry has a captain and four

subalterns, there is a spare officer available for this duty, who is also at hand to fill a vacancy.

The extension of the infantry is less than in our army, and the troops are not opened out in anticipation of artillery fire, but are retained as long as possible in the formation mentioned in para. 4. They are thus kept better in hand and the will of the commander can be exerted more readily than were the men distant from him many hundred yards.

Wide extensions are occasionally employed to get men forward to the parallel from which the final attack is launched, and sometimes, when time is available, they are dribbled up by twos and threes. Every possible means is adopted to move forward, while at the same time keeping a firm hold over the men, with a minimum of loss when going through the preparatory stages of the attack, and, as an example, it may be mentioned that between the villages of Wu-li-tai-tzu and Hsiao-chien-kou there are trenches at every twenty-five paces with a frontage of about two yards, which were evidently used to get men forward from one village to the other with as little exposure as possible; while in front of the latter village a covered approach was actually made from it to the main trench beyond.

The commander of a battalion exercises command over the extended line by means of connecting files who pass on his orders, and, after sending his firing line forward, maintains close touch of it until he comes up with the reserve. Similarly, captains of companies exercise command over their sections in the front line. Thus, the troops being in touch with the reserve, their requirements as regards ammunition or supports can easily be made known. The reserve, again, is in communication with troops behind, and so on to divisional head-quarters, which is linked to Army Head-Quarters by telegraph or telephone.

The risk of suffering loss at the hands of one's own artillery in a battle which covers a wide area, and in which the uniforms of the opposing armies are much alike, is obviously greater than was formerly the case. The Japanese have recognized this, having suffered on more than one occasion, notably at Shou-shan-pu, where it will be remembered a successful attack of the 34th Regiment was marred by its own artillery. A large national flag is therefore now carried by the infantry of each battalion, and this is hoisted or held up when thought necessary to show where the troops have arrived. In addition to this flag, each company has its own distinctive one, which is of small size.

6. *Head-Quarter Staff Officers with divisions.*—A custom prevails in the Japanese army, which, so far as I am aware, is not to be met with in any other army, of attaching an officer of the General Staff from Army Head-Quarters to each division during the action. These officers in the Second Army before leaving head-quarters receive full instructions and have a thorough knowledge of the situation and intentions of the Army Commander. On arriving at the head-quarters of the division

to which they are allotted, they report their having done so to Army Head-Quarters by telephone or telegraph, and act as a medium for the exchange of ideas between the divisional general and the Army Commander, keeping the latter constantly informed of the situation. They are held responsible that the orders sent to divisions are carried out in the sense in which they were issued. Their work terminates with darkness, when they return to Army Head-Quarters accompanied by a General Staff officer of the division who is aware of the exact positions of the troops of his general's command. On arriving at Head-Quarters all details of the day's engagement are reported, when the Army Commander, being fully cognisant of the situation, issued his orders.

If desirable, the officer from Army Head-Quarters can return thither at any time to report upon any special matter. This staff officer becomes for the time being practically one of the divisional staff and assists the chief of the staff thereof.

The following imaginary example of what the Japanese consider the utility of this system was given to me by the staff officer who supplied me with the facts in this paragraph. A division may be ordered to undertake an attack, which, from the enemy having increased in numbers or for other reasons unknown to Army Head-Quarters, is certain to fail. The officer of Army Head-Quarters would consult with the general officer commanding the division and telephone the decision arrived at to Army Head-Quarters. An actual example of what occurred while a General Staff officer was with the 3rd Division on the 11th October is as follows: That division was ordered to attack beyond Yang-chia-wan* in order to help the 6th Division, but its left was heavily engaged, and the staff officer advised the divisional general not to carry out the order. This was done, and on his return to Army Head-Quarters the officer reported his action which was approved. I may mention two more examples, one imaginary and the other real. A divisional commander whose position on a flank may cause him anxiety may be inclined to exercise greater precaution than the real situation demands, and may be, so to speak, timid and unenterprising in the execution of the orders given to him. The staff officer would now tactfully point out to him the real situation, and lead him to act up to the spirit of the Army Commander's instructions. The staff officer is intended to suggest what will materially assist the Army Commander's plans or show how a certain course may militate against their complete success.

On the 30th August, at the battle of Shou-shan-pu, the 6th Division artillery reached the ground with no second line wagons, and ran short of ammunition. Thereupon the staff officer from Army Head-Quarters called upon the next division to send some ammunition, which was at once done. The course laid down by regulation, had this officer not been present, would

* See page 470.

have been for the general officer commanding the division to make such an application through Army Head-Quarters, which would have caused delay.

The system above described is, I am informed, found to work very well and to cause no friction, but General Oku is careful to send only his most trusted and tactful officers on this difficult duty. It is said that by its application the Army Commander is enabled to have eyes in many places at once, and so improve the co-operation between divisions, which is especially difficult in a flat enclosed country, where he must necessarily depend entirely on reports. No jealousy or ill-feeling has been caused by the presence of these officers with divisions, and their position is not one which relieves the general of responsibility or makes him feel that their being with him is in any way obnoxious.

Narrative.

The unbroken sequence of successes which heralded the advance of the Armies of Japan through South Manchuria had culminated in the great victory of Liao-yang, which forced the Russians to relinquish that important military centre and with it the guardianship of the gateways opening on the roads to Korea and the Kuan-tung Peninsula. Its loss, if not entirely depriving Russia of the power to succour her beleaguered fortress in the south, made the task one of extreme difficulty, still left her face to face with her invincible foe, and cut her off from a considerable stretch of the fertile plain watered by the Liao Ho. But this was not all, for, in addition, her military prestige had suffered a heavy blow. For months previous to the battle every preparation for defence that the wit of man could devise had been made, and, as the fateful days on which the issue hung drew near, Russian hopes rose high, for it seemed that the tide of victory was at last about to turn, and that retreat, grown monotonous by regularity, would at length be stayed. But the die had been cast and she had lost, and her baffled soldiers, recoiling before the ascendancy of their southern foes, were once more retracing their footsteps towards the north. It is true that the victory did not decide the supremacy of all Manchuria nor yet attain to the magnitude of a Sedan or a Sadowa; but though Liao-yang may not take its place in history beside fields that saw the surrender of an emperor and his army or the downfall of the military fabric of a nation, it must ever stand as a great achievement redounding to the honour of Japan—a tide mark in the annals of her onward march. To have overcome the immense difficulties of moving three separate Armies over long distances through a region in most parts mountainous and practically roadless, bared of supplies and destitute of railways, of marching them across a country strong in positions stoutly held by a determined enemy and then winning a great battle, lasting several days, was as fine a feat of perseverance as it was

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an enterprise of arms scarce to be surpassed. This she had done, and, but for these difficulties, made greater by inclement weather, Russia would have lacked time to increase her troops and must have stood to fight in feebler force or sought an issue further north.

Nevertheless, though the victory had been gained, it was a costly one, and the exhaustion it entailed so severe that to follow up and gather all the fruits was impossible. Apart, however, from the effects of a hot pursuit, Japan had won a great prize. A strategic point whose possession by either side conferred distinct advantages, had been seized and its value to the nation holding command of the sea in Far Eastern waters was much enhanced by its comparative proximity to Ying-kou (Niu-chuang)* on the Liao-tung Gulf, with which it is connected by a river open to navigation by large boats for some seven months of the year.

With forces assembled on a broad front at Liao-yang, the Japanese no longer held the flank position, and there was therefore no immediate necessity for an onward move. The work of organizing communications had first to be undertaken, supplies of food and ammunition collected, the troops rested, ranks refilled, and sick and wounded transported to the rear. The railway had as yet only progressed as far as Ta-shih-chiao, but on the 14th September the branch line thence to the port of Ying-kou was opened, and on the 1st October three trains laden with supplies arrived at Liao-yang.

In the meantime the Russians, making a free use of the railway, had fallen back on Mukden, followed as far as Yen-tai by the cavalry, and by the 7th September General Kuropatkin was able to report that the withdrawal was complete.

It has been mentioned earlier that after passing the Tai-tzu Ho, at that season practically unfordable owing to heavy rain, the Russian rear guards destroyed all the military bridges and rendered the railway bridges temporarily impassable. Materials for their reconstruction were not readily forthcoming, and the divisions of the Second Japanese Army remained south of the river, protected by detachments which were thrown beyond it to keep touch with the enemy. Under cover of this screen means of passage were improvised as speedily as possible† and the railway bridge was repaired, and about the 16th September the Army was transferred to the northern bank. By the 30th of that month its three divisions held a fortified position, the right at the village of Nan-tai (C 4),‡ some thirteen miles north of Liao-yang, the left at Chang-chia-wo-peng (B 4). To the east, in prolongation of the line held by the Second Army, lay General Kuroki's troops, while in rear, in second line south of the Tai-tzu Ho, was the Fourth Japanese Army.

* See Map 1.

† See Map 41.

‡ The Second Army had no pontoons.—A. H.

§ See Map 41.

30th Sept.

Throughout September there was little to record beyond the frequent collision of patrols and reconnoitring parties. The Japanese were busily preparing for the movement on the ancient Manchu capital, an operation which through the severity and prolonged nature of the fighting at Liao-yang, they had been forced to postpone, while the Russians, lured by the *ignis fatuus* of Port Arthur, still cast their glances towards the south.

Indications that a hostile advance might shortly be expected were not wanting, and even if the Japanese Field Intelligence Department had failed to keep their Commander-in-Chief fully informed, General Kuropatkin's proclamation of the 2nd October, in which he pronounced that "the moment for the attack so ardently desired by the army" had at last arrived, could scarce have failed to put him on his guard.

By the 2nd October, too, Marshal Oyama had almost completed his preparations, and the problem of how best to secure Mukden and the line of the Hun Ho, the next important river to the north, whether by forcing the enemy's centre or turning his right or left or by a combination of these methods, was under consideration. On that date, however, General Kuropatkin himself offered a solution by putting into effect the terms of the above-quoted proclamation and commencing an offensive movement towards the south. **2nd Oct.**

On the 4th-5th October the advance became known, and on the 6th October heavy pressure began to be felt on the right of the First Army, against which flank it seemed that the enemy's chief strength was about to be thrown. **6th Oct.**

On the 7th the Fourth Army, to which was attached the 14th Regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade and the Foot Artillery, moved north of the Tai-tzu Ho, and next day came up between the First and Second Armies. **7th Oct.**

On that day orders were issued for the three Armies to concentrate their troops in readiness for eventualities, and the positions of the Second Army, which had somewhat changed, were as follows:—

Head-Quarters at Ta-chih-fang (C 5), whither they had moved on the 8th from Liao-yang.

1st Cavalry Brigade, under Major-General Akiyama:—

At Hei-kou-tai (A 3):—

14th and 15th Cavalry Regiments.

1 squadron 9th Cavalry Regiment.

1 squadron 11th Cavalry Regiment.

I. and II./9th Regiment of the 4th Division.

1 battery of horse artillery (6 guns); and

1 section of engineers.

On the right bank of the Hun Ho:—

2 squadrons 9th Cavalry Regiment.

2 squadrons 11th Cavalry Regiment.

1 battery of machine guns.

3rd Division, under Lieut.-General Oshima:—From Nan-tai (C 4, south-east), to a point about 2,000 yards east of Hon-kou-chen-pu (C 4, west), with an advanced post consisting of 1 section 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the I./33rd Regiment at Hsiao Tung-shan-pu (C 3, south).

4th Division, under Lieut.-General Tsukamoto:—From Hou-kou-chen-pu (C 4) to Chang-chia-wo-peng (B 4), with an advanced post consisting of two squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment and the III./8th Regiment at Kuang-yin-ko (B 3).

6th Division, under Lieut.-General Okubo, and the 13th Regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade at Tung Shan-kang-tzu (C 5, north-west), with an advanced post consisting of 1 section 6th Cavalry Regiment and the I./48th Regiment at Liu-tiao-chai (C 3, centre).*

The advanced posts thrown well in advance of the main line of defence were so placed as to give ample warning of a hostile movement.

Such were the dispositions made by General Oku, two of his divisions with about half the guns holding a line eight miles wide, with another division and the remainder of the guns in reserve, posted a short distance behind the centre.

8th Oct. The pressure of the enemy on the First Army steadily increased, and by a late hour on the afternoon of the 8th at least three divisions were before it.

9th Oct. On the 9th it was known that the troops on the Mukden road had been reinforced and amounted to one division, which had not yet, however, arrived to the south of Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west). West of the high road a force of unknown strength held the line from Liu-tang-kou (D 2, south) to Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2), with its main body between Ta-tai (C 2, south-east) and the railway line, while in front of the Fourth and Second Armies was a dense screen of cavalry which came close to the front of the advanced posts.

On the 8th and 9th patrols on both sides met in several places and exchanged fire, and towards the front of the main body of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and its detachment came a large force composed of troops of all arms.

The enemy's intentions were clear, but his plan for putting them into effect was difficult to divine, and uncertainty prevailed as to the situation of his main strength and whether the real attack would be made on the Japanese right or centre.

Up to the 7th October the front of the three divisions of the Second Army had been on one line, but the report of a Russian

* The Reserve Brigade of the Second Army now formed part of the general reserve of the three Armies. The 13th Regiment of Artillery of the 1st Artillery Brigade, one battery of Russian field guns, the four 10·5-cm. Canet guns, and four 15-cm. Canet howitzers captured at Nanchan, were attached to the Second Army. The Russian field battery had six guns.—A. H.

advance and the possibility of the adoption of a defensive attitude had led General Oku to withdraw the 6th Division with the exception of its advanced post at Liu-tiao-chai (C 3), and keep it and the 13th Regiment of Artillery under his own hand as a special reserve available for the delivery of heavy counter-attacks. This wise precaution proved unnecessary, for by the afternoon of the 9th the Russians had so far developed their movement that Marshal Oyama, unwilling to permit them to secure the advantage of the initiative, issued orders for a general advance.

9th Oct.

It was at this time known that the enemy, aided by his improved railway communications, had brought up further reinforcements, some of which were not yet south of the Hun Ho, and it was deemed advisable, therefore, to forestall him by boldly marching to the attack. So unexpected a movement might disconcert him and make him waver in his plans, when a blow would have double effect and would greatly add to the chances of victory.

The general tenor of the Marshal's orders was as follows:—

The First Army with a portion of its troops will engage the enemy coming against it from the east and with the remainder meet his advance from the north.

The Fourth Army, acting as the pivot of the First and Second Armies, will advance in the direction of Huang-hua-tien (E 2) and Ku-chia-tzu (E 2) (east of the Mukden road).

The Second Army, maintaining communication with the Fourth Army, will march to the line stretching from Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west) to Tai-ping-chuang (C 2).

Shortly after this order was received General Oku directed the following movements to be undertaken by his troops on the 10th* :—

- (a) The Second Army, with the object of attacking the enemy, will advance to-morrow towards the line Pan-chia-pu (E 2) to Tai-ping-chuang (C 2).
- (b) The 3rd Division (*i.e.*, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, 17th Infantry Brigade, 7 batteries of artillery,† and 3 companies of engineers) to leave Hsiao Chi-tai-tzu (C 4) at 6.30 a.m. and march west of the railway but east of the line of the following villages—Ta Chi-tai-tzu (C 4), Shih-chiao-tzu, Ta Huang-ti (D 4), Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3), and Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3, centre). Its objective to be the line Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west) to Chiu-chia—Liu-tang-kou (D 2/3).
- (c) The 6th Division (*i.e.*, 6th Cavalry Regiment, 11th Infantry Brigade, 6 batteries of artillery and 3 com-

* This order is not verbatim.—A. H.

† Includes Russian field battery attached this day to 3rd Division.—A. H.

panies of engineers) to leave Hou-kou-chen-pu (C 4, south-west) at 6.30 a.m., and march between the left bank of the Sha Ho and the line of villages mentioned in (b). Its objective to be the line from Chiu-chia Liu-tang-kou (D 2/3) to Pei Yen-tai (D 2, south-west), the latter place, however, not to be occupied by the division.

- (d) The 4th Division (*i.e.*, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 7th Infantry Brigade, 7 batteries of artillery* and 3 companies of engineers) to leave Tou-tung-kou (B 4) and march west of the Sha Ho and along its right bank. Its objective to be the line Pei Yen-tai (D 2, south-west) to Tai-ping-chuang (C 2).
- (e) The 1st Cavalry Brigade maintaining connection with the 4th Division to cover the left flank and rear of the army, paying particular attention to Chang-tan (A 2).
- (f) The remainder of the Second Army was ordered to assemble at 8 a.m. on the line Hung-chia—Huang-ti to Pai-chia—Huang-ti (C 4/5). That is, the following troops:—

From the 3rd Division, the 5th Infantry Brigade, which would be complete on the I./33rd Regiment joining from the outposts.

From the 6th Division, the 24th Infantry Brigade, less I./48th Regiment, which, happening to stand on the line of march of the 4th Division, joined it.

From the 4th Division, four battalions, *viz.*: III./9th and 38th Regiments of 38th Infantry Brigade, and the 13th Artillery Regiment.†

These troops were the reserve of the Second Army under the direct orders of General Oku.

- (g) Army Head-Quarters would arrive at Hung-chia—Huang-ti (C 4, south) from Ta-chih-fang (C 5) at 7 a.m.

In pursuance of the decision of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief interpreted as above, the Second Army began its march to meet the onset of the Russians, some of its columns starting a little late owing to the tardy arrival of the orders.

The region to the north of its defensive line, which was about to be the scene of much heavy fighting during the next few days, bears a close resemblance to that stretching to the south and west of Liao-yang. Both districts are plain land freely sprinkled with villages, in some of which the houses belonging to the richer farmers are strongly built with bricks and tiles, and surrounded by high and thick mud walls. Small woods and clumps of trees, generally marking the sites of

* Includes battery of four Canet howitzers. Owing to road difficulties they were sent to the 6th Division.—A. H.

† The four 10·5-cm. Canet guns were attached to no division, but followed the army on railway trucks, positions being prepared for them daily close to the line.—A. H.

Chinese burial grounds, are scattered here and there, and in and around the villages the thick foliage almost hides the houses from sight. The trees and the millet, where it is uncut or stacked in the fields to dry, together with the gentle swelling of the plain, make the view restricted, and the manœuvres of troops, except to those close to them, invisible. To such a degree was this the case that, during the first three days' operations, the commander of the Second Army, the divisional generals and sometimes even the brigadiers were forced to rely almost entirely on reports in order to keep themselves informed of the progress of their troops. East of the Mukden road, which was at first the dividing line between the Fourth and Second Armies, some low hills spring from the plain, one of which, when captured, served as a point of observation for General Oku and his staff, but the main range, which south of Liao-yang, throws successive spurs across the path of forces moving north, is now some miles to the east and outside the area in which the Second Army operated. Leaving out of consideration for a moment the obstacles presented by the rivers, this plain land offers little impediment to the passage of an army. The railway, with embankment ten to fifteen feet in height, still continues north and does not cross the line of march; ravines there are a few, but they are mostly shallow, and the hard *kaoliang* stubble protruding several inches from the ground, is more a cause of annoyance by night than by day. The rivers are a more serious matter. On the extreme left of the army ran the Hun Ho, fordable almost everywhere, while penetrating its line of march was the Sha Ho. This latter river, as well as several of its tributaries, take their rise to the east of the Mukden road, and, while the main waters strike south-west at Lin-sheng-pu (D 2), the affluents run due west until they join the parent stream. All of them have muddy bottoms, are difficult to ford, and flow some thirty feet below the level of the plain. Their banks are generally for a few feet steep, in places inaccessible, and on either side, within the depression in which they flow, is sufficient space for the march of infantry in file or fours or the concealment of reserves. Crossing places for wheeled traffic are to be found in the vicinity of the villages on their banks, but the descent to the stream is often steep and the ascent therefrom the same, thus making the quick passage of guns and wagons an operation not entirely easy.*

Such was the country in which the Second Army, its ranks refilled and eager for the fray, was to meet its oft-defeated adversary—a country devoid of those bold positions which from Nan Shan northwards served as stepping stones in its onward march.

* These rivers and their immediate surroundings are not unlike those in the Punjab—such as the Rawal and Sohan—except that they are on a smaller scale and are free from rocks. They are fordable for infantry and cavalry in many places, but the mud and steep banks make them formidable obstacles to guns.—A. H.

In a district of the character just described, battles naturally resolve themselves into struggles for certain localities and centre themselves upon the villages—more especially on those whose sites cover the easiest crossings of the rivers. Thus the waterways mark the general defensive front from which the villages, like bastions, bulge; and before these, again, standing as outworks, are other villages. But, unlike the seizure of some eminence which forms the key of a position on hilly ground, the capture of a single village on the level, where no one spot commands another, is not immediately decisive and might be compared to water filtering through a dam. At first the invading stream flows slowly, but as its volume grows and greater pressure is exerted from behind, the gap widens and the pent-up flood, breaking through, overwhelms the barrier and carries havoc to either side. Combats under such conditions are, as a rule, prolonged and bitter and the losses heavy, for the cover afforded by the houses and the difficulty of retirement over open ground tempt the holders to linger, rendering eventual escape most hazardous.

10th Oct.

As already mentioned, the divisions of the Second Army moved northwards on the 10th, while the reserve troops, marching in three columns and keeping behind the 3rd and 6th Divisions, proceeded to Hsing-lung-pu (C/D 4).

At 11 a.m. the 5th Division of the Fourth Army was heard exchanging shots with the enemy at Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), and at noon, when General Oku reached Hsing-lung-pu (D 4, west), deliberate artillery fire was audible from the direction of the 3rd Division.

*3rd Division.**—This division moved in two columns composed as follows:—

Right Column.

2 squadrons, 3rd Cavalry
Regiment.

I. and II./18th Regiment.

1 battery of artillery.

1 company of engineers.

Left Column.

2 companies II./34th Regi-
ment.

The right column, which was followed by the main body of the division, arrived at Hsin-li-tun (D 4, north) at 10.50 a.m., its march thither being unopposed; and the left column reached the neighbourhood of Men-hu-lu-tun (D 3/4) at the same hour and deployed against the enemy in the village of Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3).

Lieut-General Oshima, after considering the situation, decided to attack the enemy in Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), and added two companies III. 18th Regiment and one battery to the right wing, but the enemy's rifles east of that place and his guns at

* For the sake of clearness the movements of the three divisions and 1st Cavalry Brigade will, as far as possible, be described separately.—A. H.

Shih-li-ho (D/E 3) poured so heavy a fire upon the advancing troops that no progress could be made, and they were withdrawn to the neighbourhood of Hsin-li-tun (D 4). It was next resolved to force the enemy from Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3) with the left wing, capture Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3, centre) and thence operate against Shih-li-ho, and so assist the right. With this view the main body of the division joined the left column, and about 6 p.m., after some rather severe fighting, Shuang-tai-tzu was taken, upon which the Russians opened a heavy fire of artillery on the captors from the east of Yin-te-niu-lu and Wu-li-chieh (D 3). A short time before Shuang-tai-tzu fell into Japanese hands the II./13th Regiment and a section of cavalry—the right wing of the 6th Division—occupied Erh-tai-tzu (D 3, south-west), thereby assisting the attack of the 3rd Division's left. The latter division had now assembled its main body at Shuang-tai-tzu, and the commander, finding a portion of the 6th Division at hand, decided to combine with it in an attack on Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3, centre). But the enemy held that place in great force, and, as darkness was at hand, the attack was deferred and the division passed the night in battle formation on the line Hsin-li-tun (D 4, north) to Shuang-tai-tzu.

6th Division.—The division, which started somewhat late, moved in two columns:—

Right Column.	Left Column.
1 squadron 6th Cavalry Regiment.	1 squadron 6th Cavalry Regiment.
II./13th Regiment.	II. and III./45th Regiment.
	3 batteries of artillery.
	1 company of engineers.

The right column reached San-chia-tzu (C 4, north-east) at 10 a.m., and the left, followed by the main body of the division arrived at the same hour at Kang-chia-tai (C 4, north centre). Beyond these two villages the march was barred by the enemy who held Ching-tui-tzu (C 3, south-east) and Hsiao Tung-shan-pu (C 3, south centre) from which places he was driven about 12.40 p.m. Thence he fell back to Erh-tai-tzu (D 3) and Ta Tung-shan-pu (C 3, on the Sha Ho), both of which villages he held with obstinacy. Three batteries were now despatched north-east of Hsiao Tung-shan-pu to help the right in its attack, and a flanking fire was poured on the defenders of Erh-tai-tzu, who were driven from it about 4.20 p.m. At the same time the left wing, after a sharp fight, succeeded in taking Ta Tung-shan-pu, and the enemy, repulsed by both wings, fell back on other troops in Yin-te-niu-lu and San-chia-lin-tzu (C/D 3). As both these last villages as well as Yang-chia-wan (C/D 3) appeared to be strongly held, General Okubo judged that his further advance would be vigorously opposed. The reserve was therefore summoned to Hsiao Tung-shan-pu (C. 3, south centre),

and the troops of the division passed the night where they stood.

4th Division.—This division marched also in two columns as follows :—

Right Column.	Left Column.*
1 section 4th Cavalry Regiment.	2 squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment.
I. and II./8th Regiment.	III./8th Regiment.
3 batteries of artillery.	
1 company of engineers.	

The right wing, behind which moved the main body of the division, marched through Ta Huang-tun (C 4, north-west) and Kuang-shan-tun (C 3, south) to Shu-pei-tai (north of last named), and found before it in occupation of Yang-chia-tien-tzu a weak force of cavalry and infantry, amounting in all to one company. This party was easily disposed of and fell back on Kang-chia-tien-tzu (C 3, centre) at half-past four, whence it was driven before dark. There the right wing halted for the night, since to have advanced further would have thrown it too much in front of the 6th Division, with which connection had to be maintained.

The left wing had an easy task this day, its front, except for a few cavalry, being clear of the enemy. Thus by midday Ho-chia-tun (C 3, north-west) was occupied and furnished quarters for the night.

The main body of the division halted in Shu-pei-tai (C 3, south-west).

1st Cavalry Brigade.—Leaving a regiment at Hei-kou-tai (A 3), the cavalry brigade marched at noon, and at 2 p.m. reached Shen-tan-pu (B 2), its right gaining touch of the 4th Division's left, already in Ho-chia-tun (C 3). In like manner the regiment at Hei-kou-tai maintained connection with the main body of the brigade and with the detachment which had been left beyond the Hun at Chi-tai-tzu.†

At 6 p.m. Army Head-Quarters issued an order from Ta Huang-ti (D 4) where a halt for the night had been made, regarding the quartering of the troops. Each division was instructed to pass the night where it stood and open up communication with the troops to right and left, while the reserve was allotted quarters in the villages of Hsing-lung-pu (D 4) and Hsi Pu-tsao-kou (north-west of last-named). In order to facilitate the transfer of guns from one bank of the Sha Ho to the other, the 6th Division was directed to construct a bridge suitable for that purpose near Hsiao Tung-shan-pu (C 3, south centre).

* Two squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment and the I./48th Regiment (6th Division) joined the left column on its march.—A. H.

† About 9 miles south-west of Hei-kou-tai.

The line occupied by the divisions on the night of the 10th ran from Hsin-li-tun (D 4, north centre) through Shuang-tai-tzu, Erh-tai-tzu, Ta Tung-shan-pu, Kang-chia-tien-tzu to Ho-chia tun (C 3, north-west). Opposed to them this day, between the Mukden highway and the Sha Ho, there had been one brigade of cavalry, three regiments of the 17th Army Corps, and two batteries of artillery; while west of the Sha Ho only two or three squadrons of cavalry, a company of mounted infantry, and four horse artillery guns had been met. Both these bodies evidently formed the advanced troops of the Russian right, and, though the fighting that had taken place did not entirely clear up the situation, it seemed probable that the main body would be found occupying the line from Shih-li-ho (D/E 3) to Yang-chia-wan (C/D 3). The distance covered by the army was some seven miles in advance of the line which it had left at dawn, and, though the resistance met with on the right and centre had kept the 3rd and 6th Divisions back, the turning movement of the cavalry and 4th Division—both lightly opposed—was developing and promised well.

As regards the progress made by the other armies to the east, the right wing of the First Army, which was in the general direction of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5), after re-occupying the ground that it had lost, was maintaining itself firmly in the face of two divisions. Opposite the remainder of that army was a force which held the neighbourhood of San-tai-tzu (F 4) to the south-east of Ta Pu (E 3), and gave no signs of hostile movement.

Of the Fourth Army, the 10th Division was in occupation of the hill east of Tu-men-tzu (E 4) and confronted the enemy at San-kuai-shih Shan (E 3), while the 5th Division on the left halted at the southern end of Wu-li-tai-tzu was face to face with the defenders of that height.

Under these conditions Marshal Oyama determined to repulse the force at present east of the Mukden highway and drive it back in a north-easterly direction. With this view the following orders* for the conduct of the armies on the 11th were issued:—

- (a) The First Army will march from Ying-kuan-tun (E 4) in a north-easterly direction.
- (b) The Fourth Army will move at daybreak, drive the enemy from the hill of Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), and then, swinging to its right, push forward towards the north-east.
- (c) The Second Army, after expelling the enemy from its front and reaching the line Sha-ho-pu and its neighbourhood, will assist the movement of the Fourth Army on its right.

* These orders are not verbatim.—A. H.

(d) The general reserve will assemble in the neighbourhood of Tu-men-tzu (E 4).*

In the meantime, at 8 p.m. General Oku had given orders as follows:—

1. The enemy who was at Erh-tai-tzu (D 3) and Hsiao Tung-shan-pu (C 3, centre south) has fallen back in a northerly direction. The 1st Cavalry Brigade is on the line Shen-tan-pu (B 2) to Hei-kou-tai (A 3).
2. With the object of attacking, the Army will march tomorrow to the Shih-li Ho (D 3), and the leading troops of divisions should leave the line they now hold at 6 a.m.
3. The 3rd Division will attack the river line from Shih-li-ho (D/E 3) to Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3); the 6th Division from the west side of Yin-te-niu-lu to Yang-chia-wan (C 3, east), and the 4th Division from Ta Yu-chung-pu to Hsiao Yu-chung-pu (both in C 3, north-east).
4. The reserve of the army will assemble in the neighbourhood of its present quarters in readiness to march at 6 a.m.
5. The Army Commander will be at Ta Huang-ti (D 4).

When Marshal Oyama's orders came, it was found that those already issued to the Second Army required no alteration, as their terms met the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief.

11th Oct.

At 1.5 a.m. on the 11th October a message was received from the Chief of the Staff, Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, to the effect that two divisions were massed against the right of the First Army and that it was important that the movements of the Second Army that day should be rapid and decisive, since it was the intention of Marshal Oyama to compromise the retreat of these divisions by pushing forward with his left.

The troops in the first line began to move as ordered.

3rd Division. — This division moved in two columns composed as follows:—

Right Column.

Left Column.

I. and II./34th Regiment.

18th Regiment.

Assisted by the divisional artillery posted east of Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3, south-west), the right attacked the enemy in Wuli-tai-tzu (on Mukden road) from Men-hu-lu-tun (D 3/4); while the left at the same time advanced against Nan-kuan-tzu (D 3, centre) from Shuang-tai-tzu.

* On the 10th October the general reserve is believed to have consisted of the 3rd and 11th Reserve Brigades, head-quarters and the 15th Regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade and the Foot Artillery. On the 11th the Reserve Brigades and 15th Regiment of Artillery were given to the Fourth Army, and the 5th Division and Foot Artillery were kept by Marshal Oyama. From the 11th onwards the general reserve maintained the latter constitution.—A. H.

About 7.50 a.m., in order to hurry on the movement of the division, General Oku returned to its commander from the reserve the 5th Brigade, less the I. and II./33rd Regiment (i.e., the III./33rd and 6th Regiments were sent). As soon as this reinforcement arrived, General Oshima sent the I. and II. 6th Regiment* to the right wing, his intention being first to push the attack on Wu-li-tai-tzu and then proceed against Shih-li-ho.

The 5th Division of the Fourth Army, starting its attack at daybreak, had in the meantime occupied the southern part of Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill. But the enemy's position in that part of the field was exceptionally strong, the ground being perfectly open and much exposed to the fire of artillery—three batteries of which were disposed, one on the north-east side of Shih-li-ho, another at the west side of Hsiao Fan-chia-tun (E 3), and a third at the west of Wu-li-chieh (D 3, close to railway)—while infantry held trenches and mud walls in and about Shih-li-ho and on the southern side of the river of that name. In consequence the divisional commander decided to defer the attack on Shih-li-ho and direct his efforts against Nan-kuan-tzu (D 3, centre), a hamlet of some thirty houses lying about two hundred yards south of Yin-te-niu-lu.

Previous to this, at 10 a.m. the enemy in Nan-kuan-tzu received a reinforcement, and one battalion, the II./34th, was called up from the reserve to strengthen the left

About 12.30 p.m. some two or three battalions of the enemy's infantry made a determined counter-attack against that flank of the 3rd Division, coming forward from the western side of Nan-kuan-tzu. This attack was supported by the fire of artillery directed against the Japanese infantry lying in the open behind the slight shelter which they had thrown up during the advance. No sooner did the enemy appear than the four battalions of this wing (18th Regiment and II./34th) assisted by the 6th Division artillery, west of Shuang-tai-tzu, returned a withering fire and drove him back to the shelter of the village with heavy loss. A lull now ensued north of Shuang-tai-tzu, during which trenches were dug and ammunition was carried up for the next advance.

News was at this time received from the Fourth Army that a large force of the enemy was pressing southwards towards it. In consequence, at 3.20 p.m. General Oku, aware of the situation of the 3rd Division and anxious to push on in accordance with Marshal Oyama's orders, sent it a further reinforcement of one and a half battalions from the reserve, (Three companies from each of the I. and II./33rd Regiment, leaving two companies with Army Head-Quarters as guard.)

General Oshima now gave two and a half battalions to the left wing, (viz., the 33rd Regiment, less two companies with

* This left the II./6th, III. 33rd, and II. 34th Regiments in the divisional reserve, which was to follow the right wing.—A. H.

Army Head-Quarters) and directed the position before it to be charged and taken.

That wing, on receiving the reinforcement, again attacked with great determination, and after severe fighting drove the enemy—about one regiment of infantry—from Nan-kuan-tzu at half-past five and occupied the place.

During this struggle on the right, the 6th Division captured Yang-chia-wan (C/D 3), a large village on both banks of the Sha Ho, whence the flank movement which, on the 12th, drove the enemy from the line of that river, was launched.

About 4.15 p.m. General Oku sent the following order to the commander of the 3rd Division:—

“The 6th Division has occupied Yang-chia-wan and will continue to advance west of a line running from Erh-tai-tzu through Liu-tang-kou (D 2, south) to La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west) with the object of arriving on a front from La-mu-tun to Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east).

“You will co-operate with the 6th Division, expel the enemy before you, and endeavour to reach the line La-mu-tun-Sha-ho-pu (E 2, centre north.)”*

To carry out this order forthwith was not within the power of the 3rd Division, nor was the division to reach the indicated line for several days. The occupation of Nan-kuan-tzu, satisfactory though it was, still left intact the village of Yin-ten-niu-lu, which was held in considerable strength and blocked the passage of the river.

In front of it and on either flank were shelter trenches, and its high mud walls, overlooking the ground in front, were loopholed and held. No further aggressive steps were taken during daylight, but at 10 p.m. part of the left wing dashed across the open and almost gained the village, at the very moment that two or three battalions of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry advanced to make a counter-attack. Bayonet fighting ensued; but Major-General Kodama, commanding the left wing, deeming it fruitless to continue a hand-to-hand conflict in the dark, ordered his men so engaged to withdraw. This operation was successfully achieved and without disorder, for the numbers of the Japanese who took part in the attack were few, and a portion of the left wing deployed north of Nan-kuan-tzu helped to cover their retreat. After they had fallen back the enemy came forward to the works on the southern edge of the village and reoccupied the trenches to the south of it, remaining so close to the Japanese that the fire of rifles scarcely ceased throughout the night.

East of the railway the right wing had at last succeeded, and just before sunset occupied Hsiao Chien-kou (D 3, east).

* This order was meant to convey the idea that the recipient was free to proceed as far north as the limit mentioned, if possible.—A. H.

Such was the position of the 3rd Division, and the troops only awaited dawn to resume the attack.

6th Division.—The troops of the division were distributed as on the 10th, and at daybreak again engaged the enemy on the line Yin-te-niu-lu, Yang-chia-wan (C D 3) to San-chia-lin-tzu.

At 7 a.m. the left wing drove the Russians from the last of these villages and occupied it.

The right wing endeavoured to push the attack, but came under a heavy fire of guns and rifles directed on it from several villages and could not get beyond a line some 500 or 600 yards north of Erh-tai-tzu. At half-past twelve the enemy made his counter-attack from Nan-kuan tzu, and this wing co-operating with the left of the 3rd Division drove him back. An opportunity now seemed to offer for pursuit, but the forces at Yang-chia-wan and Yin-te-niu-lu opened a heavy fire to cover the retreat of their discomfited infantry, and no advance could be made. As soon as the commander of the division heard of the counter-attack, he sent the III./13th to assist the right wing, but before that battalion arrived the enemy had been driven off.

It was now half-past one and the attack was making little progress, for the enemy resisted stubbornly and gave no signs of yielding. In order, therefore, to force matters in the centre, General Oku gave the following order to Lieutenant-General Okubo:—

“I return to you the II. and III./48th. With as much expedition as possible you will expel the enemy from Yang-chia-wan, and to assist in this operation I am sending you the 13th Regiment of Artillery, now at Erh-tai-tzu.”

At half-past two General Okubo ordered the batteries of his division and those of the 13th Regiment (72 guns) to come into action against the enemy at Yang-chia-wan, but before the guns had opened fire, the left wing, by a bold advance, took the village. Thence the enemy retired on Lang-tzu-chieh (D 3), which place and its vicinity were held by a strong force posted in shelter trenches and behind banks and walls.

The I./13th was next sent to join the left, it being intended to push the attack against Lang-tzu-chieh, and the commander of the division, taking with him the reserve, went as far as San-chia-lin-tzu.

The left wing now resumed the attack; but the ground was open and swept by rifle fire, and the strong position held by the Russians defied attempts to reach it. Under these circumstances the commander of the division ordered his troops to halt for the night.

4th Division.—About one section of infantry made a night attack on the Russians in Ching-tui-tzu (C 3, north-east) and repulsing a squadron of cavalry occupied the village at 2 a.m.

Before daybreak the III./8th was sent to support the advanced section, and the whole of the right wing went forward,

the left following at 7 a.m. At this time the enemy was holding the line Ta Yu-chung-pu (C 3, north-east) to Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south), a locality where the ground was perfectly open and over which advance, except with heavy loss, would be difficult.

At 10.30 a.m. the commander of the division received the following order from the Army Commander:—

“You will repulse the enemy on the line Ta Yu-chung-pu to Yang-chia-wan, so as to assist the attack of the 6th Division.”

Half an hour passed, and this order was succeeded by another:—

“I am anxious to gain the line Kuan-lin-pu (D 1) to Sha-ho-pu (E 2, north). You must endeavour, therefore, to reach the line from Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) to Kuan-lin-pu, so as to threaten the enemy's right flank and line of retreat.”

At 4.30 p.m. the right wing, after repulsing about two battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry, and one battery, captured Ta Yu-chung-pu (C 3) and San-chia-tzu (C 3, north), and the left wing, having driven back a regiment of cavalry, occupied Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2).

General Oku now heard of the projected attack of the 6th Division from Yang-chia-wan (C/D 3), and directed the 4th Division to advance quickly so as to help the operation but the open nature of the ground, and the enemy in front and opposite the left flank made advance beyond Ta Yu-chung-pu and Li-ta-jen-tun impracticable for the troops of that division, and they halted for the night.

1st Cavalry Brigade.—The main body of the brigade had passed the night of the 10th at Shen-tan-pu (B 2, south), and about 2.30 p.m. on the 11th repulsed a small force of about two or three companies of infantry which came against it from Ku-chia-tzu (B 2, centre). This effected, a reconnaissance was made in the direction of the latter place and the following information obtained:—

At Huang-ti (B 2, south-east) there was a weak force of the enemy; at Chou-kuan-pu (A 2) on the left bank of the Hun Ho, were some two or three hundred men, and at the villages of Hsiao and Ta Han-tai-tzu (B 2) was a body of troops whose strength could not be ascertained.

Another party sent towards the north-west reported that about four hundred infantry and cavalry were at Chang-tan (A 2) on the right bank of the Hun Ho.

In view of the several forces at its front and flank no advance was made this day by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which remained on the line where it had passed the night of the 10th.

Reports from all directions showed that the Second Army was in contact with a strong hostile force, and at 6 p.m.

General Oku reported to Manchurian Army Head-Quarters in the following terms :—

“A force exceeding two divisions is in front of the Second Army. After Yang-chia-wan (C/D 3) was taken by us, each division continued its offensive movement, but up to the present time no precise report of the result has been received.

“The Army will continue its advance, and should the intended line not be reached before dark, operations will be continued during the night and at an early hour to-morrow.”

After collating reports received from divisions and from the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the information regarding the enemy at the disposal of the Commander of the Second Army, who had taken up quarters for the night in Ta Huang-ti (D 4, west), was as follows :—

Between the Mukden highway and the Sha Ho were two divisions of the 17th Army Corps and eight batteries of artillery. On the right bank of that river were troops of the 72nd Reserve Division and one regiment of the 35th Reserve Division with six squadrons of cavalry and two batteries of horse artillery. These troops were actually engaged on the 11th, but it was ascertained later that there were other troops in reserve.

At 9 p.m. Second Army Head-Quarters issued the following order :—

- “1. The 4th Division with its first line has occupied a front from Ta Yu-chung-pu (C 3, north-east) through San-chia-tzu to Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south).
- “2. The Army will continue its attack on the enemy to-morrow.
- “3. The 6th Division will leave its line from Nan-kuan-tzu (D 3, centre) to Yang-chia-wan at 6.30 a.m., and moving forward occupy the front from La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west) to Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east). If possible Lang-tzu-chieh (D 3, north-west) will be taken to-night.
- “4. The 3rd Division will leave its line from Hsiao Chien-kou (D 3, east) to Nan-kuan-tzu (D 3, centre) at 6.30 a.m., and co-operating with the 6th Division, advance to that extending from La-mu-tun to Sha-ho-pu (E 2, north). If possible Lung-wang-miao and Wu-li-chieh (D 3, north centre) will be seized to-night.
- “5. The 4th Division, in order to protect the flank and rear of the Army, will menace the enemy's right and advance to the line Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) to Kuan-lin-pu (D 1).*

* No hour was named in the order for the division to advance, nor do any special orders appear to have been issued to the 1st Cavalry Brigade.
—A. H.

- "6. The distribution of troops will be the same as to-day.
"7. The Army Commander will be at the north side of Ta Huang-ti (D 4) at 6.30 a.m."

During the day, in spite of the fact that the greater part of the Second Army had been thrown into the first line, the actual progress was but slight. Practically the whole of the 3rd Division had been engaged, and where the line of resistance was greatest, there the principal reinforcements had been sent. Thus, to the right four and a half battalions had been added by the Army Commander; to the centre—where only 68 casualties occurred—two battalions; while the left, which met with little difficulty in its advance, received none. In other words, assistance had been forthcoming to push the attack in inverse proportion to the tactical advantage which it lay in the power of each division to secure. Like the needle attracted by the magnet, the Japanese soldiers could not resist the force that drew them on, and, as at Shou-shan-pu, hurled themselves directly at the enemy before them and at the very spot where he was best prepared. The orders of 11 a.m. to the 4th Division encouraged the belief that, as suggested by the Chief of the Staff, Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, a turning movement was intended, but to this end no additional troops were granted—though it is possible they were not considered necessary—and the action of the 4th Division became that of a mere flank guard protecting another force engaged upon a frontal attack. The cavalry, too, might have left their mark upon the operations of the day, but one finds them dallying in quarters till 2 p.m., and then only reconnoitring to the front. That so little was done to weaken the Russian defence by a flank attack is the more astonishing when it is remembered that their right rested on no obstacle that could not be turned or enfiladed from the south; and, in spite of the favourable opportunity for a decisive stroke before the enemy had gathered in full strength, none was made, and the day's fighting almost reaches the level of a reconnaissance in force.

By 10.50 p.m. a despatch from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters describing the general situation of the First and Fourth Armies reached General Oku. It was as follows:—

"The enemy in the direction of Yu-shu-ti-hsia (H 5, north), in front of the right of the First Army, has increased in numbers and now amounts to at least three divisions and ten batteries of artillery. In consequence, the right of that Army is debarred from taking part in a forward movement.

"The enemy in front of the remainder of the First Army amounts to three divisions.

"Before the Fourth Army there are about three batteries of artillery posted in the vicinity of Shih-li-ho and Hsiao Fan-chia-tun (E 3.)

"The district between Hsiao Fan-chia-tun and San-kuai-shih Shan (E 3, S.E.) is clear of the enemy, and the 10th Division

of the Fourth Army is therefore assisting the First Army in its attack on San-tai-tzu (F 4). The enemy, however, has increased in numbers and progress is slow.

"The 5th Division of the Fourth Army still maintains its position on Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill and is engaging the enemy on the line from Shih-li-ho to Hsiao Fan-chia-tun."

At the same time as the despatch arrived the following order was received :—

"The Fourth Army after being reinforced by the general reserve will continue assisting the First Army in the attack on San-tai-tzu.

"The Second Army will conform to the orders already issued to it and endeavour to repulse the enemy in the direction of Sha-ho-pu (E 2)."

At 1.10 a.m. on the 12th October the following telegram **12th Oct.** was received from the same source :—

"The main object of your Army to-morrow (12th October) must be to repulse the enemy on the line Pan-chia-pu (E 2, s.w.) to Liu-tang-kou (on railway west of the last-named) so as to facilitate the movement of the Fourth Army to its right."

Judging from this telegram that it was important to close the Second Army towards the east, and thereby support the general movement in that direction, the Chief of the Staff of the Second Army sent officers of the General Staff to each division to explain the situation. During the night the troops of the Second Army, who were in the first line, endeavoured to force back the enemy, but despite the absence of artificial obstacles at his front, their attempts were foiled and time was gained for reinforcements to reach him from the rear.

As regards the other Armies, their operations were continued also after dark, and a successful attack gave them the ground north-west of San-tai-tzu as well as the hill of San-kuai-shih Shan. These localities were fully occupied by 10 a.m. on the 12th.

*6th Division.**—At 11 a.m. on that date General Oku, anxious to spur on his willing troops to emulate the gallant deeds of their comrades to the right, sent word to each division of the success gained by the Fourth and First Armies, and at the same time ordered an attack, regardless of loss, to be delivered. Thereupon the 6th Division, whose progress during the night had been considerable, advanced again.

It will be remembered that the left of that division consisted—irrespective of other arms—of the II. and III. 45th Regiment. The I./13th had been sent to reinforce that wing on the afternoon of the 11th, but had been held in reserve by the brigadier of the 11th Brigade, who commanded in that part of the field. Attempts made to advance from Yang-chia-wan

* The action of the division on the 12th October can also be followed on Map 42, but the references in the text are to Map 41.

(C/D 3) towards evening had met with no success, and it was decided to resume them under cover of night. After sunset, therefore, the two battalions of the 45th, anticipating General Oku's orders of 9 p.m., left the outskirts of the village, one in front, the other in second line, and marched up the left bank of the Shih-li Ho towards Erh-shih-chia-tzu (D 3) and Hsiao Tung-tai (D 3). Preceded by scouts and officers' patrols and favoured by the pitchy darkness that prevailed, they crossed in silence the ridge and furrow of the millet fields, and though twice heavily fired upon, reached before dawn a point some six hundred yards from the enemy's defences south and west of the villages. Here entrenchments were dug and completed just before daybreak, when the presence of the Russians to the front and the exact position of their first line could be detected by the clouds of tobacco smoke which rose from their works. To the left of these two battalions, the I./45th Regiment, from the brigade reserve—despatched about 9 p.m. up the right bank of the Sha Ho—had arrived unnoticed before dawn in the angle between the Shih-li Ho and Liu-tang-kou (D 2, south), and was so situated as to enfilade the Russian trenches on the left bank of the former river. Under cover of darkness, too, the 6th and 13th Artillery Regiments (72 guns) took position in echelon of regiments between Erh-tai-tzu (D 3, s.w.) and San-chia-lin-tzu (C/D 3), waiting only for daylight to open fire.

As soon as objects became clear the 45th Regiment hailed bullets on the trenches before Erh-shih-chia-tzu, and the artillery taking up the fire silenced the Russian guns at Hsiao Tung-tai by 10.15 a.m. By 11 a.m., thanks to the presence of the 4th Division at Ta Yu-chung-pu (C 3, N.E.), the I./13th, sent by a circuitous route, reached a point on the left flank of the I./45th and took the Russians in reverse.

While the position of affairs on the enemy's right was rapidly approaching a crisis, the other wing of the 6th Division (II. and III./13th Regiment), which was acting in co-operation with the left of the 3rd Division, had found its advance by no means easy. Its first objective had been Lang-tzu-chieh (D 3), changed later to Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3), every attempt to reach which place met with a storm of bullets. Between 10 and 11 a.m. the 23rd Regiment had been returned to the 6th Division from the general reserve, and the 3rd Battalion shortly after came up on the left of the II./13th. Both right and left wings, backed by the cannonade of nearly fourscore guns, were now concentrating their fire upon the trenches to their front, which formed an easy mark. As the minutes passed the Russian fire grew wilder and soon signs of disturbance could be seen. The moment waited for with so much patience had come at last, and the left wing, rising like one man, raced across the intervening space, losing little in the final rush. The Russians, who had suffered terribly from the enfilade fire of the I./45th, whose position on the flank allowed them to see right into the trenches, now broke and fled

north through Erh-shih-chia-tzu. The capture of that village made its neighbour, Hsiao Tung-tai, untenable, and the stormers pressing on took it at half-past twelve, as well as sixteen guns. So rapid was the Japanese advance on this occasion that the enemy failed to carry off his dead and wounded, and left, including officers, 400 on the ground.

On the right of the 6th Division the progress was less marked. By noon the three battalions on that side and the left wing of the 3rd Division had reached to within six hundred yards of Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3), where the enemy, who had been reinforced, was making a stout defence. But the fall of Hsiao Tung-tai decided the fate of Yin-te-niu-lu, and between half-past twelve and one o'clock the Japanese soldiers saw those signs which told them that the hour of victory had come. With ringing cries of "*Banzai*" they rushed forward, regardless of the heavy fire, and at 1 p.m. took the outlying trenches, and half an hour later cleared the village. At 1 p.m. Lieut.-General Okubo, who was at Yang-chia-wan (C/D 3), received the news that Lang-tzu-chieh had been taken, and forthwith ordered four battalions of the 4th Brigade, as well as two squadrons of the 6th Cavalry Regiment, a battery, and a company of engineers, to pursue. The 4th Brigade at this time had two battalions (the I. and II./23rd) at Erh-tai-tzu (D 3, s.w.) and two (the II. and III./48th) at Yang-chia-wan. These met at Lang-tzu-chieh (B 2), and with the other troops allotted took formation for pursuit. At 4 p.m., shortly before they had all assembled in order to carry out the movement, five or six Russian battalions advanced to make a counter-attack from Wu-li-chieh (D 3). At that time there were, north of Lang-tzu-chieh but close to it, six battalions of infantry (45th Regiment, I./13th, and II. and III./48th and eleven batteries of artillery (6th and 13th Regiments, less one battery 13th Regiment, assisting 3rd Division). For the first time during the campaign the men of General Oku's army were about to meet the Russians in the open plain, neither side protected by defensive works. The situation was exciting, and the Japanese, flushed by their late success, waited only for the expected order to charge. But the order was not given, and both gun and rifle remained ominously silent, till the enemy, coming on "as solid as a wall,"* arrived within 700 yards. Then the word was passed, and in a moment sixty-six guns belched forth and several thousand rifles poured a hail of bullets on the living mass. It hesitated, returned a desultory and harmless fire, and then, strewing the ground with killed and wounded, made off towards the east and north.

From the unexpected arrival of these battalions the commander of the division concluded that the enemy, despite his defeat, could not be treated lightly, and therefore added the

* So described to me by a Japanese officer who was present.—A. H.

III./23rd Regiment and seven batteries to the pursuing force.* That force then advanced, and when it had reached about one thousand yards north of Lang-tzu-chieh, four battalions came against it from the direction of Chen-chia-Liu-tang-kou (D 2/3). The same tactics as had just succeeded were repeated, and the Russians were allowed to come to a range of 500 yards, when, a sudden fire being opened, they speedily dispersed. In these attacks the enemy lost very heavily, particularly at Chen-chia-Liu-tang-kou, where the ground was littered with his dead.

The pursuing force had now reached as far to the front as was considered safe, and therefore halted for the night south of the river, covering itself with outposts on the northern side. Behind it the main body of the division assembled at Lang-tzu-chieh, and there, wearied with exertions that had helped so much to win the day, passed the night.

3rd Division.—Between 10 p.m. on the 11th and 3 a.m. next morning the troops of the right wing of the division (II. and III./6th and I. and III./34th Regiments) entrenched themselves three hundred yards north of Hsiao Chien-kou (D 3), carrying the works east and west of the Mukden road, and connecting them to the village by a zigzag approach. While so engaged the enemy's patrols discovered them, and his guns fired upon them from the northern side of Shih-li-ho (C D 3), but most of the shells flew overhead and casualties were few. At 3 a.m. seven batteries (3rd Artillery Regiment and one field battery of captured Russian guns) took position, one battalion on the slope of the hill behind Hsiao Chien-kou, the remainder directly behind the village† and on its south-west side. Halfway between Hsin-li-tun (D 4, north) and Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), immediately west of the railway, were four 10·5-cm. captured guns, and on the eastern side of Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3) stood four 15-cm. captured howitzers. For all these guns emplacements with deep trenches on the wings, as well as pits for ammunition wagons, had been prepared by night. In front of the right wing was the village of Shih-li-ho, behind which ran the river of that name, its winding course clearly marked by the trees upon its banks. This village is a large and well-built one, standing astride the river, but the southern portion alone was held by a shelter trench 150 yards from it, and on either flank were trenches stretching east and west. On the right bank of the Shih-li Ho, overlooking the stream and close to where the main road crosses it, is an ancient Chinese mud fort, which was used as a Russian gun position,

* It now consisted of two squadrons, five battalions of infantry, eight battalions of artillery, and one company of engineers.—A. H.

† This village is in two parts with a space of about 150 yards between them, and some of the guns fired through the space.—A. H.

one battery being there and another further west, so placed as to fire parallel to the railway and sweep the plain in front.

It is necessary now to turn for a moment to the left wing of the division (*i.e.*, 18th Regiment and 33rd Regiment, less two companies head-quarter guard) which had captured Nan-kuan-tzu (D 3) on the 11th. Its front line was entrenched north of the village, the remainder behind the cover afforded by the walls and houses, while the reserve of the division (I./6th and II./34th Regiments) and Divisional Head-Quarters were at Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3, south).

In these positions, and with an enemy so placed that if attacked at all he must be attacked in front, the wings of the division awaited dawn. During the night the reinforcements received at Yin-te-niu-lu (D 3) permitted the Russians to extend their line to the east, and before daybreak an assault on the Japanese left was driven back with heavy loss. As the increase of their forces was apparent, the II./6th regiment was withdrawn from the right wing at half-past seven and added to the divisional reserve, which was then ordered to advance behind the left wing and assist in the attack on Yin-te-niu-lu.

At daybreak the guns, posted as described, had opened fire, and directed their efforts against Shih-li-ho (D/E 3) and Wu-li-chieh (D 3), while, to help the cannonade on the latter place, a battery of the 13th Regiment (6th Division) came to the east of Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3, s.w.). As time wore on and the hour for the assault approached, the fire waxed hotter and the enemy—whose guns were mostly posted behind villages—still kept up his customary salvoes. By noon signs were observed that the shells of the Japanese artillery were taking effect, and at that hour news of the advance of the left of the 6th Division reached the right. Not long after Yin-te-niu-lu fell, and the left wing pressing on passed through that village, crossed the Shih-li Ho, and carrying everything before it, reached Lung-wang-miao (D 3, north) at half-past two. The pursuing troops continued their march thence from Huang-pu-shan to the river (E 2, south-west), and there the night was passed.

While these eventful movements were in progress on the left, the right wing waited until 2.50 p.m., when the III. 6th Regiment left its trenches, and, accompanied by the two battalions on its left, advanced by rushes. Covered by the fire of their artillery the Japanese made for the Russian trenches, but before they reached them the defenders fled. The III. 34th hastened to the river bank west of Shih-li-ho (D/E 3) and fording the stream, captured four guns on the further side, while the remainder of the right, hurrying through the village, came out on its northern edge. The enemy in this part of the field, whose retreat was greatly due to pressure further west, now scattered and fled, and though a strong position had been prepared at Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west), he failed to rally, and, with the exception of a small force which held a trench

upon the north side of the hill, passed out of sight to the east and north. The right wing followed up and halted for the night in Pan-chia-pu. Behind it came the main body of the division, which took quarters in Shih-li-ho and its vicinity.

4th Division.—The 4th Division advanced in two columns as under :—

Right Wing.	Left Wing.
1 section 4th Cavalry Regiment.	2 squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment.
8th Regiment.	I./48th Regiment of 6th Division.
I./31st Regiment.	
3 batteries of artillery.	
1 company of engineers.	

The right wing moved at an early hour along the road to Pei Yen-tai (D 2, south-west) and Hung-ling-pu (north of last-named), and the left at the same time advanced from Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2) towards Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre) and Kuan-lin-pu (D 1) the divisional reserve remaining at Kang-chia-tien-tzu (C 3, centre).

In front of the right wing the enemy held the village of Pei Yen-tai with a regiment of infantry and eight guns, and a force of unknown strength was reported to be in occupation of the line Ta-tai-Hsiao-tai (C 2, south-east). An attempt was first made to capture Pei Yen-tai, but the flank fire from Ta-tai and Hsiao-tai so delayed the operation that the III./8th (less the 12th company) was detached, and co-operating with the left wing, Hsiao-tai was taken at half-past eight. Scarcely was this village occupied than a Russian battalion was observed close to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (D 2, west), while approaching that village from the north was the vanguard of a greater force. Immediately guns near Wan-chia-yuan-tzu opened on the left wing then advancing on Ta-tai, taking it in flank. Thereupon the 4th Company, 37th Regiment, was sent to Hsiao-tai and three batteries followed from the reserve. At this time the cavalry of the 4th Division held Li-ta-jen-tun, where it protected the left flank of the advance. By noon the eight guns at Pei Yen-tai were silenced, but those which had come to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu had now increased to twenty-four and kept up a hot fire on Ta-tai, which was returned by the divisional artillery. In the direction of the latter village reinforcements were seen coming forward from the north as well as a battalion which arrived at Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre) from San-chia-tzu (C 3, north).

At 12.45 p.m. the commander of the division heard from General Oku of the successes won by the other Armies and was told that the Second Army must not be behindhand in fulfilling the task assigned to it for the day. Thereupon the III./37th was sent to the right wing to force the attack on Pei Yen-tai, the capture of which place would materially assist

the advance of the 6th Division. The enemy there as well as further to the right was receiving reinforcements, and at 1 p.m., a battery of artillery joined the eight guns already in action north-west of Pei Yen-tai. The three batteries of the right wing engaged these guns while the infantry gradually advanced against the village. Two more Russian batteries now arrived on the west of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, joining the twenty-four guns already there. Some infantry followed them, and it seemed as if the offensive was about to be assumed.

To the left the enemy had eight guns near Meng-yuan-pu (C 2, north), and about three hundred infantry held the village of Fu-chia-chuang (C 2) and threatened Li-ta-jen-tun, but were forced to retire by the cavalry at the latter place.

Reverting to the right wing the enemy in Pei Yen-tai showed no signs of giving way, and the artillery at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu harassed the left of the attack. The situation had now come to a crisis, and the troops, in spite of the flank fire poured upon them from Ta-tai, and the guns north of it, assaulted Pei Yen-tai and took it at 4 p.m. Eight guns were captured, and the enemy, driven back to the north under a heavy fire, suffered severely. When the right wing gained the village, the enemy went from Ta-tai, making as if to attack the left wing in Hsiao-tai, while two battalions appeared advancing between Wan-chia-yuan-tzu and San-chia-tzu in order to support the movement. By 5 p.m., the line Ta-tai to Hei-lin-tun (C 2) was held by four Russian battalions, while from the rear reinforcements could be seen hurrying up. The attitude of the enemy became more threatening every moment, and the position of the left wing opposed by several times its numbers grew precarious. Nevertheless the commander of that wing led his men forward till a space of no more than five hundred yards separated the hostile lines. At this juncture three batteries from Hsiao Yu-chuang-pu (C 3, north-east) opened on Ta-tai, and two batteries of the right wing—temporarily without a target—turned their fire in that direction. For nearly half an hour a heavy cannonade was maintained, while the fate of the left wing hung in the balance. But the firm attitude of the Japanese battalions (I./48th, three companies III./8th, and one company I./37th Regiment) supported by the well-directed fire of thirty guns not only restored the situation, but threw disorder into the enemy's ranks. Seizing the chance that offered, the left wing now made a rush, captured the position, and frustrated an attempt of the enemy to rally at Ta-tai. The Russians, leaving many dead, fled towards Hung-ling-pu (D 2) and Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, and found there other troops which had taken post behind the villages. Efforts were made to assemble them, but the panic-stricken soldiers would not be stayed, and passing on, carried with them portions of the reserve.

Both wings of the division now began to follow up, but reinforcements and the fire of guns from the north forced them

to halt, and the night was passed on the line Pei Yen-tai—Ta-tai to Tai-ping-chuang (west of Ta-tai).

1st Cavalry Brigade.—The main body of the cavalry did not move from the villages of Shen-tan-pu (B 2/3), and the four squadrons at Chi-tai-tzu,* on the right bank of the Hun Ho, after repulsing an attack, advanced in a northerly direction some three thousand-yards to the village of San-tai-tzu.

The head-quarters of the Second Army, which had been at Ta Huang-ti (D 4, west), from an early hour, moved at 2 p.m. to Men-hu-lu-tun (D 3/4), where it was intended to pass the night, and the reserve, which had been in the latter village until 3.20 p.m., marched to Shuang-tai-tzu (D 3).

At 5 p.m. the Second Army was making good progress in all directions, the line of the Shih-li Ho had been taken, and the enemy seemed to be in full retreat to the north.

At that hour, reports regarding the situation of the several divisions having come in, the following orders were issued:—

(1) To the Commander of the 3rd Division.

“With your main body occupy Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west), and with a portion hold the hill there and the line from Huang-pu-shan to Li-san-chia-tzu (D 2). Keep a careful look-out in the direction of Huang-hua-tien” (E 2, centre).

(2) To the Commander of the 6th Division.

“With your main body occupy the line Li-san-chia-tzu (D 2) to Hung-ling-pu (west of last named), and with a portion of your force continue to pursue the enemy. Be careful that your flank troops maintain communication with the 3rd and 4th Divisions.”†

(3) To the Commander of the 4th Division.

“The Army is going to occupy a line from the hill near Pan-chia-pu to Hung-ling-pu. You will send part of your force to pursue the enemy, and with the main body occupy the line from Hung-ling-pu to the west thereof. Keep a careful watch in the direction of Su-hu-pu” (C 1, north).

The troops with which the Second Army was engaged this day between the Mukden highway and the Sha Ho consisted of the entire 17th Army Corps and part of the 10th Army Corps. Beyond the right bank of the river were about half the Siberian Reserve Army Corps and a cavalry division, while along the whole front eighteen batteries had taken part. Of this force a large portion had been crippled, for 1,800 dead were counted and 28 guns captured.

* About 9 miles S.W. of Hei-kou-tai A 3.

† There was a gap between the Second and Fourth Armies this day, and it was therefore important for the former Army to keep its divisions in close touch with each other.—A. H.

At 6 p.m. the following telegram was received from the Chief of the Staff, Manchurian Armies:—

"To-day's action has been most successful, but darkness prevented its being carried on to a decisive conclusion. The enemy seems still to be bringing up reinforcements, and about one and a half divisions of infantry have taken up position at Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre). Be on your guard, therefore, and be prepared for further offensive action."

This news was conveyed to the divisions.

At 7.50 p.m. an order was received from Army Head-Quarters by General Oku. It was as follows:—

"1. The enemy before us appears to be falling back on Mukden. His force opposite the right of the First Army is as before. The left of that Army in conjunction with the Fourth Army has repulsed him, and is endeavouring to cut off the retreat of the force opposite the right wing.

At 2.20 p.m. troops at Huang-hua-tien (E 2) moved towards the south-east and part of the Fourth Army was sent against them.

"2. The intention of the Commander-in-Chief is to force the enemy north of the Sha Ho and seize the left bank of that river.

"3. The First Army will occupy the line Hsin-chia-pu to Pei-kou (F 2), and if conditions permit will secure Feng-chi-pu (G 2) and cut off the enemy's retreat.

"4. The Fourth Army will pursue and endeavour to reach the line Pu-tsao-kou (F 2) to Chang-ling-tzu (E 2 east), and a part of it in co-operation with the First Army will approach the neighbourhood of Huang-hua-tien (E 2).

"5. The Second Army will follow up the enemy and try to reach the line Sha-ho-pu (E 2 north) to Lin-sheng-pu (D 2 N.E.). It will send a strong detached force to Kuan-lin-pu (D 1) to watch the direction of Su-hu-pu (C 1). Should Sha-ho-pu be strongly defended by works, it will be undesirable to attack it and lose men, but assistance will be given to the Fourth Army in prolonging the line to be taken up by it.

"6. The general reserve of the Armies will assemble in the neighbourhood of Ku-shu-tzu (E 3 s.w.).

"7. The Army Commander will be at Yen-tai (D 4)."

At 11 p.m. General Oku issued the following order*:—

"1. As the result of to-day's fighting the enemy has retired in a northerly direction.

* These orders were not issued until the General Staff officers from the Head-Quarters of the Second Army attached to the divisions for the day had returned to Head Quarters and discussed the situation.—A. H.

"The 3rd and 6th Divisions have taken 25 guns.*

"Reinforcements for the enemy amounting to about one and a half divisions have reached Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) and are making defensive works there. One brigade of the 5th Division (Fourth Army) will come to our right wing and move in the direction of that place.

- "2. The Second Army will pursue the enemy to-morrow.
- "3. The 3rd Division will send a strong force at 6 a.m. to follow up the enemy along the Mukden road from Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west) towards Sha-ho-pu (E 2, north). The main body will assemble at the latter place.
- "4. The 6th Division will send at 6 a.m. a strong force to pursue the enemy towards La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west), and its main body will assemble at Liu-tang-kou (D 2/3).
- "5. The 4th Division, starting at an early hour, will, if possible, occupy Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) and help the attack of the 6th Division. Its main body will assemble in the neighbourhood of Chang-liang-pu (D 2, centre).
- "6. The 1st Cavalry Brigade will endeavour to assemble in the village of Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2) so as to protect the left flank of the army.
- "7. The general reserve will assemble at 6 a.m. at Shi-li-ho (D/E 3).
- "8. The distribution of the remainder of the troops will be as before.
- "9. The Army Commander will leave his quarters at 7 a.m., and will be found at Wu-li-chieh (D 3)."

The operations of the Second Army on the 12th, though distinctly successful, were disappointing, for the absence of cavalry and horse artillery—necessary to turn defeat into rout—robbed the victory of half its fruits. As on the previous day, the mounted troops on the left flank had admirably fulfilled their usual rôle of cavalry of position, but they in no way helped to win the day. The four battalions of the 4th Division with the general reserve again took no part in the action, yet their presence on the left would probably have led to the capture of Pei Yen-tai (D 2, south-west), and the villages to the west at an early hour, thereby gravely imperilling the Russian retreat from the Shi-li Ho and greatly facilitating the attack of the 6th and 3rd Divisions. Nevertheless, in spite of the incompleteness of the victory a heavy blow had been delivered by the Japanese, and General Kuropatkin's attempt to move south on Liao-yang may be said to have been rendered abortive by the fighting of this day.

* The number taken was 20, but 4 were reported twice, and a telephonic error caused 5 wagons to be counted as four guns.—A. H.

Marshal Oyama's next project was to wheel his Armies towards the north-east and try to cut off the troops facing the right flank of the First Army. With this view General Oku had given orders to his divisions to close towards their right, covering the Mukden road and railway line and occupying a front considerably narrower than the original space which they had held a few miles north of Liao-yang.

On the night of the 12th there was a violent thunderstorm **13th Oct.** accompanied by heavy rain, which made the movement of troops on the 13th—more especially of guns—very difficult.

At 10.10 a.m. a report came in from the commander of the 3rd Division to the effect that the troops at Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) appeared to number rather more than a division, and that under cover of several observation posts they were busily engaged in making a defensive position on the range of hills east of that place. As the ground which was in course of preparation for defence lay directly on the line of advance of the Fourth Army, General Oku decided to help its movement by sending the troops of the reserve to the 3rd Division with the view of their taking part and helping in the attack on Huang-hua-tien. Orders were accordingly issued at 11 a.m., but they were countermanded later, as events occurred which altered the aspect of affairs. A staff officer was, however, at once sent to the hill of Huang-pu Shan, whither Second Army Head-Quarters moved between one and two o'clock.

3rd Division.—During the night of the 12th–13th the advanced troops on the right of the 3rd Division had made an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the northern portion of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south), which the enemy still held, but in the early morning of the 13th it was found that it had been vacated under cover of darkness, the occupants having fallen back a short distance to the north.

A pursuing force consisting of—

2 squadrons 3rd Cavalry Regiment,

6th Regiment,

33rd „ (less 1 company each of I./II. Battalions),

3 batteries,

1 company of engineers,

was now sent along the Mukden highway, while the remainder of the division assembled at Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west). At the same time three batteries* which had been attached to the division on the 12th were recalled to the reserve of the army.

Driving back the enemy's outposts, the pursuing force reached Chuang-yu-tien (E 2, on Mukden road) about 9 a.m., and occupied it with two battalions of the 6th Regiment. Here they found themselves faced by superior forces of both infantry

* One battery 13th Regiment, one captured field battery, and four 15-cm. howitzers.—A. H.

and artillery, and, as an advance beyond seemed impracticable, the pursuit came to a standstill. The enemy's batteries, five in number, were posted as follows:—

- 1 battery at Wu-chia-wa-tzu (E 2, on Mukden road),
- 2 batteries at La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west),
- 2 „ „ Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east),

and the eighteen Japanese guns, which took position east of Chang-yu-tien, failed to make any impression on them, and suffered especially from the flank fire of the batteries at Chang-ling-tzu. In front of the hill east of Wu-chia-wa-tzu, was a strong body of infantry, and in prolongation of the right was the division at Huang-hua-tien. The commander of the 3rd Division had been ordered to attack the latter place in order to help the advance of the Fourth Army, but as the prospects of success appeared extremely doubtful considerable time was devoted to a careful reconnaissance of the position against which it was intended that the troops should be thrown.

6th Division.—In the meantime the 6th Division had sent forward in pursuit at 6 a.m., under Major-General Koidzume, a force consisting of—

- 2 squadrons 6th Cavalry Regiment.
- 23rd Regiment.
- II. and III./48th Regiment (I./48th was still with 4th Division).
- 3 batteries.
- 1 company of engineers.

The five batteries of the 13th Artillery Regiment, which had been with the division on the 12th, had been returned to the reserve of the Army, and the main body of the division was assembling at Lang-tzu-chieh (D 3, north-west).

General Koidzume's cavalry soon reported that the enemy's outposts were visible at Hung-ling-pu (D 2, on Sha Ho), on which a portion of the force was sent against that place and the rest to Ta-chu-kuei-pu (north-east of it). The weak force guarding Hung-ling-pu on the left bank of the Sha Ho was quickly brushed aside, the river crossed, and the village on the right bank entered. It chanced that there two battalions of the 55th Russian Reserve Division had taken quarters on the previous night and still lay fast asleep (at 8.20 a.m.) when the Japanese suddenly and without warning came upon them. Rudely awakened from their ill-timed slumbers, the astonished soldiers found the active enemy in their midst, and without a thought of self-defence fled under a heavy fire, leaving behind their blankets, kits, and rifles. At that moment the right wing of the 4th Division came up opportunely on the south-west side of Hung-ling-pu, and, joining in the attack upon the defenceless enemy, helped to drive him in complete disorder towards the north and north-west. This incident was at once reported to the divisional commander, who shortly left Lang-tzu-chieh for

Liu-tang-kou (D 2/3) taking with him the main body of the division. By 11 a.m. it was assembled at the south side of the latter village, while the pursuing troops at the same hour had arrived at Shu-lin-tzu (D 2, west centre), a part being thrown forward as far as Sha-ho-pu station. There a halt was called, for the enemy fired heavily with two batteries at La-mu-tun (E 2, west) and two more between that place and Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, east), while near the latter place was a large body of infantry. As Major-General Koidzume found that his further advance was blocked by considerably superior forces, he decided to remain for the night at Shu-lin-tzu (D 2, east).

It has been mentioned that General Oku's intention was that the 3rd Division, reinforced from the reserve, should attack the enemy at Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre), but of that division a portion was in close contact with hostile troops, and the ground, over which the remainder would necessarily have to pass in order to attack the village and the height in rear, was so open as to make concealment quite impossible. Moreover, the Fourth Army, whose presence at this time would have helped to draw the enemy's attention towards the south, was making slow progress and had only occupied the line from Tung-shan-kou (E/F 3) to Shuang-tai-tzu (E 3, north-east) at sunset on the 12th. Consequent on these conditions the commander of the Second Army decided to pass the main body of the 6th Division—which was not engaged—out of view of the enemy behind the 3rd, and send it to the right, while the 3rd would continue to devote its efforts to dealing with the enemy directly to its front. At 3 p.m., the 3rd Division was instructed as to the change of plan, and the main body of the 6th* from Liu-tang-kou (D 2, south)—to which was added eight batteries of artillery (13th Regiment, Russian field battery and three of the 15 cm. howitzers)—was directed to march south of the hill of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south-west) against the enemy at Huang-hua-tien. At this time the reserve of the Second Army was behind the extreme right flank at San-li-chuang (E 3, north).

At 4 p.m. the following order was received from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters:—

“The right wing of the First Army is very hard pressed by the enemy, and is in a dangerous condition. I have, therefore, given to that Army one division of the general reserve, so that the enemy before it may be driven back.

“The Second and Fourth Armies will endeavour, therefore, to keep as large a reserve as possible to meet emergencies.”

No alteration in General Oku's instructions of 3 p.m. was rendered necessary by this order, and the movement of the 3rd and 6th Divisions was permitted to proceed. The march of the

* Main body of 6th Division consisted of one squadron 6th Cavalry 11th Infantry Brigade, and three batteries.—A. H.

latter division from Liu-tang-kou, and of the reserve artillery from San-li-chuang to the hill of Huang-pu Shan took time, owing to the heavy state of the roads, and not until half-past five did the two portions begin to arrive. Before this the divisional commander had reached and climbed the hill, and there been placed in full possession of the situation by General Oku's Chief of the Staff.

About 6 p.m. the infantry had mostly cleared the east side of the hill, and were passing north-east over the ground which drops with a gentle slope towards Fang-chia-chung-tzu and Chiang-hu-tun (both E 2, centre south). To the western side of the former village a part of the guns was sent, and the three howitzers took position south of the river at Huang-pu-shan village and opened fire, to which the enemy replied with harmless vigour.

The sun by now had almost set, and the troops were still some distance from the enemy's position, so the order went forth to pass the night on the line Fang-chia-chung-tzu to Huang-pu-shan.

3rd Division (continued). — As soon as the order was received by the divisional commander directing him to deal with the enemy to his front instead of moving to the right, he sent his three remaining batteries to join the rest at Chang-yu-tien (E 2, on main road), and added the 34th Regiment to the right of the pursuing troops already there. By the time these reinforcements reached their destination the afternoon was far advanced, and though the guns opened fire for a short time, the light soon failed, and the pursuing troops passed the night on the line from Chang-yu-tien (E 2) to Chiang-hu-tun (E 2). A portion of the 34th Regiment, however, pushed boldly, indeed rashly, forward after dark as far as the village of Hou-tai (E 2, centre), where it found itself but a hundred yards from the Russian line. The audacity of the movement probably saved the troops from destruction by leading the enemy to suppose them in greater numbers than they actually were, and when darkness came they were withdrawn in safety some distance to the rear. This movement was carried out without the knowledge of the enemy, who still believed that Hou-tai was held, a circumstance which helped to bring about a brilliant incident on the following day.

4th Division.—At 6 a.m., the right wing, viz. :—

- 1 section 4th Cavalry Regiment,
- 8th Regiment (less 3 companies III./8th),
- I./31st Regiment,
- 3 batteries,
- 1 company of engineers,

left Pei Yen-tai (D 2, south-west) and moved towards Hung-ling-pu, south-west of which place they came upon the enemy's

outposts. Pressing them back, they gained the village at the same time as Major-General Koidzume's force of the 6th Division was entering it, and drove the occupants forth in great confusion.

The left wing, viz. :—

2 squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment,
I./48th Regiment of the 6th Division,
3 companies III./8th Regiment,
1 company I./37th Regiment,

which, with the exception of its cavalry quartered in Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2), had passed the night of the 12th at Ta-tai and Hsiao-tai (C 2, south-east), was delayed in its advance, as the enemy's artillery was still in position at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2). Moreover, in occupation of that place there appeared to be a strong force, of which one battalion was moving south towards Hsiao-tai. The troops, therefore, halted under cover of the villages and awaited events, and the divisional cavalry, which had been relieved between 6 and 7 a.m. by an advanced party from the cavalry brigade, proceeded to Tai-ping-chuang (C 2). At 9 a.m. the hostile infantry moving south had ventured to within six hundred yards of the Japanese entrenchments, from which the two battalions of the left wing opened fire, and drove them back with heavy loss.

Prior to this, General Tsukamoto, hearing that the Russians were coming on in strength against the outer flank, despatched three batteries from the main body of the division to its assistance. By the time that they arrived, however, the enemy had been overcome, and was in full flight towards the north.

The right wing after its success at Hung-ling-pu continued to advance, but found itself opposed by three batteries of artillery in position near Ta-lien-tun (D 1). The infantry had now (10.30 a.m.) deployed, and moving forward under fire came to Chi-hsiang-tun and Chang-liang-pu (D 2, centre), and at 11 a.m. the three batteries of the wing were in action on the northern side of Hung-ling-pu (D 2).

At 1 p.m. the Army Commander sent the following order to the 4th Division :—

“It is intended that the main body of the 3rd and 6th Divisions shall attack the enemy in combination with one another on the line Hung-ling-pu to Wu-chai-wa-tzu (E 2, on main road). The 4th Division, therefore, co-operating with the troops of the 6th Division (Major-General Koidzume's force) will press the enemy so as to assist the attack.”

At 2 p.m., shortly after this order was received, the condition of affairs in front of the division was as follows :—

The enemy was holding the line from Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) through Ta-lien tun (D 1) and Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu to Shao-chia-lin-tzu (D 1, west). The force holding these

villages was estimated at seven battalions of infantry, and it was evident that the number of batteries was on the increase. There were at Ta-lien-tun 24 guns, at Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu (D 2, north) 8, and on the north side of Shao-chia-lin-tzu 16 more.

The 4th Division was at the same hour placed as follows:—

The right wing held the ground from a point north-east of Chi-hsiang-tun (D 2, centre) through San-chia-tzu to Chang-liang-pu. The two squadrons of the left wing were at Pao-tzu-yen (D 2, west), and the I/48th Regiment (the other battalion of this wing had rejoined the divisional reserve) was some distance to the rear in occupation of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2), exposed to the fire of the battery at Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu (D 1/2).

By this time the three batteries of the reserve, which had been sent to help the left, had returned to Hung-ling-pu (D 2) whence the whole of the divisional artillery opened fire on Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east). On that village, with the object of carrying out the orders of the Army Commander, several attacks were made. These did not succeed, for the ground to the south of it for about two hundred yards was devoid of any kind of cover, while the left flank of the assailants was in full view of Ta-lien-tun (D 1, south), from which place a heavy fire was poured. Moreover, as night was approaching and the enemy receiving reinforcements, it was deemed futile to continue the struggle, and orders were given to desist.

During these attacks the divisional cavalry had pushed on to Wu-chung-ying (D 2, north-west), but no sooner had they reached that village than they were forced by hostile infantry to retire to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2), where they and the I/48th halted for the night.

1st Cavalry Brigade.—The main body of the brigade moved from Shen-tan pu (B 2/3), at 4 a.m. and reached Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south), at 7.30 a.m. As already mentioned, an advanced party had preceded it and replaced the two squadrons of the 4th Cavalry Regiment in that village.

By 2 p.m. the main body of the brigade succeeded in covering a further distance of about two miles and came to Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre). An hour later some five or six hundred hostile cavalry appeared moving south from San-chia-tzu (C 2, north-east), but without waiting to deal with them at close quarters the horse artillery was ordered to fire, on which the advance was checked and troops went north.

This day the cavalry detachment on the right bank of the Hun Ho recrossed the river and came to Shen-tan-pu (B 2/3). The front of the mounted troops was practically the same as on the previous day, and the country in their vicinity generally clear of the enemy.

The general line of the Second Army at night was from Chiang-hu-tun (E 2, centre), through Shu-lin-tzu (D 2) to Chang-liang-pu (D 2), with head-quarters at Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south-west), while the front of the enemy ran from Wu-chia-wa-tzu (E 2, north centre) through La-mu-tun to Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east).

Up to the 13th the Russians had been gradually pushed back towards the north, but on that day the limit of advance of the Second Army had been almost reached, for the enemy now held a strong position previously prepared for defence in case of defeat.

The attacks against the right wing of the First Army had somewhat slackened giving the impression that a portion of the troops before it had been withdrawn, and in consequence that Army was about to take a more active share in the general offensive movement towards the north.

The right wing of the Fourth Army (*i.e.*, the 10th Division) was at Tung-shan-kou (E/F 3) and on the hill above it, while the left was at Shuang-tai-tzu (E 3, north-east), and it was intended that on the morrow all these troops should help the First Army in its attack against the Russian right. At 10 p.m. the following brief order was received from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters:—

“Continue attacking according to previous orders.”

At midnight General Oku issued the following orders:—

“1. To-morrow the Army will again attack the enemy.

“2. Each division will therefore continue the attack as already ordered.

“3. Major-General Koidzume's brigade of the 6th Division in conjunction with the 3rd Division will attack La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west) and endeavour to secure the line of the Sha Ho.

“4. I shall be on the hill of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south) from 6.30 a.m.”

The progress made by the Second Army this day was moderate, but this was as much as could be expected, for conditions had altered and the force opposing it had much increased in numbers. Up to the 13th the Russians had persisted in their endeavours to force back the right of the First Army, but the troops on that flank had more than held their own, and it was no doubt considered useless longer to continue the movement. The Second Army had meantime kept steadily advancing and was now several miles north of the Japanese right, and, should the Russians be driven by it from the railway line and lose the bridges over the Hun Ho at their rear, little less than disaster would result. For this reason reinforcements had been hurried forward from Mukden, and the Second Army thus found its advance continually opposed by growing numbers, making movement further north impracticable.

14th Oct. At 6.30 a.m. Army Head-Quarters* took up their position on the hill of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south); a quarter of an hour earlier a report was received from General Nodzu that he purposed to advance with the main body of the Fourth Army on Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east) from Pu-tsao-kou (F 2).

At 8.15 a.m. the following order was sent to the commander of the 3rd Division:—

“After your pursuing troops have pushed back the enemy, keep a firm hold of the line Sha-ho-pu to La-mu-tun (both E 2, north), and retain as many men as possible in reserve.”

3rd Division.—This division had begun operations before daylight, and at sunrise was close to the enemy and on the point of resuming the attack. Its two wings were composed as on the 13th, viz:—

Right Wing.

Left Wing.

33th Regiment.

2 squadrons 3rd Cavalry Regiment
(pursuing troops).

6th Regiment.

33rd Regiment (less 1 company,
each of I. and II. Battalions).

6 batteries.

1 company of engineers.

The right wing was directed to make for the hill east of Wu-chia-wa-tzu (E 2, north centre), and the left for the village of that name which is situated on the Mukden highway, but, before their movement began and while it was still dark, two companies of Russian infantry—probably supposing that Hou-tai (E 2, centre) was still held—advanced south to attack that place. The 34th Regiment, as before mentioned, had, however, been withdrawn thence on the night of the 13th, and when the Russians opened fire they met with no reply. Thereupon they fell back, but the right wing and part of the left wing, which were in readiness to move, followed them and took up unnoticed a line running from the north of Hou-tai towards the west. Here they lay in silence till day broke, and, immediately it was light enough, poured volley after volley into the enemy's bivouac near Wu-chia-wa-tzu, causing such confusion that they were able to rush into the position almost unopposed.

Part of the right wing now pressed on to Ku-chia-tzu (north of Hou-tai), while the left, co-operating with the remainder of the right, occupied Wu-chia-wa-tzu, on the eastern side of which village 24 guns and as many ammunition wagons were captured.† The pursuit was thence continued, and part of the left wing entered Sha-ho-pu at 7 a.m., the enemy retreating

* 4th Regiment of Foot Artillery (four battalions) was attached to Second Army to-day.—A. H.

† 24 guns were taken, but one which was damaged was not removed by the captors.—A. H.

without offering resistance. That village, however, was practically within the Russian line of defence, its south-east edge being held while the ground south-east of La-mu-tun (E 2, west) was also occupied.

Reinforcements from the north now came up and manned that part of Sha-ho-pu which lies north of the Sha Ho, whence they covered a counter-attack against Wu-chia-wa-tzu made by troops on the eastern side of La-mu-tun. Two companies (I./6th Regiment) which had been held in reserve, were now called up to support the left wing posted on the western side of Wu-chia-wa-tzu, and endeavours were made to hold back the enemy, who at this time threatened to surround the division. The II./18th Regiment, which had been sent from the divisional reserve to Huang-hua-tien (south-east of Hou-tai) to help the expected attack of the Fourth Army, was hastily recalled and sent to the east of Ku-chia-tzu (E 2, centre) to check the enemy, who appeared about to advance west of that village.

The troops in the village of Sha-ho-pu had meanwhile been reinforced by part of the right wing, and were able to maintain themselves there and hold in check the enemy across the river, while the remainder of the left wing attacked the occupants of La-mu-tun, in which operation they received the support of the divisional artillery at Wu-chia-wa-tzu (E 2, north centre). It was now half-past eleven and three companies of Russian infantry appeared on the west side of Wu-chia-wa-tzu, and opened fire on the rear and left of the Japanese in Sha-ho-pu. Two companies III./18th Regiment were therefore sent to the right wing, and the attempts to imperil the holders of Sha-ho-pu were frustrated. Nevertheless, the position of the troops there was precarious, and though they were able to hold their own and beat off every attack, the enemy to the north and east was receiving reinforcements, while the 3rd Division had none left wherewith to support its heavily engaged front line. From 5 p.m. the enemy on the hill east of Ku-chia-tzu and in La-mu-tun increased in strength, but his attempts to dislodge the 3rd Division were unavailing, and both sides, after a hard day's fighting, passed the night in close proximity to each other.

6th Division.—The main body of the division, whose attack on Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) had been postponed on the 13th, taking advantage of the thick fog that prevailed till 8 a.m., pushed forward its right (*i.e.*, I. and II./45th Regiment) to the hill north of Tuan-shan-ssu (F 2, south-west), its left (*i.e.*, the 13th Regiment) to the hill south of Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east), and assembled its eleven batteries at Ning-kuan-tun (E 3, north). The guns could not at first open fire, as objects at a distance were invisible, but as the fog lifted, the enemy's artillery in the neighbourhood of Chang-ling-tzu shelled the approaching infantry, and the Japanese guns replied. The advance was continued with little loss, and at 11 a.m., the enemy was driven from the hill east of Chang-ling-tzu, a large flag with the rising

sun in the centre proclaiming to General Oku on Hung-pu Shan (E 2, south) into whose hands it had fallen. A few of the Japanese batteries, keeping in the wake of the infantry, came into action on the captured hill and threw great disorder into the ranks of the retreating Russians, who made off towards the north, leaving a force to hold San-tao-kang-tzu (E 2, north-east). By noon the reserve of the main body of the division had come up, making the position secure, upon which a battalion of the 13th Artillery Regiment and the 15-cm. howitzers were returned to the reserve of the Second Army.

At 12.30 p.m. General Oku sent the following order to the commander of the 6th Division :—

“ The district east of Chang-ling-tzu, having been allotted to the Fourth Army, you must quickly withdraw your troops to the west of it, and keep as large a body as possible in reserve.”

As the enemy had by this time fallen back some distance and showed no signs of attempting to recover the position from which he had been expelled, the commander of the troops in the first line occupied the hill south of Chang-ling-tzu and placed observation posts on the other heights in the vicinity, recalling the remainder of the troops to the reserve, which was assembling in Chien Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre south). In these positions the arrival of the Fourth Army—which did not, however, come up this day—was awaited.

At 3 p.m. a battalion of Russian infantry appeared moving south from San-tao-kang-tzu (E 2, north-east), and the III./45th Regiment was sent to Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) to meet it; but the enemy had evidently suffered severely, for, although he made several minor attempts to press forward again before nightfall, no serious attack was undertaken against the Japanese, who as a precautionary measure added the I./45th Regiment to the force at Huang-hua-tien.

The ground further to the east was held by the 13th Regiment, which occupied the hill south of Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east) and that north of Tuan-shan-ssu, while the remainder of the troops assembled for the night in Chien Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre south).

6th Division (Major-General Koidzume's Force).—Of this force, which, as already stated, consisted of—

2 squadrons 6th Cavalry Regiment,
23rd Regiment,
II. and III./48th Regiment,
3 batteries,
1 company of engineers—

the 11th Company 48th Regiment had been sent on the 13th to Sha-ho-pu station (D 2, east), while the remainder assembled at Shu-lin-tzu (south-west of station), on the south-east of which place the three batteries were posted ready to open fire at dawn.

During the night the usual reconnaissance had furnished the following information regarding the enemy and the nature of the ground in his vicinity:—

- (a) Defensive works existed on the south side of Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east), which were held by at least one battalion of infantry.
- (b) Encampments were observed on the ground north of La-mu-tun (E 2, west).
- (c) The Sha Ho could be forded everywhere by infantry, and by following the bed of the river Lin-sheng-pu could be approached unseen.
- (d) The district between Shu-lin-tzu and La-ma-tun was perfectly open.

It had been expected that the 4th Division would be in a position to attack Lin-sheng-pu at an early hour on the 14th, but that division was engaged with the enemy on its left, and was not free to turn its attention in any other direction. As, however, an advance on La-mu-tun by General Koidzume's troops would expose their flank to fire from Lin-sheng-pu, it was clear that both these places must be attacked simultaneously. As a preliminary step, and in order to give time for the 4th Division to come up and co-operate with the left, the II. and III./48th Regiment (7 companies) were sent as right wing to join the company at Sha-ho-pu station.* Arrived at that point, they would be in a position to confront the enemy in La-mu-tun and draw his attention from the 3rd Division, then attacking to the east of that place. At the same time preparations were made to attack Lin-sheng-pu from the right bank of the Sha Ho, a task which was entrusted to the left wing (II. and III./23rd Regiment), the remainder of the force (2 squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment, I./23rd Regiment, and 1 company engineers) being kept as a reserve.

The left wing at once deployed north of North Shu-lin-tzu (D 2, east), and lay there under the fire of the enemy, who was holding trenches south of Lin-sheng-pu. At 10.30 a.m. part of the 4th Division arrived from Chi-hsiang-tun (D 2, centre) and a combined movement was made against the common objective. In spite of a severe fire of artillery from Ta-lien-tun and Ssu-fang tai (both D 1), the advance was continued, and by noon the troops had reached some six hundred yards south of the village. Here such cover as could be thrown up in the open was made and a heavy fire of musketry poured upon the place.

At 1 p.m. the enemy in Lin-sheng-pu received reinforcements, amounting to nearly a regiment of infantry, and the

* Sha-ho-pu station consists of the station buildings and several sheds and houses built of stone—some dozen in all—all on the east side of the railway line. The buildings, which for several days were a constant mark for the Russian guns, served to cover the troops who assembled there prior to the attack on La-mu-tun.—A. H.

artillery at Ta-lien-tun and Ssu-fang-tai kept back an attempt of the Japanese to get closer.

While General Koidzume's left was so engaged, the right, under a heavy fire of guns and rifles, was gradually filtering across the open to the cover afforded by the buildings at Sha-ho-pu station, whence later, by twos and threes, a part ran forward some three hundred yards towards La-mu-tun.

Two companies of the reserve (2nd and 3rd/23rd Regiment) had been sent to the left, but before they joined it the reserve of that wing (5th and 8th/23rd Regiment), moving up the river bed and along the left bank, suddenly appeared four hundred yards from the enemy's left, south of Lin-sheng-pu, and opened volleys on him. The remainder of the Japanese left wing, seeing their opportunity, rushed forward, and in co-operation with the companies on the flank drove the Russians from their trenches. It was now about 1.50 p.m., at which hour the II. and III./48th Regiment had occupied the northern buildings at Sha-ho-pu station. At half-past two the left tried to get closer—for though the trenches had been taken, the village of Lin-sheng-pu was still in hostile hands—but the enemy held firmly to the ground, maintaining himself on the southern border and even attempting a counter-attack. The fire which had been kept up by the Japanese for several hours had now reduced the ammunition to only a few rounds per man, and, but for the timely arrival of a fresh supply—carried to the firing line from North Shu-lin-tzu by the reserve company left there (the 3rd Company 23rd Regiment)*—the troops would soon have been devoid of any means of defence beyond their bayonets. A storm of thunder and lightning with heavy rain now began, during which the Japanese pushed forward, and at 3.20 p.m. took the south and east edges of the village, hoisting their national flag to indicate their presence there. From that time onwards the enemy's hold of the village weakened, and by 4 p.m. his expulsion was complete. When the southern edge was seized, part of the left wing tried to press on to the northern border, but in the houses were many Russian soldiers who could not be expelled except by individual combat. The remainder of the wing, advancing from the south-west corner, ran direct to the northern edge and assisted in the clearing of the houses and in driving the enemy to the east and north, who in his retreat was covered by the guns (three or four batteries) at Ssu-fang-tai.

By 4 p.m. the right wing was all assembled behind the buildings at Sha-ho-pu station, and, as the enemy at La-mu-tun had increased and evening was at hand, it was decided to halt there for the night.

* The ammunition was carried forward by the men, who were extended to 15 paces. Each man had two bundles of 180 rounds slung over a shoulder. Thus the supply was taken to the firing line, distant only a few hundred yards from the enemy, with comparatively small loss.—A. H.

Turning once more to the left, the enemy was no sooner driven out of Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) than, with the help of the troops of the 4th Division, defences were made, a work which was interfered with by reason of the fire from six batteries at Ta-lien-tun and Ssu-fang-tai. At 11 p.m. three battalions of Russian infantry made a counter-attack and nearly surrounded Lin-sheng-pu; but the Japanese, waiting until they came quite near, suddenly opened fire, and after forty minutes drove them off. The foremost troops, who had come within twenty yards of the village, left over one hundred dead, and the punishment received in this attack prevented any similar attempts from being made during the remainder of the night.

4th Division.—This division was ordered to attack the village of Lin-sheng-pu with its right, and with its left hold Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2) so as to secure the left of the Second Army. With this object in view the I. and II./37th Regiment and the 1st and 8th Companies, 8th Regiment, forming part of the right wing, went to San-chia-tzu (D. 2, north centre) before daylight and began to make defensive works on the north side of that village, while the remainder of the right (I./8th Regiment less one company, and II./8th Regiment less one company) was sent to occupy Chang-liang-pu (D 2, north centre). This latter body was intended to protect the flank of the advance on Lin-sheng-pu, and was directed eventually to go as far north as Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu (D 1/2). While these movements were in progress the whole of the divisional artillery took position on the line San-chia-tzu to Chang-liang-pu, ready, from well-concealed epaulments, to open fire at daybreak. The reserve of the division was assembled in Hung-ling-pu (D 2, centre south), and the left wing held defences at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, with its cavalry reconnoitring in front. At 7 a.m. the sound of heavy guns and rifle fire could be heard at Divisional Headquarters from several directions, and at that hour the position of the enemy, so far as known, was as follows:—

His first line extended from Lin-sheng-pu through Ta-lien-tun and Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu to the west, and his guns, whose number could not be exactly ascertained, but which had increased during the night, were posted between Ta-lien-tun and Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu.

At 8 a.m. three Russian battalions appeared to the north of Shao-chia-lin-tzu (D 1, west), and gradually moved in a southerly direction; but the Japanese gunners, perceiving their advance, opened fire and forced them to retire. The opportunity which this gave was seized by the troops facing Lin-sheng-pu, who advanced some distance towards that village.

Opposite the left wing of the division was a battery placed on the west of Shao-chia-lin-tzu, which began firing at 8 a.m., and at Lai-shen-pu (C 1) were two battalions of infantry. Of the latter, one advanced towards San-chia-tzu (C 2, north-east)

and the other to Ta Wu-ching-ying (D 2, west), while in rear of them a force of unknown strength followed in close formation. The right wing troops were now about eight hundred yards from Lin-sheng-pu, but were held back by the fire from Ta-lien-tun on their flank, and from that place there were indications that a counter-attack was about to be launched. Consequently the attack of this wing was temporarily brought to a standstill.

At 11 a.m., covered by artillery fire, two Russian battalions advanced from the direction of Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu,* and half an hour later arrived some seven hundred yards from Chang-liang-pu. There they were met by a heavy fire from guns and rifles, and compelled to retire in great haste and in great disorder. As soon as this movement came to the knowledge of the divisional commander he sent the 5th and 6th Companies of the 37th Regiment to Chang-liang-pu (D 2), but when they reached that place the enemy had been dispersed. The Russian troops opposite the left wing this day did not display the same recklessness in advance as was noticeable in the operations against the right, for as they came forward they made trenches, but got no further by 11 a.m. than the line from Pao-tzu-yen (D 2, west) to San-chia-tzu (west of last named).

Previous to this, at 9.20 a.m. Major-General Akiyama, commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade, observing that the enemy was threatening the 4th Division's left, had sent to its assistance two squadrons of cavalry, a company of infantry, and two horse artillery guns. Thus when the attack was made the left wing stood as follows:—Infantry on the northern side of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2), two horse artillery guns south-east of that place, and two squadrons of cavalry in support at Ta-tai (C 2, south-east).

At 12.40 p.m. the enemy resumed his advance against the left,† his front line consisting of four battalions with two more in reserve, the latter closely followed by a battery. At 2.30 p.m. the front line arrived some six hundred yards from the left wing, which had meantime (at 1.30 p.m.) received the 7th and 8th Companies 37th Regiment from the divisional reserve and placed them on its left, and the battery took position south-west of Ta-lien-tun (D. 1, south) and opened fire.

* Before moving off the battalions were formed up south of Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu and deliberately inspected by company and battalion commanders in full view of the Japanese. The mounted officers then dismounted, and the advance, which was made in quick time and without any attempt at extension, was carried out as regularly as on a peace parade. After some 200 or 300 yards had been passed over single rank was formed and the movement was continued to a point 700 yards from Chang-liang-pu without a shot being fired. The whole operation was watched with breathless interest and amazement by the Japanese soldiers who without difficulty drove back with heavy loss the exponents of such bygone tactics.—A. H.

† This movement was not carried out like the previous ones, but a portion of the Russian line advanced covered by the fire of the remainder.—A. H.

Shortly before 3 p.m., when the enemy had approached even nearer, the Japanese left deployed its whole strength and opened fire. The Russians were then making shelter trenches, and offered a good target to the fire which was poured upon them. As the men fell thickly disorder grew, and at last they broke and fled to the rear in such haste that the battery was left behind, and barely escaped with the loss of all its wagons.* The rout of the enemy on this part of the field allowed the right wing to advance on Lin-sheng-pu, which was occupied at 4 p.m. by the troops of the 4th and 6th Divisions.

The fact of so strong a force facing the 4th Division this day had been reported to the Army Commander, who sent to it the III./9th Regiment from the Army reserve. For the Russians reinforcements had arrived, the intact railway close behind their line greatly facilitating their quick movement, and opposite the left there still were eight battalions of infantry and two batteries. This force showed greater caution in its movements than its predecessors, and, when its first line came to about one thousand yards from the Japanese, trenches were dug. Observing this deliberate action, which seemed to promise greater resolution in the expected assault, the commander of the division strengthened the left by sending to it the III./8th (less the 12th Company). But no fresh attack was to come before dark, and at 7 p.m., without firing, the Russians fell back towards the north pursued by part of the left wing, which occupied Pao-tzu-yen (D 2). As the enemy opposite that wing had now all gone, the reinforcements received from the cavalry brigade were returned at half-past seven.

On this date the troops opposite the 4th Division consisted of eighteen battalions of infantry and fifty-four guns, a force more than double that brought against it by the Japanese. In spite of this inequality† of numbers, the defence of the left supported by the cavalry brigade enabled the right in conjunction with the 6th Division to attain its object, and at night the 4th Division held the line from Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2) while a part occupied Pao-tzu-yen (D 2, west).

1st Cavalry Brigade.—The cavalry brigade, which had passed the night of the 13th at Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre), sent one detachment to help the 4th Division, another to make the occupation of Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south) secure, and a third to reconnoitre up the banks of the Hun Ho.

At 10 a.m. a battalion of Russian infantry came from San-chia-tzu (C 2, north-east), but after being shelled fell back. At noon four or five squadrons of cavalry, a regiment of infantry

* Two guns were left behind, but the Japanese were unable to take possession of them and they were removed at night. Five ammunition wagons were, however, secured.—A. H.

† As the Japanese held an entrenched position on the left, the disparity of two to one in numbers is inconsiderable and almost disappears when the suicidal method of the Russian attack is remembered.—A. H.

and a battery appeared from the north at San-chia-tzu, and part of the infantry advanced towards Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2). The four guns of the cavalry brigade now opened fire on the flank of the advancing troops, who showed little determination in their hostile errand and were speedily checked.

At 1 p.m. the enemy at San-chia-tzu was joined by another battery, and as soon as it came into action two battalions, appearing from both sides of the village, advanced towards Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre). A third battery now came up to San-chia-tzu and with the others engaged the four guns of the cavalry brigade south-east of Hei-lin-tun. The latter, unable to oppose a force so numerically superior, did not reply, but being well concealed, shelled the advancing infantry and held them in check till sunset, when they retired north-east. At 6 p.m. a force of cavalry and infantry of unknown strength coming from the north-west entered the village of Fu-chia-chuang (C 2) and, repulsing the Japanese detachment there, pressed on to Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south). The same fate met the defenders of that place, who fell back to Tai-ping-chuang (C 2, south), firing on the enemy as he advanced. At this time the reinforcements which had been sent to the 4th Division in the morning were on their way back to Li-ta-jen-tun, and when Tai-ping-chuang was reached they were told that the enemy had occupied their quarters in the former village. To proceed against him at this hour (it was then after half-past seven) was decided to be useless, and a halt for the night was therefore made in Tai-ping-chuang, it being intended to attack the invaders on the following morning.

The Head-Quarters of the Second Army passed the night at Pan-chia-pu (E 2, south west), and there received the following order from Manchurian Army Head-Quarters:—

“1. The First, Second, and Fourth Armies have succeeded in repulsing the enemy at their front.

“The force which advanced against the First Army from Fu-shun* has been driven back by the 12th Division and by Major-General Umezawa's Brigade, and is retiring on that place and Mukden.

“2. Army Head-Quarters will issue instructions regarding the next operation against the enemy as soon as all troops who have been engaged in the recent fighting have reassembled.”

At 10 p.m. General Oku issued this order:—

“1. The enemy along our front seems to be retiring, but a part of his forces is still in position before the 3rd Division and Koidzume's Brigade.

“2. The Army will continue the attack to-morrow.

“3. The 3rd Division will endeavour to secure the line Sha-ho-pu to La-mu-tun (both E 2, north).

* About 25 miles north-east of Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2).

- "4. The 6th Division will assist the 3rd Division with as many troops as can be spared, but the main body must remain at its present position and make it secure.
- "5. Koidzume's Brigade will try to occupy the line from La-mu-tun to Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east).
- "6. The 4th Division will endeavour to maintain its present position and will assist the attack of Koidzume's Brigade.
- "7. The reserve of the Army will assemble by 5 a.m. at Chang-yu-tien (E 2, centre).
- "8. I shall be on the hill of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south-west) at 6.30 a.m."

The progress made by the Second Army this day, though not entirely fulfilling expectations, was, especially on the right and left, most satisfactory. The 4th Division, greatly helped by the covered approach up the bed of the Sha Ho, had completed its task and taken Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east), and the 3rd Division, after gaining a brilliant success in the early morning, had maintained itself and blocked the main road south throughout the day in face of heavy opposition. The Russians everywhere had suffered many casualties and shown, as on the previous day, that their attack delivered in the open was far from difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, the frequent assaults made this day by them upon the Japanese line of battle, more especially on the right and left, debarred the centre from engaging in any serious enterprise against La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west). That place, covering a cart road over the Sha Ho must, however, eventually be taken in order to carry out Marshal Oyama's intention—not yet expressed—of holding a strong defensive line south of Mukden and the Hun Ho. The growing strength of the Russians, exceeding anticipation, made further advance impossible, but the line of the Sha Ho offered as advantageous a position for defence as any between it and Liao-yang, and behind it, strongly entrenched, the army could complete the necessary preparations for advance while beating off, if need be, attempts of the Russians to come south.

6th Division.—At 6 a.m. on the 15th October the II./45th **15th Oct.** Regiment was sent from the reserve to attack the enemy at San-tao-kang-tzu (E 2, north-east), and six batteries of artillery took position east of Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) to assist. The remainder of the division was at the latter village and at Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east) where it awaited the arrival of the relieving troops of the Fourth Army. By 10 a.m. the II./45th, in combination with a portion of the 3rd Division, occupied Hou Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east).

As there seemed no danger of attack from the east, and as troops were urgently needed for the attack on La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west), General Oku decided, with the approval of

Manchurian Army Head-Quarters and in consultation with the commander of the Fourth Army, to withdraw the 6th Division from the neighbourhood of Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre). An order was therefore issued directing General Okubo to assemble his men—with the exception of the II./45th Regiment and a few sections left on outpost duty on the hills—in Chiang-hu-tun (E 2, centre south), and the four batteries belonging to the reserve of the Army, which were still with the division, were recalled. At 1.20 p.m. a telegram as follows was received from General Nodzu:—

“I have sent to Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) a detachment under Major-General Yamada with orders to assist the Second Army in its attack on San-tao-kang-tzu” (E 2, north-east).

On receiving this telegram, General Oku issued, at 1.30 p.m., the following order to the commander of the 6th Division:—

“All troops in Chiang-hu-tun (E 2, south centre), will advance to assist the attack of the left wing of the 3rd Division now operating against La-mu-tun; but the artillery of the troops which were at Huang-hua-tien will only go as far as San-chia-tzu (west of the Mukden highway), and will report to the Artillery Commander* who will be found there. The Koidzume Brigade is returned to your command.”

According to this order all troops of the 6th Division, with the exceptions before mentioned, moved west of the Mukden road behind the village of Chang-yu-tien, which reduced the distance between the two wings of the division, and brought it again to its proper place in the centre of the line of battle of the Second Army.†

2nd Division—The right wing (I./18th, and half of the II./18th Regiment) was sent to attack the enemy north of Ku-chia-tzu (E 2, centre) and the whole of the divisional artillery took post north of Hou-tai (E 2, centre) to help the operation. The enemy was at this time still in possession of Tung Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east) which necessitated a preliminary movement of the attacking infantry towards that place, but at 7.30 a.m., when the Japanese artillery opened fire, he retired and yielded up the village without opposition. Thence he went to the hill east of Hou Chang-ling-tzu (E 2, east) and to that north-east of Ku-chia-tzu, so that the occupants of Tung Chang-ling-tzu found themselves engaged on two points—north and east. At this juncture the II./45th Regiment, despatched by the 6th Division at 6 a.m., was seen advancing on Hou Chang-ling-tzu, and at 11 a.m. the 3rd Division troops uniting

* Major-General Saisho, the officer commanding the Artillery of the Second Army.—A. H.

† For subsequent action of 6th Division, *see* pages 503 to 505.—A. H.

with it attacked that village, the hill east of it, and the hostile force east and north of Ku-chia-tzu. Fired upon by artillery at Shang-lau-tzu (E 1), the Japanese infantry pressed on and took the hill north of Ku-chia-tzu, and thence endeavoured to reach as far as San-tao-kang-tzu (E 2, north-east), but the ground south of that place was strongly held, and to advance further was found impracticable.

At 3 p.m. the detachment of the Fourth Army under Major-General Yamada (41st Regiment, 20th Reserve Regiment, three batteries of field and two of mountain artillery) arrived north of Ku-chia-tzu, and joined the right of the 3rd Division. Another attempt to advance was brought to a standstill, for the men were tired for lack of sleep and from six days' marching and fighting, and failed to drive home the attack. Under these circumstances it was decided to rest them and defer the attack to the following day, but by the time that darkness came the men had regained their accustomed vigour, and, being led against the enemy, drove him back, occupied the hill east of Wei-chia-lou-tzu (F 2, north-west) and captured two guns with ammunition wagons. This advance, forcing the enemy to fall back north, relieved the pressure on that part of the 3rd Division which was further west. La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west) too having been captured before sunset by the 6th Division, the condition of the right of the Second Army, for hours practically surrounded, was greatly ameliorated, and the troops, wearied with prolonged exertion, were at length enabled to snatch some well-earned rest.

6th Division (Major-General Koidzume's Force).—The II. and III./48th Regiment, the right wing of the force, received several counter-attacks during the night, but by morning had entrenched themselves in several lines north-west of the station buildings facing La-mu-tun. To strengthen them the III./38th Regiment, from the reserve of the Army, was sent at an early hour, and at intervals from 10 a.m. despatched to the trenches reinforcements, sometimes by sections, generally by twos and threes.* In support of the coming attack on La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west), in which these troops were to take part, the three batteries attached to the force kept up a steady fire from their position of the 14th instant.

The left wing of Major-General Koidzume's force had received orders to co-operate with the 4th Division in main-

* The Russians kept up a fairly continuous fire on these reinforcements, and a good many fell killed and wounded on their way to the trenches, but only when a stronger party sallied forth from the station buildings did the volume of fire greatly increase. The majority of the men, when reinforcing, carried packets of ammunition slung over one shoulder and ran, at their utmost speed, to the place pointed out to them at the prepared cover in front, dropping down into the trenches so suddenly as to lead to the conclusion that they had been hit. Over 200 rifles and as many packs were counted on the 16th at the station buildings, showing that the casualties had been numerous.—A. H.

taining possession of Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east), and, if possible, to detach troops to aid in the attack on La-mu-tun. At 6 a.m., however, from two to three Russian battalions made a counter-attack on the former village, getting close up under cover of a hamlet which lies adjacent to it. Suddenly the Japanese found the enemy within thirty paces of their trenches. Fire was immediately opened and the advance was momentarily checked, but an equal force came from the north to join the battalions already engaged, and the situation of the defenders grew extremely critical. The Japanese at first fired volleys, and then, fixing bayonets, rushed against the enemy and engaged him hand to hand. The Russians now began to lose heavily, and at length retired, covered by the fire of fresh troops at Ssu-fang-tai (D 1), leaving many killed and wounded on the ground.* It so happened that the left wing was continually exposed to counter-attack, and consequently could not help the right wing operations.

The right wing endeavoured, about 7.30 a.m., to draw near to the enemy in La-mu-tun, but his infantry behind mud walls and in Chinese houses fired heavily, and with the aid of four or five batteries in Ssu-fang-tai (D 1), prevented the attack from being pressed home. By 9 a.m. the leading troops of the wing had reached a point some six hundred yards from the enemy, but the increasing forces which opposed them showed that their strength was insufficient to reach the desired objective.

At 11 a.m. General Oku heard of their difficulties and gave orders for every available gun to be sent in support. Thus the whole of the reserve artillery and that received from the Fourth Army on the 14th instant, was sent to take up a position on the line Chang-yu-tien to San-chia-tzu (E 2, west centre). The artillery, which was under command of Major-General Saisho, numbered 13 batteries,† and, as the separate units of which it was composed came up, fire was opened on La-mu-tun. This fire at first was not severe, as the troops from Huang-hua-tien (E 2, centre) had not arrived, and until they came the attack could not take place.

At 1 p.m. Major-General Koidzume's force received the news that the remainder of the division was coming to its assistance, but at that hour another counter-attack was made on Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east), in which the left wing suffered so severely that it could take no part in the important attack about to be begun. About this time the enemy, whose six batteries at the north-east part of La-mu-tun (E 2, north-east)

* The Japanese state that they saw more killed and wounded here than they had observed at any time during the war up to this time. A scout who was wounded later, while engaged in ascertaining the number of dead, counted 500 bodies before he fell. The dead at this part of the field lie still unburied, the Russians firing on burial parties.—A.H.

† 13th Regiment (six batteries), 4th Foot Artillery (four batteries), one captured field battery, one battery 15-cm. howitzers, and one battery of 10.5-cm. guns.—A. H.

and at Ssu-fang-tai (D 1) were firing heavily, received reinforcements of infantry at the former place which made the first line there number five battalions.

At 1.40 p.m. the reinforcements from the station buildings came forward in a constant stream of men ten yards apart, and their advance to the trenches in front was heralded by the increasing sound of musketry.

At 3 p.m. the I. and III./45th and II./13th Regiments arrived from the east of the Mukden road and deployed in the *kaoliang* north of San-chia-tzu. About one hour later three batteries of the 6th Division artillery joined the others firing on La-mu-tun, and a heavy cannonade began. The infantry was now moving forward to the attack from Pa-chia-tzu and San-chia-tzu (both E 2, west) in many lines covered by high-explosive shells which set fire to the village in several places and threw up much dust along its southern border. The heavy fire from the guns seemed to take effect, for the Russians could be seen running from the village in groups.

At 4.30 p.m., as the battalions on the right came within a few hundred yards of it, those north of Sha-ho-pu station rose from their trenches and raced across the plain in swarms. Both forces reached the village simultaneously at 4.40 p.m. and, pressing through it, occupied the northern edge, firing on the retiring Russians, who left 500 dead behind. In their flight, which was covered by guns at Ying-yu (D 1) and Kuan-tun (E 1), they lost still more from the artillery of the 3rd Division, a portion of which greatly harassed them. The force which had been driven back in the attack was estimated at one division, and its complete defeat gave to the Japanese the line of the Sha Ho from the Mukden road to its mouth. On this line, gained only after six days' battle, the victorious troops passed the night, the main body in La-mu-tun, and the Koidzume Brigade in Lin-sheng-pu.

4th Division.—This division, whose orders were to maintain the position gained on the 14th, faced the enemy on the line from Ta-lien-tun (D 1) through Ta Wu-ching-ying (D 2, north-west) to San-chia-tzu (C 2). The artillery of the division was at Chang-liang-pu (D 2, centre) and received a deliberate fire from five batteries posted, two at Kuan-lin-pu and three at Ku-chia-tzu (both D 1). To assist the 1st Cavalry Brigade in recovering Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south) two companies were sent to it, and the division itself passed the night on the same ground as on the 14th instant.

1st Cavalry Brigade.—The main body reinforced by two companies of infantry from the 4th Division approached the village of Li-ta-jen-tun in order to expel the enemy, but two hostile batteries appeared at Meng-yuan-pu (C 2, north) and opened fire, while a strong force coming in view at Fu-chia-chuang (C 2) effectually prevented the Japanese from carrying

out their purpose. The main body of the brigade ceased the attack and assembled at Tai-ping-chuang (C 2, south) intending to resume the operation at an early hour next day, when conditions might be more favourable, but during the night the Russians retired and Li-ta-jen-tun was reoccupied. Part of the brigade at Han-shan-tai (C 3, north-west), though pressed by superior forces, maintained itself there, and the remainder, holding to the line stretching from that place to Li-ta-jen-tun, passed the night undisturbed.

The Head-Quarters of the Second Army were quartered in Shih-li-ho (D/E 3), and the reserve of the Army assembled in Chang-yu-tien (E 2). All three Armies had now reached the line which it was intended they should hold.

At 9.30 p.m. the Commander of the Second Army issued the following orders with a view to the occupation of the right bank of the Sha Ho :—

- "1. The enemy beyond the Sha Ho is retiring in a northerly direction, but still holds the line from Ssu-fang-tai (D 1) through Kuan-lin-pu (D 1) and Hsing-chia-tai (C 1/2) to the neighbourhood of Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south-west). The 1st Cavalry Brigade confronts him at Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre).
- "2. The Army will remain on the line it now occupies.
- "3. The 3rd Division (less two squadrons, 3rd Cavalry Regiment) after repulsing the enemy at North Sha-ho-pu* will occupy the line from the height of South Sha-ho-pu to the wood† at the western side of the village, and will make special endeavours to connect with the left wing of the Fourth Army.
- "4. The 6th Division (less two squadrons 6th Cavalry Regiment) connecting with the left of the 3rd Division will hold the line from the wood to the right bank of the Sha Ho through Shu-lin-tzu (D 2. east). Part of its artillery will assist the attack of the 6th Division to-morrow.
- "5. The 4th Division (less the 19th Brigade, itself less one battalion) will maintain the line which it now occupies.
- "6. The 1st Cavalry Brigade will continue operating as ordered yesterday.‡
- "7. The reserve of the Army (staff of the 19th Brigade and one regiment 13th Artillery Regiment, and the 15-cm. howitzers)§ will assemble in the neighbourhood of Chang-yu-tien (E 2) and await orders.

* The portion of Sha-ho-pu village (E 2) which is north of the river.

† The wood mentioned twice in these orders was in the hands of the Russians.—A. H.

‡ On afternoon of 14th two squadrons, each of 3rd and 6th Cavalry, reinforced the 1st Cavalry Brigade.—A. H.

§ The 10·5-inch guns were posted west of the railway line south of Shu-lin-tzu.—A. H.

"8. The 4th Regiment of Foot Artillery will rejoin the Fourth Army.

"9. Army Head-Quarters are at Shih-li-ho."

At 2 a.m. on the 16th the following report was received from **16th Oct.** the Fourth Army:—

"In order to assist the attack of your Army to-day, a detachment, consisting of nine battalions of infantry and six batteries of artillery under Major-General Yamada, will open up connection with your right wing. This detachment ought already to have arrived on the line indicated to it, and is presumably at present in touch with your troops. Please consider it as under your command."

At 6.30 a.m. Manchurian Army Head-Quarters arrived at the hill of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south-west).

3rd Division.—In order to occupy the line from the height north of Ku-chia-tzu (E 2) through North Sha-ho-pu to the east of La-mu-tun (E 2, north-west), the commander issued orders for his two wings to attack.

The right wing moved first at an early hour, and advanced from San-tao-kang-tzu (E 2, north-east), against the enemy's left flank at North Sha-ho-pu, while the left wing (6th and 33rd Regiments, the latter less two companies), after waiting for the development of the right attack, advanced against the border of the same village. In support of the operation the divisional artillery opened fire from a position north of Ku-chia-tzu (E 2), while the remainder of the division assembled in reserve at the south-west side of that village.

At 7.30 a.m. some hostile guns came into action at the south-east side of Pao-chia-wa-tzu (E 1), to which the Japanese replied, but after a heavy duel continued until 9 a.m., the latter slackened fire and directed some of their guns against North Sha-ho-pu.

Meanwhile the right wing, crossing the stream which joins the Sha Ho north-east of Sha-ho-pu, had reached San-tao-kang-tzu (E 2, north-east), beyond which place, on account of the increasing forces of the enemy, they could not go. To the right the heights at Wei-chia-lou-tzu (F 2) were held by a portion of the detachment of the Fourth Army, which had taken them during the previous night.

At this time the left wing found great difficulties in the way of its advance, for though the fire of the divisional artillery had made the enemy retire from North Sha-ho-pu, his troops, entrenched in the neighbourhood of Ta Ku-chia-tzu (E 1) and others holding works on the southern edge of Pa-chia-wa-tzu (E 1) and on a line from Kuan-tun (E 1) eastward, still resisted strongly. Moreover, Russian reinforcements had arrived and a heavy fire of guns was poured on South Sha-ho-pu.

As the frontal advance of the left mainly depended on the flank advance of the right, the commander of the division sent orders in which he urged the latter to press the attack. That wing had then reached the right bank of the Sha Ho, repulsing one battalion on arriving there; but, from a point one thousand yards beyond, a heavy fire of guns and rifles was received, and it was seen that the enemy held a line of works too strong to be assaulted. Nothing could be done beyond waiting for assistance from Major-General Yamada's detachment; but that force itself was not in a position to help, for about one division had come up from the south-east and halted close before it, while on its right flank was a regiment of infantry. Thus, though the enemy had disappeared from North Sha-ho-pu, the right bank of the river could not be occupied unless he were forced from the strong works which had been constructed here.

At 4 p.m. this state of affairs was reported to General Oku, who decided not to attempt further enterprises north of the Sha Ho, but merely to hold the left bank of that river. This decision was in conformity with Marshal Oyama's orders of the 12th, which deprecated needless loss of life and named the very limit which the Second Army had reached. Another reason which influenced General Oku was the knowledge—first obtained by means of a captured map, and later visibly demonstrated—that the enemy held a strongly prepared position north of the river, and to attempt to drive him from it with an army somewhat exhausted by several days of fighting would be a hazardous operation, both costly and unprofitable.

At 4.30 p.m., therefore, the following order was sent to the commanders of divisions:—

- "1. The enemy is close in front of our first line. He has been repulsed by our cavalry at Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south).*
- "2. The Army will occupy quarters on the line which it now holds.
- "3. Each division will quarter itself where it now is, so far as circumstances permit, and hold the line at present occupied.
- "4. The reserve of the Army will assemble in the neighbourhood of Pa-chia-tzu (E 2, west).
- "5. Army Head-Quarters will be at Shih-li-ho (D/E 3), where messengers will be sent for orders at 9 p.m."

3rd Division.—In consequence of the above orders Lieutenant-General Oshina directed the right wing (18th Regiment) to maintain the line where it was till dark, and—first communicating with the detachment of the Fourth Army and keeping it informed of its movements—then to retire without attracting notice as far as Ku-chia-tzu (E 2). The reserve of the division which was then in occupation of that village (the 34th Regiment)

* That village was occupied unopposed at 9.20 a.m.—A. H.

was warned to be prepared for the retirement of the 18th Regiment. The commander of the right wing, as soon as he received the order, consulted with Major-General Yamada, and then began a gradual withdrawal to Ku-chia-tzu, where, at 7 p.m., the I. and III./18th Regiment arrived, unmolested. The II./18th, however, could not retire, for behind its right were the guns, not yet withdrawn, of Major-General Yamada's detachment.

At 7 p.m. a brigade or more of the enemy's troops, which had crept up in the dark, made a counter-attack on the left of the detachment of the Fourth Army, scattered it, and came upon the right wing of the II./18th. Advancing with superior forces, the Russians surrounded the battalion, which by the orders of its commander rallied in one compact body. Bayonet fighting then ensued, during which both sides lost heavily, but the Japanese most. A portion of the ill-fated battalion reached Ku-chia-tzu; the remainder sternly resisted, maintaining themselves all night in a small village and with fine determination fighting from house to house as they were burnt out by the Russians. When morning came the remnant—for the battalion commander, several officers, and 280 men were lost—found its way to Ku-chia-tzu, and that any escaped was greatly due to the commander's wisdom in ordering the men to mass together. In this reverse a serious loss occurred, for the two guns captured on the 15th were retaken, and in addition the Fourth Army left behind it nine field and five mountain guns.*

When the news of this mishap reached General Oku he sent a battalion of the 38th Regiment from the reserve to help the 3rd Division, which had taken up a defensive line and was prepared to receive the enemy's counter-attacks; but the losses which he had suffered prevented him from pressing forward, and the division passed the night in quietness, sending the reinforcing battalion to Hou-tai (E 2, centre) as a reserve, where it arrived at midnight.

6th Division.—On the night of the 15th the II./45th Regiment, which had remained on the right of the 3rd Division, after transferring its posts to the Fourth Army, rejoined its own division.

With the object of occupying—in accordance with General Oku's orders—the line extending from the left of the 3rd Division to Shu-lin-tzu (D 2, east), the 11th Brigade (less one battalion) was made the right wing of the division and ordered to hold the ground from the left wing of the 3rd to the west of La-mu-tun (E 2, west), up to and including the Sha Ho railway bridge. The 23rd Regiment and one battalion of the 48th, as left wing, were directed to continue from the railway bridge to the south-west side of Shu-lin-tzu and with a portion to occupy Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) at that time held by the 4th Division. To assist these operations and support the attack of

* The Russian accounts call the locality where this took place Putilov Hill.

the 3rd Division on North Sha-ho-pu, the divisional artillery and one battery of captured Russian field guns took position on the south-west of La-mu-tun.

At 6.30 a.m. the Russians resumed their counter-attacks on Lin-sheng-pu, preluding the advance of a regiment of infantry from the north by a heavy artillery fire. The 23rd Regiment and part of the 4th Division, which were in the village, drove them back with heavy loss.

The heavy fire which was kept up by the Russian batteries at Ssu-fang-tai (D 1) and the threatening attitude of his infantry made the withdrawal of the 4th Division troops impossible, but at 7.10 p.m. a report was received that this had been effected, upon which the I./13th Regiment was sent to take their place in Lin-sheng-pu. Before they withdrew, however, another counter-attack—the sixth this day—made by a battalion of infantry, was repulsed. At night the division held the line laid down for it to occupy.

4th Division.—The enemy, who kept up a hot artillery fire on this division, which was occupying the same position as on the 15th and did not reply, was posted as follows:—

In the neighbourhood of Ssu-fang-tai (D 1) -	18 guns.
In Hsiao Shuang-tai-tzu (D 1½) -	8 "
In Kuan-lin-pu (D 1) -	16 "
In the neighbourhood of Shao-chia-lin-tzu (D 1, west) (to which were added eight more in the afternoon) -	8 "
In Hsing-chia-tai (C 1½) -	6 "

His infantry covered by entrenchments held the line Ta Wu-ching-ying (D 2, west) San-chia-tzu (C 2).

The left of the division had been strengthened by the return of the 7th and 8th Companies of the 37th Regiment, which had been sent to help the 1st Cavalry Brigade on the 15th.

At 1.30 p.m. a column of infantry advanced from Lai-shen-pu (C 1) to Hsing-chia-tai (C 1½) and deploying on both sides of the latter village prepared to attack. At 2.10 p.m. a battery of the division opened on this column. Next there appeared a regiment of infantry which came from Shao-chia-lin-tzu (D 1, west) to Ta Wu-ching-ying (D 2) and deployed on the south and west of the latter village.

By 4 p.m. the force at Hsing-chia-tai had increased to a strength of three battalions, and another battalion began to advance from the neighbourhood of Hei-lin-tun (C 2, centre) towards Ta-tai (C 2, south-east).

At this time the left wing was placed as follows:—

At Huang-ti* III./8th Regiment.

At Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2) I./48th and 8th Company 37th Regiment.

* Not on map; evidently not the village of that name in B 2, possibly the unnamed village north-east of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C, D 2).—A. H.

Between Huang-ti* and Wan-chia-yuan-tzu one battery (4th Artillery Regiment).

At Ta-tai (C 2, south-east) 4th Cavalry Regiment (less one squadron) and one section of infantry.

South-east of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu 7th Company 37th Regiment in reserve.

Besides these troops the 6th Cavalry Regiment (less one squadron) from the cavalry brigade, fighting on foot, helped the 4th Cavalry.

At 5.30 p.m. the Russian line of infantry was distinctly visible at the south of Pao-tzu-yen (D 2, west), extending in the direction of Ta-tai and threatening to surround the left. Nearer and nearer it came, but the Japanese held their fire. At last, when it had approached to within 600 yards, volleys of musketry and salvoes of artillery greeted it. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery all took a share in punishing the persistence of the enemy, and by using rapid fire threw great confusion into his ranks. At length the Russians, finding, however, that the attempt to use mass tactics against extended troops was simple massacre, fell back, leaving over 500 dead upon the ground.

About 5 p.m. the 6th Division had replaced the 4th in Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-west), and the latter was ordered to continue the line to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C/D 2).

At 7 p.m. the divisional commander issued orders as follows:—

"The left wing will guard the line from Hsiao Huang-ti* to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu.

"The right wing will protect the portion from San-chia-tzu to the nameless village east of Huang-ti* and will connect with the left of the 6th Division.

"The troops in Lin-sheng-pu, after handing over that village to the 6th Division, will rejoin the main body of the division early to-morrow.

"The reserve of the division will remain in Hung-ling-pu " (D 2).

The force opposed to the 4th Division this day has been estimated at about $1\frac{1}{2}$ divisions of infantry and over 50 guns.†

1st Cavalry Brigade.—At 9.20 a.m. the enemy having retired from Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south), that place was re-occupied, and during the rest of the day the troops of the brigade helped the 4th Division in repelling the Russian counter-attacks.

This day saw the arrival of but few fresh Russian troops; the Japanese plan, however, was not to attempt to move

* Not on map; evidently not the village of that name in B 2, possibly the unnamed village north-east of Wan-chia-yuan-tzu (C D 2).—A. H.

† From uniforms and prisoners it was known that the Russian troops included the following regiments:—215th, 216th, 282nd, 283rd, 284th and 285th.—A. H.

further forward, but to hold the left bank of the Sha Ho, and there for a time await events. The attempt made by General Kuropatkin to move south had been completely foiled, and the losses of his army had greatly exceeded those of the Japanese. Between the 10th and 16th October 8,000 dead had been left by the Russians on the ground,* and during that period the casualties in the Second Army only amounted to:—

—	Officers.	Rank and File.	Total.
Killed - - -	44	970	1,014
Wounded - - -	178	5,294	5,472
Missing† - - -	4	216	220
Grand total - - -	226	6,480	6,706

The ammunition expended by the Second Army from 10th to 16th October amounted to 127 rounds per rifle and 299 per gun.

From several sources it was known by the Japanese that the Russian troops who had been engaged with the Second Army consisted of the main part of the Tenth Army Corps, the whole of the Seventeenth Army Corps, the 35th Division, and parts of the Fifth and Sixth Siberian Army Corps—in all about five divisions with 100 guns.

From the moment that the line to be held by the Second Army was definitely decided on, arrangements were made to render it as strong as possible; but the position of the troops was slightly altered during the next few days. The 4th Division, after handing over Lin-sheng-pu (D 2, north-east) to the 6th Division, held the line from that place through Changling-pu (D 2) and Hsiao Wu-ching-ying (D 2, west), to Mengyuan-pu (C 2, north), while thence it was continued to the south-west by the 1st Cavalry Brigade on the front Tai-ping-chuang (C 2, south), Li-ta-jen-tun to Han-shan-tai (C 3, north-west) and beyond with the main body of the brigade at Hsiao-tai (C 2, south).

On the 19th October it was thought desirable to withdraw the 3rd Division slightly to the rear from South Sha-ho-pu (E 2, north), which place was vacated and a line somewhat behind the Sha Ho taken up, and on this date the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved its main body into Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2, south).

* Another Japanese report states that up to the 15th 5,000 dead were counted, and 80 men were taken prisoners.—A. H.

† The missing mostly belonged to the 11./18th Regiment, the losses in which occurred during the retirement of a portion of the regiment, on the night of the 16th October.—A. H.

Both Russians and Japanese held lines of defence at distances so close in parts that minor collisions constantly occurred, and firing both by day and night was very frequent; but as neither side was in a condition to assault the other, the deadlock which followed the operations just described was destined to continue many months.

In the earlier battles of this campaign in which the Second Japanese Army had been engaged, it had generally found itself opposed to an enemy holding a well-defended position covered by obstacles difficult to overcome, but the fighting north of Liao-yang lacked these characteristics, and one side or the other assumed the rôle of attacker or defender according as occasion or necessity arose. At first the Russian turned aggressor, but finding his advances promptly met, quickly took the part for which his inelastic training and moderate wits best fitted him. But the absence of an obstacle before his trenches removed much of the sting from his defence, and the determined valour of the enemy forced him to fall back more than once before inferior numbers. As the Second Army threatened to drive him to the Hun and so imperil his left before the First Army, he changed his methods and made many counter-attacks, but these were mostly local, never general, and in every one his losses were severe. His advance against the lines of Japanese riflemen lying in the open or in trenches, ill-supported by artillery, ponderous and slow, offered an easy mark for gun and rifle, and his masses, coming on in continental European fashion, rarely if ever reached the goal for which they aimed.

As regards the Japanese themselves, the readiness to rush on points which could only be taken after much delay and heavy loss, though still an instinct with both generals and men, showed some tendency to diminish, and the Commander-in-Chief of the army in the field himself had set his face against unnecessary waste of life. The six days' fighting through which the troops had passed had added greatly to their great self-confidence, and proved conclusively that the Russian soldier, indifferently led, was far less formidable in attack than in defence.

APPENDIX 1.

*THE CAPTURE OF VILLAGES ON THE BANKS
OF THE SHIH-LI HO.****11th-12th October 1904.***(a) Action of the II. and III. Battalions of the 13th Japanese
Infantry Regiment.*

An officer of the II./13th Regiment relates that on the 10th October a report was received that the enemy was at Yin-te-niu-lu (B 2) and Lang-tzu-chieh (B 1), and was moving thence south: the troops at the former village on Erh-tai-tzu (A 3), and those at the latter on Yang-chia-wan (A 2). The 6th Division moved to meet this advance in two columns. The right column came to Erh-tai-tzu and expelled the enemy on the night of the 10th.

11th Oct.

At 1.30 a.m. on the 11th an order was received to the effect that the enemy was occupying the line Yin-te-niu-lu to Yang-chia-wan and that the division would be attacked by him. Orders were therefore issued for the right column to march at 6 a.m. against Lang-tzu-chieh.

When the II./13th had advanced 700 yards north of Erh-tai-tzu it met with a rather heavy fire from guns and rifles from both flanks and halted.

The main body of the division marched in the direction of Yang-chia-wan, and about 11.30 a.m. a strong force of the enemy came against it from Yin-te-niu-lu. At 11.50 a.m. another order was received stating that the III./13th, from the divisional reserve, would join the troops at Erh-tai-tzu to assist in dealing with the strong force of the enemy coming south from Yin-te-niu-lu.

This additional battalion reached the II./13th at 12.50 p.m.; the enemy's advance had in the meantime been checked by gun and rifle fire. The two battalions were ordered to advance after dark in the direction of Lang-tzu-chieh and attack the enemy. Shortly after they had moved they received a heavy fire, but the range was great and no casualties occurred. They now stopped and made trenches. The Russians were at this time firing from Yin-te-niu-lu with rifles and machine guns, as well as from Lang-tzu-chieh.

* See Map 42.

About 9.30 p.m., while the men were engaged in digging trenches and all around was very quiet, a heavy fire was suddenly opened—probably with the object of interfering with such work as the troops were then engaged upon—and one shell killed six and wounded as many more. Digging was, however, continued, and, after the trenches were completed, the men were ordered not to fire, but to lie down in them, so as to induce the enemy, if possible, to make a counter-attack. His fire continued for about forty minutes, being directed towards the trenches and against Erh-tai-tzu, but after that time it ceased again.

Frequent patrols were sent out towards Yin-te-niu-lu and Lang-tzu-chieh; they found that the enemy was making no preparations to advance. Some companies were therefore ordered to move forward, and made entrenchments four hundred yards further to the front. A little before daylight the two battalions moved to the advanced trenches—which had been made during the night, the men who had tools working, covered by others in front with rifles—and at dawn firing began hotly from both sides. 12th Oct.

About noon the enemy's gun and rifle fire slackened and the two battalions advanced about three hundred yards towards Lang-tzu-chieh; the left wing of the division could be seen near that village. Shortly afterwards the left wing occupied Lang-tzu-chieh, and the two battalions advanced again. It was known that Yin-te-niu-lu was occupied by a strong force of the enemy and that reinforcements were coming up. The II. and III./13th Regiment, which had at first faced toward Lang-tzu-chieh, were now directed to move on Yin-te-niu-lu; they opened a fire which lasted twenty minutes, after which the enemy's right wing began to retire.

The left of the 3rd Division on our right was now heard firing on Yin-te-niu-lu, and a mass of the enemy's cavalry appeared on the west side of that village, behind Lang-tzu-chieh, to cover the retirement of the infantry. The two battalions fired at the cavalry, who soon made off. The portion of the enemy between Lang-tzu-chieh and Yin-te-niu-lu, who had been in trenches, had already gone, but part remained entrenched just south of the latter village and showed no signs of giving way. As the losses up to the mound* had been heavy, it was decided to cover the distance between ourselves and the enemy as rapidly as possible. The attack was therefore continued up to 250 yards from the enemy, who still held on. Rushes of the whole force were now made, and the Russians began to retire and were pursued to the river bed, where many were killed.

At 1.30 p.m. the right bank of the river was occupied, and from there a large body of the enemy could be seen retreating northwards. These men had neither packs nor rifles, and many fell to our fire.

* Marked on north-west corner of B 2 on Map 42.

The left column came up to the river bed, and the right pursued by its fire, but a strong hostile force was now seen advancing from Lung-wang-miao (C 1). The Japanese returned the fire of this force, which halted and retired towards the north. At 4.30 p.m. the Japanese stopped firing.

The pursuing troops, of which the II. and III./13th formed part, were about one brigade, and they advanced about one mile.

When the pursuing troops were advancing the enemy fired upon them with guns in order to cover the retreat of his infantry, but the Japanese, avoiding the fire, advanced. At sunset they halted, and then fell back to Lang-tzu-chieh, where they were quartered for the night.

The following are notes taken from replies to questions put to the officer from whom the above account was received :—

When the battalion advanced from Erh-tai-tzu (A 3) to a point 700 yards north, where entrenchments were made, the enemy's artillery fire was heavy and the men dribbled forward three at a time until the 700 yards point was reached, rushing each time about thirty yards. From this point to the mound they advanced by half-section rushes.

From 12 midnight till noon on the 12th October the two battalions covered a front of 600 yards, six companies being in the front line and two in reserve.

When the direction was changed towards Yin-te-niu-lu, the movement was carried out on the centre, the left wing coming forward and the right wing falling back. Up to 250 yards from the enemy the advance was continued by section rushes, the fire then not being so heavy. The reserve companies joined the front line at the mound, and from 250 yards onwards the whole line rushed together. During the advance up to 250 yards the men fixed bayonets of their own accord.

We fired upon the cavalry at distances from 1,300 to 1,500 yards, and the Russians replied from horseback.

From the mound for 200 yards onwards there was no firing on our part, but the men were halted now and then to get their breath. After covering 200 yards a few rounds were fired. In the advance by sections, the sections rushed irregularly, but as a rule a flank one led. The advance was covered by the fire of the other sections, and care had to be taken not to fire into the sections in front.

The reserve company of each battalion reinforced all along the line wherever there were gaps.

(b) *Attack on Erh-shih-chia-tzu (A/B 1).** Action of the II. and III. Battalions of the 45th Japanese Infantry Regiment.

11th Oct.

An officer of the 45th Regiment gave the following account :—

Our troops took Yang-chia-wan (A 2) at 3 p.m. on the 11th, which place the enemy had held with about 900 infantry and

* See Map 42.

300 cavalry. They retired through the village to Lang-tzu-chieh (B 1), where it seemed that they joined a strong force. After the capture of Yang-chia-wan (A 2) it was not easy to reconnoitre to the front on account of the open nature of the ground, but two scouting parties were sent under officers along the right bank of the Sha Ho. From their reports and from information received from troops on the right it was estimated that the enemy on the line of the villages Erh-shih-chia-tzu to Lang-tzu-chieh numbered about two regiments of infantry.

Under these circumstances the commander of the left wing, Major-General Iida, decided to make a night attack, and at sunset the II. and III./45th Regiment left the northern end of Yang-chia-wan, one battalion in first and the other in second line.

The leading battalion sent three companies to its first line and kept the fourth in reserve, the last being placed on the right flank. The first line companies sent scouts about one hundred yards to the front. Communication with other troops on the right flank was maintained by scouts, and similarly on the left. Each company kept touch of the one next to it by means of files.

About 600 yards was covered in the first advance from Yang-chia-wan; during this firing was heard on the right, and bullets passed overhead. Thereupon the leading battalion lay down; 15 men were wounded. Soon the fire slackened, and the battalion began to entrench itself on the spot where it was, viz., about 600 yards north of Yang-chia-wan.

Again it advanced 200 yards and again received bullets and about 20 men were wounded. It again halted and made trenches, and while so engaged scouts were sent to the front, with an officer, to see whether any further advance would be possible. The report came that there was a covering force of about a company in front of the village, and that the rest of the enemy's troops were on the outskirts of the village.

Under these circumstances an advance of about 150 yards was made which brought us, it was supposed, to within 600 yards of the enemy. A third line of trenches was now made, and when they were finished it was dawn. From the last line of entrenchments the enemy's line could be exactly located, by the clouds of tobacco smoke which rose out of it. **12th Oct.**

To make sure of the exact position, the commander of the line ordered three sub-sections to fire on the line where the enemy appeared to be. He seemed taken by surprise, and his whole line showing itself over the trenches began a confused fire. As it was now light, the commander of my battalion ordered the whole line to return the fire. As it got lighter the artillery south-east of Yang-chia-wan opened fire.

At 9 a.m. two more companies joined our firing line from the second line, and a heavy fire was maintained. The enemy seemed to be suffering severely, and his killed and wounded

could be seen being carried back to the village. The Japanese soldiers believing that their fire was having a good effect, aimed with great steadiness.

At 10 a.m. the fire seemed to take still greater effect,* and the enemy's killed and wounded were carried away in greater numbers.

About 11.30 a.m. the Russian left wing began to give way, and soon the right followed. We therefore pursued with rifle and artillery fire, killing and wounding many Russians before they could reach the village. As soon as they got under cover of the village our line began to advance, and we entered that place and re-formed companies.

Our troops next fired at the enemy at the eastern end of Hsiao Tung-tai (B 1), and at Yin-te-niu-lu, and he continued also firing for some time.

Soon, however, he began to retire from the east of Hsiao Tung-tai in confusion, being pressed in front by troops on our right and on his right flank, in consequence of which he suffered severely. Our troops then entered that village, and concentrated at Lang-tzu-chieh.

The casualties in the two battalions were 95 killed and wounded of all ranks, and among them is included the colonel of the regiment, who was wounded.

(c) *Operations of the I. Battalion, 45th Japanese Infantry Regiment.*†

This account, given by an officer of the Regiment, describes the fighting of the battalion which was immediately to the left of the II. and III./45th Regiment.

11th Oct.

On the evening of the 11th October, about 5 p.m. the I./45th Regiment, which formed the brigade reserve, was ordered to enter Yang-chia-wan (A 2). We received the enemy's shrapnel and rifle fire from Lang-tzu-chieh (B 1), and from the west of that place.

The major commanding the battalion ordered the 4th Company to occupy the east and north ends of Yang-chia-wan, while the other companies had their supper and awaited orders.*

At 8 p.m. an order came to the effect that the enemy was strongly guarding a line running from the western end of Lang-tzu-chieh, and that the brigade was going to attack from the western side of Lang-tzu-chieh. The I./45th was ordered to be in first line on the right bank of the Sha Ho.

The 4th Company was ordered to be the firing line, the rest, led by the major, were in second line.

According to orders the 4th Company formed into column of sections advancing from a flank, the sections moving in fours with a few scouts in front, and at section interval. Each

* Due to the fire of the I./45th Regiment.—A. II.

† See Map 42.

section had its own scouts, commanded by a corporal, thrown about fifty yards to the front.

To keep up communication with the first line on the left bank of the Sha Ho, a scout with a corporal was sent, and another scout with an officer was ordered to reconnoitre a tributary of the Sha Ho—the Liu-tang-kou Ho (A 1)—which was expected to interfere with our advance. In this formation we advanced along the river bank for 200 yards, the other companies following in the same formation. We began the march at 9 p.m.

After proceeding 200 yards, a heavy fire of guns and rifles began on our right, and shrapnel came over our heads. Immediately each company lay down, and, as we were moving in the valley of the river, we escaped loss.

After waiting for a short time the enemy's fire slackened, and we again advanced. Soon we received a report that the scouting party under an officer had found that the banks of the tributary were very steep, but not very difficult for infantry to pass.

We continued our advance to the tributary, but while so doing received the enemy's fire so frequently, that it was decided that it was inadvisable to go further, at that time, in an easterly direction. We therefore halted and dug entrenchments; while digging, the 3rd Company came up and soon after the 1st and 2nd Companies.

The enemy's fire now slackened, and a scout under an officer was sent to reconnoitre. We had finished digging when the scout returned and reported that our battalion could advance at least 300 yards, as the ground was similar in front. Thereupon the major ordered a further advance, and detailed the 1st and 4th Companies for the firing line, the remainder to the reserve.

After communicating with the troops on the left bank that the battalion was advancing further, we went on in the same formation as before. We had covered 300 yards, when a scout who had been detailed to keep up communication with the troops on the left bank reported that they had also advanced and were then on our right rear and were beginning to dig. At this time the two companies of the first line halted and dug, as did also the 3rd Company, which came up on the left of the others, the 2nd remaining in reserve.

A little before we began to dig a scout under a corporal was sent to find out if the second tributary was passable. This scout was discovered by a Russian sentry, and retired, unable to effect his mission.

When the three companies had finished digging it was daylight. We heard troops on the left bank firing, and soon the enemy's bullets came into our entrenchments and our battalion replied with a slow fire. **12th Oct.**

At 10 a.m. an order was received to the following effect:—

“The enemy is still holding in strength the western outskirts of Erh-shih-chia-tzu. The battalion must cross the Sha Ho and threaten his right flank.”

The major therefore ordered the 2nd Company (reserve) to cross the river first, and as soon as this was done the 4th Company on the right of the entrenchment also crossed. In front of us we saw the enemy, who was reinforcing his firing line, and we wondered whether he was going to make a counter-attack. It was considered undesirable to fire until all the companies had crossed the river, so the two who had done so waited. The 1st Company came to the left of the 4th, and the 3rd remained as reserve in the bed of the river. We could see the rest of our regiment approaching the enemy's position.

As soon as the three companies were in position they opened fire on the enemy's entrenchments; from where we were we could see the occupants, who were exposed to the waist to our fire. It seemed that they were quite unaware of the approach of our battalion, and when we opened fire they appeared greatly astonished. Soon the enemy's right began to retire, and the troops on the left bank of the river poured a heavy gun and rifle fire upon him, in which our battalion joined.

The major now ordered the front line to charge, and we rushed against the enemy on the outskirts of the village. The troops who attacked the enemy's front also charged, and my battalion went on to the further side of the village. When we arrived there the troops in Lang-tzu-chieh were still resisting, but finding that we had taken Erh-shih-chia-tzu they began to retreat.

We impeded this retreat, and charging towards Lang-tzu-chieh captured eight guns and wagons.

What struck me was the way in which the Russians maintained order to some extent during their retirements. After taking Lang-tzu-chieh, we found the enemy who had been confronting the 3rd Division retreating eastward, and we fired upon him.

We crossed the river at 11 a.m., and entered the village a little after noon. There we halted twenty minutes, and then rushed Lang-tzu-chieh, taking it about 1.30 or 2 p.m.*

* It is difficult to follow the movements of the battalion on the map. The officer's account was not clearly translated from Japanese, and there is some confusion about the rivers. The account, however, shows the deliberate and careful manner in which step by step the battalion moved.—A. H.

(d) *Operations of the I. Battalion, 13th Japanese Infantry Regiment.**

The following account was given by an officer of the battalion:—

The fight at Lang-tzu-chieh (B 1) began on the evening of the 11th October. About 9 a.m. on the 12th the preliminary action ended. My battalion was the reserve of the 11th Brigade commanded by Major-General Iida, and was posted at Yang-chia-wan (A 2) until 9 a.m. that day. At that hour another battalion joined the brigade and mine received the following order:—"Keep communication with the left of the division (I./45th) and threaten the enemy's right flank."

12th Oct.

The major assembled the captains on the north side of Yang-chia-wan, and gave the following order after explaining what was to be done:—"3rd and 4th Companies will be in the first line and the 1st in reserve." (The 2nd Company had been absent as artillery escort since the 11th October.)

We started off immediately and proceeded about 200 yards. There we found entrenchments which had been made by our troops (I./45th), and we halted. The companies had proceeded to the front one by one from the north side of Yang-chia-wan at intervals, so as not to attract the enemy's attention and draw his artillery fire.

From the entrenchments in which we were the major observed the enemy's position, but could make out nothing of the enemy himself. He found that a battalion (I./45th) was turned towards the east and was crossing the river. The adjutant was therefore ordered to go to the battalion on the right to ascertain its intentions, and at the same time to reconnoitre the enemy's position. He went to the right and was fired at, and being of short stature had difficulty in crossing the river, which had a muddy bottom. He ascertained that the enemy's position consisted of entrenchments in front of the village of Erh-shih-chia-tzu (A/B 1), and that the battalion on the right was about to attack. When this was reported to the major, he decided to march along the bed of the river with all three companies. When we had proceeded some distance up the river it was noticed that the enemy was reinforcing his first line, and it looked as if he intended to make a counter-attack. The 3rd and 4th Companies, therefore, were ordered to advance as first line, and 1st Company to follow as reserve. The latter company was posted behind the left wing.

About 11 a.m. the companies opened fire on the enemy at Erh-shih-chia-tzu. We opened up communication with the battalion on our right, and reported to the brigadier our position and what was going on.

After a time we found that the enemy was retiring from the northern end of Lang-tzu-chieh in masses in some confusion.

* See Map 42.

On our left was a considerable force of cavalry, which, it was supposed, was scouting. The major ordered the 1st Company to extend the line to the left and fire on the retiring enemy, and at the same time protect that flank. The enemy's infantry in its retirement was mixed up with cavalry and artillery, and we could see men falling from their horses.

Up to this time there had been no casualties in my battalion, as the enemy seemed quite surprised and not prepared to meet its fire. Two flags were tied to a tree to show where we were lest our own artillery should in error fire on us. This was necessary, as the battalion was far in advance of the rest of the division. We communicated our position and condition to the battalion on our right, and in reply were informed that it was about to charge. As my battalion was so advanced we only fired and waited for the movement of the one on our right. At this time we were shooting standing up, in order better to see the enemy.

After some time the enemy's sharpshooters appeared at the north end of Lang-tzu-chieh and fired on us; at the same time we came under shrapnel fire from the north at a considerable range. We imagined that this fire was intended to cover the retreat of the infantry. At this time—it was 11.30 a.m.—my battalion had many casualties, and the men who were standing lay down and made rough entrenchments. The enemy's cavalry now increased, and some seven or eight squadrons looked as if they were about to charge. Thereupon the left company was ordered to fire on the cavalry, and this drove them off. The enemy on our right had now retired and disappeared, but on the left a strong force seemed as if it was going to make a counter-attack. The battalion therefore entered the river bed a little west of Erh-shih-chia-tzu, and there we carried our killed and wounded.

The enemy opposite our right flank in Yin-te-niu-lu (B 2) still resisted stubbornly, and a little before 1 p.m. an order came from our brigadier to occupy Lang-tzu-chieh and threaten the Russian right flank, which was in front of the right of our division. We immediately proceeded to Lang-tzu-chieh, following the bank of the river. The enemy's artillery still remained on the right bank of the river. At Lang-tzu-chieh we charged a battery with the bayonet and took its eight guns. We then proceeded to the north-east end of the village, and seeing the enemy in retreat we opened a heavy fire. Some mounted men—I cannot say whether they were artillery or cavalry—now came from the north, probably to try to retake the guns, but these we drove off. About this time—a little past 2 p.m.—we received a heavy fire from the north-west of Lang-tzu-chieh, and supposing that it came from some of our own troops, we reported to the brigadier, who said it was the enemy's cavalry. We then became anxious for our wounded on the river side, and a private soldier went back for one of our captains who was

wounded, and, though the cavalry was near, managed to carry him to a safe place.

About 4 p.m. our pursuing force came up and my battalion assembled and bivouacked.

A staff officer who was present while this account was being given stated that it had been calculated that 420 bullets had been fired in this action for each Russian killed.

APPENDIX 2.

THE CAPTURE OF SHIH-LI-HO.

12th October 1904.*

(a) *Account given by an officer of the III. Battalion of the 34th Japanese Infantry Regiment.*

On the morning of the 11th October, the III./34th Regiment **11th Oct.** was on the north-east of Men-ho-lu-tun,† whence it moved up the railway line some distance, and halted till noon.

About 2 p.m. two battalions (reserve) came to Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3).

Under cover of night the whole right wing came forward and entrenched itself behind the village of Hsiao-chien-kou (D 3). Thence it moved forward, and entrenched itself in front of Hsiao-chien-kou between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m., 11th/12th October.

Two companies of the III./34th were in the trenches north-west of the village, two companies I./34th in front of the village, and two of the III./6th east of the Mukden road. The remaining companies were in rear.

While the entrenchments were being made the enemy's patrols discovered our presence, and guns and rifles opened on us from Shih-li-ho (D 1). The night was pitch dark and the missiles went overhead and fell some 400 yards to the rear, and in the six companies only 20 were wounded.

At 3 a.m. three batteries of artillery came up behind the village, and another three south-east of it, on the slope of the hill there. The Fourth Army was just behind, east of Wu-li-tai-tzu hill.

* See Map 42.

† South of Shuang-tai-tzu (B 3).

At 9 a.m. on the 12th October, an order was received that when the 6th and 3rd Divisions began their attack on Yin-te-niu-lu (B 2) at noon, the advance on Shih-li-ho was to begin and the enemy was to be driven back to Lung-wang-miao (C 1).

Between darkness and dawn an officer's patrol, consisting of one officer and two men, thrice reconnoitred as far as a point 500 yards south of the railway bridge, and ascertained that the enemy's position was strongly entrenched to the south of Shih-li-ho, while there were entrenchments for two companies to the west of that place. There were 16 guns on the right bank of the Shih-li Ho and 8 more to the north-east.

About 12.50 p.m. I could see the front line of the 6th Division heavily engaged, and small parties of the enemy were retiring at a run from Yin-te-niu-lu towards Wu-li-chieh (C 2). At 1.30 p.m. larger parties were observed running in the same direction in disorder.

At that hour the order came to attack the enemy in front at 3 p.m. The whole line was to await the effect of the artillery fire and then rush for Shih-li-ho. The left was to go beyond the village so as to surround the enemy. At this time the enemy's artillery and our own were engaged. A message was now sent to the artillery to co-operate in our attack, but the commander of the right brigade had already given orders to that effect.

At 2.40 p.m. the artillery on the slope of the hill opened against the enemy's guns north of the village and the guns behind Hsiao-chien-kou fired on those of the Russians to the west of Shih-li-ho. A very heavy fire was kept up, the enemy's guns were silenced, and the houses of the village set on fire in two places.

On account of the good effect of our artillery it was decided not to wait till the hour fixed for the attack, and at 2.50 p.m. the 6th Regiment began to advance. Seeing this the III./34th was ordered to attack. The latter battalion advanced with an interval of one yard between the men, and went forward, one section at a time, by fifty-yard rushes. As the Japanese artillery was firing very heavily the Russians crouched down in their trenches and did not notice our advance until 200 yards had been covered, but when a point 600 yards short of their line was reached the fire poured on us was very severe, and our casualties were heavy. As the left (III./34th) advanced quicker than the right it got in front of it. The battalion had started with two companies in its front line, but during the advance another company came up on the left of the line, prolonging it to the railway, and so helping to make our movement threaten to surround the village. The I./34th on our right also brought up another company on account of the casualties it was suffering, and it went directly into the line and filled up gaps. All our losses were by rifle fire, as our guns prevented the Russian artillery from firing on the infantry.

On reaching a distance of 600 yards from the enemy rapid rifle fire, lasting perhaps from three to four minutes, was used, and when we had advanced one hundred yards more, the enemy began to fall back by twos and threes.

The advance from 600 to 500 yards was made as follows:— Each battalion sent its companies forward by half-sections, those in rear covering those in front. The rushes were fifty yards. The fire between 600 and 500 yards was very heavy. The reserve company of the III./34th came up at this time, its three sections rushing up in echelon. The I./34th and III./6th Regiment received fire from the village but the III./34th was fired on from the trenches to the west of it.

As the enemy in front of the village was now retiring, orders were given to cease fire and, disregarding loss, charge the trenches to our front. The Russians, seeing the determined advance, fell back from the trenches, but only a few shots were fired at them, as it was thought that some other troops near them were Japanese, who, having passed through the village, were pursuing. On reaching the trenches this error was speedily rectified. The Russians disappeared into the river bed, as soon as they were out of sight four guns across the river opened fire with shrapnel at a range of 600 yards. Thinking it dangerous to remain in our present position, I ordered the men to rush forward and try and take the guns. The left company, which was now only 400 yards south of the railway bridge, was well situated for carrying out this object. In the meantime one of the other companies waded the river and reached some houses on the other bank, and fired on the flank of the guns. At this time the gun teams were coming up and the horses bolted. Of the gunners with the guns, nearly all were killed, only seven were left. As the men approached the gun position these seven men were also shot. The captain in command was found at the guns and taken prisoner. In all 4 guns and 5 wagons and 960 rounds were taken.

When the troops in Shih-li-ho village saw that the river had been crossed, they advanced and went towards the hill of Huang-pu Shan (E 2, south-west).*

The losses in this attack were approximately as follows:—

III./34th Regiment—

Killed	-	-	-	-	-	12
Wounded	-	-	-	-	-	78
I./34th Regiment, killed and wounded	-	-	-	-	-	100
III./6th Regiment, killed and wounded	-	-	-	-	-	78

Total casualties	-	-	-	-	-	268
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The losses of the III./34th Regiment were mainly between 600 and 500 yards from the enemy, and by the fire of the four

* See Map 41.

guns 15 were killed and wounded, one shell accounting for 13 out of the 15.

The two companies that took the guns—the left company assisted the one that waded the river—after the enemy had retreated, took up a position on the right bank of the river. One company pursued in the direction of Huang-pu Shan and another went along the railway for three-quarters of a mile. As the latter was pushing along a battalion of the troops across the railway joined it, and both went on.

Second Lieutenant Yatabi was the officer who made the reconnaissances which furnished accurate information regarding the enemy. Two of the scouts under him were killed. He was with the section which first reached the guns. On the 14th, during a counter-attack, his section annihilated a party of one hundred Russians. This gallant young officer, deeply regretted by his battalion, lost his life from a shrapnel wound in the neck, on the 14th October.

(b) *Notes regarding the Attack on Shih-li-ho Village.**

On going over the ground passed over by the I./34th Regiment in the attack on Shih-li-ho, about five days after the action, it was not difficult to tell where the firing line had halted to fire after leaving the main trench, which was connected by an approach with the village of Hsiao-chien-kou. These places could be recognized by the ammunition clips and cardboard packets, as well as unfired rounds which were lying about, and a fair calculation of the cartridges expended by the men at each halt could be made.

After leaving the trench, which is 300 yards north of the village, the rushes appeared to be as follows:—

Distance in yards.	Rounds expended per man (approximately).
147	30
65	15
70	15
68	15
84	15
168	5
440	Nil.
1,042 yards.	95 rounds.

A foreign officer who happened to see this attack—I was in another part of the field—told me that he thinks there was a halt in the middle of the rush given as 168 yards, but that the men did not fire. He was, however, a considerable distance away, and was uncertain. He stated that the men were not

* See Map 42.

more than one pace apart in the firing line of the I./34th Regiment. On reaching 440 yards, the men made straight for the village, without stopping, as the Russians were flying to the rear. The walls of the houses are spotted with bullet marks, and a good number of shells struck the houses and trees, and, in a few cases, penetrated up to the base in the latter without bursting.

The men, during the rushes, appear to have laid down behind the heaps of *kuoliang* if they happened to come in their way. There were traces of casualties having occurred behind this cover from view.

APPENDIX 3.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Second Japanese Army.

10th October 1904.

Commander, General Baron Oku.

Chief of the Staff, Major-General Osako.

1st Cavalry Brigade* (Major-General Akiyama) :—

9th, 11th, 14th, and 15th Cavalry Regiments.

I. and II./9th Infantry Regiment (4th Division).

1 battery horse artillery, 1 battery machine guns.

3rd Division (Lieut.-General Oshima) :—

5th Brigade (Major-General Yamaguchi) 6th Regiment.

33rd "

17th Brigade (Major-General Kodama) - 18th "

34th "

3rd Cavalry Regiment.

3rd Artillery Regiment.

3rd Engineer Battalion.

4th Division (Lieut.-General Tsukamoto) succeeded Lieut.-General Ogawa, wounded at Shou-shan-pu) :—

7th Brigade (Major-General Nishijima) 8th Regiment.

37th "

19th Brigade (Major-General Ando) - 9th "

38th "

* It is believed that this is correct. There are three squadrons in the two divisional cavalry regiments 9th and 11th, and five in each of the 14th and 15th Regiments.

4th Division—*cont.*

4th Cavalry Regiment.

4th Artillery Regiment.

4th Engineer Battalion.

6th Division (Lieut.-General Okubo) :—

11th Brigade (Major-General Iida)	-	13th Regiment.
		45th "

24th Brigade (Major-General Koidzume)	23rd "
	48th "

6th Cavalry Regiment.

6th Artillery Regiment.

6th Engineer Battalion.

Specially attached to Second Army :—

13th Regiment, Artillery Brigade.

Four 15-cm. howitzers.

Four 10·5-cm. Canet guns.

Six guns of captured Russian Field Battery.

These guns and the following troops were kept by General
Oku as the reserve of the Army, viz. :—

5th Brigade.

24th Brigade (less I./48th Regiment).

19th Brigade (less I. and II./9th Regiment).

**(32) Battle of the Sha Ho.—Fourth Japanese Army.
Operations from the 7th to the
14th October 1904.**

NOTE by Lieut.-Colonel A. L. HALDANE, D.S.O., General Staff.
Tokio, 27th January 1905.

(See Map 41.)

The following is little more than a translation of a note of the operations of the Fourth Army during the above period. It is not in sufficient detail to be of much value, but explains generally the part taken by General Nodzu's Army in the battle of the Sha Ho.*

The Fourth Army, after the battle of Liao-yang, remained in reserve south of the Tai-tzu Ho, and when it advanced to take part in the movement against the Russians, its left was on the Mukden highway and its right in touch with the First Army.

The country over which it advanced is bordered on the west by the hills of Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) and Huang-pu Shan (E 2), and on the east by a hilly region. The line of its march led between these ranges, and was in consequence less level than the ground passed over by the Second Army. The report is as follows:—

On the 7th October the 5th and 10th Divisions were assembled on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and the remainder of the Fourth Army (14th Artillery Regiment, Foot Artillery, and 10th Reserve Brigade) on the left bank. **7th Oct.**

On the 8th October the 10th Division and 10th Reserve Brigade occupied a defensive position from Chi-tai-tzu (E 5) through Ta-lien-kou (E 5) and Hsi Ying-cheng-tzu (D 4) to Lan-ni-pu (D 5), and the 5th Division on their left held from Fang-shen (D 5) to Nan-tai (C 4). **8th Oct.**

The enemy had been constructing defensive works for several days at San-kuai-shih Shan (E 3) and at Pan-chia-pu (E 2).

On the afternoon of the 9th about one division of the enemy advanced to Yao-pu (E 4), and about two divisions came south-westward along the railway and stopped in the vicinity of Ku-shu-tzu (E 3), Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), and Erh-tai-tzu (D 3). **9th Oct.**

* No British officer was attached to the Fourth Army.

10th Oct.

On the 10th the Fourth Army advanced at an early hour, the 10th Division being ordered to attack the force at Ku-shu-tzu, while the 5th Division in two columns moved against Wang-chia-tun (D 4). The 5th Division attacked the enemy east of Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) from Ku-chia-tzu (D 4) and from the hill east of Wu-li-tai-tzu, but his position was very strong and progress was difficult. Therefore one battalion of artillery of the 5th and one of the 10th Division engaged him, and just before sunset the 5th Division occupied Wu-li-tai-tzu, and the 10th Division, without having met any resistance, occupied the hilly part of Ying-kuan-tun (E 4).

11th Oct.

From an early hour on the 11th the 5th Division began its attack on the enemy at Shih-li-ho (D/E 3) and Fan-chia-tun (E 3), but his artillery on the height west of the latter place and at Shih-li-ho prevented any progress from being made, and consequently he could not be driven from his positions.

When the left wing of the 10th Division had nearly reached Chin-chia-hao-tzu (E 3), the enemy in the direction of the 2nd Division of the First Army increased in numbers, and one battalion of field artillery and one of mountain guns were sent to help that division.

That night Major-General Okasaki's Brigade (First Army) was under a heavy attack, and one regiment of infantry was sent from the 10th Division to help him.

On this day the 5th Division* and the Foot Artillery were under Marshal Oyama as a reserve, and instead the 3rd and 11th Reserve Brigades, the Head-Quarters of the Artillery Brigade and the 15th Artillery Regiment, were given to the Fourth Army.

12th Oct.

On the 12th October, the Fourth Army kept the Reserve Brigades in reserve, and the Head-Quarters of the Artillery Brigade and the 15th Regiment of that brigade were given to the 10th Division, which continued attacking the enemy in front of it. The commander of that division decided to make a night attack, and from 1 a.m. that operation began.† About 2 a.m., the first line had reached as far as San-kuai-shih Shan (E 3), on the top of which hill the enemy had defensive works as well as on the east side, while the village of the same name was strongly held. The first line of the 10th Division surrounded the village and, after severe fighting with the bayonet, killed nearly all the defenders and captured a battalion commander and about 200 men. The enemy retired, leaving over 800 dead on the field.

* This contradicts the statement above, that the 5th Division was engaged, but the translation received is as given above, with corrections in grammar, and there was no opportunity of verifying the contents of the report.—A. H. Manchurian Army Order on page 475 describes the fighting of the 5th Division on the 11th October. It would appear that the 5th Division was detailed to the reserve on the night of the 11th.

† For a more detailed account of this attack, see page 535, where the date is given as the night of 11/12th October.

In the night charge the 39th Infantry Regiment particularly distinguished itself, and among the casualties were the regimental commander, many officers, and 25 per cent. of the men.

When the sun rose the 11th Reserve Brigade from the reserve of the Fourth Army was added to the fighting line, and its two regiments attacked the enemy at the height to the south of Yang-cheng-chai (F 3), being assisted by one battalion of field artillery and a regiment of mountain guns, while one regiment of field artillery at Ta-pu (E 3) also helped. After the assault on San-kuai-shih Shan, the whole of the troops were moved against the enemy, who held a very strong position at Shuang-tai-tzu (E 3), from which he could not be forced by nightfall. Opposite the enemy, who had two divisions at this point, the Fourth Army passed the night. During it the 11th Reserve Brigade made a night attack, but was "utterly routed" and driven back.

On the 13th one regiment of the 3rd Reserve Brigade was added to the 10th Division, which continued the attack. Its right wing advanced against the enemy on the height south of Yang-cheng-chai (F 3), and with its main body attacked him also at Tung-shan-kou (E/F 3) and Shuang-tai-tzu (E 3). He added one battery to the troops at Shuang-tai-tzu, but the Japanese guns gradually forced him to withdraw in a northerly direction. Seeing that the opportunity was favourable, a general attack was now made, but the right wing could make no way on account of the strong works held by the enemy, and especially two batteries,* which fired from Meng-chia-fen (F 3). The main body of the division advanced to Tung-shan-kou (E/F 3) and Shuang-tai-tzu (E 3), and about sunset occupied the position there.†

On the 14th the Commander of the Fourth Army took one regiment of the 3rd Reserve Brigade and one battalion of mountain artillery from the 10th Division and made it the reserve of the Army, and ordered the 10th Division to continue the attack. The artillery with that division was placed as follows: 15th Regiment at Pei San-chia-tzu (E 3), and one battalion of mountain guns at Meng-chia-fen (F 3). At this time the enemy was at Tuan-shan-ssu (F 2), the height east of that place, and at Shih-miao-tzu (F 3), and his earthworks were continuous on this line. His artillery was placed as follows: three batteries at Tuan-shan-ssu (F 2), two at Ta Shan (F 2), and one battery near Tung-shan-kou (E/F 3).

* Although the Japanese infantry on occasions advance against the fire of shrapnel with comparative impunity, there are other times when they are held back, as here, and on the right of the Second Army at Shou-shan-pu (Battle of Liao-yang).—A. H.

† According to an order of Marshal Oyama's issued at 3 p.m., the 5th Division was sent to the First Army on the 13th October and joined it on the evening of that date (see page 446 of Col. Hume's report).

Part of the Japanese guns first engaged the batteries at Tuan-shan-ssu, and as the enemy could not resist their fire he retired, withdrawing his guns by hand, but leaving ammunition wagons behind. Previous to this the Japanese infantry, which was waiting for the proper time to charge, rushed for the hill of Shih-miao-tzu (F 3), first deploying as regularly as if at peace manœuvres. Covered by the artillery, which frequently changed position, they advanced. The enemy, from entrenchments on the slope of the hill and in the fields below, fired on the troops on being approached, and, waiting until they had arrived at a distance of about 350 yards, made a counter-attack. This was kept back by the artillery, which was now not far from the enemy's entrenchments, and the infantry continued to advance.

About 4 p.m., a detachment commanded by Major-General Oki, 11th Reserve Brigade, including the 12th Regiment of that brigade, charged the entrenchments on the hill and in the fields, and drove the enemy from them. Before this, two batteries of the 15th Artillery Regiment, seeing that the infantry was on the point of charging, took position to the west of Tuan-shan-ssu (F 2) and fired on the enemy's right flank and rear. This fire had good effect and completed his disorder. As soon as the Japanese saw the retirement two batteries of mountain guns and three from the 14th Artillery Regiment changed position, and fired heavily on the retiring enemy in the direction of Ta Shan (F 2). Two batteries of the 15th Artillery Regiment and the 14th Regiment of Infantry of the Reserve Brigade pursued, and the enemy retired north-west of Ta Shan, while his rearmost troops stopped at Wa-shang-kou (F 2). I should like to say that in these engagements the infantry and artillery worked as if they were at peace manœuvres and without the least confusion.

The enemy's force was over two divisions of the 1st Army Corps and part of the 5th Siberian Army Corps. He left, during the fighting described herein, over 1,500 dead, and about 300 prisoners were taken. We captured 3,000 rifles and 10 ammunition wagons. Our casualties, which are still under investigation, amounted to under 2,000.

(33) Battle of the Sha Ho.—Fourth Japanese Army.
Night Attack of the 10th Division on
San-kuai-shih Shan on the 11/12th
October 1904.

NARRATIVE of a Staff Officer of the 10th Division, reported by
Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., with
remarks by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B.,
22nd November 1904.

Plates.

Night attack on San-kuai-shih Shan - } Map 43.
Freehand sketch of San-kuai-shih Shan - }

See also squares E/F 3 and 4 of Map 41.

Remarks by Lieut.-General Sir W. G. Nicholson, K.C.B.

In submitting the enclosed report, which I have just received from Sir Ian Hamilton, I would offer the following remarks :—

1. The value of the Japanese officer's account greatly depends on its accuracy and completeness. No British or foreign officers are attached to the Fourth Japanese Army, or were present on the occasion described.

2. As regards Lieut.-General Hamilton's comment (c), I would observe that the light given by a starshell is very transient, and afterwards the darkness seems greater than before.

Unless strings or wires are stretched extremely tight, and are so strong as to be comparatively rigid, the slack allows of the elevation of the muzzles of rifles.

Lieut.-General Hamilton gives no indication of the distance between first and second lines which would prevent a bullet which had passed through some part of a man in the first line from striking and wounding a man in the second line. A man in the second line might be disabled by a bullet which had not killed, but only wounded, a man in the first line. The question is one of trajectory, and I am inclined to think that the adoption of such a rule as that proposed by Sir Ian Hamilton for night attacks would separate the first and second line by a much greater distance than he imagines.

*The Narrative and Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir Ian
Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.*

I have the honour to submit the following account of an attack delivered by the 10th Division on the night of the 11/12th October 1904. It was given me by a staff officer, who took personal part in the engagement.

The interest as well as the value of the narrative was greatly enhanced by the fact that I heard it on San-kuai-shih Shan (Chinese for "three rock hill"), the very restricted area upon which masses of troops struggled for mastery during the night, and the key, not only to the position which was attacked, but also; as it afterwards turned out, to the whole of the central Russian line of battle.

2. San-kuai-shih Shan is a narrow rocky ridge, often rising quite sheer in bare stone pillars like the well-known formations of Saxon Switzerland. The ridge rests on a foundation of gently sloping grassy hillside which runs down in every direction for about one hundred yards until it blends with the perfectly flat ploughed fields stretching away bare and unbroken for at least six hundred yards to all points of the compass. The actual rocky ridge is about five hundred yards long by fifty broad, and is low-waisted, with a high peak at each end like a mediæval warship. At the extremities San-kuai-shih Shan may be one hundred feet above the plain, and between the peaks not more than fifty feet. In the centre is a temple as shown in the accompanying sketch,* and on the eastern side, nestling close under the flank of the rising ground, is a small Chinese village surrounded by a wall five feet to six feet high, and consisting now of the charred ruins of about a dozen Chinese huts.

3. To the northward stretched an open cultivated plain, generally level, but with here and there a gentle undulation which would serve for an artillery position or to conceal a small body of troops, until some four miles distant a range of hills closed the view.

To the east is a similar flat plain extending for about two and a half miles until the western hill of the Okasaki-yama† cluster of heights is struck. Two miles a little east of south is Temple Hill, which at the period in question had just been taken from the Russians. Temple Hill greatly resembles San-kuai-shih Shan in all its general characteristics; it is surrounded by open ploughed ground, and the intervening country between these two points is also perfectly open and flat, except that a Chinese cart track passes from one to the other, which has so furrowed its way into the ground that it must have afforded as good cover as a regular constructed shelter trench. From one to two miles further south runs a line of hills which was then held by the Japanese.

* See Map 43.

† Marked on Map 41, square F 3.

Looking northward from this Japanese position to San-kuai-shih Shan, the plain is quite unbroken except by the village of Hsiao Pu eight hundred yards short of the objective, and by an insignificant flattened hillock or mound which breaks the dead level by rising a few feet above it at a point three hundred yards east of Hsiao Pu and six hundred yards south-east of San-kuai-shih Shan.

To the west of San-kuai-shih Shan the country is open and flat, the field of fire being only interrupted by occasional villages. Six thousand yards to the north-west is the nearest point at which any natural position stands out above the plain, and here a low rounded hill close to the main Mukden road was in the possession of the Russians on the date under consideration.

4. The general situation on the 11th October, and the respective positions of the two armies, will be dealt with hereafter in another and more important paper.* Suffice it to say at present that the Japanese and Russians were facing one another, generally within artillery range, and that their lines ran parallel east and west, trending somewhat southwards on the Japanese right and Russian left. San-kuai-shih Shan was opposite what may be best described as the Japanese left centre. During the period between the capture of Liao-yang and the renewal of the fighting on the 9th October, San-kuai-shih Shan had lain in the neutral zone between the two armies. Twice, at least, it had been in Russian occupation, but as late as the 8th Captain Jardine, 5th Lancers, accompanied the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on a reconnaissance to the ridge, and found it free from the enemy.

5. I will now give the story of the night attack, as narrated by the Japanese staff officer:—

“The First Army had been entrusted with the task of taking Temple Hill, and our Army was directed to break into the enemy’s line at San-kuai-shih Shan. The First Army was able to attack Temple Hill by day, but an immediate advance over the perfectly level plain to our front was too difficult to be carried out in the same manner, and as our orders were peremptory, and did not admit of delay in their execution, it was decided to stake our fortunes upon an attack by night. This was interesting—indeed, exciting news to all the officers. Many had practised night attacks with battalions, a few with regiments, but boldly to throw a whole division into the dark was to go beyond the experience or expectations of any. The general called up his commanding officers on to the northern extremity of the hill south of Ta Pu village. There would be no moon that night, so it was necessary to consider and decide the entire plan of operations before the setting of the sun. Hardly had the discussion begun when news came in from the First Army that its attack upon Temple Hill had been

* See page 543.

successful, but that a counter-attack was feared, and that reinforcements would be welcomed. The Fourth Army sent the required help, so that while the situation was simplified and improved by the capture of Temple Hill, we were nevertheless not quite so strong or so competent as we had been to take full advantage thereof. The right column of the Fourth Army now occupied the line from Temple Hill to Ta Pu village.

"The heights north of San-tai-tzu* were strongly held by the enemy, and we were well aware that he was in our front also, but in what strength or distribution we had no very clear idea. The general officer commanding the division now made his plan and issued his orders. The force at his disposal consisted of twenty-three battalions, and of these six were to be placed in the first line, eight in the second line, and nine in the third line, or general reserve. A commander was told off for the first and second lines of each wing, and the general officer commanding the division himself took charge of the reserve or third line.

"Some distance in rear of the division, behind its left or western flank, was the Army reserve, under the personal command of General Nodzu. The reason the Army reserve was thrown back one and a half miles to the left rear was because the left flank was considered to be our weakest in the event of a counter-attack by the enemy.



* On Map 41, square F 4.

"The distance between the first and second lines was 50 yards, and 50 yards also separated the right and left wings. In the second line the battalions were at 50 yards interval; 150 yards divided the second from the third line.

"The first line was to advance in single rank, shoulder to shoulder. The second line was to move in line of section columns at close interval, but with 50 yards interval between battalions. The third line was to move with the first two battalions of each regiment in mass, and with the third battalion in immediate support. The two brigades of the Army reserve were in mass, but whether the battalions were in quarter column or in line of section columns at close interval I cannot say.

"You ask if deployment was possible? Certainly it was not possible for the third line, or for the Army reserve, to deploy rapidly from such a formation on a dark night.

"Communication between the several lines was to be carried out by men bearing white flags. All troops were to march with bayonets fixed. The first line was not to fire at all unless in the most extreme emergency, but were to trust to cold steel to see them through. The second and third lines were, of course, not to fire under any circumstances.

"All our troops, from the divisional commander downwards, had been wearing khaki during the day, but at night orders were given that the black great coat was to be worn, with a white band round the left arm, as a distinguishing badge.

"Every commanding officer remained on the top of the mountain until after sunset, so that there might be no mistake about the direction of the line of attack owing to the different aspect of the country by night and by day. It was then observed that even after dark the outlines of San-kuai-shih Shan and the western hill of the Okasaki-yama group were quite distinguishable. Accordingly it was decided that the left should march on the former point, and the right on the latter. Each company was to be preceded at a distance of 50 yards by scouts, who were to give warning by a preconcerted signal of the presence of the enemy, and then to lie down at once, so as to get out of the line of charge or fire.

"We had often heard of night attacks failing through bad timing, so we made special arrangements to avoid doing so by causing everyone to set their watches to that of the divisional commander. We also made a heap of *kaoliang* on the spot where the divisional commander was standing, and at 1 a.m. it was set on fire as a signal beacon by his special order.*

"San-kuai-shih Shan had been named by the soldiers 'the devil's mansion,' and as the devil is not a good person to sup with,† and his mansion was to us an unknown land, we all

* Just like the beacon fire signal for the Afghan night attack on Sherpur in December 1879.—IAN H.

† A curious seeming connection here to our English proverb about a long spoon for use when supping with the devil.—IAN H.

feasted heartily up to 11 p.m. Nothing happened before 1 a.m. The troops were in position, and General Nodzu advanced to his place with the Army reserve, halting in the valley to the south-west of Ta Pu village. The troops of the first line must have been eagerly awaiting the beacon fire signal, for they started the moment the flame began to take hold of the *kaoliang*. At the same time the divisional commander and his staff moved off rapidly to take up their position on the left of the divisional reserve.

"At 3 a.m. the reserve and its commander reached the western end of Ta Pu village. Just before their arrival an intense rifle fire broke out to the north, and when orderly officers were sent out, they came back reporting very severe fighting in progress upon and around this rocky hill of San-kuai-shih Shan. Very soon three or four shells were fired by the enemy, of course without effect. As regards our own artillery we had three batteries in position amongst the pine trees on the hills to the south, so as to be prepared for next morning in case the attack failed.

"I will now cease to hold the position of an officer on the staff, and will speak henceforth as if I had been a commander of a unit on the first line. About 3 a.m. the left of the first line had advanced as far as the flattened hillock 600 yards south-east of San-kuai-shih Shan.* A small picket of the enemy was found there, but was easily brushed away. By this time the Russians must have thoroughly understood that a night attack was being made, although whether by a large or small party was probably as yet uncertain. The regiment occupying the hill was a fine corps, with a great reputation, and it showed good nerve by withholding its fire until we drew very close indeed. When, however, we got within one hundred and fifty yards of the village the enemy opened upon us with volleys, but no reply was made, our men continuing to creep forward quietly and steadily. As is very well known, men firing at night almost invariably shoot too high. This fight was no exception to the rule, and the enemy's bullets flew over the heads of our first line and killed the horses of the divisional commander and his adjutant, besides doing other damage in and about Ta Pu village. At this moment General Nodzu, attracted by the firing, appeared with his staff in Ta Pu. The divisional commander, therefore, felt it his duty to go up to him and beg him to retire, as it is not considered right with us that Army commanders should show themselves in the firing line. With deep reluctance he acknowledged the justice of the request and rode back to take up his old position with the Army reserve on the left rear of the fighting line. All round San-kuai-shih Shan there was now intense firing, but in front of the right wing everything was quiet. Therefore, as fire has a double power of

* This is shown on Map 43 by a single elongated contour line, and it is also referred to in my para. 3.—IAN R.

attraction in the darkness, the men of that wing brought up their right shoulders and closed in on the east and even north-west of San-kuai-shih Shan.

"Thus as the enemy continued to hold his ground and to fire he became more or less surrounded by our division.

"The first line of the enemy had been extended all along in front of the hill, out on the level ground some one hundred and fifty yards to the south of it. As soon as our first line got within one hundred yards of the enemy's first line some of our men were compelled to open fire. In Ta Pu village it became known at once that this had happened, for the enemy used volleys, and our men independent firing, and besides, there is a difference in the sound of a rifle shot according as it is pointed towards you or away from you. I cannot say for certain, but it seems likely that the enemy may have had many lines in tiers, one above the other, firing from San-kuai-shih Shan.

"Not less than two-thirds of the division surrounded the hill and began to climb it, and a series of desperate detached struggles took place all over the slopes, bullet or bayonet being used as either came handier. Meanwhile the left of our line worked round the west and south-west of San-kuai-shih Shan, and on their way came across some guns of the enemy on the road, about four hundred yards west of the southern point of the hill* and captured them. During this part of the action a portion of the right wing came into contact with the walls of the small village under the eastern slope of San-kuai-shih Shan, the existence of which they had not suspected.

"At 4.30 a.m. our left wing gained possession of the heights, and the loud *Banzai* which they then gave sounded clear above the rattle of musketry, and announced the welcome news to the divisional staff as far away as the village of Ta Pu. Nevertheless the enemy still clung to the rocky parts of the hill and to the temple, and the firing continued as heavily as ever, more especially from the village. Major-General Marui, commanding a brigade, was wounded here, and the standard bearer of the Himeji Regiment was killed. Another officer seized the standard and he also was shot. Then the colonel commanding the regiment took it up, and in his turn he fell, being struck by a bullet from the wall. Thus there was no one left to command at this point, the commander of the next regiment being further to the east. Then there occurred an incident of some interest. The adjutant of the brigade met the adjutant of the regiment and discussed the situation with him. They agreed that the village must be carried at once and at any cost, as a prolongation of the struggle would result in an excessive number of casualties. So they called out loudly in the night, 'Is there anyone here who will leap into that village and set it on fire?' Out of the darkness came the reply, 'I

* This road runs north from Ta Pu to Ta-kou.—IAN H.

Captain * * *, will command the forlorn hope*; who will follow me?' And nearly two hundred men closed in to his call and put themselves under his orders. All of the leading men were shot or bayonnetted from behind the wall as they came up to it, but others managed to jump in and set fire to several houses. Amongst these houses they found a wounded lieutenant-colonel of the enemy, who was so badly hit that he could only stand with difficulty when he was put upon his feet. They told him that the whole division was now round the village, and that one part was taken and another part in flame, so that he should go into the corner where fighting was still going on and order his men to surrender. He refused, however, saying that he had been given a special charge to defend this village to the utmost, and he could not, and would not, persuade his men to give in. Just beside him was a corporal, and to him we used the same persuasions. That non-commissioned officer obeyed us. He did what he was told, and entering the village where the enemy was still fighting fiercely, he spoke loudly in Russian to the men. At the same time the fire took a still stronger hold of the houses, and whether because of that or because of the exhortations of the corporal, the fire of the enemy slackened from that moment. Even at 5 a.m. there were still groups of Russians fighting here and there in the position, but generally speaking we had practical possession of it from that hour.

"Our troops who captured the guns had gone on and left them, and the Russian artillerymen finding this out brought up their horses at the gallop and carried off the guns, leaving, however, a number of ammunition wagons. The noise made by the galloping horses was mistaken for an attempt by the Russian cavalry to charge. Day broke at 6 o'clock and then we found our regiments on the hill were completely mixed up with one another. There was a dense fog on the horizon, and we spent the next hour trying to find out who were dead, who were still alive. There was sorrow over the dead and congratulations with one another amongst the living. At 7 a.m. staff officers ascended the hill. If you look around you here and see all these Russian and Japanese graves mixed together and encircling the entire hill, you may in some measure imagine what this place looked like in the early morning of the 12th October.

"We ascertained from prisoners that San-kuai-shih Shan had been occupied by the 1st Brigade, 37th Division, 1st Army Corps. The regiment on the hill itself was the Alexander IIIrd Regiment. The enemy's killed were evidence that they had freshly arrived from Europe, as their skins were quite delicate and white, and not at all browned yet by the hardships of

* In Japanese "troop determined to die." The difference of the impression is illuminating. The European hopes to live, the Japanese desires death, in theory at any rate.—IAN H.

campaigning. They wore long frock coats which were quite new and unsoiled, on their shoulder straps there was a crown. A prisoner told us also that on the previous day Kuropatkin had sent for the commander and told him that he expected the Japanese would try a night attack upon him, and that he must not retreat one step, but must hold on to the hill until everyone was killed. The commander did not himself return, but the lieutenant-colonel who was wounded must have taken his place.

"We captured 200 prisoners, and over 200 Russians killed and wounded were left upon the ground. The Japanese casualties were nearly 1,000. The Russians fought very bravely, and even on the 13th October there were some of them left ensconced in water pots in the village and in holes and clefts of the rocks of San-kuai-shih Shan as well as in the temple on the ridge, who would fire on our men whenever they approached.

"This ends what I have to say. It is for you to look at a map and to judge what effect upon the relative position of the two armies was produced by the wedge we drove into the centre of the Russians on the night of the 11/12th October."

Comments.

(a) This story was delivered to a small group of officers, and from notes taken on the spot I have been able to correct or amplify certain passages here and there. From the rough sketch made by the narrator it seems clear that at least one regiment of the reserve made an encircling movement and attacked the right and left rear of the enemy's position at San kuai-shih Shan.*

(b) In this sketch the Russian guns are shown behind the north point of San-kuai-shih Shan. I was, however, pointed out the exact spot at which they were first captured, and, then later, taken away, and I have therefore described the position accordingly in the statement. It is probable that the guns were fired during the 11th from the position in which they are shown in the sketch, and that at night they were brought out upon the road ready to move to some other position next morning. In any case it seems to me a very unusual and dangerous arrangement to leave guns at night on what may be considered the outpost line.

(c) Success is ordinarily held to justify the methods by which it was obtained. It is just because of this general feeling that an expert should scrutinize the details of arrangements which have secured victory with a specially critical eye, for the tendency to say "all is well that ends well" is undoubtedly dangerous. Regarded in this spirit, I must say I think the formations of the second and third lines of the attack on the night of 11/12th were too inflexible and dense. Also that the

* The lower sketch on Map 43.

distance (50 yards) between the first and second lines was too close. Neither the second nor third lines could deploy. They were tied to their heavy masses, and if effective fire had been brought to bear upon them the slaughter must have been in the same proportion as that of the dervishes at Omdurman. There was no inherent certainty that would not be subjected to such a fire. Our mountain batteries in India carry star shell for the purpose of suddenly turning on the necessary light, but admitting that the Japanese knew the Russian guns had no such projectiles, it would not have been so very difficult for the Russian piquets on retiring to set *kaoliang* beacons on fire, which would have shown up the whole advancing division.

It was justly said by the narrator of the story that men firing in the dark almost invariably shoot too high, but there is a very simple expedient to counteract this, which I have also seen used in Afghanistan and in the Relief of Chitral. It is merely to run a string or wire in front of the advanced trenches at such a height that when the soldier gets into position for firing and places the muzzle of his rifle under the wire, he cannot send his bullet harmlessly into the air, however excited he may be.

It seems from the account given me that General Kuropatkin anticipated a night attack. Was it safe, then, for the Japanese to anticipate, as they apparently did, that no special arrangements for their reception would be made? To leave for a moment the safe rôle of a negative critic, and to venture on an opinion, I feel sure that here, as elsewhere, the best, safest, and most handy formation for a night attack is by line of company columns in sections at deploying interval preceded by scouts. The second line should be just so far back that a bullet killing a man in the first line should not also perforate a man, or men, in the second—a condition which was not fulfilled in the case under consideration.

(d) The Russians appear to have been in possession of San-kuai-shih Shan since the 9th, and from midday on the 10th they must have had in contemplation the possibility at least that they would have to stand an attack there. Yet neither were there any thorough good shelter trenches constructed, nor was the temple on the hill or the village on the east flank put into a state of defence or loopholed. I think I have the authority of Plato for saying it is waste of time to consider what might have happened under conditions which were not fulfilled. I will only say, therefore, that the Japanese never lost a chance for want of taking trouble, whereas in that respect I honestly believe that the Russians are even worse than the English.

**(34) Battle of the Sha Ho.—First Japanese Army.
Operations from the 6th September to the
15th October 1904.**

REPORT by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Plate.

General Map of Operations - - - Map 41.

I have the honour to submit herewith reports by Lieut.-Colonel Hume, D.S.O., Captain B. Vincent, and Captain Jardine, on the parts played by their respective divisions in the Sha Ho battle.

In my report describing the battle of Liao-yang it will be remembered that the curtain was rung down upon that engagement by the Umezawa Brigade, which had worked round on the right of the First Army and fired the last shots of the battle at San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) on the afternoon of the 5th September. On the 6th the exhausted troops stood fast, but on the 7th positions were taken up on the assumption that a considerable period of quiescence was going to give the Army of Manchuria breathing space wherein the recent heavy losses in men and material could quietly be made good from Japan. The grounds upon which I base this opinion are, first, that junior officers looked at the matter in this light; secondly, that the positions actually selected, whilst convenient for distribution of drafts and supplies, were not by any means well calculated to meet any sudden offensive movement by the Russians. They were as follows:—First Army, right wing, Yen-tai Colliery (E 4); First Army, left wing, Lan-ni-pu (D 5), just north of San-tao-pa (D 5), on the main road between Liao-yang and Mukden. The right wing consisted of the 12th Division, which occupied not only the Colliery itself, but followed the branch line of railway thence to Ta-lien-kou (E 5). The left wing was formed by the 2nd Division, which extended from Ta-lien-kou (E 5) to Lan-ni-pu (D 5), the front of the two divisions united covering about seven miles of country. The Guard Division formed a second line in rear of the right wing. They were quartered in and about Lo-ta-tai (D 5) which is just inside the limits (southern) of the map. The Umezawa Mixed Brigade, consisting of reserve regiments, was detached to the right to occupy the villages of North and South Ping-tai-tzu (H 3). The idea was that it should guard the approaches from Mukden to Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5), but if it

is remembered that the mountains are much more formidable than they appear to be on the map, and that it is 14 miles as the crow flies, and 18 miles by road, from the Colliery to Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), then all that can be urged in favour of such dispositions is that great liberties are allowable immediately after gaining a great victory.

8th Sept. The Umezawa Brigade concentrated on the 8th September at Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4), and marched on that date in pursuance of its orders, arriving at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) on the 9th September. At this time the Second and Fourth Armies were still concentrated to the south and south-west of Liao-yang, refitting and resting after their heavy losses during the recent battle. The only troops from these forces which might be said to be in touch with the First Army were a mixed brigade from the Fourth Army at Kao-li-chiang* on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, west of the railway, and a mixed detachment belonging to the Second Army at Hua-kou-pu (C 5), a village some six miles west of Lan-ni-pu.

The main body of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which had been sent out to guard the left wing of the whole Japanese Army, was about this time at Hsiao-pei-ho,† near the junction of the Tai-tzu and Hun Rivers.

The whole reserve of the First Army consisted at this time of three battalions, namely, the I. and II./129th and the II./139th of the line, which were stationed with the First Army Head-Quarters at Feng-shen.‡ Speaking of the general feeling of the First Army, I can vouch for it that at this time no one anticipated any immediate or even early resumption of fighting. The Russians were supposed to be entirely absorbed in the problem of retirement, and the Japanese themselves were busily occupied in filling up their depleted ranks and their empty supply and ammunition columns. By the 14th September the bridges over the Tai-tzu Ho had been reconstructed, and the Second and Fourth Armies moved northwards across the river under orders issued at Liao-yang by Marshal Oyama on that date. During the 15th and 16th September these armies took up their new positions in line with the First Army, the Fourth Army forming the centre of the Manchurian Army, the Second Army being on the left.

14th Sept.

Ever since the battle of Liao-yang, General Baron Kuroki and his staff had been haunted by a certain uneasiness regarding the country to the east of their position, and the potentialities for offence which it might afford to the enemy. The uneasiness was due to the fact that they knew very little about it except that it was difficult and very mountainous. The name of

* Not on map; is 14 miles south of Yen-tai (D 4).

† Not on map; 30 miles west of Yen-tai.

‡ Not on map; is 3 miles north-west of Liao-yang. (See Map 40.)

Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) was familiar as having been from the earliest times a mining centre buried in one of the most mountainous districts of Manchuria, but the country to the north of it was really *terra incognita*. Accordingly, from the 7th September onwards, spies and small reconnoitring parties were kept constantly at work in this area, and the information thus gained, together with a close study of some captured Russian maps, tended rather to accentuate than to dissipate the vague anxieties to which I have referred. Ultimately these took shape in an order directing the 12th Division to extend its right wing from Yen-tai Coal Mine (E 4) to a point about 4,500 yards east of it. As a general staff officer said, when speaking to me in this connection, "Though still in a mountainous district, the conditions have changed since we marched on a very broad front with each division on a different road through the mountains on our way to Liao-yang. Now we have the whole strength of the Russians in our immediate front. We consider it, therefore, absolutely necessary to form a continuous line without any gaps in it, and you will find that our tactics will be altered according to this principle in future."

I may say here that it was found impossible in practice to adhere to this idea, which is the continental conception of a line of battle, as opposed to our South African conception of columns of varying size fighting semi-independent actions over a very broad front under the general guidance and control of the Commander-in-Chief. In the attempt, however, to work up to the system enunciated by the staff officer above mentioned, and in order to occupy the position from Lan-ni-pu (D 5) to 4,500 yards east of Yen-tai Coal Mine without leaving any gap or interval, it was necessary to bring the Guard Division up into the front line. The distance from Lan-ni-pu to this point was $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and this was considered too wide a front for two divisions to hold. The new dispositions, which were carried into effect by 17th September, were as follows:—

17th Sept.

12th Division from the hills east of Chien-tao (F 4) to Ta Ta-lien-kou (E 5).

2nd Division on the left of the 12th, extending as far as an old Russian Fort south-west of Ta-lien-kou (E 5).

Guard Division from the left of the 2nd to Hsi Ying-cheng-tzu (D 4).

Two reserve battalions were sent from the Army reserve to reinforce the 12th Division.

The Fourth Army now occupied a line from Lan-ni-pu, on the main road, to Nan-tai (C 4, south-east), about 2 miles west of the railway, and the line of the Second Army ran from Ta Pa-tai-tzu to a point north of Hua-kou-pu (C 5) (6 miles west of Lan-ni-pu).*

* From Nan-tai (C 4, south-east) to Chang-chia-wo-peng (B 4), according to the narrative of the Second Army, p. 458.

A general staff officer, speaking of this period, remarked: "The nature of the country in front of the right wing of the First Army now became daily better known to us; and the more familiar we became with its characteristics the more difficult and dangerous it seemed to become." At this time I personally saw very little, but from various sources I learnt that Russian scouts and small parties of cavalry skirmished daily with the Japanese outposts, and that the Russian horse artillery was the cause of the cannonading which continually went on. No one believed in any possibility of a Russian advance, and regimental officers used to treat the demonstrations by Cossacks and guns as a good joke and a welcome interlude in the dulness of their lives.




On the 17th September, the day on which the new dispositions were completed, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, under Prince Kannin, which had been until now quartered to the south of Liao-yang, joined the First Army. On the 21st September it was directed to march to the right of the 12th Division.

Meanwhile the Russian forces in front of the Umezawa Brigade had been steadily increasing. On the 17th September a Russian force consisting of one infantry brigade, eight squadrons cavalry, and eight guns, attacked the brigade, but were repelled with heavy loss. From the half-hearted way in which the Russians fought, the Japanese took it to be merely a reconnaissance in force. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this check, the Russians after 17th September again increased in numbers to the front and right of Umezawa, and much anxiety was felt for his safety by the Head-Quarters Staff, who had now begun to consider the brigade dangerously weak to hold such a difficult and extensive line of country. Two battalions were therefore sent from the 12th Division to reinforce, and joined Umezawa at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) on 19th September. The relief produced in the minds of the Head-Quarters Staff by the safe arrival of these two battalions was, however, but momentary. Hardly had they marched into Ping-tai-tzu when the Russians showed a strong disposition to press and threaten the right of Umezawa's Brigade, and even to threaten his right rear and line of communications at Pen-hsi-hu. Orders were accordingly sent to the General Officer Commanding the Communications to push as many troops as he could spare through Chiao-tou* to strengthen the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5). As fast, however, as these new arrangements were made, they were rendered inadequate by the steady daily increase of the Russian troops opposite Umezawa. On 24th September, therefore, General Kuroki made up his mind to concentrate the main force of the First Army on the right wing, and he proposed to Marshal Oyama that in order to enable him to carry this redistribution of his forces into effect the line now held by the Guard Division should be handed over





* Not on map; 17 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5).

to the Fourth Army. Kuroki's plan was to concentrate the 12th Division at Ta-yao (E/F 5) village, and to move the Guard and 2nd Division to the east of their present positions. Marshal Oyama accepted this suggestion, and on the 1st October the new dispositions were carried out.


Although I may to some extent anticipate matters, I think that this is the place where I should interpolate with my narrative extracts from a conversation I had soon after the battle of the Sha Ho with another general staff officer. It will put what I have been saying up to this point in another way, and make it, I hope, more easy to understand. This part of the conversation began by my asking him if he was not surprised that the Russians had attacked so soon after the battle of Liao-yang. He said: "We do not know yet, but we believe that Kuro-patkin's advance was in consequence of a pure misunderstanding. We hear on respectable authority that there was a story current among the Russian Head-Quarters Staff that the Japanese had sent back a large force to assist in the siege of Port Arthur. Just a day or two before the Russian attack, our right was virtually at the coal mines, Umezawa at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) being practically isolated. There was nothing between the Umezawa Brigade and the Colliery Hills. This must have seemed to offer a rare opening to the Russians. But, if we did not predispose such dangers, and guard against them, then we should be in a bad way very often. Immediately after Liao-yang our three divisions held the following relative positions between the Colliery on the east and the railway on the west." (He then rapidly designated the troops on a piece of paper.)




"Our first step towards getting ourselves straight was to hold the country extending from Colliery Hills to the railway by a continuous line, and to cover our right by sending Umezawa to Ping-tai-tzu; thus:—



"Though an improvement, this was obviously a dangerous arrangement. We were holding an enormous front with no reserves, whereas the Fourth and Second Armies had narrow fronts and large reserves. So after a time we managed to get Marshal Oyama's leave to put the 12th Division in reserve at 'Ta-yao (E/F 5), which left us with only the Guard and 2nd Divisions in front; thus:—



"Then, when it became certain we were going to be attacked, we were able to string out, thus:—



"We had moved back the 12th Division to 'Ta-yao (E/F 5) before we really thought we were going to be attacked, merely as a precaution. This was a fortunate idea, for in the event we received such short notice of the enemy's advance that we could hardly otherwise have got into fighting formation in time. I mean to say that if the 12th had not been thrown well back in reserve at a spot like Ta-yao (E/F 5), whence comparatively good roads lead eastwards, we could not have carried out such an expansion of our front with so little loss of time. Until the necessity arose a big gap existed between the right of the First Army and its detached brigade at Ping-tai-tzu and Pen-hsi-hu. It was natural that

the enemy should have believed he had ample time to crush Umezawa, as he could never have imagined we would get extended so quickly. As it was, a very few hours would have made it too late for Umezawa to get back and join the rest of the line. We got all the enemy's orders and dispositions off the body of a Russian staff officer who was killed in a skirmish.* Knowing what was in the wind, we had the greatest anxiety as to whether Umezawa would be able to fall back on the line of mountains more immediately covering Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou (J 7) without suffering a demoralizing pursuit. He got his orders on the morning of the 7th, but he did not think it was wise to evacuate Ping-tai-tzu till after dark. He then made a splendid retreat, and was not in any way harassed on his line of march. We all of us think the enemy made an enormous mistake in turning round northwards again to attack Pen-hsi-hu. They ought to have gone right on to Chiao-tou."

This is all very well, but the crux of the matter is that one of the most obvious and important parts of the problem which the Japanese had before them was how they were to cover Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou. Their best friends must admit that these dispositions were but ill-calculated to fulfil such a purpose. It is unnecessary to labour the point, for the map is quite sufficient evidence that the Colliery Hills (E/F 4) was not the place for a concentration of the bulk of the First Army if the intention was to cover Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou from an impending attack. The Japanese had several times told me of an intention of theirs to give the Russians an *ebi* in exchange for a *tai*. An *ebi* is a shrimp and a *tai* is the most delicious fish in the world. The proverb is equivalent to ours, "Set a sprat to catch a whale." The isolation of Umezawa had no compensating possibilities, and was equivalent to offering the Russians an *ebi* for nothing. It was caused by the fear of broad extensions and the desire for "regulation" fronts which the Japanese have learnt from the Germans, and are only now unlearning by very slow degrees, as the war drags its weary length along.

To return to the sequence of events. I have said that on 1st **6th Oct.** October the new dispositions were carried out, whereby the centre of the First Army's forces was shifted considerably more towards the eastern screen of mountains behind which danger appeared to be brewing. On the 6th October the Umezawa Brigade, with its head-quarters at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) was being pressed upon more and more by superior forces of Russians.

* On another occasion a general staff officer told me that "near Ta Ling (H 4) was the corpse of a Russian Staff Officer, and on it we found Kuropatkin's orders to Stakelberg instructing him to turn the right wing of the Japanese Army, and if possible march on Liao-yang." — IAN H.

who were also entrenching themselves on the heights immediately to the north. Russian scouts also appeared daily in the neighbourhood of Tung-shan-pu (F 3), which was on the left front of the First Army. To clear up the situation and put out feelers in the direction of possible danger, it was considered desirable at this time to occupy Okasaki-yama (F 3), San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3), and Tu-men-tzu (E 4 north) as advanced posts. Detachments were accordingly detailed as follows:—

One brigade, one battery for Okasaki-yama (F 3).

One company for San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3).

Two companies for Tu-men-tzu (F 3).

On 6th October the last two positions were occupied as ordered, but the enemy prevented the occupation of Okasaki-yama.

This denial given by the Russians to a force so comparatively strong as a battalion and a battery was a very significant sign. Speaking on the subject, a Japanese officer remarked: "Up till now we had been in the habit of sending out such small detachments, and had seldom met with much opposition. The natural inference was, therefore, that the Russians must be increasing in numbers behind Okasaki-yama, although the hills hid their movements from view. On the main Liao-yang-Mukden road, however, bodies of Russians could be seen, and our cavalry were pressed back by Cossacks daily."

The night of the 6th October was an anxious one at the Head-Quarters of the First Army. All these disturbing reports, and many others also, kept coming in, and it appeared beyond reasonable doubt that a general advance of the Russians was in progress, and their principal strength was opposed to the Japanese right wing. Several Russian divisions at the least appeared to be advancing from Feng-chi-pu (G 2), on the Sha Ho. Later on this night, the 6th, a spy reported that large bodies of Russians had been crossing the Hun Ho between 3rd and 5th October; also that a very considerable Russian force was advancing south from Fu-shun.* All these items of news pointed the same way, and, as in duty bound, the First Army staff reported the conclusion they had arrived at to Marshal Oyama that very night, the 6th October. Apparently, however, the Second and Fourth Armies had not yet discovered any cause of anxiety. They were frankly sceptical about the possibility of a Russian advance, for, in the words of an able officer on the staff of the First Army, the reply they gave was to the effect that "they did not know anything about it." Fortunately, however, the commander of a Japanese Army or even of a division or brigade is not carefully taught, as used to be the case in India, that anything not specially allowed by a regulation or superior authority must be wrong.

* Not on map; is about 25 miles north-east of Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2).

General Kuroki did not feel that the fact that Marshal Oyama did not believe any action was necessary in any degree relieved him from the necessity of action. The question which cried for instant decision was what should be done with the Umezawa Brigade, so far advanced at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), which must now, according to the most recent information, be almost surrounded by the enemy? Time was painfully short, but for one hour the problem was eagerly debated. The question presented itself as follows: By far the best way out of the difficulty would be that the Umezawa Brigade should hold its own and refuse to retreat. But was this possible? If the First Army had stood alone, then, as far as its own dispositions were concerned, such a solution seemed feasible. For, after careful calculation, there was found to be a very reasonable ground for hope that there would be time for one or more of the other divisions to run out their right wings so as to join Umezawa and form line with his left before he could be crushed. This, from the point of view of morale especially, would be a much better solution than retiring Umezawa. The First Army, however, did not stand alone, and the crucial point was whether, with the best will in the world, the Fourth and Second Armies would be able to join up with the left of the Army in a similar manner? At that time the main forces of the Fourth and Second Armies were still a considerable distance behind, near Liao-yang, and two or three days would be necessary for them to move up in line as desired. The question thus resolved itself into a consideration of whether the Umezawa Brigade could hold out in its present position for two or three days, and as this was considered impossible, orders were sent to it to fall back on Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5).

An argument which had some effect in reconciling the First Army Staff to this very distasteful idea of a withdrawal was that by such a movement the Russians might be inveigled into a very difficult and intricate terrain, nearer to the Japanese main forces. In such a country it was reckoned that their superior force of cavalry would be practically thrown away, whilst their heavy field artillery might find itself unable to quit the main tracks. Moreover, there were great strategical compensations imaginable as an offset to the retirement of Umezawa and his pursuit by a large force of Russians, provided always that there seemed reasonable prospect of ultimately arresting the enemy's advance on this side. For such a development seemed to offer a good chance of making a counter turning movement against the other flank of the Russians, which must temporarily have been weakened to reinforce the advance against Umezawa, and a success in the neighbourhood of the railway and high road to Mukden would be infinitely more telling than a Russian success in the mountains to the east.

On the evening of 7th October the Umezawa Brigade withdrew, in accordance with the orders it had received, to

about 2 miles south of the Ta Ling (H 4) and 4 miles north of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5). Umezawa being very much in contact with the enemy, who was threatening to surround him, did not attempt to retire by day, but slipped away after dark, and got clear without having a shot fired at him.

This was an excellent beginning for the Japanese and a very bad one for the Russians, who certainly lost a great chance by permitting this small isolated force to extricate itself so cheaply. The following orders were issued from the First Army Head-Quarters on this date:—

Feng-shen,* 7th October 1904, 2 p.m.

1. The Russians occupying the valley of the Hun Ho, east of Mukden, are moving south. The heads of the Russian columns seem to have arrived on the line Sung-shu-chu-tzu (J 2)—Feng-chi-pu (G 2) through Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2) during yesterday (6th).
2. The First Army will occupy the line from the vicinity of Yu-shu-te-hsia (H 5) to the vicinity of Yen-tai Coal Mine (E 4) through the height south of Shang Yin-chiang-pu (G 4).
3. The Umezawa Brigade will occupy the vicinity of Yu-shu-te-hsia (H 5) as soon as possible.
The 24th Regiment and the Head-Quarters of the Artillery Battalion, with the two batteries, will return to its own division (12th) in the vicinity of Tung-chia-pu-tzu (F/G 5).
4. The 12th Division will commence its movement to-day, and will occupy the height south of Shang Yin-chiang-pu (G 4).
5. The Guard Division will commence its movement to-day and will concentrate near Chang-hai-tun (F 5), $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles north-east of Ta-yao (E/F 5), and entrench on the heights north of that place. The advance party of the Guard Division will be left on the height near Tu-men-tzu (E 4, north).
6. The 2nd Division will remain in its present position, concentrating as much as possible.
7. The cavalry brigade will reconnoitre in the direction Shuang-tai-tzu (E 3), north of San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3).
8. The G.O.C. will be at Feng-shen.*

At noon on 7th October the Head-Quarters of the 12th Division left Ta-yao (E/F 5) village. Up to this time the Japanese thought the Russians had only at the most two divisions around Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5), and the intention with which the 12th Division started was to fall upon the right flank of these advancing forces. The numbers of the enemy, however, so greatly exceeded the estimate, and increased so rapidly, that

* Not on map; is 3 miles north-east of Liao-yang (see Map 40).

the Japanese lost the power of initiative, and had to expend all their energies in attempting to reinforce Pen-hsi-hu.

Four battalions and one battery were left behind by the 12th Division on the heights north of Tung-chia-pu-tzu (F/G 5) to fill up the gap between them and the main force of the First Army.

As a supplement to the First Army Orders of 7th October, two battalions of the 29th Reserve Regiment were ordered to return to Ta-yao (E/F 5) by the afternoon of 8th October, and the I./39th Reserve Regiment was also directed to take up its position at that village. These three battalions constituted the reserve of the First Army at the commencement of the Sha Ho battle. The following Manchurian Army Order was issued by Marshal Oyama on the 8th of October:—

The Manchurian Armies must concentrate their respective forces as much as possible, and be ready to counter-attack at any time.

The First Army will occupy the vicinity of Yen-tai Coal Mine village (E 4) and Tung-chia-pu-tzu (F/G 5).

Second and Fourth Armies will take up their positions on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho with their forces as compact as possible behind the lines taken up.

The First Army had practically anticipated this order, and had nothing more to do on receipt of it.

On 8th October, a bold concentrated attack by the Russians **8th Oct.** on Umezawa must infallibly have succeeded. The reinforcements from the 12th Division were still so far back that they did not arrive on the scene till the evening of the 9th October, and the trenches and abattis by which the Japanese eventually compensated to some extent for their great numerical inferiority were only being hurriedly put in hand. But instead of falling on in the resolute fashion of men who realize that time is the very essence of the situation, the Russians merely played with their opportunity. They skirmished a little from the north with the attenuated covering front line of Umezawa, and on his extreme, thrown back, right at Pen-hsi-hu, made an enveloping movement. On the 7th October the entire garrison of that place had consisted of two mountain guns, three companies of reserve infantry, and one troop of cavalry, out of which 70 men had been sent on detachment to Chiao-tou (J 7). On the 8th, a welcome reinforcement of two battalions and two guns arrived from Umezawa's front line, making up this garrison to a strength of approximately 2,000 rifles, 4 guns, and 50 sabres. A Japanese officer informed me that:—"At this time three Russian battalions with five guns appeared east of Pen-hsi-hu, whilst another party crossed the Tai-tzu Ho at Wei-ning-ying (K 5)." On another occasion he said: "The two regiments of Cossacks who crossed the Tai-tzu Ho were accompanied by at least one brigade of infantry." According

to Captain Jardine, who has lived with the 12th Division, and got his information from officers present, the Russians on the 8th occupied Wei-ning-ying (K 5) with four battalions, which were supported by a brigade at Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4), whilst simultaneously 1,500 cavalry under Rennenkampf crossed the Tai-tzu Ho and moved round till they interposed between Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou, cutting the telegraph wire as they went. Whereas, however, the officer above mentioned gives the force of infantry which accompanied the cavalry at a brigade at least, Captain Jardine's informants speak of two or three battalions. I think it is certain, at any rate, that there was a brigade at Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4), and I am sure it is a moderate estimate of the Russian force within a few miles of Pen-hsi-hu to put it at 12,000 rifles, several batteries, and 1,200 sabres.

If war were like chess, where the power of a piece is constant, then Pen-hsi-hu was lost, and Chiao-tou also. Not only was the weak garrison of the former place almost surrounded by very superior forces, but its line of communication through Chiao-tou to Lien-shan-kuan* was apparently already in the grasp of the enemy. It seemed possible, indeed, that the Russians, by making adroit use of the advantage they had gained, might compel Kuroki to fall back some distance, just as Umezawa had been forced to fall back from Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) in the first instance. In Chiao-tou itself, where large stores of food and material had been accumulated under immense difficulties, there was positively only one company of Japanese infantry as garrison. The officer commanding the depôt at Chiao-tou did the best he could to extemporize some simulacrum of a force, and armed the military coolies available with captured Russian rifles. There are three passes, one of which must be crossed by the troops coming down from Pen-hsi-hu to Chiao-tou. The commander of Chiao-tou was able to spare ten men to hold each of these passes. A draft was on its way from Lien-shan-kuan,* and a staff officer was sent by the General Officer commanding the Line of Communications with another 300 men, scraped together from anywhere, to reinforce the Chiao-tou garrison. The 5th Reserve Brigade, which had recently landed at An-tung, was also directed to move by forced marches on Chiao-tou, but neither of these parties would have been in time had the Russians attacked.

I have just used a comparison drawn from the chess board. The situation resembled that in which a player has concentrated his attack on an important piece; he has only to take it, losing something in exchange; his will becomes paralyzed; he wastes two moves in doing nothing essential, and inevitably loses the whole game. The Russians acted thus. The initiative was theirs, and owing to sheer want of

* Not on map; is 30 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5).

"go" they permitted it gradually to slip back into the hands of the Japanese. It was not only that the Russians seemed stricken with paralysis opposite and around the extreme Japanese right, just at the moment when they had only to grasp the nettle quickly and firmly to score a considerable, if by no means a decisive, success; it was that they did not even demonstrate actively in front of the centre and left of the First Army so as to prevent the Japanese from repairing the original blunder they had made in their distribution of their forces. On this subject an officer remarked to me with much justice: "Had the Russians pressed simultaneously all along the line, the right of our Army could hardly have escaped being crushed. As it was, on the night of the 8th the Umezawa Brigade was almost entirely surrounded."

Orders given to the commander of the 12th Division at **9th Oct.**
9.20 a.m., 9th October:—

1. Leave necessary troops in present position and hasten to drive back the Russians in the direction of the Ta Ling (H 4).
2. The Umezawa Brigade will be under your command.

The Chief of the Staff had already explained the situation to General Inouye, commanding the 12th Division, and now the latter was left to use his own judgment.

Orders to Major-General Umezawa, 9.20 a.m., 9th October:—

1. Your brigade is placed from now under the command of the G.O.C. 12th Division.
2. The 12th Division will leave a retaining force in its present position and advance on the Russian right in front of your brigade.

Orders to the officer commanding the 2nd Cavalry Brigade,
2 p.m., 9th October:—

1. The Russians round Pen-hsi-hu are attacking, and fighting has been going on since dawn. About two regiments of Russian cavalry are advancing along the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and have cut the communications between Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou.
2. Your brigade will advance to Chiao-tou as soon as possible, to co-operate with the garrison there and reconnoitre to its front. If possible, try to repulse the enemy.

At the time these orders were issued the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was engaged in reconnoitring, and there was only one regiment present at Brigade Head-Quarters, Mien-hua-pu (G 4). This regiment started at once, taking with it the machine guns, while the other regiment was recalled that night, and started later.

On the 9th October the distribution of the Russian left was as follows:—

One division north of Wei-ning-ying (K 5);

One division on the main Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) road;

Two divisions between Yao-chien Ling (G 4) and San-chia-tzu (F 3); and

One brigade south of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5).

I cannot carry on the narrative better than by interpolating here some remarks by an officer of the First Army:—

"We thought it hopeless to expect to save Chiao-tou with only some 300 men to defend it, and also we hardly thought Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) would hold out against the Russian division which was attacking it. In fact, we considered it almost impossible for our troops at Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou to stand their ground until the arrival of the cavalry brigade. The cavalry brigade was, however, so to say, our last card, and if it should be defeated, our line of communication on the right would be entirely cut. Taking the above into consideration we simply did not dare take the risk, and so this second order was despatched to the cavalry brigade on the evening of the 10th:—'Instead of advancing to Chiao-tou, stay at Sha-kan,* on the Tai-tzu Ho, in order to guard the rear of the right wing of the army.'"

"Fortune being on our side, before the above order reached the cavalry brigade it was already in Chiao-tou, and the dying man on our right once more began to breathe."

The Japanese have enjoyed much good fortune during this campaign, not all of it deserved, but for a sheer unadulterated stroke of phenomenal luck this miscarriage of an order was impossible to compete against. The cavalry started at 5 p.m., October 9th, and reached Chiao-tou in 22 hours.

Orders received at 10 p.m., 9th October, from Marshal Oyama:—

1. The Japanese Armies of Manchuria will attack the Russians before the latter are ready to attack us.
2. The First Army, including the 12th Division and Umezawa Brigade, should attack Hsia Shih-chiao-tzu (H 3), due north of Pen-hsi-hu.

When the main force of the Fourth Army reaches Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Yentai), the main force of the First Army should attack the Russians.

The Fourth Army will begin to advance early on the morning of 10th October.

The Second Army will line up with the Fourth Army and attack the Russians with its left thrown forward.

* Not on map; is 15 miles south of Ta-yao (E/F 5).

First Army orders founded on above, 11.30 p.m., 9th October, Ta-yao (E/F 5):—

1. Since last night the Russian movement to the front and on the right and right rear of the wing has become more active. We have seen at least four divisions. The Russians on the main Liao-yang-Mukden road appear to be about one division, but their force there is increasing. Their advanced guard was near Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) this afternoon.

The Russians on the west of the main road advanced to the line Li-ta-jen-tun (C 2)—Liu-tang-kou (D 2). The main body is at the latter place and at San-chia-tzu (C 2).

2. The Fourth Army commences to advance from dawn to-morrow, and will attack the Russians near Ku-chia-tzu (E 2) and Huang-hua-tien (E 2). The Second Army will advance alone on the left of the Fourth Army toward the line Pan-chia-pu (E 2)—Tai-ping-chuang (C 2).
3. The First Army will advance when the Fourth Army arrives at Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), to-morrow, towards Feng-chi-pu (G 2), attacking the Russians there with its main force.
4. The 12th Division and Umezawa Brigade will continue to act its part as ordered, and will advance towards Kang-ta-jen-shan (H 2) after repulsing the Russians.
5. The Guard and 2nd Division will occupy their present positions.
6. The general reserve of the First Army (29th Reserve Regiment—two battalions—and the II./39th Reserve Regiment) will concentrate south of Hui-yao (F 5) and east of Ta-yao (E/F 5) before 4 a.m.
7. The cavalry brigade will have its main force near Chien-chang-tzu (K 4), guarding the roads in the valley of the Tai-tzu Ho on the right rear of the Army.

The first news that came to hand on the 10th October **10th Oct.** from the right was extremely disquieting. At 5 p.m. on the afternoon of the 9th, the important outpost mountain of Ming Shan (J 5) had been taken, and as it commanded a part of the trenches towards the eastern end of the line these had to be evacuated. Towards nightfall Shih Shan (J 5), the other outpost mountain, was also lost, and Stakelberg himself, with the Russian main body, arrived at Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4). I resist the temptation to enlarge upon all this very interesting fighting, as Captain Jardine's description* and Captain Vincent's sketches deal fully with the subject. Suffice it to say that the remarkable want of appreciation of time as a prime factor in warfare, which is such a thoroughly Russian characteristic, was never more clearly exemplified than on

* See pages 658-9.

this occasion. As Ming Shan (J 5) and Shih Shan (J 5) fell, fresh troops ought to have moved forward at once to improve the advantage, and no Japanese who was present doubts that if the Russian commander had done this he would have succeeded in penetrating the Japanese line in the dusk of the evening. The Russians were in no hurry, and what was the consequence? At 8 p.m. three battalions and a battery of mountain artillery sent by General Inouye from the 12th Division arrived under Major-General Shimamura at Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5). This enabled the two battalions of the Umezawa Brigade to be sent back to him to the Ta Ling (H 4), where they were urgently required, and still left Pen-hsi-hu considerably strengthened. Nor did the Russians who had crossed the Tai-tzu Ho attack Chiao-tou (J 7) as expected, but turned northwards to attack or threaten Pen-hsi-hu from the south, thus presenting their backs to the approaching Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which thus had yet another stroke of good fortune in store for it.

Perhaps, however, the culminating point of want of initiative on the part of the Russians was reached at 11 a.m. on the morning of the 10th. Stakelberg had on the previous evening achieved very considerable successes. It remained for him to improve these with a complete victory before anything happened, which might enable his enemies to recover themselves. For this purpose he had available in the neighbourhood 15,000 infantry, against the 3,000 rifles of the Japanese. It is extremely difficult to arrive at anything approaching accuracy as regards the numbers of the Russians. The Japanese say that Stakelberg had altogether five divisions opposite Pen-hsi-hu, Ta Ling (H 4), and Tu-men Ling (H 4). Two of these divisions were supposed to be in the vicinity of Pen-hsi-hu. This would give a force of double the number I have named. But I have arrived at my figure by asking many questions and by making the deductions which experience has taught me are so necessary, and I believe the 15,000 may be taken as a fair and moderate estimate. No attempt was made by Stakelberg to press his advantage during the night, and in the morning there was a mist which might have helped him to get to close quarters. Still he did nothing. At 11 a.m. the mist rose, and what happened? An attack by Stakelberg? Not yet; that was to come in due course, without any unseemly haste. Meanwhile there was a small preliminary play to be enacted. Three Japanese companies, say 500 men, attacked Shih Shan (J 5), the important outwork captured by the Russians on the previous evening, and in the face of both armies re-took it after a very severe struggle from the unsupported garrison. When this feat of arms was quite satisfactorily settled and finished in favour of the Japanese, then, and not until then, did the Russian main force slowly deploy its huge masses, and crossing the valley, engaged the

Japanese line along the whole of its front. I feel that this story carries with it its own commentary, and that it would only weaken the moral did I attempt to emphasize it in any way. In front of the Ta Ling (H 4) and Tu-men Ling (H 4) nothing was happening. The Russians were in touch with the defence at both places, but they were giving the 12th Division full time to come up and reinforce, and it must have been obvious to them that the Japanese were not yet quite ready with their entrenchments.

On this day, the 10th, the advance of the Fourth Army was not carried out according to the programme, and the First Army, therefore, could not advance.

Orders First Army Head-Quarters, 3 p.m., 10th October, Ta-yao (E/F 5):—

1. The First Army will remain in its present position.
2. The general reserve will spend the night at Hui-yao (F 5).
3. The G.O.C. will be at Ta-yao (E/F 5).

Remark by a Japanese Officer: "As mentioned before, we had almost given up hope of relieving Chiao-tou, but as the Russians did not attack that place, the cavalry brigade was again ordered to Chiao-tou on the 11th inst. in order to restore the communications with Pen-hsi-hu."

Orders for 11th, dated 10 p.m., 10th October, Ta-yao (E/F 5):—

1. The Russians in front of the First Army are entrenching from the heights north of Mien-hua-pu (G 4) to San-chia-tzu (L 4), and their advance party is on the height south of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) and on the height north of Chien-tao (F 4).

The 10th Division and 10th Reserve Brigade, Fourth Army, are occupying the height north of Ying-kuan-tun (E 4), and their object is to line up with the left wing of the First Army to-morrow and to attack the enemy in front.

The cavalry brigade will advance towards Chiao-tou (J 7) to-morrow. (When the order was issued the cavalry brigade had already been seven hours in Chiao-tou.)

2. The First Army will occupy the line from the height north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) to the height north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) with its main force early to-morrow morning.
3. The 12th Division will continue to carry out its former orders, but if possible, at the same time that the main force First Army attacks, the Kigoshi Detachment will push forward and attack towards the Yao-chien Ling (G 4).

4. The Guard Division before sunrise will expel the enemy from height 238 (F 4), and attack toward the heights north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4).
5. The 2nd Division before sunrise will occupy the heights north of Chien-tao (F 4) and then attack the height north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3).
6. The general reserve First Army will be concentrated south of Hui-yao (F 5) at 4 a.m.
7. The G.O.C. will be at Cheng-tzu Shan (E/F 5) (south of the Coal Mine) at 8 a.m.

Orders from Marshal Oyama at 10.45 p.m., 10th October :—

1. The G.O.C. intends to press the enemy to the north-east of the main road. The First Army will carry out its former instructions.
2. The Fourth Army on the 11th will expel the enemy from Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) and then wheel to its right.
3. The Second Army repulsing the enemy in front, will facilitate the right wheel of the Fourth Army by attacking.
4. The general reserve (Fifth Division and Reserve Brigade and one regiment of the Artillery Brigade) of the whole Army will concentrate at Ta-lien-kou (E 5).

11th Oct. The 11th October was spent in trying to carry out General Baron Kuroki's orders, with varying, and, on the whole, not with very brilliant success. I will take the line of battle from right to left, and briefly indicate what will be found in full detail in the reports of Lieut.-Colonel Hume, Captain Vincent, and Captain Jardine. At Pen-hsi-hu my narrative left the Japanese awaiting the attack of the Russians all along their line on the forenoon of the 10th. The history of that day may be given as one of the defenders being just able to hold on, and no more, against great odds unintelligently led. I call special attention to what Captain Jardine says about the amazing bad shooting of the Russians from the top of Ming Shan (J 5). On the 11th desperate attacks of the same ill-directed, ill-combined descriptions continued. If a first-class general could have taken the Russians in hand, and concentrated here and dispersed there, then the Japanese themselves think their lines must have been broken, but no supreme attempt was made to get through at all costs at any one point. On this date there was another remarkable example of bad Russian shooting, this time by the artillery, who inflicted no loss on a Japanese battalion at 2,000 yards, slowly crossing in close order the broad and swiftly flowing Tai-tzu Ho. The night of the 11th then saw no material change in the situation at Pen-hsi-hu.


At the Ta Ling (H 4) nothing happened on the 11th except the steady increase in the numbers of the enemy.

At the Tu-men Ling (H 4) the enemy attacked with forces greatly superior, which worked up to within 600 yards of the Japanese trenches, but did not press to the assault.

So much for the Umezawa Brigade and the 12th Division, the next troops, moving westwards, being the Guard Division. I have given General Kuroki's orders, and in Colonel Hume's report* will be found the versions of these orders as furnished to him by Major-General Asada.

The story of the Guard Division is briefly that it got about half way to its objective during the night, and that after daybreak it could make no further progress. The right column took Wai-tou Shan (G 3) by daybreak without opposition. It did not dare advance across the broad open valley to its front, and attacked the enemy in the hills on the other side of it, and, indeed, the tendency of the Russians was to counter-attack against the exposed flank of the Guard on Wai-tou Shan (G 3) and to force it back. It was not, indeed, till 4.30 p.m., when it received assistance from one of the battalions left behind by the 12th Division, that the right column felt at all secure.

The left column of the Guard, which was to make for the hills north of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) after taking point 238 (F 4), also achieved the first part of its task by a night march, but not in this case without fighting. I repeat the formations as shown in Lieut.-Colonel Hume's report. They are almost identical with the formations ordered to be adopted for the night attack which never came off, but was stopped at the last moment, on the Friday before the battle of Ladysmith, called sometimes "Mournful Monday":—




As soon as the first shots were fired at them, which was when they got within about 50 yards of the enemy's advanced

* See page 617.

sentries and within 250 yards of the enemy's line on the crest, the two battalions modified their formation as follows:—

1st line 1 battalion
deployed in double
rank with 20 yards
between com-
panies.

2nd line 1 battalion
with 20 yards be-
tween companies.



The hill was taken without very serious fighting. The chief point of interest seems to me to be that in the half light, just before dawn the Russians were plainly visible on the crest line, whilst the Japanese in the valley were quite invisible. In a night attack, where the difficulty of seeing is the chief factor the smallest advantage in this respect is apt to be decisive. It was for this reason that some of our officers towards the end of the South African War, used to put their night outposts somewhere down the reverse slope of a hill, so that they might see the enemy coming over the sky line. The Boers also did this sometimes, and now I find the Japanese more and more inclining to sacrifice the advantage of a long field of fire for the advantage of forcing the enemy to take up the sky line if he wishes to attack. Of course as soon as daylight comes the crest of the ridge is again occupied.

After the left column under Major-General Watanabe had taken height 238 (F 4) it was attacked from the direction of Shang Liu-ho (F 4) and Watanabe-yama (F 4), and had all it could do to hold on to what it had captured. At 1 p.m. the situation seemed dangerous, and the troops on height 238 were reinforced by the last reserves. These, together with the Japanese Guard Artillery, proved sufficient first to check the Russians, and then, very gradually, to assert a certain superiority, although not sufficient to enable any advance to be made until 4.30 p.m. At that hour two battalions moved north-westward on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) to co-operate with the 2nd Division in its attack on that mountain, with one battalion supporting them by advancing towards Yeh-ho-kou (F 4). The Russians repulsed this combined attack by parts of the Guard and 2nd Divisions, and the situation on the evening of the 11th was practically what it had been at daybreak. What the Guard had gained had been gained in the night. Since daylight it had only succeeded in holding on, and as evening fell and his

attack on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) failed, the general officer commanding must have realized that he was not in a very comfortable position. His left, which had been repulsed, had climbed back on to 238 (F 4), and was there in echelon well in advance of the 2nd Division to its south-west. The right of the Guard on, and in advance of, 242 (G 4), was absolutely exposed, and a serious attack by the Russians on that part of the line might easily have sent the whole of the division back to the positions they had occupied before the commencement of the battle. This attack was not made, and the Guard was thus permitted to retain what it had gained by its night attack as a stepping stone to a further advance.

Continuing to move to the left, the next troops to be considered are the right of the 2nd Division, which consisted of the 3rd or Matsunaga Brigade. At 2 a.m. on 11th October, Matsunaga had received orders from Divisional Head-Quarters to attack the Russian position on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) at dawn. He attacked at 5 a.m., and got within a few hundred yards of the spurs running south-west from San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) main mountain without much difficulty. There his further progress was arrested by two battalions occupying the spurs in question and by the Russian artillery north of San-tai-tzu (F 4) and east of Yeh-ho-kou (F 4) until 11.30 a.m., when he threw in his reserves to reinforce his left. The Japanese then made a very determined attack, the details of which I saw much more clearly than I could have done had I been taking part in the struggle. Captain Vincent also got a good view, and I will not repeat what he has put so well in his report. I will only say that I was immensely struck with the Russian parade-like stiffness and inflexible immobility, which seem to render them passive spectators of their own impending envelopment and destruction by the lightning-like movements of the Japanese. I could see every man of the section referred to by Captain Vincent as they darted from cover to cover along the, to us, exposed flank of the low south-western spur of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). The panoramic view* gives an excellent idea of the ground, and taken in conjunction with the map almost tells the story by itself. The Russian advanced post of perhaps fifty men was exactly on the point of a little knoll, and behind it was a wood in which, from its appearance after the fight, at least a regiment of Russians must have been posted. The wood was only some two hundred yards distant from the top of the knoll occupied by the advanced post, and yet when the Japanese got round the right flank of this small body the troops from the wood gave no assistance. The Russian commander of the advanced post made a great mistake in not throwing out a few men on his right flank down into the broken ground which existed at the foot of the knoll. Had he done this, the small

* See Panorama 6.

party of Japanese who got round his right and suddenly appeared in his right rear, only fifty paces distant, could not have made their encircling movement half way up the knoll without being themselves completely enfiladed from below.

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On the right of the 3rd Brigade the effort to move forward had produced results corresponding to those achieved on the left. That is to say, a firm lodgment was effected on the under features south of the main San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) ridge, but the fire from the wood south-west of the ridge, and also from the crest lines of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), was too severe to permit either right or left column to advance across the neck and attack the big mountain.

The next and last section of the advance was that of the left of the First Army, the 15th Brigade, under the command of Major-General Okasaki, who had been ordered to attack Tera-yama or Temple Hill (F 4) from the position he had taken up during the night in the villages of Shuang-liu-ssu (E 4) and Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). I was able to see this attack also, and a more interesting contrast to the operations of the 3rd Brigade just described it would be difficult to imagine. Matsunaga and his brigade were on mountains, attacking Russians on mountains. Okasaki, only three miles to his left, was on the dead level plain, and about to attack Russians also on the dead level plain, with the exception of a small portion of their force posted on Temple Hill. This Temple Hill and the whole of its surroundings are admirably well shown in his panorama by Captain Vincent.* Temple Hill stands out as a salient knoll connected by a long low neck of ground at a gentle slope, with the mountains on the other side of the Ku-chia-tzu (E 2)-San-tai-tzu (F 4)-Shang Liu-ho (F 4)-Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) valley, from which the Russians had advanced to seize San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and threaten the Coal Mines (E 4). These mountains were full of Russians, and in the part of the field now under consideration, Temple Hill was their most advanced position. The hill itself was about 500 yards long, about 50 yards broad at the top, and about 80 feet above the level of the plains. All along the western side of the hill, and as far as the salient of the spur to the south, was a deep sunk road worn by ages of Chinese traffic into a covered way two feet to six feet below the level surface of the ground. It was in so far better than the best fortification that there was no freshly turned earth to betray its exact alignment. The Russians, however, always threw away such an advantage by exposing themselves. They occupied the sunken road and Temple Hill itself, and although the villages of Ku-chia-tzu (E 2) and San-tai-tzu (F 4) restricted the field of fire considerably, enabling an enemy to work up without exposing himself much within six hundred to four hundred yards

* See Panorama 6.

of the position, still, this last stretch of perfectly level, bare ploughed land was about as nasty an interval to cross over as it is possible to imagine. Especially was this the case when it is borne in mind that the Japanese line of advance was enfiladed from its left by the Russian guns at San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) and from its right by the battery north of San-tai-tzu (F 4). There was much similarity in the task allotted to the Fourth Army and that which the 15th Brigade was ordered to undertake. The Fourth Army Commander was directed to attack San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) on the morning of the 11th, just as Okasaki was ordered to attack Temple Hill. The reason Okasaki did not move until the afternoon was that he had been advised to keep touch with the left of the Fourth Army, and that Army did not seem able to get on. A former report of mine* dealing in detail with the remarkable night attack by the Fourth Army on San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3), saves me the trouble of dealing further with that part of the operations, except to point out that the commander of the Fourth Army did not seem inclined to run the risk of a frontal attack over ground and against an objective curiously similar to that against which the 15th Brigade was about to move.

However this may be, Okasaki determined to wait no longer, and indeed at 3 p.m. he had received a reminder from General Kuroki, who, with the 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade on the defensive on his right, and the Guard and 3rd Brigade 2nd Division, held up in their attack at his centre, felt he must score a positive success at the only point now possible, viz., with his left. At 3.30 the attack began. Captain Vincent's report gives such an exact life-like description of what took place, that it would not be possible to improve upon it.† I attribute Okasaki's small losses under conditions on the whole so favourable to the defence: (1) To the bad shooting of the Russians; (2) to the short distance (comparatively) the Japanese had to cross between Ku-chia-tzu (E 2) and West San-tai-tzu (F 4) and their objective; (3) to the marvellous rapidity with which the Japanese infantry can run, a rapidity which on this occasion did not flag, owing to the short distance to be covered; (4) to the usual want of initiative of the Russian reserves and commanders on either flank. No one now can say what a vigorous onslaught from San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3), with widely extended enveloping lines on the Japanese bunched up in Ku-chia-tzu (E 2), preparing for their rush, might not have achieved; (5) to the sunken road being so deep in places that the Russian infantry were tempted to keep their heads down and simply stand waiting at the bottom of this natural trench till the Japanese jumped down amongst them.

The actual temple itself, which stands on the summit of the small rocky hill, was carried at 5 p.m., but part of the

* See page 533.

† See page 600.

ridge a few yards away to the north of it was held very bravely by the garrison for some time longer, and it was midnight before the occupation was made secure. As on so many other occasions, the Russians only began to put their best foot forward when it was too late to affect the issues of the day. There was also some promiscuous fighting in which much fierce gallantry was shown by both sides, in the vicinity of East San-tai-tzu (F 4), but here too nothing happened of any tactical moment. Thus ended the series of desperate combats which took place on the 11th October. Okasaki's successful assault of Temple Hill was a distinct, brilliant success, but there is no doubt whatever in my mind that General Kuroki was much disappointed by the general progress achieved.

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The 11th October was over, leaving an impression of disappointment and doubt upon the minds of the Headquarters Staff of the First Army, an impression which the events of the night and of next morning were destined greatly to alleviate.

First Army Orders issued at 6.30 p.m. on the 11th October:—

1. The enemy seems to be retreating on every side. The 2nd Division will advance to attack along the left wing of the 12th Division.

The Japanese force in the direction of Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) is still safe.

2. I intend to-night to take the line from the east of Tu-men-tzu (F 3) to the height north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3).
3. The Guard and 2nd Divisions will continue their advance and carry out the object of the First Army.
4. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade will continue to carry out previous orders.
5. G.O.C. will be at Ta-yao (E/F 5) to-night.

12th Oct. I will again take the Army from right to left, and give a brief summary of the actions fought during the night of the 11th–12th and on the day of the 12th.

All along the front of the Umezawa Brigade and the 12th Division at Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5), Ta Ling (H 4), and Tu-men Ling (H 4) a general and very severe attack was made by the Russians. Fortunately it was a belated one. Had it taken place even twelve hours sooner it is difficult to believe it would not have succeeded. It must be remembered that by the morning of the 12th October the bulk of the 12th Division and a considerable part of the Umezawa Brigade were concentrated at Pen-hsi-hu, also that by this time very strong defences had been constructed. The Russians who made the most determined effort

to break in were those who attacked at Honda-yama (J 5). There they advanced up the comparatively gentle slope in a mass like the Old Guard at Waterloo, and were repulsed again and again by the two companies opposed to them, for the same reason that Napoleon's Guards were repulsed, viz., they could not, and did not even attempt to, use their rifles, except as pikes were used in the middle ages. The Japanese lost 40, the Russians, at this spot, 300. By daylight the enemy had fallen back a little, and seemed to have given up the idea of carrying the lines of assault, but he showed no intention whatever of retiring.

At 10 a.m. occurred the deplorable Russian cavalry fiasco on the south bank of the Tai-tzu Ho to which I have devoted a special report.* Here *Rennenkampf* and 1,500 Cossacks, without warning their own infantry and without any serious struggle, fell back and let the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade occupy a rising ground commanding the extreme left of the Russian infantrymen, who had their backs to the river and their attention concentrated on *Pen-hsi-hu*. From this rising ground at 11.30 a.m. the six machine guns of the cavalry brigade suddenly opened at 1,400 yards range on two Russian battalions in close order, and claim to have destroyed 1,000 of them in a few minutes. Some officers are inclined to attribute the behaviour of these Cossacks to the fact that in Russia there is no divisional cavalry. Never being brought into touch with infantry, the theory is that they have even less sympathy for them than a cavalry which is sometimes brought into close touch with the foot soldiers by the divisional organization. This may seem rather far-fetched, but no ordinary reasons will account for this disastrous mistake, by the side of which some of the worst of our South African blunders appear comparatively venial. This last blow was too much for *Stakelberg*, and he began to fall back at once. By 2.30 p.m. the whole of his left had withdrawn to *Wei-ning-ying* (K 5). The next section of the line was the *Ta Ling* (H 4), where it may be remembered no attack was delivered on the 11th. This day (the 12th) at 3 a.m. a Russian regiment advanced in close formation up the road to the pass. The Japanese let them come within 450 yards, and then opened on them with their two guns in the pass. At 5 a.m. the Russians attacked and took the table-topped mountain *Gunki-yama*, which is 300 yards in front of the main defensive line and dominates it by some 20 feet. The Japanese company defending it kept the Russians off for an hour, and most of them elected to die there. Fortunately, *Gunki-yama* (H 4) was itself commanded at 700 yards range by another mountain 250 yards north-west of the *Ta Ling* (H 4), on which the Japanese had two mountain guns. As soon as it was daylight these guns played on the restricted table-top, measuring only fifty yards by

* See page 664.

eight yards, and then shrapnel worked terrible havoc on the Russians jammed together there in a dense crowd. Under such circumstances Russians hold on till they are smashed up, instead of recognizing they are in a trap, and retiring the bulk of their men to make an attack on the guns themselves, or in some manner endeavouring to modify the situation to their own advantage. However, in this instance, the fiery commander of the Japanese was by no means inclined to wait until the shrapnel had done its work, and taking the regimental standard in his hand (hence Gunki-yama, Standard Hill) immortalized himself, as can be read in Captain Jardine's interesting account. The bad shooting of the Russians was again remarkable on this occasion. A British battalion would, I honestly think, silence two mountain guns at 700 yards very speedily, if, as I understand was the case on this occasion, they were using direct fire. Then, again, the Russians, in strength, held a hill at 600 yards in flank of the Japanese counter-attack, which moved along a narrow ridge and was thoroughly well enfiladed. Yet the Russian fire, judging by the casualties, seems to have done little harm. There was no further fighting on the 12th in front of the Ta Ling (H 4).

At Tu-men Ling (H 4) it will be remembered that on the evening of the 11th the Russians had worked up to within 600 yards of the advanced Japanese position. A very good idea of this advanced position can be obtained from Captain Jardine's sketch.* At 4 a.m. on the 12th October the Russians attacked the advanced post of the Japanese with the bayonet. Just at dawn the Russians got a footing on the western extremity of the trenches, but this was commanded and enfiladed from the higher eastern extremity at eighty yards range, and they were all killed or driven down the hill again. During the day the Russians gradually fell back to a respectful distance. They had brought two battalions against two companies, and had failed with a loss of 133 dead, who were left lying just in front of the Japanese advanced post trenches.

Moving westwards, the Guard on the evening of the 11th was still occupying hills 242 (G 4) and 238 (F 4), which they had seized the previous night. To carry out their orders it was now necessary to make another night attack, and one which promised to be more serious than their last. For the enemy was now fully on the alert, and was also of the strength of, approximately, a division. The right column, starting from 242 (G 4), had, however, no difficulties to encounter, for as it turned out the enemy to their front along the south side of the Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) valley had retired during the night. Accordingly it reached San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) before daylight, and afterwards moved further north towards Hua-kou-ling Shan (G 3) and Ma-erh Shan (G 3), to try and cut the line of retreat of the enemy. The course of the left column was not to

* See page 650.

be so easy. The orders its commander got from Lieut.-General Asada, commanding the division, were to drive the enemy off Watanabe-yama (F 4, east), the northern continuation of ridge 238 (F 4) on which he stood, and to occupy Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) before dawn.

Lieut.-Colonel Hume's map* is the best on which to follow the subsequent movements of the Guard's left column or 2nd Brigade (Major-General Watanabe). One of its regiments was told off to start at 2.30 a.m., and march down the valley on the east of the ridge 238—Watanabe-yama—and capture Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) and the spur to the east of it before dawn. The other regiment was to attack along the top of the ridge and along its eastern slope. It was to start at the same time as the right column (2.30 a.m.), and after driving the Russians off Watanabe-yama, was also to make Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) its ultimate objective. What actually occurred was that one battalion marched in double column of route by fours, one column on each side of the sharp ridge, right down upon the enemy, whilst another battalion moved down into the valley to the east, and then, when it had got level with the enemy's position, advanced up the eastern slope so as to strike him in flank. In each case the attackers deployed when firing began. The Japanese formations, as described by Lieut.-Colonel Hume, seem to me to have been excellent, and to exactly have fitted the requirements of the situation. The descriptions given by the Japanese commanders are very valuable. The one point on which they might perhaps give a misleading impression is that it might be inferred from them that everything progressed with clockwork regularity. I have gathered from others who were present that there was at one moment terrible confusion, which seemed almost irremediable—Russians and Japanese firing in every direction or rushing anywhere and anyhow with bayonets at the charge. In a rough-and-tumble of this sort a Japanese is more at home than a European, and once the Russians broke their ranks it was all up with them.

During the remainder of the 12th October there was not much change in the dispositions of the Guard Division. These dispositions were certainly eccentric, and demand a moment's consideration. The Japanese line of battle ran generally from east to west, trending southwards on the right. Such an alignment was quite in accordance with the plan of the Marquis Oyama, who had announced his intention of advancing his left, and refusing his right, so as to push the Russians off the line of railway into the mountains to the east of it. To play their part in this scheme the Guard should have been facing a little east of north, its right keeping touch as far as possible with the 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade, its left moving level with the 2nd Division. Actually, however, it was facing north-west. Its left had pivoted on Pa-chia-tzu

* Map 44.

(F/G 4), which was more or less in line with the other divisions, but its right had been wheeled far forward so as to touch the southern slopes of Ma-erh Shan (G 3). The 12th Division, which should surely have kept some sort of connection in prolongation of the right of the Guard, was a day's march to the south-east of that flank, and not only was the continuity of the general line thus completely broken, but from a divisional point of view the right flank of the Guards was pointing northwards at such an angle to the Russian line of battle as to seem to be inviting an enterprising enemy to come and roll it up completely.

To recapitulate: the Japanese left was endeavouring to wheel eastwards. The Japanese right was kept at a standstill, both by the enemy, and, so it is claimed, by the intention of General Kuroki. Meanwhile the right centre had altogether broken its alignment, and was apparently endeavouring to bring off a *coup* on its own account by wheeling westwards, thus tending to force the enemy opposed to it on to, instead of away from, the railway! This seems to me an occasion upon which the latitude allowed to divisional commanders did not work with quite its wonted success, and the fact that all ended well should not blind a critic to the fact.

On the left of the Guard was Major-General Matsunaga with the 3rd Brigade, which, after being brought to a standstill all day by the obstinate Russian resistance on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), finally took that hill by severe night fighting, lasting from 7 p.m. until one in the morning of the 12th October. Matsunaga had now to descend from the captured mountains and cross the open Shang Liu-ho (F 4) valley to attack the Russians on the other side of it, preparatory to occupying the heights north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3). This is one instance amongst many of the cut-and-come-again nature of the Japanese soldier. The brigade had been fighting all the previous day, and had been very hard put to it to hold its own. It had carried on the combat into the night, and between 7 p.m. and 1 a.m. had stormed a formidable mountain, stubbornly held, with the bayonet. Now it was to attack across a valley of perfectly open plough land and assault the Russians lining the hills on the other side of it!

Beyond the village of Chien-chiao-cheng (F 4) there was no cover worth speaking of between troops advancing from the south and the Russian rifles on the north side of the valley. The space to be traversed during such an advance was very nearly a mile, and, except perhaps the stretch of grass burnt purposely to show up their khaki, which had to be crossed by the Gordon Highlanders at Doornkop, near Johannesburg, I have never seen a less inviting prospect for troops about to attack. The 3rd Brigade left the hardly-won summit of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) at dawn, and reached the cover of Chien-chiao-cheng (F 4) village a little before 7 a.m. without drawing

fire. From 7 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. the brigade was crowded together behind the walls, houses, ditches, and trees, which were its last cover before facing the open. During this period the village was exposed to a heavy fire from at least twenty-four guns to the north. The range was about 5,000 yards, and the shrapnel did little harm to men lying close under cover. Had the Russians possessed high-explosive, or even common shell, Chien-chiao-cheng (F 4) would I think have been a less safe starting-off point than it proved. At 10 a.m. 30 Japanese guns, 18 of them a mile to the west of the 3rd Brigade and 12 of them a mile to the east, came into action to support the impending attack. At 11.30 a.m. Matsunaga slipped his men at the Russian position. The advance resembled that of Okasaki on Tera-yama of the previous day. The men got across the 1,600 yards of open ground in three tremendous rushes, hardly firing at all. Again they streamed over the level in little wedge-shaped bunches, the swiftest of foot leading. They did not suffer much loss, owing, as usual, to the bad shooting of the Russians, and still more to their own marvellous sprinting capabilities. A Japanese soldier crossing a space of six hundred yards of plough can cover the distance in one rapid rush with all his heavy equipment on his back. This no European can do. Therefore it may be taken that a European will have twice as many bullets fired at him in any assault as a Japanese. Secondly, a Japanese is four times as difficult to hit as a European, even by the fewer bullets which are fired at him, twice as difficult because he moves twice as fast, and again twice as difficult because he is half the size. Thus we may say that it is six times easier to kill an attacking Russian, who is the slowest of all Europeans, than a Japanese. Although these comparisons are so inexact that they may be considered to some extent fanciful, yet they are not fanciful at all, but perfectly serious facts, which alone, in conjunction with detestable Russian shooting, explain the faculty of attacking entrenchments over exposed plains without crushing loss, which is frequently exhibited by the Japanese. Directly they are arrested, whether by barbed wire, rivers, very steep mountains which are not dead ground, *kaoliang* bent and twisted, &c., &c., they lose almost as much as other people, for then their small stature is the only advantage left to them.

Matsunaga took the lower fringe of the hills and a knoll north of Chien Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4), but did not pursue his advantage by attacking the Russian second line just east of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), because he paused to pull his men together, and then, just as he was going to advance, he got fresh orders. These were to the effect that he must disengage himself to his front and march down the valley due east as far as Shang Liu-ho (F 4), thence tending south-east to the Yao-chien Ling (G 4),

where the 12th Division were reported to be in a very bad way.* The order was issued at 1 p.m., but naturally Matsunaga could not turn his flank to an enemy immediately in his front and march down a broad valley exposed to all the Russian guns; at least, he could not do so as long as it was light. He therefore waited until nightfall, which will bring his further operations into the 13th October. I will only remark here that the Russians seem generally strangely slow at drawing conclusions from tactical omissions or commissions, or, at any rate, in acting upon them. This attack of Matsunaga's, so dashingy begun and so suddenly dropped in mid-career, must have aroused suspicions. The Russians should surely have imagined that something was wrong either with Matsunaga himself or somewhere else along the Japanese line of battle. Had they acted on this assumption, and, as it grew dusk, resumed contact with Matsunaga and begun to press upon him with determination, instead of confining themselves to a very small demonstration, his difficulties, and the difficulties of the entire Japanese army, might have been very much increased.

The last troops whose operations on the 12th October remain for consideration are those of Major-General Okasaki, on the extreme left. It will be remembered that Okasaki finally completed the capture of Tera-yama or Temple Hill (F 4) north, at midnight of the 11th-12th. It will also be remembered that some desultory fighting went on up to midnight about East San-tai-tzu (F 4). In the very small hours the Japanese in this part of the field occupied Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), and at 4 a.m. the main force of the brigade started from San-tai-tzu (F 4) to attack the round hill, called by the Japanese by the familiar term of Suribachi-yama (F 3). On his way he surprised and easily routed a Russian advanced detachment on the ridge south-west of Okasaki-yama (F 3) and north of Temple Hill (F 4, north). He then, after some fighting, which is well described by Captain Vincent, took possession of Suribachi-yama. The saddle connecting Suribachi-yama with the rocky ridge already captured, as well as with Okasaki-yama, was seized about the same time; also the hill projecting from the rocky ridge and to the north of it, called Nan Shan (F 3). Several of the accompanying maps and sketches illustrate this important section of the terrain, but the best for

* This explanation of Matsunaga's movement was twice given me at the time by high authority. Afterwards, however, I was told, also by high authority, that the entire and only reason of Matsunaga's expedition was to cut off the retreat of the Russians falling back from Pen-hsi-hu. My own idea is that Kuroki was actuated by a combination of both motives. He was anxious about the 12th Division, and wanted reinforcements to be near them. He had also the hope that if the 12th held their own, Matsunaga might be able to cut in on the line of retreat of the Russians. Had that officer not been pulled up at the Yao-chien Ling (G 4), a short spurt of some 8 miles would have enabled him to interpose between the Russian left wing and Mukden.—IAN H.

reference at the present stage of the operations is the small plan drawn into Captain Vincent's written report.* The panorama† gives an excellent representation of the various heights and saddles above mentioned. Having got so far, Okasaki was faced by the mountain to which he was destined to give his name. Temple Hill, taken the previous evening, had been its furthest extended southerly advanced post. He had now captured the remaining outworks of the mountain, namely Nan Shan (F 3) on its west, the rocky ridge and saddle on its west and south-west, and Suribachi-yama on its south. All this he had accomplished by 8 a.m., but the steep sides of Okasaki-yama, strongly held, and supported on the north by the Russians on Round Top Hill (F 3) and by batteries north-east of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) and between Shih-miao-tzu (F 3) and Ha-ma-tang (F 3), were too much for him to tackle, at any rate until he could get better support from his own artillery, and he made no further progress on that day. To prepare the ground for the fresh effort a Japanese brigade of artillery from the Fourth Army came into position immediately west of Temple Hill during the afternoon, and supplemented the fire of the brigade of 2nd Division artillery, which had been in action since noon a little to the north of Temple Hill. A full account of this artillery action will be found in Captain Vincent's report.

Before passing on to the engagements of the 13th, I will briefly summarize the events which I have just described:—

- (1) A general and very serious series of attacks by the Russians on the right of the First Army at Pen-hsi-hu, the Ta Ling (H 4), and Tu-men Ling (H 4) in the early morning. All repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants.
- (2) The Guard advanced at 2 a.m., and by 7 a.m. had occupied the height north of Mien-hua-pu (G 4).
- (3) The 3rd Brigade (2nd Division) occupied San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) during the night, and crossing the valley to the north of it, drove off the Russians towards Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3). It was then ordered to the Yao-chien Ling (G 4).
- (4) The 15th Brigade (2nd Division) had also advanced in the direction of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) and had captured the west, south-west, and south under features of Okasaki-yama (F 3), which still intervened between them and their objective. The impending departure of Matsunaga was about to liberate considerable Russian forces to oppose Okasaki.
- (5) The 2nd Cavalry Brigade had left Chiao-tou (J 7) at dawn and had advanced towards the rear of the Russian forces attacking Pen-hsi-hu. About 11 a.m. it had

* See page 601.

† See Panorama 6.

reached the Tai-tzu Ho, and pressing back easily a large covering force of Cossacks, it attacked the Russian reserves with machine guns, causing them great loss and determining the retreat of the whole of the Russian extreme left.

Instructions issued by First Army Head-Quarters, 6 p.m., 12th October.

1. The Fourth Army has already occupied the height north of Meng-chia-fen (F 3) and the line of hills west of that place.
2. I expect to pursue the Russians, hitting them as hard as possible.
3. The Guard Division will, I expect, press the Russians towards Shang Chia-wen (G 2) and Hsing-ling-tun (F 2) south of Feng-chi-pu (G 2).

The 2nd Division will press the Russians along the line Pei-kou (F 2) to Wa-shang-kou (F 2), and if possible the Guard Division will occupy with a detachment the height north of Feng-chi-pu (G 2). The 2nd Division will also occupy, if possible, Ta Shan (F 2) (Pagoda Hill). Having done this, the divisions will concentrate their forces and prepare to push on further.

The detachment (the 3rd Brigade), at present moving against the Russians in front of the 12th Division, will continue to carry out previous orders.

13th Oct. On the 13th October the enemy had practically cleared away from the extreme right of the First Army about Pen-hsi-hu. He had to be allowed to depart unmolested. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade, a division and a half, were holding a line 13 miles long, and it was impossible suddenly to concentrate and change from the defensive to the offensive.

At the Ta Ling (H 4) the Russian artillery violently bombarded the whole of the Japanese line all day without causing any loss, as the Japanese guns did not attempt to reply, and the infantry kept well under cover.

At the Tu-men Ling (H 4) the Russians made two somewhat half-hearted attempts to attack, but in neither case did they succeed in getting within three hundred yards of the Japanese lines. Here also the Russian guns fired heavily all day long, causing but trifling loss to the well-entrenched troops. Shrapnel is no sort of use against men in deep trenches unless hostile infantry is threatening them so closely that they have to hold their heads up to shoot.

Moving westwards, the next scene of active operations on the morning of the 13th October was the Yao-chien Ling (G 4) where the Russians at that time were successfully resisting the

indefatigable 3rd Brigade, which had been marching all night in torrents of rain to try and cut off those of the enemy who were reported to be falling back from the neighbourhood of Pen-hsi-hu, or, according to the other account, merely to hold out a hand to the 12th Division. This singular movement will assuredly excite the curiosity of future military historians. In the first place the Guard's left column, or 2nd Brigade, was nearer Yao-chien Ling (G 4), and practically on the main road leading to it. This brigade was not yet closely engaged with the enemy, and Matsunaga, by taking ground to his right, could have filled up the gap left by their departure. This method was not adopted, and Matsunaga marched to the Yao-chien Ling (G 4) in rear of the Guard, and across the section in which that division was still operating. Something similar took place in the advance on Pretoria, when my column was moved from Heilbron, on the right, across the Guards Division, to operate on the left, instead of the Guards being sent to the left, and my closing in to take their place in the centre. Unquestionably in each of these instances there must have been good reasons for the action taken, but I have no more idea what they were in one case than in the other.

Secondly, this is an occasion upon which no one dare characterize the Japanese tactics as unenterprising. Only by taking a sanguine view of the situation could it be said that the victory in the left and centre of the First Army was even half won. Yet, from that critical section of the field, General Kuroki took one of his finest brigades and sent it out of all touch with everything to try and cut off the Russians retreating from Pen-hsi-hu. Some will call such tactics daring, others will say that they were foolhardy; in any case they are extremely interesting.

I have already drawn attention to the work performed by Matsunaga's men. They fought all day on the 11th. On the night of the 11th-12th they stormed San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). On the 12th they attacked across the valley north of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and effected a lodgment on the foot of the hills on the opposite side. On the night of the 12th-13th they started at 7 p.m., and marching all night, got within 200 yards of the Russians holding the Yao-chien Ling (G 4) at 5 a.m. The night had been pitch dark, and it had poured with rain all the time. Nevertheless, the brigade made repeated attempts to storm, and fought till 9 p.m. on the 13th, losing some 500 men in their endeavours to effect a lodgment on the enemy's position. Captain Vincent has given a good account of the terrain and of the fighting, so I will not poach on his preserves.

In accordance with Instruction No. 3, issued by General Kuroki at 6 p.m. on the 12th, already given, the Imperial Guards started at 6 a.m. on the 13th to endeavour to reach Hsing-ling-tun (F 2) and Shang Chia-wen (G 2).

The orders given by Lieut.-General Asada to his right column were to take Ma-erh Shan (G 3) immediately overlooking it

to the north-east, and to attack the big mountain, Chien Shan (F 3), about two miles to its north-west. Ma-erh Shan (G 3) and Chien Shan (F 3) are joined by a col as is shown on the map with Lieut.-Colonel Hume's report.* The left column was to prolong the line of the right column to the left and attack the enemy in the hills east of Tu-men-tzu (F 3).

From these instructions and orders it seems clear that the commander of the First Army, as well as probably the commander of the Manchurian Army, had given up the idea with which the operations had commenced. The great conception of turning the right of the Russian Army by refusing the right of the Manchurian Army and advancing its left had been abandoned under the pressure of unforeseen difficulties, and the First Army was now engaged, in conjunction with the Fourth Army, in two distinct minor operations. The first was the endeavour to push the 3rd Brigade over the Yao-chien Ling (G 4), and thus cut off the retreat of a portion of the extreme left of the Russian Army. The second was an attempt to envelop both flanks of the section of the Russian forces between Tu-men-tzu (F 3) and Ma-erh Shan (G 3).

The right column of the Guard, consisting of 6 battalions, got on to Ma-erh Shan (G 3), and advanced as far as the neck joining Ma-erh Shan (G 3) and Chien Shan (F 3), beyond which point it could not make further progress owing to the heavy rifle fire from Chien Shan (F 3) and the gun fire from the north-east and north-west. A force of Russians then advanced through Hsia Hei-niu-tun (F 3) village, and the left of the right column became involved here in a very fierce and equally balanced contest.

The left column also started, according to its orders, at 6 a.m., but the Russians were in force on the hills north and east of Tu-men-tzu (F 3), and it had to halt and entrench to maintain its ground. Meanwhile, the enemy, growing bolder, began to press into the gap which had always existed between the right and left columns of the Guard, and established himself on Iida-yama (F 3), thus, as will be seen from the map,* interposing definitely between them. I hope whoever reads this will look carefully at the map with Lieut.-Colonel Hume's report at this point. The situation at this moment was very alarming. Both right and left wings were hotly engaged and the centre of the division was virtually pierced. A bold advance through this gap might capture the Japanese guns, or if sufficient Russian guns and reinforcements came on to Iida-yama to enable the force to strike out east and west, the Guard must be definitely defeated. The only body of troops available to cope with this danger was the left column itself, consisting of one battalion, and the two other battalions of the same regiment, the 4th Guards, who were all put under the command of Colonel Iida, and ordered to attack at once. I will not trespass

* Map 44.

on Lieut.-Colonel Hume's story of this assault, which he gives in the best possible way, namely, in the words of the commander. I will only call attention to the extensions used of from 3 to 5 paces, both in the first and second line, which is a fairly complete answer to those who say our deductions from the South African war were inapplicable to European conditions. The Russians fight in extraordinary close formations, so wide extensions are less necessary against them than they would be against any other troops in the world; nevertheless, the Japanese extensions are more than double what they were at the beginning of the war. Also to the company rushes of from 40 to 80 yards, and to the fact that although the Japanese did not fire, the Russians could not hit them at 600 to 200 yards. The result of this attack was that the threatening Russians were thrown on the defensive, and although Colonel Iida lost 500 men out of his one regiment, and could not take the whole of the enemy's position, which was only evacuated after dark, still there was good cause to be thankful that nothing worse had happened.

Meanwhile the right column had been repulsed. The radically unsound alignment of this column, with its flank pointing northwards, had borne fruit at last. The enemy advanced against it from Ma-erh-shan-pu-tzu (G 3) and enfiladed the line, and a battery from Wu-chia-kou (G 3) assisted the Russians' rifle fire with its shrapnel. At 2 p.m. the entire right column retired several miles into the general alignment, which, in my opinion, they should never have left. The Russians, with their accustomed lack of quick grasp of a situation, let the whole of the column, including the isolated battalion on the col between Chien Shan (F 3) and Ma-erh Shan (G 3), get back without any serious molestation. This want of enterprise is strange to understand. The battalion in question was under fire from Chien Shan (F 3). Russians were on Iida-yama (F 3) and were advancing from Ma-erh-shan-pu-tzu (G 3). It hardly seems possible that a battalion on the col between Chien Shan (F 3) and Ma-erh Shan (G 3) would be permitted to escape without very serious and demoralizing losses, and yet it did escape without active pursuit, and, so to say, with hardly a scratch! During the night the Russians re-occupied Ma-erh Shan (G 3) but evacuated Iida-yama. On this day's fighting the Guard had certainly come off second-best.

Major-General Okasaki was left on the evening of the 12th October in possession of all the underfeatures of Okasaki-yama (F 3), but the main hill, steep and dominating, still remained in Russian hands, like a pistol pointing at what was certainly now the weakest spot in the line of the First Army. For since Instruction No. 3 was issued at 6 p.m. on the 12th October, the 3rd Brigade had passed entirely out of this section of the battlefield to the Yao-chien Ling (G 4), and the 2nd Division, which, under the bold Instructions, was to press

the Russians back towards the north, consisted of the 15th Brigade reinforced by two battalions of the 29th Reserve Regiment, and the one battalion left behind by Major-General Matsunaga. Okasaki determined on the morning of the 13th that as soon as the Japanese artillery could master, or even hold its own with, the Russian guns, he must storm the main hill.

The crests of Okasaki-yama (F 3) and Round Top (F 3) were far too restricted for the superior Russian forces. Opinions vary very much as to the number of men the Russians actually put upon the hill, but there was not room for the effective employment of more than one battalion. As in the case of Spion Kop, to cram more men upon a very narrow ridge than can use their rifles is merely to offer up victims to the enemy's shrapnel without any compensating advantage, for the moral support of being surrounded by friends is lessened in proportion as these comrades become corpses. Vigorous counter-attacks against Suribachi-yama (F 3) or Nan Shan (F 3) would have given employment to the reserves, and would have prevented the Japanese from devoting the whole of their deliberate attention to the capture of Okasaki-yama, the actual assault on which was carried out only by six weak companies. From where I was standing I could distinguish individuals quite clearly, especially on the crest line, when they were silhouetted against the sky, and when I saw both sides bobbing up to fire and getting back under cover the second they had got their shot off, I recalled a famous Aldershot fulmination to the effect that "battles are not won "by Jacks-in-the-box, but by determined men," &c. To read some of these high flown dicta, it might be imagined that the way to win a battle was to make a useless sacrifice of as many men as possible in the least possible space of time.

At the moment of extreme tension and crisis, I was lost in amazement to see the procedure of the two little crowds of combatants in whom so many hopes were centred. There seemed to be about seventy Japanese and not quite so many Russians struggling on the summit. The Japanese had been lying for a long time within fifty yards of the Russian line in a little hollow of dead ground. After several attempts by small bodies which were each time repulsed, at last they swarmed up at the crest-line like a lot of bees and drew out the Russians, who, headed by an officer, darted out and drove them with the bayonet, clubbed rifles and rocks a little way down the hill. The two bodies then drew apart and remained facing one another at about fifteen yards distance for what seemed an eternity, and was certainly five minutes. During this period the little cluster of combatants swayed to and fro and closed and parted again several times, using the bayonet and sword, or throwing stones, but shooting very little. Each artillery showered projectiles without apparent

discrimination amongst this struggling knot of humanity, on whom hundreds of glasses were levelled from all parts of the field by hands trembling with excitement. It was a scene I can never forget, but I must not allow myself to be drawn into an attempt to describe it. The point I wish to emphasize is that bodies of Boers and British could not face one another in the open so long and escape annihilation. In such a *melée* as this neither bayonet, sword, nor stone would be in it against a good Boer, who would have had a man lying dead for each of the ten cartridges in his magazine in some twenty seconds. Neither side possesses even in the smallest degree the lightning deadly quickness of the Boer with his rifle. I met a soldier next day on the hill, and he told me he did not use the bayonet, but took to stone throwing. I asked him why he had done so, seeing it was surely quicker to load and fire. He said that the Russians threw stones, and that at the moment this method seemed to come most handy.

As on the 11th the capture of Temple Hill (F 4, north) by Okasaki had shed the solitary gleam of light on the results of the fighting for the First Army, so on the 13th the capture of Okasaki-yama was the only positive success along the entire front.

Speaking on the results of this day, a Japanese officer said to me about a week later: "We were at our weakest between the 2nd Division and the Guard, and it was a touch-and-go affair with us there until the night of the 13th. Up till then, if the Russians had come on with the four divisions which they had available on the line Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4)-Tu-men-tzu (F 3), and had made a determined night attack, it would have succeeded."

The victorious Okasaki was not allowed long to rest upon his laurels. Directly it was dark he moved under orders from Head-Quarters across the valley east of Okasaki-yama and attacked Lien-hua Shan (F 3). The Russians held the hill to the west of Lien-hua Shan (F 3), and Okasaki attacked it from the south-west and south. The fighting was severe and at close quarters. After the Japanese had taken the position the Russians made several counter-attacks, which were repulsed, when they fell back on Ha-ma-tang (F 3).

This was the last effort of the Russians, and the great battle of the Sha Ho was now practically over so far as the First Army was concerned.

First Army Orders, 11 p.m., 13th October:—

1. The Russian force in front of the 12th Division is still in the same position. The Russian guns near the Ta Ling (H 4) increased in numbers to-day. In front of the main force of the First Army, there are large bodies of Russians at Feng-chi-pu (G 2) and

Ta-tzu-pu (G 3), their advanced line being close to us.

2. The Army is going to continue its attack towards Feng-chi-pu from daybreak on the 14th.
3. The Guard Division will attack east of the Shang Liu-ho (F 4)—Feng-chi-pu road, and the 2nd Division will advance west of the same road.
4. The main force of the 5th Division will remain as a general reserve, concentrated at Shang Liu-ho (F 4) by 7 a.m. 14th.
5. The G.O.C. will be on the hill east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4) from 7.30 p.m.

14th Oct.

After these orders were written, however, and during the night of the 13th–14th, the Russians began a general retreat.

The 5th Division, newly lent to the First by the Fourth Army, left San-tai-tzu (F 4) and Pan-la-shan-tzu at 5.30 a.m. on the 14th, and advanced towards Wai-tou Shan (G 3) through Shang Liu-ho (F 4), with orders to press the Russians across the Sha Ho.

The 3rd Brigade was ordered to advance from Yao-chien Ling (G 4) to Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), the Russians having evacuated the pass during the night.

The following orders were issued in connection with the general advance of the Japanese First Army:—

8.40 a.m., 14th October.

- (1) When the Guard Division arrives at the valley of the Sha Ho, the G.O.C. will collect his forces and be ready to have one regiment of infantry to place at the disposal of the G.O.C. First Army at any moment.
- (2) The 2nd Division to do the same on arrival at the Sha Ho, the Reserve battalions being ready to come under the direct command of the G.O.C. First Army.

The 29th Reserve Regiment (two battalions) and the II./39 Reserve Regiment (originally the First Army reserve) had been under the command of the 2nd Division since the night of 12th October, when the 3rd Brigade was detached to the Yao-chien Ling (G 4).

The 5th Division arrived at the Sha Ho at 2 p.m. on the 14th and occupied Wai-tou Shan (G 3).

The commander of the 5th Division wished to go on, and General Kuroki entirely approved of his doing so, but on reference to Manchurian Army Head-Quarters, peremptory orders were received from Marshal Oyama prohibiting any advance beyond the Sha Ho. During the 14th the whole of the Russian army retreated to the north of the Sha Ho.

The 5th, Guard and 2nd Divisions all arrived at the Sha Ho.

The 3rd Brigade reached Ping-tai-tzu (H 3).

The Head-Quarters of the 12th Division arrived at Shang Shih-chiao-tzu (H 4).

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, east of Pen-lsi-hu, arrived at San-chia-tzu (L 4).

Much rain fell during the day, and the troops suffered greatly. There was no serious engagement, but in front of the Guard the Russians fought a delaying rear guard action on Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (F 2), north of Chien Shan (F 3), and the 2nd Division came under artillery fire near Miao-pu-tzu (F 3). When its own artillery came up it caught a Russian infantry brigade in close order, and caused it a great deal of damage. The Russians then continued their retreat.

The movement of the Manchurian Armies ended at the line of the Sha Ho. The 5th Division was now ordered back to the Fourth Army, and started on 16th October, leaving one battalion behind on Wai-tou Shan (G 3). That night (16th) the Russians made a counter-attack with one regiment against this battalion and retook Wai-tou Shan (G 3). On 27th October three Reserve battalions, supported by three battalions of the Guard, were ordered to retake Wai-tou Shan (G 3), and did so with considerable difficulty and the help of a large force of artillery, including howitzers and mortars.

Several staff officers have told me in conversation that the First Army was very keen to push on across the Sha Ho on 16th October, and to follow up the Russians while they were on the run. Marshal Oyama, however, presumably for some strategical reason which the First Army cannot fathom, forbade them to cross the river. I suggested that the river formed a good line of defence, but was assured that this was not the reason which had actuated the Generalissimo.

It is certain that at the time the First Army had supplies and ammunition enough to have enabled it to make a vigorous pursuit. When I asked the same officers whether the First Army could equally well have pursued after the battle of Liao-yang, they shook their heads, and admitted that at that time the troops had not a kick left in them.

A general staff officer explained to me in the course of some remarks on these operations, that the Chief of the Army Staff continually gives instructions to the generals commanding the divisions, so that when actual orders are issued, they are usually extremely concise.

On the 15th October there was no fighting, and on that **15th Oct.** day the Japanese First Army began to dig itself in all along the line which it was destined to occupy for several months. This line extended from the Hsin-kai Ling (G/H 4) on the right, through Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), Hua-kou-ling Shan (G 3) and Wa-shang-kou (F 2) to Pu-tsao-kou (F 2).

I have made my observations on the operations as I went along, and have therefore but little to add now.

In my opinion the whole battle was one long effort to rectify the initial bad strategical disposition of the Army at the moment of the Russian advance. In the course of this effort the Japanese rank and file performed prodigies and covered themselves with glory. Time after time the Russians were victorious from the *Kriegspiel* point of view, time after time the Japanese infantry showed that big battalions are not everything, and that morale plus system can wring victories from the worst situations.

I have ventured to criticize the despatch of the 3rd Brigade to the Yao-chien Ling (G 4). Major-General Matsunaga left the battle of the left centre at its most dangerous and critical phase, and marched far away to the south-east to try and achieve a dashing exploit elsewhere. Judging by results, he lost 500 men, inflicted no damage on the Russians, and exhausted his brigade to the last degree. The Japanese are always careful to emphasize their admiration for the boldness with which a brigade was withdrawn from a doubtful battle, and despatched from that sphere of action to try and do a brilliant *coup* elsewhere. I see nothing admirable in such tactics, and I think the only excuse for Matsunaga's night march would have been an urgent appeal for assistance from the 2nd Division.

This I have reason to believe was never made. On the contrary, by the forenoon of the 12th October the 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade were confident of being able to hold their own, and it was at 7 p.m. on that date that Matsunaga marched away.

I have also referred to the peculiar manner in which Lieut.-General Asada handled the Guard Division on the 12th October. The right flank of the Guard was obviously its most dangerous and weakest spot, and yet the commander of the right column was permitted to accentuate this danger by wheeling forward into the very jaws of the enemy.

No doubt the letter of his orders justified him in pushing on at night regardless of the hard fighting which was delaying the left column of his division, but during the next day, the 12th, it was the function of the divisional general to resume a suitable fighting alignment. He did not do so, and I do not think history will approve his appreciation of the situation. On the 13th October he had to reap to some small extent the consequences which were, it seems to me, far less serious than they might have been had he been opposed to an enemy at the same time observant and active.

I have indicated the opinion of the First Army that it was capable of pursuing the Russians beyond the Sha Ho. Certainly the troops had been severely handled, but I believe the Japanese Generalissimo could have got one more fight out of them, which might have driven the enemy north of

Mukden. It may have been remarked, however, that the troops the commander of the First Army proposed to use were not his own, but the Fifth Division, which had been temporarily lent him from the Fourth Army by Marshal Oyama. This fact will be significant to those who have served in many campaigns. It will be difficult I think to form a satisfactory judgment on this point until the war is over, and complete accounts from both sides are available for study.

**(35) Battle of the Sha Ho.—First Japanese Army.
Operations of the 2nd Division.—Fourth
Japanese Army. Operations in connection with
the 2nd Division.**

REPORT by Captain B. VINCENT, Royal Artillery.
Pan-la-shan-tzu, 1st November 1904.

Plates.

General Map -	-	-	Map	41.
View from Yen-tai Coal Mine	-	-	Panorama	6.

On 7th September, after the battle of Liao-yang, the 2nd Division took up its position in the general alignment of the First Army, between Yen-tai Coal Mine (E 4) and the railway. The right of the division was near Ta-lien-kou (E 5) and its left near Lan-ni-pu (D 5). The 12th Division was on its right and the Guard Division formed a second line behind the 12th Division near Lo-ta-tai (D 5).

On 15th and 16th September, according to orders issued by Marshal Oyama on the 14th September, the Second and Fourth Armies crossed the Tai-tzu Ho and came up into line with the First Army, and the last changed its disposition by bringing up the Guard Division on the left of the 2nd Division.

Constant reconnaissance, aided by spies, showed that the Russians were increasing daily in front of the First Army, and on 24th September new dispositions again became necessary. The Fourth Army took over the line held by the Guard, and the 2nd and 12th Divisions moved to their left, the former now entrenching itself along a position north of the Coal Mine, with its right on Ta Shan (F 4) and its left about Pai-ling-tzu (E 4).

The First Army orders, dated Feng-shen,* 7th October, 2 a.m., showed that the Russians were moving south, evidently with the object of attacking, and order No. 6 of that date was to the effect that the 2nd Division should remain in its then position as concentrated as possible.

10th Oct.

The night of the 9-10th October had been spent by the 2nd Division in its trenches, in expectation of a Russian attack, which, however, did not come off.

* Not on map; it is 3 miles north-east of Liao-yang.

The position taken up in the evening of October 9th was as follows :—

- 3rd Brigade (Major-General Matsunaga) on the right—
 - 4th Regiment entrenched on Ta Shan (F 4).
 - 29th Regiment at East Chien-tao (F 4).
 - I./2 Artillery* (No. 1, 2, 3 Batteries) on Ta Shan (F 4).
- 15th Brigade (Major-General Okasaki) on the left—
 - 16th Regiment at Shui-chen (F 4).
 - 30th Regiment at Ying-kuan-tun (E 4).
 - II./2 Artillery, 2 batteries west of the Coal Mine (E 4).
 - 1 battery north-east of Coal Mine Hill.

At about 7 a.m. three or four Russian batteries (8 guns each) took up a position on the north-west slopes extending into the plain north of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and opened fire against I./2 Artillery on Ta Shan (F 4) and also on No. 4 Battery north-east of Coal Mine Hill. For thirty to forty minutes their fire was very rapid, and then intermittent. The Japanese batteries, which were all well entrenched, with bomb-proof shelters for the detachments, did not see the Russian batteries coming into action, so in order to discover their position and to direct the Japanese fire, the officer commanding I./2 Artillery sent an observation party under an officer to the highest point of Ta Shan (F 4). This point, as I afterwards saw, was the only part of the mountain visible from the Russian gun positions, and from it the officer was able to regulate the Japanese fire by means of flags and orderlies.

Throughout the day the Russian fuzes were too long, and very few of their shell had effect on the Japanese batteries on Ta Shan (F 4).

At 11.50 a.m. I went close up to No. 4 Battery, which was very strongly entrenched on a low spur of Coal Mine Hill, with excellent bombproof shelters for the detachments, made with beams and planks brought from the mines close by. The Russian artillery opened a rapid fire on it for twenty minutes, during which time the Japanese gunners remained safely under cover, and in consequence they suffered no loss. The officer commanding the battery had a deep hole cut for himself, which afforded perfect safety from shrapnel fire.

From noon till 2.40 p.m. there was silence. Large columns of Russians coming from the directions of Okasaki-yama (F 3) and Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) slowly deployed into the valley of San-tai-tzu (F 4) in long skirmishing lines. It looked as if the Russians really intended to attack, in spite of the lateness of the hour. The Japanese outposts between Chien-tao (F 4) and San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) began to fall back on the main line of defence, the Russians pressing close behind them.

* 1st Battalion of the 2nd Artillery Regiment. Each Japanese field artillery regiment consists of two battalions, or, in British nomenclature, brigades.

One section of Japanese infantry fell back from a low rocky hill just east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4) under fire from Russian infantry, who immediately occupied it. The Japanese retired somewhat hurriedly behind an undulation some six hundred yards south of it, except one man, who quietly strolled along, too proud to hurry, to a small clump of fir trees, where he lay down unhit within five hundred yards of the Russian riflemen.

No. 3 Battery fired on this small party of Russians, who, according to an officer, were dressed in Chinese clothes.

The Russians occupied the heights of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) (called "Fort Hill" from an old Chinese redoubt at the highest point) and had posts thrown out on the smaller hills and ridges intervening between it and Ta Shan (F 4).

The 3rd Brigade remained in its entrenchments during the day, merely pushing out a few patrols to reconnoitre the Russian position, with a view to attacking it next day.

There were no casualties in the divisional artillery during the 10th October.

At about 2.30 p.m. the Russian batteries withdrew towards San-tai-tzu (F 3), but this movement was not observed by the Japanese artillery. About 11 a.m. also, I noticed from Coal Mine Hill several companies of Russian infantry advancing over the west slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and disappearing into the valley, offering good artillery targets, which, however, the Japanese batteries did not take advantage of. In fact, throughout the day the Japanese artillery fired very little. The Russian batteries were a bit too far away, and the Japanese seemed to be husbanding their ammunition.

The afternoon was quiet, the whole Russian line having halted along the valley between Temple Hill (Tera-yama) (F 4, north-west) and San-tai-tzu (F 3) and to the west and east of these places.

Ta Shan (F 4) itself formed a valuable study in field fortification. The trenches were very carefully made, and well protected from enfilade fire by frequent traverses. There were bombproof shelters every few yards constructed of fir logs roofed with sods. No. 3 Battery on the west end had two sets of gun pits, one on the crest of the ridge for firing to the north, the other on the south slope, with a good view to the west, and with detachment shelters specially constructed for protection against enfilade fire.

In some of the infantry trenches I saw, for the first time during this campaign, some attempt at head-cover, which might



have easily been improved by roofing with bundles of *kaoliang* and earth. Viewed from a few hundred yards' distance the sods and men's heads would no doubt have been confused.

There were also wire entanglements (plain wire, not barbed) in front of some of the trenches; in fact, the whole defensive line looked as if several days' work had been expended upon it, either in anticipation of a Russian attack or as a strong position to fall back upon if necessary.

At midnight 10/11th October the commander of the 2nd Division sent out orders to the commanders of brigades and the officer commanding the artillery to assume the offensive.

The orders received by the officer commanding the artillery were as follows:—

“The 3rd Brigade will attack San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), the 15th Brigade will attack Temple Hill (F 4, north-west), get in communication with the commanders of brigades, and support the attacks.”

As the two brigades had to advance against two salient points in the Russian line, and had little to do with one another, the intervening ground being open and unsuitable for an advance, I will treat the operations of each brigade more or less separately. Before doing so, however, it will be necessary to explain the dispositions of the artillery in accordance with the orders received by the officer commanding the artillery:—

II./2 artillery, south-east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). One 11th Oct. battery north-east of Ishi-yama stream (E/F 4) with detachment pits 6 feet to 8 feet deep, the other two, south of the nullah, hidden behind the rocky hill Ishi-yama and a wood, with a very limited field of fire towards San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4).

This artillery position seemed as if it had been chosen more with a view to escaping the Russian fire than to preparing the way for the infantry attack.

Of the I./2 Artillery, Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries remained in their positions of the previous day, and No. 3 moved into a new position on the plain just west of Chien-tao (F 4) village, where it also dug itself in securely in a stubble field.

Three Russian batteries (of which one was mountain artillery) came into action on the north-west slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and one battery appeared on the north-east of Temple Hill (F 4, north-west). This latter battery, the Japanese gunners say, often changed its position, moving five hundred yards to one thousand yards right or left, at least the Japanese artillery never saw the movements of the battery, but merely the flashes* coming from different places. It retired altogether in the afternoon. Some artillery of the Fourth Army came into action on the high ground south or south-west of Shuang-liu-ssu (E 4), and two of these batteries assisted a battery of II./2 Artillery by firing at San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) while another one fired on Temple Hill later on at Major-General Okasaki's request.

* The Russians used sham flashes on this occasion, as on many others.
—B. V.

According to information which I was given, there were about three Russian divisions in front of the 2nd Division and Guard Division at this time. The Russian line extended west from Temple Hill (F 4, north-west) to and beyond San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) and east along the San-tai-tzu (F 4) valley. Their main position appeared to be in the hills north of Temple Hill, while five or six companies were on the small hill itself, which jutted out some distance into the plain from the main line of hills. There was also a battery of eight guns on the low rise north of San-kuai-shih Shan (E, F 3).

At 2 a.m. on 11th October, Major-General Matsunaga commanding the 3rd Brigade, received orders from the 2nd Division Head-Quarters to attack the Russian position on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) at sunrise. The dispositions for this attack were as follows:—

4th Regiment in the first line (2nd Battalion on the right, 1st Battalion on the left, 3rd Battalion in rear of the centre).
I. 29 in reserve.

The brigade assembled north of Shang Chen-chia-kou (F 4) at 5 a.m., and the advance commenced immediately. The Japanese pushed back the Russian outposts and occupied the village of East Chien-tao (F 4). On arrival, however, at the foot of the heights north of this, it was discovered that the Russian force had been considerably increased, and a check occurred. One Russian battery north of San-tai-tzu (F 4) and two or three batteries east of Hsia Liu-ho (F 4) opened fire against the Japanese infantry, and the guns of the latter batteries concentrated their fire particularly against the Japanese reserves. Two Russian battalions had established themselves in the hills south-west of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), and for a long time held the Japanese advance in check.

During the night of the 10/11th October, Major-General Okasaki, commanding the 15th Brigade, received orders from the 2nd Division Head-Quarters to occupy the villages of Pan-lashan-tzu (F 4) and Shuang-liu-ssu (E 4) and to attack Temple Hill during the day, conforming with the movements of the Fourth Army on the left.

The position of the 15th Brigade at daybreak on 11th October was as under:—

16th Regiment at Ishi-yama and in the village of Pan-lashan-tzu (F 4).

30th Regiment in and near Shuang-liu-ssu (E 4.)

Two companies of each regiment as brigade reserves.

The G.O.C. Brigade on the hill south of Shuang-liu-ssu (E 4).

Artillery.—From Coal Mine Hill,* about half a mile north of the branch line terminus, an excellent view of the whole battle-field could be obtained. Unfortunately, up till about 9 a.m.

* See Panorama 6.

a white mist hung over the San-tai-tzu (F 4) valley, which obscured the Russian movements from view.

From 7 a.m. onwards the artillery duel was in full progress. No 2 Battery, near Chien-tao (F 4), was receiving series after series of *rafales* from the Russian artillery near San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), but most of the shrapnel burst too far over the battery, a fault which was not corrected until after some hundreds of rounds had been wasted on the bare stubble fields.

Nos. 1 and 3 Batteries on Ta Shan (F 4) were firing at the Russian shelter trenches in the hills and ridges 1,500 yards to 2,000 yards to the north between their position and San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). At 8.20 a.m. No. 3 Battery appeared to be temporarily silenced by the Russian artillery south of San-tai-tzu (F 4).

At 8.55 a.m. during a few minutes' pause in the Russian bombardment, the gunners of the Chien-tao (F 4) battery emerged from their trenches and ran off to the village for ammunition, which they brought up by hand. The Russians now lengthened their fuzes instead of shortening them, and burst their shrapnel over and behind the village of Chien-tao (F 4).

At 9 a.m. the Russian battery north-east of Temple Hill opened fire on No. 3 Battery and enfiladed it. It made excellent shooting, but the Japanese had anticipated fire from this direction, and had carefully prepared shelter in which they sat, apparently unable to return the fire.

At 9.15 a.m., the mist clearing, long lines of Russian infantry in single rank, but not extended, could be seen advancing across the valley from the foot of the hills north of San-tai-tzu (F 4) and coming out of the village itself. About four brigades crossed the valley and disappeared from view in the broken ground west of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). Large masses of Russians, baggage columns, and cavalry were moving backwards and forwards near the entrance of the Hsiao-takou (F 3) valley. About this time it looked as if the Russians meant to attack in force.

At 9.25 a.m. about a section of Japanese infantry advanced into the rocky rise "V" east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4), but five minutes later had to retire again.

At 10 a.m. the three Japanese batteries near Ishi-yama (E F 4), which up till now had been silent, opened fire. The battery north of the hill fired at Temple Hill at ranges of 3,000 to 3,500 yards, and the other two fired against the Russian artillery near San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), using shrapnel up to 3,500 yards and high-explosive shell at longer ranges. They had their wagons close up to the guns, covered with bundles of *kaoliang*. Almost immediately the Russian artillery returned their fire, and made good shooting, especially at the two batteries

south of the nullah. It was a fine example of the overwhelming effect of accurate rapid fire from Q.F. guns. The Russian shrapnel, which was well distributed, simply swept each gun in turn, and not a man dared expose himself for one second. The commanding officer's horse, the only animal near the guns, broke loose and galloped to the rear amid a storm of shrapnel bullets.

From the Russian gun position which I afterwards visited, only the bare crest line of Ishi-yama could be seen, so they evidently used indirect fire, probably controlled and directed by telephone from an observation post on the top of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). In fact some broken telephone wire was afterwards found there.

It was thought that this one-sided bombardment probably was preliminary to a general advance of the Russian infantry, but about 10.20 a.m. large bodies of Russians began to move up the valley north-west from Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), and about two brigades moved away north of Temple Hill.

At 11 a.m. a Japanese battalion in reserve near Coal Mine Hill (E 4) moved up to Ishi-yama (E/F 4).

About 11 a.m., a Russian brigade of infantry advanced from Shang Liu-ho (F 4) towards the north of San-cheng-tzu Shan, while at the same time two Russian companies pushed up the valley between the 3rd Brigade and the Guard Division on its right.

3rd Brigade.—At 11.30 a.m. Major-General Matsunaga sent three companies of his brigade reserve—then in Chien-tao (F 4) valley—to reinforce the left wing and to dislodge the Russians from the low hills west of San-cheng-tzu Shan. The I/4 Infantry thus reinforced began to push back the enemy, and about 1.30 p.m., after a desperate encounter, in which at some places the opposing forces were firing at each other at a few paces distance, occupied the ridge south of the wood.

From my position I could see the infantry of the 3rd Brigade streaming over the ridges between Ta Shan (F 4) and San-cheng-tzu Shan. Companies rushed along the slopes with marvellous rapidity, making use of every rise and crevice in the ground as shelter from the fire of the Russian infantry in the wood and on the heights beyond. I watched in particular one section on the left making its way along the western slopes towards knoll "B",* which was then the right of the Russian position. They stalked a Russian post on the knoll, and managed by utilizing every unevenness in the ground to approach within fifty paces of the Russian trench. Then I saw them rush the knoll, the Russians stand up, and a hand-to-hand bayonet fight ensue. The mob of fighting men gradually worked a few yards down the north side of the knoll, leaving some 20 dead and wounded as they went. Then the Russians seemed to go, and those who were not already killed next

* See Panorama 6.

appeared moving as fast as possible over the open plough towards a small wooded rise to the north-west. The Japanese advanced to some cover at the north foot of the knoll and fired at the retreating Russians, most of whom were too blown and hampered by their great coats to run. Several more were shot in crossing this open space. At the same time that this interesting episode was taking place, the Japanese infantry on the other side of the valley were pushing along in the most determined manner, in spite of heavy fire from the wood and shrapnel from the batteries north-east of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4).

By 1.40 p.m. the Japanese infantry had effected a lodgment, and at once grubbed up shelter with their small entrenching tools.

An attempt was made at this time to pursue the Russians towards San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), but the slopes were too steep, and the enemy held their crest lines in such force that it proved unsuccessful. A renewed attack at once would have entailed too much loss, so the general resolved to wait till night before making one.

In going over this part of the ground after the battle, it was hard to understand why the small party of Russians on knoll "B" * was not supported from the wood close in rear, which is large enough to hold a brigade, and had evidently been full of troops at the time. Even, if a few good shots had crept forward from the wood down some of the numerous small ravines, they could have enfiladed the Japanese on the slopes of the ridge to the east, and might possibly have made their position untenable without having been discovered themselves.

At 2.20 p.m. the small village of Chien Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4) was set on fire by the Russians, who were now moving north-east in a long column.

At 2.30 p.m. a Japanese battalion suddenly emerged from a trench north-east of Chien-tao (F 4) to get water from the village. Even from my position on a high hill a few hundred yards behind, the network of trenches, covered ways, and underground shelters was extremely hard to detect in the bare brown soil. The whole Japanese army in front seemed to be underground.

At 2.50 p.m. the Ishi-yama (E/F 4) batteries began to fire again at the Russian artillery positions near San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), chiefly using high-explosive shell at about 4,500 yards range. Great columns of black smoke and dust rose where the shells burst, but by this time most if not all of the Russian guns had retired singly towards the Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) valley. The mountain battery also had disappeared undetected by anybody. I afterwards counted one hundred and thirty pits within twenty yards each side of one Russian battery

* See Panorama 6.

position, many of which had been made by high-explosive shell, and the rest by percussion shrapnel.

The only evidence of any damage having been done to the Russian equipment was one broken limber tray. The lie of the ground had compelled both sides to use indirect fire.

The Russian artillery which retired from San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) took up a new position on the hills near Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3).

During the day the II./2 Artillery, whose chief duty was to support the attack of the 3rd Brigade, divided its fire between the Russian artillery north-west of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and the infantry in the heights. The two batteries on Ta Shan (F 4) fired off and on throughout the day at the Russian infantry at ranges of 1,900 to 2,500 yards. No. 3 Battery also fired on a small hill 1,000 yards in front, where Russian infantry suddenly appeared, and drove them back with severe loss. This battery also fired at a range of 6,000 yards on two Russian regiments of infantry on the march from Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) to San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), and at a Russian battery moving between Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) and San-tai-tzu (F 4). The effect of the fire on this battery at 2,700 yards seemed to be considerable, for it returned the way it came in great disorder.

To the spectators it looked as if the 3rd Brigade might at this time (1.30-3 p.m.) have pushed on its attack on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), and this opinion seemed to be confirmed next day, when a staff officer said it was thought inadvisable to let the brigade go on, for fear of pressing the Russians into the Fourth Army.

From various scraps of information which I have obtained since with regard to this particular part of the fighting, it seems that the Russians in San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) offered a very stubborn resistance, and that the 3rd Brigade held its own, but could not do more.

At 1.10 p.m. the commander of the Guard Division on the right of the 2nd Division ordered Major-General Watanabe, the commander of his left column, east of the Yeh-ho-kou (F 4) valley, to send as many men as he could spare to assist the 3rd Brigade in the attack on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4). He also ordered three batteries to bombard the hill. At the same time a mistake occurred through a wrong message given by a sergeant of the 3rd Brigade, who was sent by Major-General Matsunaga to the Guard. Major-General Watanabe understood from the sergeant that the 3rd Brigade were falling back before a superior force of Russians. He therefore halted where he was, and it was not until 4.30 p.m. that it was discovered that the message should have been to the effect that the 3rd Brigade would not advance at present.

At 4.30 p.m. Major-General Watanabe sent one battalion to assist in the attack on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), but this

battalion did not proceed nearer than Yeh-ho-kou (F 4) that evening.

Leaving the 3rd Brigade in this position till the evening, we will now return to the 15th Brigade, in connection with the Fourth Army on the left.

Fourth Army.—Operations were begun by the Fourth Army **10th Oct.** (5th and 10th Divisions and reserves, with the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, consisting of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Regiments). On the 10th October the right column (10th Division) moved on Ta Pu (E 3, south-east) and the left column (5th Division) marched along the main road from Liao-yang to Mukden, with Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3, south-east) as its objective. Chen-tzu Shan (E/F 5) was occupied by the right column, and at 9 a.m. the left column attacked Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3), opening fire on it from Yen-tai (D 4) with artillery, to which the Russian guns replied, using indirect fire from behind one of the small number of solitary hills which stand out of the plain in that locality.

The Russian force at Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3) (one regiment of infantry and one squadron of cavalry) offered a stubborn resistance to the advance of the Japanese left column, but the latter, assisted by guns of the right column, took the place at 3 p.m. Between 6 and 7 p.m. the right wing of the left column occupied Ku-shu-tzu (E 3), east of Wu-li-tai-tzu (D 3). The whole Russian force which opposed the left column was about a division, and it continued to hold the line Ta-kou (E 3), Ta and Hsiao Fan-chia-tun (E 3) and Shih-li-ho (D/E 3).

At 9 p.m. the right column occupied Ta Pu (E 3), the Russians moving forward in numbers towards Temple Hill (F 3). During the day the right column, Fourth Army, prepared to co-operate with the left of the First Army (15th Brigade) and left a detachment in Fei-tsai-tai (E 4, north) to keep touch with it. An artillery duel took place between the Japanese guns on Chen-tzu Shan (E/F 5) and three Russian batteries near Temple Hill, the Russian force in that direction being estimated at more than a division.

On 11th October the Fourth Army continued its advance **11th Oct.** against the Russian line Ta-kou (E 3), Ta and Hsiao Fan-chia-tun (E 3) and Shih-li-ho (D/E 3), its artillery at Ku-shu-tzu (E 3) engaging five Russian batteries. Soon the Russians began to extend their line westwards, but were at once confronted by the right of the Second Army, which joined up with the left of the Fourth. The Russians offered obstinate resistance to the advance, and heavy fighting occurred round a small solitary hill north-north-west of San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) which the Japanese failed to take that day.

15th Brigade.—At daybreak part of the right of the Fourth Army got in touch with the left of the 15th Brigade, and its artillery came into action south and south-west of Shuang-liu-szu (E 4). Owing to the resistance offered by the Russians

the progress of the Japanese line was extremely slow, and the advance of the 15th Brigade, which should have taken place at daybreak on the 11th, had to be postponed till the afternoon. At 3 p.m. Major-General Okasaki (15th Brigade) received another order from the commander of the 2nd Division to attack Temple Hill, keeping connection with the right of the Fourth Army.

At this time the Russian battery near San-tai-tzu (F 4) retired, and the Japanese battery north of the nullah at Ishiyama (E/F 4) fired at Temple Hill, while the other two batteries of the left group concentrated their fire on the Russians near Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3). Also No. 3 Battery of the right group on Ta Shan (F 4) fired at the Russian infantry on and about Temple Hill, which offered excellent targets, and continued to do so till dark.

A great battle seemed to be raging in front of the Fourth and Second Armies. Since daybreak neither the right wing of the Fourth Army nor the 15th Brigade appeared to have made any advance. Before them was an open plain, swept by Russian shrapnel, and beyond that a large force of Russians holding the foot of the hills. Major-General Okasaki stated afterwards that before receiving the above-mentioned second order to attack, he had decided that as the Fourth Army was not yet ready to co-operate, he would remain where he was till dark and then make a night attack on Temple Hill (F 4), whatever the Fourth Army might do.

At about 3.30 p.m. long columns could be seen returning along the road over the saddle by Okasaki-yama (F 4), by which they had advanced the previous day. In fact it looked as if a general retirement had been decided upon, the only exception being a counter-attack by about two companies of infantry which advanced over the lower west slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), utilizing three or four small nullahs as cover from the Japanese fire on knoll "B."* They did not advance very far, however, and lay down till dark.

At about 3.30 p.m. Major-General Okasaki decided to commence the attack on Temple Hill (F 4). His brigade was disposed as under:—

- | | |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Right wing, | I./16 east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). |
| | II./16 west of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). |
| | ½ III./16 in reserve behind Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). |
| Left wing, | I./30 (less 2nd Company) and II./30 at Shuang-liu-ssu (E/F 4). |
| | II./30 (less 9th Company in reserve behind) at Shuang-liu-ssu (E/F 4). |
| General reserve, | ½ III./16 and 2nd and 9th Companies of /30 south-west of Shuang-liu-ssu (E/F 4). |

* See Panorama 6.

The two batteries behind Ishi-yama could not fire on Temple Hill, and the battery in front was pretty well occupied with the Russian artillery near Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), so Major-General Okasaki asked for the assistance of a mountain battery and three field batteries of the 14th Regiment, Artillery Brigade, Fourth Army, which were in action on the hills behind. This artillery fired at the Russians north of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), north of Temple Hill, and at the infantry on Temple Hill. They also turned their attention to the right battery near San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3).

The Japanese artillery fire on Temple Hill appeared to be very effective.

The long straggling village of Ku-chia-tzu (E/F 4) hid the Japanese advance from the Russians at the foot of Temple Hill, where they had good cover in a sunken road running north-west, but the plain south of the village was visible from the temple buildings, which were full of Russian troops.

The formations of the infantry while crossing this open plain were:—

The Japanese firing line started in single rank, but did not appear to extend until they had passed Ku-chia-tzu (E/F 4), when it opened out to two to three yards interval. The supports were in single rank 200 yards behind the firing line, and the reserves in double rank 400 yards behind the supports, shoulder to shoulder, though bullets from the temple came over the village and spurted up the dust all round them.

At 4 p.m. the firing line reached Ku-chia-tzu and remained there for about half an hour, as if hesitating to advance across the bare level stretch of stubble field to the Russian position. The east corner of the village is 600 yards from the south extremity of Temple Hill, and the distance from the west end to the sunken road is about 1,000 yards. For about 40 minutes an intense rifle fire was exchanged between the village and the sunken road, and then I saw the Japanese firing line doubling across the open in what appeared to be successive single lines of men, extended at intervals varying from 2 to 10 paces, bunched in places, but with an average interval of about three paces. Quite a dust arose from the number of bullets which struck the ground among the running men, and it seemed marvellous that so few fell. The lines came on in rapid succession, all in the same open formation, running as hard as they could, only halting once to fire and get their breath.

At 4.50 p.m. the first Japanese soldiers reached the south extremity of Temple Hill (F 4). The line then dashed into the sunken road right on top of the Russian infantry. Bayonet fights ensued, and the whole mass of men rushed up the slopes towards the Temple, bayoneting and shooting each other. The sun setting lit up the whole scene splendidly, so that every man could be seen distinctly.

The Russian line, which extended from Temple Hill north-westwards along the road, now retired in very extended order, the men running for their lives towards the hills to the north-east.

At 5 p.m. the Russian battery near San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3) opened a rapid fire on the plain, but by that time most of the Japanese infantry had crossed. If they had opened a few minutes sooner they would have enfiladed the Japanese line, and no doubt caused many more casualties. The brigade had been throughout the advance under artillery fire, but the Russian shrapnel seemed to be bursting too high, and was too much scattered.

At 5.10 p.m. the temple was taken, but desperate fighting still continued along the north side of it. When I reached the scene of action some 50 Russian dead lay in a row behind the north extremity of the rocky crest of the hill, having evidently fought to the last, without thought of retiring. Some were still kneeling in the firing position, with their fingers on the triggers of their rifles.

Two Russian battalions advanced from the north as if to make a counter-attack on Temple Hill, but the Japanese artillery fired on them and drove them off.

Just after the Japanese had occupied the Temple a Russian regiment appeared, marching westwards near East San-tai-tzu (F 4) with a band playing.

One-and-a-half battalions of the 29th Regiment, 3rd Brigade, then advanced towards East San-tai-tzu (F 4). The Russian regiment halted without entering the village, and about the same time the last of the Russian guns retired from near San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), and the battery which had been in position north of San-tai-tzu (F 4) also withdrew.

The Japanese entrenched on Temple Hill, the Russians still holding the high ground to the north in great force. After sunset they made three counter-attacks, all of which were successfully repulsed.

About 7 p.m. the one-and-a-half battalions of the 29th Regiment entered East San-tai-tzu (F 4). Then the Russian regiment with the band enveloped the village on three sides. Major-General Okasaki sent three companies of the 16th Regiment to help, and desperate fighting ensued, but the Russians held their own. About midnight the right wing of the 4th Army arrived at the west end of Ku-chia-tzu (E/F 4).

The Russians left 300 dead on and near Temple Hill, and the 15th Brigade had about 1,000 casualties during the attack and the night spent on the hill. Of these the 30th Regiment lost 600, chiefly from the Russian artillery fire, which was concentrated on the hill just before sunset.

During the advance of the 15th Brigade across the open, I was much interested in watching a Russian company in a slight dip of the ground some 1,000 yards from Temple Hill. The

men were standing up in line, shoulder to shoulder, firing volleys in the old-fashioned way—ready, present, fire—obliquely at the advancing Japanese infantry. The lie of the ground prevented them from seeing clearly the state of affairs on their left, and apparently they never realised that the Russian line was retiring until after Temple Hill had been taken by the Japanese. They remained firing volleys as if on the barrack square, till suddenly it dawned upon them that they were isolated, when the whole company turned and fled.

The Russian infantrymen in the sunken road were firing under the most propitious circumstances imaginable, with cover for themselves and a clear field of fire over the dead level plain in front. A very low average of marksmanship on their part ought to have at any rate checked the steady advance of the Japanese, or caused fearful loss among them.

The 16th Regiment lost heavily in the open from fire from the temple buildings, but the 30th Regiment escaped with few casualties until it came under artillery fire on the hill.

I noticed that many of the Russian dead in the road had been killed by shrapnel bullets, and several had bayonet wounds.

About the same time that the 15th Brigade began its attack on Temple Hill, two batteries of the left group near Ishi-yama (E, F 4) limbered up and advanced slowly in support to a position just north of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4). The Fourth Army artillery also advanced and engaged the Russian artillery in front of the Fourth Army. The Russian artillery did not fire at these two batteries when changing position. The officer commanding the artillery of the 2nd Division spent the day on Ishi-yama, and communicated with his batteries by orderlies.

The night of the 11th October was an eventful one. Fighting took place all along the line of the First and Fourth Armies. The Russians attacked the weak Japanese right at Pen-hsi-hu, Ta Ling (H 4), and Tu-men Ling (H 4), but were repulsed. The Guard Division (2nd Brigade) captured a Russian position after fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The 3rd Brigade attacked, and after a hard struggle drove the Russians off San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) (this will be described later), and at 1 a.m., 12th October, 23 battalions of the Fourth Army, including the greater part of the 10th Division, was set in motion to carry the double rocky hill rising from the plain called San-kuai-shih Shan (E, F 3). At 3.30 a.m. the hill was stormed, and it was entirely in the Japanese hands by dawn (*vide* account of the night attack written by Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton).* In this direction, as day was breaking, the Russians (145th, 146th, 147th, 148th Regiments) were seen to be holding the hills north of San-kuai-shih Shan (E, F 3). Shortly after dawn the left column of the Fourth Army moved forward in touch

Night.
11 12 Oct.

with the Second Army, but the bulk of the Fourth Army attacked the enemy in the hills north of Temple Hill in conjunction with the 15th Brigade.

3rd Brigade.—At 7 p.m. the 3rd Brigade began a fresh attack on San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), and after meeting with a most obstinate resistance, finally drove the Russians off the hill at about 1 o'clock in the morning of 12th October.

During the 11th General Kuroki sent all his reserves* to the 2nd Division, and the 3rd Brigade received two companies I./29 as reinforcement.

The 3rd Brigade losses on the 11th, including the night attack, were—

	Killed.	Wounded.
4th Regiment	- 82	327
29th „	- 103	391
	<hr/> 185	<hr/> 718

During the night of 11/12th October the 3rd Brigade received orders to continue its advance, and to occupy the heights north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), and that a reserve battalion would be sent as reinforcement.

12th Oct.

After daylight, therefore, the brigade resumed its march, and reached Chen-chiao-cheng (F 4) at 6.45 a.m. Deploying, the 4th Regiment on the left and 1½ battalions 29th Regiment on the right, the brigade advanced in the direction of the heights north of Hsiao Liu-ho (F 4) and Chien Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4).

The ground over which it had to advance, however, was devoid of cover, and exposed to the fire of Russian batteries, so Major-General Matsunaga requested the artillery of the 2nd Division and the artillery of the Guard Division near Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) to assist the movement.

During the night of 11/12th all six batteries of the 2nd Division artillery took up a position north-east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4) in line with the two batteries which the previous evening had supported the attack of the 15th Brigade on Temple Hill.

The 2nd Division Head-Quarters spent the night at a village south-east of Ta Shan with the divisional reserve (two reserve battalions). Another reserve battalion was sent to East San-tai-tzu (F 4) in support of the 1½ battalions 29th Regiment mentioned in connection with the attack on Temple Hill.

About 10 a.m. three batteries of the 2nd Division east of Pan-la-shan-tzu (F 4) and two batteries of the Guard Division near Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) opened fire on the Russian artillery, and soon silenced a battery north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3). The

* The First Army reserve consisted of three reserve battalions.—B. V.

other Russian batteries, however, near Lien-hua Shan (F 3) and Tu-men-tzu (F 3), continued to fire on the brigade, which was fortunately fairly well sheltered among the houses and trees of Chien-chiao-cheng (F 4), and little loss was incurred considering the large number of shell which burst around it.

At 11.30 a.m. the brigade began its advance across the dangerous zone between Chien-chiao-cheng (F 4) and the heights north of the valley (about 600 yards), as it was necessary to cross it at any cost.

I was told that the formation was strictly according to regulations, except that the second line and also the reserve were in line of company columns, with intervals of 20 to 40 yards, and therefore greater than the six paces between companies which is laid down in the drill book.

In the space of about thirty minutes the valley was crossed, and the assault on the heights north of it began, the Russians evacuating the nearest points about midday.

From behind a rock on Ishi-yama (E/F 4), where the 2nd Division Head-Quarters spent the morning of the 12th in a bombproof shelter on the top of the hill, I had a good view of the advance across the open of the 3rd Brigade, especially of about two companies on the left, which came under very heavy rifle fire. They covered the ground with marvellous rapidity, every man intent on reaching the enemy's position first, and not bothering about formation, which resolved itself into a deep scattered mass. In fact, the attack seemed to be carried out in successive lines of men, who, from the moment they left the shelter of the village, raced across the open, under shell and rifle fire. Men were continually dropping, whether to get their breath and fire, or because they were hit it was hard to say. The Russians retired from the pointed knoll north of the village of Chien Hsiao-ta-kou (F 4), but held on to the remainder of the ridge. The Japanese infantry occupied the knoll, but did not advance, as will be explained later.

The losses when crossing the valley were comparatively small, thanks to the rapidity with which the infantry covered the ground. The Russian artillery burst shrapnel over it the whole time, using indirect fire, but the shells burst too high and were much scattered, and so had little effect.

During the advance in column of route down the northern slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) and before reaching Chien-chiao-cheng (F 4), the troops of the brigade were fortunately not fired upon by the Russian artillery. Officers of the brigade told me that the crossing of the valley from the village to the hills (some 600 yards) was effected in three or four rushes. Fire was opened at 1,500 to 1,600 yards from the Russians, and very little ammunition was expended owing to the rapidity of the movement. The Russian infantry opened fire much sooner, but their volleys at this long range caused very few casualties. When the Japanese assaulted the knoll, the Russian first line

retired at once on their second line, and there was no hand-to-hand encounter.

At 12.30 p.m. Major-General Matsunaga gave the order to pursue, as three Russian ammunition wagons had just been captured, and he thought that the Russians were retiring, but at 2 p.m. he received fresh instructions from Divisional Headquarters, which obliged him to stop the attempt at pursuit, which had proved more difficult than he had expected.

The instructions were :—" Move to the right as quickly as possible and occupy the pass at Yao-chien Ling (G 4)."

As it was necessary, in order to carry out these instructions, to march along the open valley, fully exposed to Russian artillery fire from Lien-hua Shan (F 3) and Tu-men-tzu (F 3), the general decided to wait till darkness set in, and meanwhile to let his troops eat and rest.

There I will leave the 3rd Brigade for the present, and return to the operations of the 15th Brigade after I left them entrenched on Temple Hill on the night of 11th October.

The losses of the 3rd Brigade on the 12th October were :—

	Killed.	Wounded.
4th Regiment -	- 8	90
29th Regiment -	- 14	123
Reserve battalion (inconsiderable.)		
	<u>22</u>	<u>213</u>

15th Brigade.—After midnight of the 11/12th part of the Japanese force from East San-tai-tzu (F 4) advanced to Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), and at about 3.30 a.m. Major-General Okasaki ordered an attack on the rocky ridge running north-east from Temple Hill (F 4, north-west). At this time the brigade was disposed as follows :—

29th Regiment on the right.

30th Regiment on the left.

16th Regiment with brigade reserve in the centre.

At 4 a.m. Major-General Okasaki started from San-tai-tzu (F 4) with the 16th Regiment and two companies of the 30th Regiment (under the battalion commanding officer) towards Suribachi-yama.*

At 5.50 a.m. he arrived on the long spur south-east of this hill. Previous to this, officer's patrols had been sent out, which reported that there were no Russians on this hill, but they were in force on the rocky ridge across the valley to the west.

The 16th Regiment extended near the small village of Liao-cheng-chai (F 3), and crept quietly up the rocky ridge. The Russian sentries did not see them approaching, and without firing a shot the Japanese rushed the ridge and drove the Russians westward on to their main force. I was told that the Russians on the ridge offered very little resistance, and that the Russian sentries must have been asleep.

* See sketch opposite.

Major-General Okasaki, with the brigade reserve, was near a small clump of fir trees near the village during the attack.

While it was still dark the general saw some men moving on Suribachi-yama, and sent a lieutenant with two squads of the 30th Regiment reserve companies to see whether they were Russians or not.

The lieutenant went up to the trench on the south side of Suribachi-yama and found it empty, but while there he saw a Russian company coming up from the valley to the west, and thinking that they were Japanese, shouted out "We are here." The reply was a Russian volley at thirty paces distance, and a severe fight ensued, but finally the lieutenant with his little force repulsed the attack; he was badly hit in the shoulder, but remained in command until the Russians were driven back.

During this time the 29th Regiment met with strong opposition, and was unable to advance as expected. The general decided to push one company on to Suribachi-yama in order to prevent the Russians from taking it, and thereby commanding the Japanese advance. Hardly had this company joined the two squads on the hill when six Russian companies attacked it from the north and west. While this fight was going on one battalion of the 29th Regiment came up on the right in support, and the Russians drew back towards Okasaki-yama.

Suribachi-yama, the rocky ridge, and the saddle north-east of the latter were all occupied by the Japanese just before daybreak.

At dawn the 30th Regiment handed over Nan Shan to the Fourth Army, and marched round the south of the rocky ridge to the centre of the brigade, so that at 8 a.m. the position of the brigade was as follows:—



The guns of the Russian Artillery were placed as follows:—

10 guns north-east of Hsiao-ta-kou* (F 3).

24 guns between Shih-miao-tzu (F 3) and Ha-ma-tang (F 3), 8 in front, 16 behind; there was a brigade of infantry with these.

8 guns (about) near San-kuai-shih Shan (E/F 3).

All these guns concentrated their fire on the Japanese infantry near Suribachi-yama, but, it was remarked, "The infantry of the 15th Brigade are getting used to these hard experiences."

During the whole of the 12th the brigade remained in the above position, unable to advance.

About noon three field batteries advanced from near Pan-lashan-tzu (F 4) to support the 15th Brigade, to a position north of Temple Hill. At the same time the right group, less one battery (the 3rd), was despatched to accompany the 3rd Brigade to Yao-chien Ling (G 4). The 3rd Battery followed the left group in reserve.

From their new position south of Okasaki-yama (F 3) the left group fired on the Russian artillery north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), and at about 3 p.m. at the Russian infantry at Ha-ma-tang (F 3).

The flashes of the Russian guns could be seen behind the crest line, but against the infantry indirect fire was used.

The Russian artillery replied, but shot badly, and it was difficult to say whether they were firing at the Japanese artillery or the infantry in rear. The left group passed the night of 12/13th in this position, and the 3rd Battery in reserve bivouacked near San-tai-tzu (F 4).

Artillery.—At 8 a.m. on the 12th I joined the 2nd Division Head-Quarters on Ishi-yama (E/F 4). A Russian battery on the ridge east of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) was searching the open ground near the hill for the Japanese batteries, which had remained silent up till now, and were well entrenched. At first the Russian shrapnel fell wildly all over the plain, wide of the batteries, but when the Russian gunners located the Japanese guns they poured in a rapid and accurate fire, which made the Japanese lie low in their trenches.

At 9.30 a.m. the Japanese artillery opened fire, and numbers of shrapnel could be seen bursting near the Russian battery north of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), fired by the 2nd Artillery and the Guard Artillery from Pa-chia-tzu (F/G 4) (as mentioned in connection with the 3rd Brigade). Soon the Russian battery retired, though the Japanese shells seemed to be bursting too short.

At 10 a.m. there was comparative silence except in front of the Fourth Army, where heavy firing was taking place.

* See Map 41.

At 10.30 a.m. Russian infantry were to be seen all along the ridge east of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3), where a fight was going on with the 29th Regiment.

At the same time the Japanese right group of artillery opened a rapid fire on the Russian position in front of the 3rd Brigade, and especially on the ridge from which the Russian battery had just retired, most of the shells bursting too short over the valley of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3). This bombardment was preparatory to the advance of the 3rd Brigade across the open valley. As a rule so economical of gun ammunition, the Japanese now fired a great number of rounds with apparently little effect.

As the Russian battery had retired, and the infantry offered splendid targets on each side of the Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3) valley, it seemed to us on Ishi-yama that the Japanese artillery should have advanced to a more effective range as soon as the 3rd Brigade had effected a lodgment north of the valley. Excellent artillery positions were to be found about 1,000 yards in front on a long low undulation just south of the flat valley. We waited for half-an-hour, however, before two batteries limbered up and advanced slowly to another position four hundred yards north, and it was ten minutes later before the first shot was fired from the new position. One battery had gun pits prepared some days previously, into which it dropped, the other came into action cautiously, well down the reverse slope of a rise, ran the guns up by hand, and set to work at once to dig before firing a round. This although there were most tempting infantry targets, and the Russian artillery could only have fired at them from extreme ranges.

At 2 p.m. I rode across the plain over which the 15th Brigade had advanced in the attack on Temple Hill on the previous day. There were very few Japanese corpses on the plain itself, but many had been collected near the hill. The Russians still lay as they had fallen, the sunken road especially being full of dead and wounded.

The Japanese had made excellent trenches all round the temple buildings during the night, and the large number of cartridge clips corroborated the stories of the severe fighting which had taken place during the night. The temple itself (in Chinese "Perpetual Temple") is a very picturesque building, but it had been sadly knocked about by the troops, who had bayonnetted the idols, burnt the roofs, &c. It was now being used as a dressing station by the Japanese. At 3 p.m. the infantry of the 15th Brigade could be seen as shown in sketch.* A few attempts were made to advance from the road over the saddle up the steep slopes of Okasaki-yama, which always ended in a quick return to the trenches along the road.

* See page 601.

At 4 p.m., three field batteries of the 14th Regiment, 2nd Artillery Brigade, Fourth Army, which had been digging gun pits for the last half-hour, opened fire north-north-east from a position close to Temple Hill on its west side. The battery commanding officers were observing from step ladders propped against trees. As soon as they opened fire, the Russians fired *rafales* from the north-west.

The mountain batteries of either the 10th or 5th Division were moving about in the neighbourhood of Temple Hill, apparently unable to find employment.

The colonel commanding the 14th Artillery Regiment and his staff were near the Temple, connected with the batteries by a chain of twenty orderlies, forty yards apart, for passing orders.

15th Brigade.—The 29th Reserve Regiment was east of Hsiao-ta-kou (F 3).

One-and-a-half battalions 29th Regiment, were on the ridge between Hsiao-ta-kou and Suribachi-yama (F 3).

The rest of the brigade in a semicircle, as shown on sketch.*

Divisional Head-Quarters, San-tai-tzu (F 4).

One reserve battalion in reserve.

12/13 Oct.

On the night of the 12/13th there was heavy rain, with thunder, under cover of which Major-General Okasaki hoped to attack Okasaki-yama (F 3) successfully, but he found the mountain was too narrow and steep for a night attack.

The 10th Division, which had taken over Nan Shan (F 3) from the 30th Regiment, tried a night attack on Round Top Hill (F 3) and Okasaki-yama (F 3), but failed in the attempt.

I was told afterwards that the Russian artillery at Ha-ma-tang (F 3) was the chief difficulty in taking this hill, so during the night of the 12/13th the Japanese artillery changed position so as to be able to fire both on Okasaki-yama (F 3) and on the Russian artillery near Ha-ma-tang (F 3).

The new position was east of Liao-cheng-chai (F 3), on the ridge south of Suribachi-yama.

3rd Brigade.—At 7 p.m. the 3rd Brigade began its march eastwards towards Yao-chien Ling (G 4), merely leaving a reserve battalion to mask its departure. Just as the brigade was starting a small force of Russians made a counter-attack, but was easily repulsed. It was therefore 7.30 p.m. before the brigade really got off. Its composition was:—

4th Regiment and 1½ battalions 29th Regiment,† with two field batteries, one troop of cavalry, and two companies of engineers.

* See page 601.

† The other one-and-a-half battalions were on Suribachi-yama with the 15th Brigade.

As stated before, the night was stormy and wet. About midnight heavy rain fell, and it was intensely dark. The general had no good map of the district, and at the bifurcation of the roads east of Shang Yin-chiang-pu (G 4) the brigade took the road towards Hsin-kai Ling (G/H 4) by mistake, but fortunately soon discovered their error, and were not much delayed thereby.

At 5 a.m. the advanced guard of the brigade got in **13th Oct.** contact with the enemy, who occupied all the heights near the pass. The approach to the pass is along a wide open valley with high hills on each side, then a short steep ascent of about one hundred and fifty feet to a cutting in the narrow ridge, with an equally steep descent on the eastern side. Chinese carts negotiate it with difficulty. On the top of the pass is a temple from which a most commanding view can be had on both sides over the surrounding country.

Major-General Matsunaga, whose instructions were to push on as quickly as possible, with a view to cutting off the retreat of the Russian force which had been repulsed by the Umezawa Brigade and part of the 12th Division at the Tu-men Ling (H 4), Ta Ling (H 4), and Pen-hsi-hu, decided to attack at once with the 4th Regiment on the left (north) of the road, and the 1½ battalions 29th Regiment on the right.

At 6.30 a.m. the advanced line found itself within two hundred yards of the Russian position, but the slopes were so steep and slippery from rain, that it was absolutely impossible to attempt an assault, and as the Russians opened a heavy rifle fire it was considered better to relinquish the attack.

About 7 a.m. the Japanese artillery arrived at Shang Yin-chiang-pu (G 4) and coming into action near the road opened fire on the pass, the temple, and the Russian trenches, with both shrapnel and high-explosive shell.

After about an hour a fresh attempt was made to assault the position, but again the steepness of the slopes prevented it from being successful.

The Russian force was gradually increasing in front of the Japanese left, and after midday about one-and-a-half Russian battalions coming from Hsin-kai Ling (G/H 4) occupied the heights north of the road, and threatened the Japanese line of retreat.

Major-General Matsunaga met this force, and kept it back with a portion of his reserve.

The whole of the day was spent in renewed attempts to effect a lodgment on the enemy's position, but without success.

In the evening the Russians placed two guns in the pass of Yao-chien Ling (G 4) itself, and opened fire on the Japanese.

Four mountain guns also appeared at the same time near the Hsin-kai Ling (G/H 4), but did not fire. When night fell the two guns at Yao-chien Ling (G 4) retired, but infantry fire

continued till about 9 p.m., and then the rest of the night was passed in silence.

14th Oct.

At dawn on the 14th, Japanese patrols discovered that the Russians had retired, so the pass was at once occupied.

Followed by the artillery, the brigade pushed on towards Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), which is a large village at the junction of the two main roads, along wide valleys from the Yao-chien Ling (G 4) and Wei-ning-ying (J 5). Here the brigade arrived at 2.30 p.m. and halted.

I was told afterwards that if the force of the enemy and the steepness of the slopes had been known the attack at dawn on the 13th would certainly not have been ordered. It was fortunate that the Russians did not bring up their artillery sooner, or the 3rd Brigade would have been in a critical position.

The 3rd Brigade losses at Yao-chien Ling (G 4) on the 13th October were:—

		Killed.	Wounded.
4th Regiment	-	27	102
29th „	-	36	325
		63	427

Also three horses were shot, one of which belonged to the general.

On the 14th October the brigade bivouacked near Ping-tai-tzu; on the 15th it was relieved by the 12th Division, and on the 16th it rejoined the 2nd Division at Ha-ma-tang (F 3).

To arrive at the tactical importance of the despatch of the 3rd Brigade to Yao-chien Ling (G 4), it will be necessary to survey the battle as a whole. Suffice it to say here that one does not know whether to admire most the boldness of General Kuroki's decision to detach this brigade at a critical moment, when the Russian forces were dangerously strong in front of the 2nd Division, or the energy and endurance which the troops displayed during a trying night march into the unknown, and during repeated failures in their attack next day. This, too after two days and one night continual hard fighting (11-12th October).

14th Oct.

At 8.40 a.m. on the 14th, the 2nd Division, together with the rest of the First Army, was ordered to advance to the Sha Ho.

The reserve battalions, which had been under the orders of the commander of the 2nd Division since the night of the 12th October, were placed under the direct orders of the commander of the First Army.

The 2nd Division took up a defensive line along the hills south of the Sha Ho between the Guard Division on its right and the Fourth Army (10th Division) on its left, and began

digging trenches and underground dwelling-places for the winter, in which the troops lived until called upon to take part in the battle of the 26-29th January on the extreme left of the whole Manchurian Army.

15th Brigade.—As previously stated,* the left group of the 2nd Division artillery had taken up a new position by dawn on the 13th, and opened fire against Okasaki-yami (F 3) and the Russian artillery at Ha-ma-tang (F 3), but the Russian guns at this place, Lien-lua Shan (F 3) and Chien Shan (F 3) maintained a superiority of fire till about noon. **13th Oct.**

The reserve battery (No. 3, right group) came into action north of San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4) in the valley, and brought an oblique fire to bear on the Russians on the steep northern slope of Okasaki-yama, and was doubtless the chief cause of their retirement later on in the day. The Russian artillery did not return the fire of this battery.

Major-General Okasaki considered it very important to take Okasaki-yama, and ordered Colonel Taniyama to capture it by assault with two battalions 16th Regiment in the afternoon.

The right wing of the brigade was also reinforced by two reserve battalions.

On the morning of the 13th I returned to Temple Hill (F 4), and found the commander of the 2nd Division and staff at the temple. The position of the troops appeared the same as on the previous day. The three batteries of the 14th Regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade had moved about 600 yards further north. The Fourth Army were pushing on in two columns, the right column with Round Top Hill (F 3) as objective, the left column in the direction of Tung-shan-pu (F 3).

The relative positions of the Japanese and Russians on Okasaki-yama had remained unchanged, except that the Japanese had entrenched wherever they happened to be.

About 11.15 a.m. there was heavy shrapnel fire from the Russian batteries east-north-east, the shells coming over the long spur and bursting high in the air between Liao-cheng-chai (F 3) and Temple Hill, mostly about two hundred yards from the latter.

I supposed at the time that the Russians were firing on Temple Hill with indirect fire by the map, and had made some error in the direction of their fire, as the shrapnel burst harmlessly at a distance from any troops. Russian shells were also bursting over the village of San-tai-tzu (F 4).

A large body of Japanese troops which had arrived at San-kwai-shih Shan (E/F 3) the previous evening were still there. This, I was told, was the Grand Army reserve brigade.

At 4 p.m. Major-General Okasaki with two battalions was on the spur just south of Suribachi-yama (F 3), and his

intention was to use this hill as a pivot for his attack on the hills in front, bringing up the right wing of his brigade.

Of the three batteries near there, he now ordered one to fire on Okasaki-yama and the other two to continue firing at the Russian artillery.

About this time a Russian infantry brigade was seen approaching the north-eastern slopes of Okasaki-yama and sending up reinforcements to the Russians holding the mountain top, so Major-General Okasaki sent the III. 16 Regiment to support the other two battalions of the same regiment under Colonel Taniyama.

Thus the I. 16 was in the front line, and commenced the assault, the II. 16 joined it, and finally the III. 16 came up in support.

Major-General Okasaki kept two battalions 30th Regiment with him in reserve, and the main force of the brigade, consisting of 1½ battalions 29th Regiment and 2 reserve battalions also advanced, and reached Liao-cheng-chai (F 3) just as Okasaki-yama was taken.

From Temple Hill I was enabled to watch every movement of the attack on Okasaki-yama.

Up to 3 p.m. the Japanese infantry on the hills in front had not advanced further than the position taken up on the previous evening. At this time, however, they showed signs of moving. Men ran up the gullies and popped into the trenches to increase the numbers in the firing line. Many of the officers who could be easily distinguished by their swords and fancy shades of khaki clothing, were standing up, though under rifle fire from the top of the hill.

A field battery in the valley near Liao-cheng-chai (F 3) was bombarding the crest, but though its shells burst accurately, they did not prevent the Russians from standing up to fire. Owing to the steepness of the slope on the north side of the Russian position, the Japanese artillery fire from this direction cannot have had much effect. Some shells were also coming from the reserve battery near San-cheng-tzu Shan (F 4), which no doubt searched the back of the hill more effectually.

At 3.5 p.m. the Japanese front line left the trench along the road and began to advance up the steep hill side. Five minutes later about two sections reached spur "F"* but were enfiladed by the Russians from the top of the hill and also came under fire from Round Top Hill.

About half-a-dozen little Japanese flags now appeared on the right shoulder at point "D," where about a section had reached the shelter of some dead ground some fifty yards below the rocky extremity of the hill.

* See Panorama 6. The letters mentioned, except G. which is just below F, indicate seven summits from left to right, D the highest being Okasaki-yama.

Another two sections advanced up the centre about fifty yards and lay down to fire. A few minutes later they got up and rushed towards "E," leaving many dead and wounded scattered behind. As they ran Russian bullets spurted up the dust all round them on the dry and bare hill side. The Russian shrapnel coming from east-north-east, which were being showered on to the hill, also took effect.

At 3.35 p.m. about a section tried to reach the top from below "D," but could not face it, and scampered down the hill to the left, leaving about ten casualties.

All this time a Japanese company entrenched on "G" was firing on the Russians at "D," and continuous fire was exchanged between the Japanese at "F" and the Russians on Round Top Hill.

For the next 40 minutes the position remained unchanged, the Japanese and Russians being only about thirty yards apart near "D," and gradually the advanced groups were reinforced by small parties of men who dodged over the edge between "C" and "D." Russian shrapnel burst among them as they ran, and I saw one shell drop five, another three, and many others one or two men. The Russian shrapnel seemed to burst right over the Japanese lying prone below "D," and how any remained alive was a marvel.

By 4.40 p.m. there appeared to be about two companies near "D," the artillery fire got hotter than ever, the crest line and slopes of the hill becoming one cloud of bursting shrapnel. It was impossible to tell which were Russian and which were Japanese shell. In the midst of all this smoke, the leading Japanese section near "D" made a rush for the top, showed for a moment against the sky line, and then lay down within a few yards of the Russian trench.

Both Russian and Japanese could now be seen bobbing up and down to fire, then there was a lull in the artillery bombardment, and bayonet fighting began. Up till the last moment the Russians along the crest line had apparently not realized how close the Japanese were to their left flank, for they could be seen standing up to empty their magazines in the direction of "E," "F," and "G."

Now a desperate encounter raged for ten minutes on the summit of the hill, the combatants being distinctly visible against the sky from our position. Men bayoneted, fired, and, when their magazines were empty, threw stones, of which there was a plentiful supply on the hill. At one time it looked as if the Japanese were getting the worst of it; they were driven some yards down the slope, but just as they appeared to be going, some few men turned and reached the crest line again, followed by the rest, and the position was taken.

At 5.20 p.m. two companies from the road started up in support, and eight minutes later formed a line just under the crest, the men lying down as close to one another as possible in

single rank. Supports followed and also lay down in the same formation, all evidently taking shelter from the Russian fire from Round Top Hill.

At 5.35 p.m. the whole firing line reached the crest of the ridge and stood up to fire at the retreating Russians, the continuous roar of musketry sounding like the noise of frying bacon.

The 16th Regiment now covered the attack on Round Top Hill by the Fourth Army (part of the 10th Division).

This hill was also captured before dark, after a stubborn resistance by the Russians, who had a circular entrenchment round the top.

Next morning when I walked over these hills there were some forty Russians and thirty Japanese lying dead near the trench on Round Top Hill. Four of the latter had evidently been killed by one shell, which must have burst close to them, blowing off one man's head and mutilating the others.

On Okasaki-yama I counted about a hundred Russian dead lying near the top, and many more could be seen scattered along the line of retreat. The crest line of the hill was strewn with hundreds of empty tin ammunition boxes, rifles, haversacks, prayer-books, black loaves, &c. Most of the Russians lying near the top were non-commissioned officers, a significant fact showing that they had stayed till the last.

By the shoulder straps and cap bands I noticed men of the following units :—31st Division, 122nd, 12th, 147th Regiments, 9th Division, 57th Division, 87th Regiment, 37th Division, and 22nd Division.

The I./16 Regiment and two companies of the II./16 Regiment, which captured Okasaki-yama, lost 331 men, including the commander of the 1st Battalion, and five other officers killed and nine wounded.

The capture of this hill, which the army now call Okasaki-yama, was a really splendid piece of work, and one fraught with the utmost importance, as this clump of hills formed the thin end of a wedge in the then weakest portion of the line held by the First Army. A more difficult position to take in broad daylight could hardly be imagined. The Japanese had to climb up very steep slopes, enfiladed by artillery fire on one side and infantry fire from Round Top Hill on the other, against an entrenched crest line held by Russians who were not afraid to stand up to fire into otherwise dead ground, and who held out to the last without thought of surrender. The casualties were few compared with the attack on Temple Hill, but the assaulting force consisted altogether of only six much reduced companies.

That their services were fully appreciated by the Commander of the First Army, who was looking on from Pan-lashan-tzu (F 4), is evident by the fact that a *kanjō*, or written approval, was given to the 16th Regiment by Marshal Oyama.

Before sunset on the 13th Major-General Okasaki entered the village of Liao-cheng-chai (F 3), and waited till dark, when the brigade again advanced across the valley north-east of Okasaki-yama and attacked the Russian position on Lien-hua Shan (F 3). **13 14 Oct.**

The Brigade was disposed as follows :—

The 16th Regiment on the left, then the 30th Regiment, and 29th Regiment, with the two reserve battalions on the right.

The Russians held the hill with great determination, the guns having been previously withdrawn. About 8 p.m. severe hand-to-hand fighting took place at the foot of the hill, where bayonets, hand-grenades, and swords were used; 1½ battalions 30th Regiment and the 29th Regiment bore the brunt of the fighting, the two reserve battalions being behind on the right flank.

The 30th Regiment lost 3 officers killed, and 100 men killed and wounded.

During the night of the 13/14th the Russians made several counter-attacks, but were driven back along the Ha-ma-tang (F 3) road. Major-General Okasaki sent out patrols before dawn, who reported that there were no Russians in Miao-pu-tzu (F 3) or vicinity. On the morning of the 14th the Russians had cleared out of all the villages near there.

At 7.10 a.m. the 15th Brigade occupied Miao-pu-tzu Shan (F 3). A Russian battery of eight guns opened fire from a small hill north of Miao-pu-tzu Shan (F 3) called Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (F 2). The 2nd Division artillery, which was posted a little north of Lien-hua Shan in a position prepared during the night, finding no enemy in front, advanced two batteries, coming into action on Miao-pu-tzu Shan (F 3), and two batteries east of Miao-pu-tzu (F 3) in the valley. **14th Oct.**

The Russian battery near Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (F 2) and another at Wu-chia-kou (G 3) opened fire on them, but about midday the Russian artillery withdrew. Then the 2nd Division artillery supported the attack of the Fourth Army on Hsi-kou Shan (F 2). For this purpose the two batteries east of Miao-pu-tzu (F 3) advanced to a position on the northern slopes of Miao-pu-tzu Shan (F 3).

The night of the 14/15th and the whole of the 15th were spent in these positions without further fighting.

Losses of the 15th Brigade on 11th, 12th, and 13th October were :—Killed, 339; wounded, 1,496; the casualties were about equally distributed between the 16th and 30th Regiments.

It was estimated that the Russian force in front of the 15th Brigade was about 2½ divisions.

As mentioned before, I spent the morning of the 14th on Okasaki-yama, and watched from there the artillery fight to the north. A young officer of artillery had also been sent up to observe, and at 1.55 p.m. we saw the Russian battery limber

up under cover of a row of burning *kaoliang* stooks and retire unobserved by the Japanese artillery, much to the distress of this young officer, who had no means of signalling to his batteries. From there I climbed to the top of Round Top Hill (F 3), and got an excellent view of the operations of the Fourth Army.

Fourth Army.—On the 13th Marshal Oyama had sent the 5th Division, Fourth Army, to reinforce the First Army, which was strung out over such a large extent of country without having had any reserve for some days past. The 5th Division was ordered by General Kuroki to fill up the gap between the Guard Division and the 3rd Brigade in the direction of Yao-chien Ling (G 4). I saw part of this division moving east on the 14th and returning to the Fourth Army on the 16th.

The Fourth Army, thus weakened by nearly half its strength, advanced during the 14th.

At 2.30 p.m. infantry fire began in the direction of Hsi-kou Shan (F 2). The field battery (2nd Division) on the western slopes of Miao-pu-tzu Shan (F 3) had with difficulty run three guns up to the crest of the ridge. Another battery of the Fourth Army could be seen on the hill east of Tung-shan-pu (F 3). Both these batteries were concentrating their fire on the Russian position which extended along the high ridge of Hsi-kou Shan (F 2), and the Russians could be seen, as usual, standing up in their trenches to fire.

About 3 p.m. Japanese infantry were massed in the valley south of Shih-miao-tzu (F 3), and a battalion doubled from there along the valley. Soon afterwards the Japanese infantry disappeared over a low neck, and about 4 p.m. some two companies reappeared on the col near the top of Iwa-yama (F 2 south).


The Russians up to now had been visible behind the rocks on the top of the hill, and a great many of them, as close together as it was possible to cram, in the trench between the rocks and the road. Now they left the rocks, but could be seen bobbing up and down in the trench.

At 4.10 p.m. the leading Japanese, after halting close under the rocks, dashed to the top, evidently expecting to find the Russians still there, and then a few on the right discovered the Russians in the trench and enfiladed them. The Russians now stood up and fired among the rocks, but after about five minutes left the trench and retreated. At the same time the Japanese infantry appeared all along the foot of Hsi-kou Shan (F 2), and began clambering up the slopes. Others came from the right and ran up the long, sloping spur. After a few minutes the Japanese infantry lined the whole top of the ridge, waving national flags and firing at the Russians, who had to retreat over fairly open ground.

A terrific hail and thunderstorm then broke, and obscured the hill from view.

15th Oct. Next morning (15th October) I went to the scene of this fight. A piercing cold wind was blowing, which must have

killed off the wounded left on the ground during the night. While I was there the 40th Regiment came up and entrenched themselves. Each company as it arrived in the portion of the hill allotted to it, halted and piled arms. The officers then marked out the sites for the trenches, and the men were told off in three reliefs, *i.e.*, a section at a time. The first relief then advanced and extended hand-to-hand. In half-an-hour they had dug a good trench in medium hard soil, working with a will to keep themselves warm. Others were told off to bring up branches, *kaoliang*, &c. for shelters. The trench was completed in three-quarters of an hour.



Several of the officers of the 40th Regiment told me about the attack on the previous day.

One lieutenant of the 3rd Battalion who was with the leading company in the attack said that when he reached the top of the hill, 140 Russian dead were lying at this particular point, nearly all of whom had been killed by Japanese shrapnel fire.

When his company started up the slopes, a close line of Russian bayonets could be seen pointing towards them along the trench. Suddenly all disappeared, the Russians having evidently received orders to retire after the Iwa-yama end of the hill had been taken. Only two men were wounded in his company, and very few in the regiment. The heaviest fighting took place round Iwa-yama, and altogether 300 Russian corpses were found on the hill. They were men of the 37th Division, 145th, 146th, and 147th Regiments.

During the 15th and 16th considerable movement could be seen among the Russians across the Sha Ho, especially near Ta Shan (F 2). Russian cavalry patrols were active in all directions, and some desultory artillery fire took place. It was noticeable what a large proportion of the Russian cavalry horses were white or grey. They showed up most conspicuously against the dark background of the hills.

The Japanese commenced digging operations on 15th October all along their present defensive line. The line held by the First Army, not including the extreme right, was —

Hsin-kai Ling (J 3) on the right *via* Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), Hua-kou-ling Shan (G 3), Wa-shang-kou (F 2) to Feng-chi-pu (G 2). The 2nd Division staff remained at Miao-pu-tzu (F 3).

**(36) Battle of the Sha Ho.—First Japanese Army.
Operations of the Guard Division from
the 7th to the 14th October 1904.**

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O. Royal Artillery,
Tokio, 18th February 1905.

Plates.

Sketch map to illustrate operations of the Guard
Division, 10–14th October - - - Map 44

1. At the beginning of October, Kuropatkin considered himself strong enough to take the offensive, and expressed his intention of driving back the Japanese and relieving Port Arthur. About the 3rd or 4th October he began pushing forward troops from the line Mukden–Fu-shun* across the Hun Ho. Marshal Oyama decided to remain on the defensive behind his entrenchments until the direction of the main Russian attack became apparent, and, directly it became expedient or necessary, to take the offensive. Kuropatkin's plan of operations, which consisted of an attack along the whole line, combined with an attempt to crush the Japanese right in the mountains, gradually unfolded itself to the Japanese, who began moving their divisions to meet it.† The Guard Division therefore received orders to move to Chang-chia-tun (B 4) on the 7th October, and on the same day it took up the line Pao-chi Ling–Shuang-tou Ling (C 4)–Ta Shan (A/B 4). On its right it touched the left of the 12th, and on its left, the right of the 2nd Division, the line it occupied being somewhat in rear of the general front of these two divisions. The hills were so steep and stony, and difficult to work in, that it was not till the 9th that the division was able to complete its trenches, and turn the line it occupied into a fairly strong entrenched position.

2. The battle of the Sha Ho was fought half in the mountains and half in the plain along which runs the road and railway from Liao-yang to Mukden. The First Army fought wholly in the hills; on its left the Fourth Army fought in country where one or two offshoots from the mountains rambled out westward into the plain, affording positions formidable owing to the broad stretches of level which separated them; the Second Army, on the left, fought wholly on the plains. The 2nd Division, which constituted the left of the First Army, operated along the western edge of the mountains, and therefore had a certain amount of level to encounter, but the Guard

* 25 East of Mukden.

† See Map 44 which corresponds to squares F 2, F 3, F 4 G 2, G 3, and G 4 of Map 41.

and the remainder of the First Army worked entirely in the mountains.

3. The tract of country through which the Guard Division advanced consists of a mass of steep stony hills, the sides of which are sometimes seamed with nullahs. The rocky crests of the highest points, Ta Shan (A/B 4), Hua-kou-ling Shan (C 3), and Ma-erh Shan (C 2) rise between 500 and 600 feet above the surrounding valleys. There is little or no wood beyond occasional patches of firs and stunted oaks in the valleys and on the hills, the slopes being, for the most part, covered with coarse grass or stunted oak and hazel scrub. The valleys and foot-hills are covered with cultivation, mostly *kaoliang*. The rivers are no obstacles. The Pa-chia-tzu valley (B 3), across which the division had to fight its way, is three-quarters to one mile wide, and of the same nature as those described in former reports, but at Shang Liu-ho (B 3), where several valleys meet, an arm of the plains runs, as it were, into the hills, forming an irregular, slightly undulating, cultivated basin of considerable extent.

San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3) and Watanabe-yama (B 3) (named after the commander of the 2nd Guard Infantry Brigade) are long narrow spurs running northwards from the mass of hills; their sides are very steep and their crests maintain their general level till at their north ends they each terminate in a pronounced knoll, from which they drop abruptly some 400 feet into the Shang Liu-ho valley (B 3). A wide tongue of low undulating ground runs down to Shang Liu-ho, parallel to, and between them; east of a north and south line drawn through Pa-chia-tzu the hill system is close and confused.

The line of heights which constitute the south side of the Sha Ho valley in the area under report are Hsiao-liu-yu Shan (D 3), Hua-kou-ling Shan (C 3), Ma-erh Shan (C 2), and Chien Shan (B 2). From their lower slopes broad flat-topped under-features ramble out northwards into the valley, the most prominent portions of them being Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (B 2) and Te-te Shan (C 2), two low hills lying well away from the main ridges. Wai-tou Shan (D 2), a long narrow hill, rises abruptly some 400 feet above the Sha Ho valley, and is practically distinct from the main ridge to which it is only joined by a very low col.

In the main valleys the principal villages are large and flourishing.

4. On the 7th October the enemy was still distant from the front of the division. On the 8th the Guard Cavalry Regiment, which was reconnoitring to the north, had to retire from Ma-erh Shan (C 2), pressed back by superior forces. On the 9th, two regiments of Russian infantry and one regiment of cavalry reached Pa-chia-tzu (B 3) and Mien-hua-pu (C 3), and the same evening advanced detachments of the enemy occupied the northern points of Watanabe-yama (B 3) and San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3). 7th Oct.
9th Oct.

5. The same day, the 9th, Kuropatkin's intention to roll up the Japanese right having become clear, the 12th Division was hurried off eastwards to the assistance of the Umezawa Brigade, leaving only a small detachment on the right of the Guard.

Late in the afternoon a message reached the commander of the Guard Division from the Chief of the Staff First Army, stating that the strength of the enemy in front of the First Army and opposite its right flank was about four divisions.

10th Oct. On the 10th the Guard occupied the position they had prepared, as shown on the map,* and awaited the advance of the Russians, who, on that day, sent cavalry to Shang Chen-chia-kou (B 4) and began shelling the Erh-tao-kou valley (B 4) with a field battery which they brought into action in the Pa-chia-tzu valley, somewhere just south of the village of that name (B 3).

6. *2nd Brigade.*—It was on the 2nd Brigade (Major-General Watanabe) that the brunt of the fighting fell. This brigade took up its assigned line north of Chang-chia-tun (B 4) on the night of the 7th October, 3rd Regiment on the left, 4th Regiment on the right, and working through the night, had almost completed its trenches by the following day.

On first arriving on the position a covering party of two companies was sent forward to occupy and hold the spur running east from Erh-tao-kou (B 4) to point A (B 4).

8th Oct. On the 8th the general sent forward two companies from the 3rd Regiment to Hill 238† (B 4) and two companies from the 4th Regiment to point B (B 4); the former were ordered to fall back to point A if compelled to do so by superior forces. Superior forces did advance against Hill 238, and on the evening of the 8th the two companies fell back to point A as ordered. During the 8th, 9th, and 10th the general and his adjutant took up their position at point C, north of Hua-niu-pu (B 4).

9th Oct. 7. On the morning of the 9th three squadrons of Russian cavalry arrived on hill D north of Hsia Chen-chia-kou (B 4), followed by infantry, who took post on Hill 238; later in the day a large force of infantry, strength unknown, established itself on Watanabe-yama (B 3). At the same time the general was informed by his scouts that four field guns had arrived at Pa-chia-tzu (B 3). As soon as all this information had been obtained, the two companies from B fell back to the main position, leaving observation posts out. During the night of the 9th the situation did not change.

10th Oct. 8. On the morning of the 10th October the general observed three or four small cavalry reconnoitring patrols moving from the hills south of 238 to E, north-east of Shang Chen-chia-kou (B 4), but as they returned the way they came, he felt pretty sure there was no great force of the enemy about E in front of

* Map 44.

† Called Ohara-yama after Colonel Ohara, O.C. 3rd Regiment, which took the hill on the night of the 10-11th.—C. H.

his right, and that the patrols merely came out to reconnoitre. About noon the four guns reported the previous day opened fire from F and shelled the valley south of Erh-tao-kou (B 4). The guns were invisible to the Japanese, who did not reply either with guns or rifles, but remained concealed in their trenches. After firing some twenty rounds the Russians ceased fire. Nothing further occurred during the 10th.

9. *1st Brigade*.—On the 7th the 1st Brigade (Major-General Izaki) took up and began entrenching its assigned line, 1st Regiment on the left, 2nd Regiment on the right. It remained undisturbed till the night of the 10th, its outposts watching its front as far forward as Shang Chen-chia-kou (B 4). 7th Oct.

10. After nightfall on the 10th the commander of the Guard Division (Lieut.-General Asada) received orders from the Commander of the First Army (General Kuroki) to the following effect:— 10th Oct.

- (1) The First Army will attack the enemy from daybreak to-morrow (11th).
- (2) The Guard Division will advance against the heights north of Shang Liu-ho (B 3), while the 2nd Division advances against the hills west of Tu-men-tzu (B 3).

11. On receipt of these orders Lieut.-General Asada decided that, before making the hills north of Shang Liu-ho his objective, he must first of all take point 238 (B 4) and the line of hills to the east of it, in order that he might have his division in a favourable position from which to take off for his advance across the Pa-chia-tzu valley (B 3). Further he decided that to enable him to carry out the orders he had received, it was necessary that he should move at once. He therefore resolved to take point 238 and point 242 (Wai-tou Shan*) (C 4) that night, and, with this object, issued orders to the following effect:—

- (1) The right column, under Major-General Izaki, commanding the 1st Brigade, consisting of five battalions and half troop of cavalry, to be in position on the line of hills south-west of Pao-chi Ling (C 4) by 5 a.m., and to take point 242 by daybreak.
- (2) The left column, under Major-General Watanabe, commanding 2nd Brigade, same strength as right column, to advance to the ridge north-west of Hsia Chen-chia-kou (B 4), and to take point 238 by daybreak.
- (3) The artillery to remain in the positions occupied by the batteries in the defensive line,† and to be prepared to advance in support of the infantry if required. The group of four batteries in position near Hua-niu-pu (B 4) to be held in readiness to advance at a moment's notice.

* Not to be confounded with the Wai-tou Shan (C D 2) in the Sha Ho valley.—C. H.


† Marked on Map 44.

- (4) The Engineer Battalion to remain with this latter group of batteries to assist their advance by road making, repairing tracks, &c.
- (5) The Guard Cavalry Regiment to protect the right flank of the right column.*

11th Oct.

12. *The Left Column (2nd Brigade).*—It was not till past 1 a.m. on the 11th that the Commander of the 2nd Brigade received orders to take point 238 before daybreak. On receiving them he left one company at a point south-west of Shang Chen-chia-kou, collected the 4th Regiment at G in the valley north of Chang chia-tun, and the 3rd Regiment at H on the left of the 4th. All was ready for the advance by 3 a.m., and the brigadier sent his senior adjutant to accompany the 4th Regiment and see his orders carried out, while he himself went with the 3rd Regiment. Each regiment advanced to the attack with two battalions, II. 3 being in divisional reserve, while a battalion of the 4th Regiment (I./4) was left at Hua-niu-pu (B 4).†

13. The night was very dark, and the two regiments advanced side by side as far as point I. (B 4), the 4th along the valley bottom, the 3rd along the ridge on its left. Each regiment had one battalion in first line and one in second line, the formation adopted being as follows:—




* The divisional reserve is not mentioned in this précis of orders, but it probably consisted, as usual, of the remaining battalions of each brigade.

† Probably as brigade reserve.—O. H.

The advance was very slow owing to the extreme darkness of the night, but the brigade arrived at point I before dawn, and the 3rd Regiment then inclined to its left with the object of enveloping the right flank of the Russians on 238, the 4th Regiment attacking to its front.

14. The instructions of the brigadier, taken by the brigade adjutant to the officers commanding regiments, were to the following effect:—"All bayonets to be fixed and rifles loaded, " but the bayonet only to be used unless the enemy became " visible; then fire was to be opened." No white arm badges nor other marks to distinguish friend from foe were employed. There was no time to make such arrangements, so Major-General Watanabe, who always makes his orders as terse as possible, gave these instructions:—"Japanese are short, foreigners are " tall. There are no foreign attachés with the brigade to-night, " so treat every tall man you come across as an enemy."

15. As the 4th Regiment approached 238, fire was opened on its advanced line of skirmishers at about 50 yards range by the Russian sentry line which had been pushed forward down the slopes. The skirmishers thereupon fell back on their companies and the leading battalion deployed in double rank, while the battalion in the second line, about 150 yards behind it, formed line of section columns, with about 20 yards interval between companies, thus:—



The regiment then halted and patrols were sent out to the front to feel the enemy, but his sentries had retired on their main body. Day then began to dawn, and the Russians opened fire from the crest of 238. The distance between the two forces was from 200 to 250 yards, and though the Japanese were still in complete darkness, the Russians were visible to them against the sky line in the dawning day; so the leading battalion, still in double rank, opened fire on them, and a musketry action ensued, during which the commander of the 4th Regiment prolonged his firing line to the right, sending forward two companies from the battalion in the second line for the purpose.

16. In the meantime the 3rd Regiment, which had inclined to its left, advanced against 238, with both its battalions in one line. This advance, combined with the frontal attack of the 4th Regiment, had the desired effect, and the enemy evacuated 238. The hill was then occupied by the 3rd Regiment, the 4th Regiment prolonging the line to E (C 4) on the right, where it touched the left of the 1st Brigade.

The whole action only lasted about half-an-hour, the 4th Regiment expending about 5,000 rounds and having under 50 casualties. The 3rd Regiment did not open fire at all, and received only a few rounds themselves. There was no bayonet attack. The strength of the enemy on Hill 238 was estimated at about one battalion, and he left half-a-dozen wounded on the field.

17. *The Right Column (1st Brigade).*—The 1st Brigade advanced at about 3 a.m., 1st Regiment on the right, 2nd Regiment on the left, one battalion in reserve, and by daybreak (6.30 a.m.) occupied Hill 242 (C 4) and the ridge to the east of it without opposition. The right flank of the advance was protected by the Guard cavalry, which, with the detachment left by the 12th Division, was about Pao-chi Ling (C 4).

18. During the morning the commander of the right column noticed that the enemy had sent forward some detachments from Mien-hua-pu (C 3) to Mien-hua-kou (C 4), and, sending out some patrols, he discovered that they consisted of about two companies of infantry. He therefore placed a detachment on the hill south of Mien-hua-kou to protect his right flank, and at the same time sent II./1 to occupy and hold the ridge in front of 242. The latter battalion was in position by 7.30 a.m. Also, when the enemy retired from 238 at daybreak, his supports counter-attacked up the valley on the east side of Watanabe-yama, and established themselves in some broken ground within two hundred yards of the position occupied by the 4th Regiment.

19. In front of the left column there was at least a battalion of the enemy, which took up a position across the north end of Watanabe-yama (B 3) and along the spurs running down from it to the east, and threw up trenches. At the same time a battery near Pa-chia-tzu (B 3) shelled the position occupied by the 4th Regiment. At about 7.40 a.m. the enemy's strength on Watanabe-yama increased to about two battalions. His guns also kept up a hot fire on the 4th Regiment and on 238, and as the Japanese artillery had not yet put in an appearance, the infantry had to protect themselves as best they could with hastily thrown-up entrenchments.

20. At 8 a.m. three Russian battalions came into action in the main valley, north-east of San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3) and opened a hot fire against the 2nd Division (3rd Brigade), and against 238 and its west slopes, held by the 3rd Guards. At the same time three squadrons of Cossacks in extended order galloped up the valley along the west side of Watanabe-yama

(B 3), apparently with the insane purpose of attacking the left of the 3rd Regiment, which was holding the head of the valley. A company sent forward drove them back without difficulty.

21. Directly Hills 238 and 242 were occupied, General Asada sent for the four battalions which had been told to hold themselves in readiness to advance from Hua-niu-pu, but the officer in command of them had already grasped the situation, and had started before the order reached him. So at 9.10 a.m. a battery (4th Guard Artillery Battalion) came into action in the valley just west of Shang Chen-chia-kou (B 4) and shelled the Russians on Watanabe-yama (B 3).

22. The enemy on this latter hill was being continuously reinforced, and at about 9.30 a.m. a strong body of Cossacks again advanced at a gallop against the left of the 3rd Regiment. This time magazine fire drove them quickly back with heavy losses.

23. About 10 a.m. five Russian battalions appeared between Pa-chia-tzu and Mien-hua-pu (B/C 3). Two companies from this force moved forward to Mien-hua-kou (C 4), while a battalion advanced against the ridge held by II./1. The latter came to within seven hundred yards of the Japanese infantry, and a sharp musketry fight ensued, during which the enemy at Mien-hua-kou, now four companies strong, crept up hill and tried to turn the Japanese right.

24. At 11 a.m. 1 and 5/G.A.* arrived on the scene west of Shang Chen-chia-kou (B 4), and, with 4/G.A., shelled the Russians on Watanabe-yama, but could not turn them out of their entrenchments.

25. At 1 p.m. the enemy in front of the right column was reinforced and advanced against the right flank of the division, trying to envelop it, while a battery of eight guns came into action against 242 from a position near Mien-hua-pu (C 3), so the commander of the right column reinforced with his reserve and held on.

26. At 1.10 p.m. a body of Russian infantry advanced from Shang Liu-ho (B 3) along the valley west of Watanabe-yama, and at the same time the batteries at Mien-hua-pu (C 3) and in the valley north-east of San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3) fired rapidly in support of its attack. The Russian infantry on Watanabe-yama (B 3) also opened a hot fire, and the position of the left wing became somewhat difficult. The commander of the 4th Regiment reinforced his firing line with one of his remaining two companies in the morning, and by noon both battalions were entirely in the firing line. The commander of the left column thereupon reinforced his firing line and held on.

27. The situation at 1 p.m., as it appeared to the commander of the division, was this: The enemy in front of the right

* G.A. = Guard Artillery. 1/G.A. = 1st Battery Guard Artillery.

column was not in very great strength, but to attack him meant descending a steep slope and crossing a broad, open valley. Such an attack by daylight, especially without efficient artillery support, hardly offered sufficient advantages. Still, the right column could hold on, and was in no immediate danger. The front of the left column, however, was being more and more threatened, and the situation there was becoming dangerous. So Lieut.-General Asada sent his reserve battalion, II./3, to reinforce the left column. The battalion arrived south of 238 at 1.30 p.m. A very hot musketry fight was then going on, and the enemy's artillery was also very effective.

28. At 1.55 p.m. Major Hijikata brought his battery of captured Russian guns* into action on the lower eastern slope of 238. He unlimbered at 1.30 p.m. on a bare patch of cultivated ground, and fired his first shot at 1.55 p.m. In the interim the gunners had dug covers for themselves in the soft ground on each side of each gun.

In the meantime 6/G.A. had also come up and brought three† guns into action in epaulments in the column north of the village of Shang Chen chia-kou (B 4), about four hundred yards to the right front of Hijikata, and three guns into action against Watanabe-yama (B 3), from a point about the same distance to Hijikata's right rear. At the same time a detachment of engineers and gunners began making epaulments in a low saddle three hundred or four hundred yards east of the village. The horses, limbers and wagons of H.F.A. and 6/G.A. were drawn up in the open valley well away to the left rear of H.F.A., and partly sheltered by a wood which covered the slope on Hijikata's left. Hijikata and the two guns to his right front opened fire at 1.55 p.m. against the Russian guns down in the valley at Mien-hua-pu (C 3) with excellent effect, disabling, I afterwards heard, four of the enemy's wagons. The Russian gunners, who had been shelling the Japanese infantry at intervals, did not reply till 2.10 p.m., and then they opened a very accurate fire‡ on the guns, taking 6/G.A. to start with, and Hijikata afterwards. The Japanese gunners, however, stuck manfully to their guns, and served them at the double between the *rafales*, in spite of the losses I could see them suffering.

29. To continue the description of the artillery action in this part of the field.—At 3.10 the other three guns of 6/G.A. opened fire against the Russians on Watanabe-yama, while at 4.20 p.m. the battery in the column east of the village opened slow indirect fire against Mien-hua-pu, drawing an occasional harmless shell in reply.

* Marked H.F.A. (Heavy Field Artillery) on Map 44.

† Two of these guns were put in position at 1.45 p.m., the third of an hour later.—C. H.

‡ An artillery officer informed me they were firing indirectly.—C. H.

At 3.45 p.m. a curious thing occurred. The Russian battery which had been so effectively shelling 6/G.A. and H.F.A., suddenly changed its aim, I think to try and find the three guns of 6/G.A., which were shelling Watanabe-yama. Failing in this, it tried to return to H.F.A., but through some error it never recovered its target, but for the next hour continued to waste its shrapnel on a row of *kaoliang* stacks a good two hundred yards to Hijikata's right, which probably looked, at a distance, like epaulments. Hijikata was thus able to devote his attention to the Russian guns unmolested, the very conspicuous flash of discharge of his own guns notwithstanding.

At 4.45 p.m. the Mien-hua-pu battery suddenly changed its tactics, and began firing over H.F.A. into the broad valley behind it, where limbers, wagons, teams, and a good deal of light baggage stood. Good luck attended this change; both range and direction happened to be right, and the valley was hurriedly cleared.

The effect of the Japanese artillery fire was felt by the Russians, as about 4 p.m. two companies were seen to retire from Watanabe-yama on Pa-chia-tzu (B 3), while the infantry, which in the morning had established itself within two hundred yards of the 4th Regiment, fell back some three hundred yards. Thenceforward the Russian fire in front of the left column weakened, and the situation became less threatening.

30. During the morning the Russians on San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3) stubbornly opposed any attempt of the 2nd Division (the 3rd Brigade) to drive them off that hill, and shortly after midday the commander of the Guard Division was ordered to assist this brigade in an attack. On receipt of these orders, Lieut.-General Asada, between 1 and 2 p.m., ordered the commander of the left column to co-operate with the 3rd Brigade and to detach as many men as possible for the purpose. He also ordered his artillery commander to detach three batteries to support the attack from a position in the valley west of Shang Chen-chia-kou (B 4).

31. As will be seen from the map, the left of the left column was, at this time, some way in front of the right of the 3rd Brigade, and the gap between them was unfilled. On receipt of the order, the commander of the left column ordered II./3, which, as previously mentioned, had arrived behind 238 (B 4) at 1.30 p.m., and about one battalion of the 4th Regiment* which he could spare, the whole under Colonel Iida, commanding 4th Regiment, to advance to the attack.

32. While Major-General Watanabe was preparing for this attack, a mistake in the transmission of a message occurred which upset his arrangements. A "special sergeant-major"† came from Major-General Matsunaga to the commander of the

* I think this battalion was the one which had been left at Hua-niu-pu on the morning, and which had been brought up later.—C. H.

† A warrant officer on the strength of each company.

division with a message to the effect that the enemy in his front was so strong that he (Matsunaga) could not hold on where he was, but must fall back to the position he occupied the previous day. Assuming the message which was forwarded on to him, to be correct, Major-General Watanabe, far from attacking, had to devote his attention to the protection of his own left, as a retrograde movement by Matsunaga would leave that flank still more unprotected than it already was. He, therefore, ordered II./3 to occupy the ridge south-west of 238, and the battalion of the 4th Regiment to remain where it was in position facing north. At the same time (2.40 p.m.) the commander of the division sent a staff officer to Matsunaga to ask for confirmation of the report. The staff officer returned at 4.20 p.m. with the information that the message had been wrongly delivered, and that what Matsunaga had sent to say was that the enemy on San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3) was so strong that he could not attack alone, and that unless the Guard could co-operate in the attack he would have to stay where he was.

33. More than two precious hours of daylight had thus been lost, but matters having been set right, Major-General Watanabe, at 4.30 p.m., ordered the two battalions to the attack under Colonel Iida. Owing to the delay, the battalion of the 4th Regiment did not join in till dark, and was too late to produce much effect, but II./3 attacked towards Shang Yeh-ho-kou (B 4). At the same time Matsunaga advanced on San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3), but the enemy holding the hill would not move, and his three batteries in the valley kept up a hot fire up the Shang Yeh-ho-kou valley.

Matsunaga's attack, therefore, failed, and II./3 had only got as far as Shang Yeh-ho-kou (B 4) when night fell, so during the night the commander of the division withdrew the battalion to the hill whence it had started. The battalion had suffered heavily, but though its attack had failed in its primary object, it was not without effect, as by drawing the enemy into the valley, it assisted the advance made that night by the 3rd Regiment along the ridge of Watanabe-yama (B 3).

34. On the left of the division, therefore, the situation was as described. The 3rd Regiment was holding Hill 238, the 4th the slopes and col to the east of it, while two battalions were co-operating with Matsunaga. The 4th Regiment suffered considerably during the day, having 180 casualties, 50 of which were from artillery fire.

35. On the right the forward position of II./1 on the ridge in front of Hill 242 (C 4) was threatened by the Russians (four companies) at Mien-hua-kou (C 4), but at 4.30 p.m. a battalion of the 46th Regiment, from the detachment left by the 12th Division, luckily came up, and, in conjunction with the right of the right column, drove the enemy out of Mien-hua-kou. The flank of II./1 was thus secure, and it was able to hold on to the ridge.

36. The Guard Division had, therefore, been unable to carry out the orders received the previous night, being still on the south side of the Pa-chia-tzu valley (B 3).

The previous day, 10th October, the foreign attachés had been stationed *en masse* on a hill near the Coal Mine (west of Chien-li, A 4),* and had seen strong columns of Russians advancing in the morning over the hills west of Tu-men-tzu (B 3) and entrenching a position along the north edge of the San-tai-tzu valley (B 2). At the same time we had seen them climbing the north slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3), and establishing themselves on that hill.

Against these strong, well-posted forces the 2nd Division had been unable to make headway on the 11th, and, as previously mentioned, the 12th Division had gone from the right, leaving only a weak detachment; so, even had the Guard attacked and driven back the Russians entrenched in the very difficult ground about Watanabe-yama (B 3), they would in their advance have exposed both flanks of the division, and, further, could not have counted on efficient artillery support, as the rugged ground was totally unsuited to their field artillery. They had, therefore, no option but to hold on to the position gained during their night advance and wait for the advance of the 2nd Division. Their position was not a pleasant one, and if the Russians had been able to concentrate sufficient force against their right they would have had to fall back.

Luckily the enemy either failed to recognize the exposed condition of the Guard's right flank, or his dispositions prevented him from taking advantage of it, and the division was able to hold on to its position overlooking the Pa-chia-tzu valley.

That General Kuroki recognized this danger was proved by the fact that on the morning of the 11th we found two-and-a-half battalions of the Army reserve posted at Chang-chia-tun (B 4).

By the following morning the situation was changed, and the Russians had lost their opportunity.

From 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. two other foreign attachés and myself were on a low ridge just behind that held by II./1.

37. Once again the Japanese had recourse to a night attack. Late† at night orders came from General Kuroki to the commander of the division that the Guard was to advance that night to the hills east of Tu-men-tzu (B 3). Lieut.-General Asada concluded this order was the necessary consequence of the advance of neighbouring divisions.

With the situation as it was, however, and on account of the late receipt of the orders, he thought the hills east of Tu-men-tzu too distant an objective to assign straight off to the division, and he determined to take possession of the hills north of Pa-chia-tzu (B 3) and Mien-hua-pu (C 3) in the first instance,

* The Coal Mine is marked on square E 4 of Map 41.

† One informant told me 9 p.m., another midnight.—C. H.

and, with these in his possession, to issue fresh orders for the advance on the line of hills indicated by General Kuroki.

To carry out his orders a night attack was necessary, a difficult operation under the circumstances, as it involved the advance of the whole division with but little time for preparation. He, therefore, issued orders to the following effect:—

The right column to advance at 2.30 a.m. and take the hill north of Mien-hua-pu (San-cheng-tzu Ling) (C 3) before daybreak.

The left column to leave a division in position, advance along Watanabe-yama (B 3) and occupy Pa-chia-tzu (B 3) and the spur east of it by daybreak.

38. The night was very dark, and the general feared that the division might not be able to keep line, but that one wing might get in front of the other, expose its flank, and get rolled up. Some definite point of connection was therefore necessary, and as the chief resistance was expected in front of the left column, Lieut.-General Asada ordered the right column, when it reached the ridge north of 242 (C 4), to time its advance by that of the left column, and, if necessary, wait for it.

39. The strength of the enemy in front of the right column was five infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment, and in front of the left column over two infantry regiments with two cavalry regiments. Three batteries of artillery were in action north-east of San-cheng-tzu Shan, one at Pa-chia-tzu, and one at Mien-hua-pu.

12th Oct.

40. *The Right Column* advanced with the 2nd Regiment on the right, the 1st on the left, one company being sent to the left to connect with the left column.

The Left Column left one battalion 3rd Regiment on 238 (B 4) and the col south-west of it, sent two battalions of the 3rd Regiment along Watanabe-yama (B 3), and the 4th Regiment along the valley east of that ridge.

The advance was ordered for 2.30 a.m., but the night was so dark that much time was lost by the orderlies who carried orders, and had to cross much broken ground in performing this duty. The movement therefore did not begin till between 3 and 3.30 a.m.

41. *The Right Column* advanced on both sides of the Mien-hua-kou valley (C 4), the 2nd Regiment being directed on the hill east of Mien-hua-pu (C 3) and the 1st on Mien-hua-pu. It met with no opposition, any Russians in its front on the south side of the Pa-chia-tzu valley having retired during the night. The column, instead of waiting for the left column as ordered, moved straight on, and by 7 a.m. was in occupation of San-cheng-tzu Ling (C 3), the only enemy met with being a body of cavalry, which retired north-east from Mien-hua-pu. On account of the rapid advance of the right column, the connection between the two columns was entirely lost by daybreak.

42. As regards this action of the commander of the right column, the question arises—was it justifiable? When the

advance commenced, hot fighting began at once in front of the left column. On reaching the line of the ridge in front of Hill 242, the commander of the right column found that the enemy had gone from his own immediate front, and his ears told him that the left column was held up. The question that presented itself to him was: Shall I carry out Lieut.-General Asada's orders, and wait for the left column, or shall I take advantage of my clear front and push on? If he followed the former course, daybreak might, and probably would, find the division in a safe position, but still a long way off the objective assigned to it by Army Head-Quarters; if he took the latter, daybreak would find his column *en l'air*, but threatening the line of retreat of the force opposing the left column, and much nearer the line which General Kuroki wished the division to occupy on the 12th. He took the risk and chose the latter alternative, and, as matters went, had no reason to regret it.

43. After occupying San-cheng-tzu Ling the right column advanced north towards Hua-kou-ling Shan (C 3), and Ma-erh Shan (C 2) to press the enemy and try and cut his line of retreat.

44. *The Left Column.*—At about 1.30 a.m. on the 12th October the commander of the left column received orders to drive the enemy off Watanabe-yama (B 3) and occupy Pa-chia-tzu and neighbourhood before dawn. He immediately ordered the 4th Regiment (two battalions) to rendezvous at the east foot of 238 by 2.30 a.m., and at that hour to advance along the valley on the east side of Watanabe-yama and capture the east end of Pa-chia-tzu and the spur to the east of it before dawn.

The orders for the 3rd Regiment were as follows:—

I./3. Brigade reserve.

II./3. To attack up the east slope of Watanabe-yama.
One company of this battalion was in regimental reserve.

III./3. To attack from 238 along the ridge.

The regiment was also to commence its advance at 2.30 a.m., and, when it had driven the enemy off the hill, it was to advance to Pa-chia-tzu (B 3). At the same time Major-General Watanabe placed one company of I./3 on the knoll J west of 238 (B 4), and when the advance began sent two companies from I./3 to drive off with the bayonet a body of Russian infantry, which, exceeding one company in strength, was occupying knoll K north-west of 238.

45. Major-General Watanabe had from his post on 238 been carefully watching the Russians in his front during the 11th, and though the occupants of the ridge kept well out of sight behind the crests of the spurs, the actions of the few who showed themselves gave him a pretty good idea of their dispositions and enabled him to decide on the plan of attack which he adopted.


At one time during the day he saw some mounted officers come up the valley from the north-west to "a"*; there they stopped some time, and through his glasses Major-General Watanabe could see that the one who was evidently the commander was arranging something, and from his actions he concluded that there must be a considerable force at "b," from the neighbourhood of which many volleys had come during the day. The officers then went back to the north-west, but stopped about three minutes at "c," and again at "d," speaking to someone at each spot.

The general therefore came to the conclusion that there was a considerable force on the crest of the ridge and on its western slopes at the four points mentioned. At the same time the commander of the 4th Regiment reported that the enemy was holding the spur at "e," and as the general was very anxious to find out what force he was in on the east side of the ridge, he watched and examined it carefully. He made out that the trenches at "e" could not accommodate more than a battalion, and he could also see men carrying things from "e" to the more forward positions. Further, the movements of the enemy's cavalry patrols convinced him that he had no strong force to contend with on his right front.

Putting the result of his observations together, he came to the conclusion that the main force in his front was posted on the principal ridge of Watanabe-yama (B 3) and on its western slopes, and that it would be possible for him to move the 4th Regiment round the enemy's left to Pa-chia-tzu before daybreak. In the meantime he would attack the Russians on the ridge with the 3rd Regiment, and even should he have made a mistake in his dispositions for this attack, and the 3rd Regiment should be checked, still the presence of the 4th Regiment at Pa-chia-tzu would ensure its eventual success.

46. The two battalions of the 3rd Regiment advanced simultaneously at about 3 a.m., and as the control of them then passed to the hands of the battalion commanders I will take them separately.

47. The II./3, according to the orders it had received, advanced to attack the enemy on Watanabe-yama at 3 a.m. The 8th Company was in regimental reserve, so the major only had three companies under his command. The battalion assembled behind 238, and was disposed as follows:—Two companies (5th and 6th) in the first line, 100 yards apart; one company (7th), in second line, 50 yards in rear, thus:—



* See squares B 4 north and B 3 south for the letters mentioned.

48. The companies started in section columns, and 50 yards in front of each company a line of seven little groups of skirmishers, each under a non-commissioned officer, was extended. The battalion moved down into the valley east of 238 in this formation, re-formed at the bottom, and then crossed a very steep spur into a subsidiary valley, down which it advanced for about fifty yards. It then wheeled to the left, which movement brought it within about 100 yards of the enemy's line on the crest of the ridge. The commander had previously called up the company commanders and explained to them what he wanted to do, and as the night was very dark he adopted the close formation described, and placed himself in the centre, where his words of command would be heard.

49. As the wheel to the left was concluded a whistle was heard suddenly sounded above the battalion, and immediately a volley was fired at it. The three companies lay down at once, the two leading companies deployed in rank entire, and bayonets were fixed; the 7th remained in column. At the same moment, fire was opened against their right flank, so one section of the 7th Company was told off to face this enemy. As the Russians on the main crest were visible on the sky-line, the 5th and 6th Companies were ordered to fire volleys, and after three volleys had been fired the major ordered a bayonet charge, 50 yards in rear of which followed the remaining two sections of the 7th Company. The fighting was very severe, the men using their bayonets, the enemy firing and throwing hand-grenades. The 5th and 6th Companies suffered so severely that both the reserve sections were sent into the centre of the front line. The Japanese charged twice without success, so the section on the right flank was recalled and sent in also to reinforce the centre. Thereupon the whole line rose and charged once more, and after a severe hand-to-hand fight the enemy gave way and retreated.

At that moment III./3 came along the ridge and lined up on the left. II./3 pursued, firing, for a short distance, then re-formed and advanced towards Hachimaki-yama.* At 5.30 a.m. the battalion reached the position "a" shown on the sketch, the enemy retreating north-east and north-west before its fire. On reaching "a" the Russians on Hachimaki-yama also began retreating, whereupon the two battalions advanced in line, and II./3 occupied that knoll.

50. The three companies lost 10 officers (5 killed)† and 197 non-commissioned officers and men (62 killed); 80 per cent. of the casualties were caused by hand-grenades filled with dynamite or some other high explosive. Between the three charges made the firing line lay down close under the steep razor-backed crest,

* The name given to the knoll at the north end of the ridge by the Japanese soldiers, who likened the ruined Chinese fort on it to the crown of a coolie's head with the twisted cloth tied round the forehead.—C. H.


† Two others died of their wounds.—C. H.

which was so narrow that the opposing lines were in most places under twenty, and in some only five yards apart. The three companies fired 9,200 rounds.

It was pitch dark when the first Russians retreated, but by the time the battalion reached Hachimaki-yama day was fast breaking. The action was over by 7 a.m.

51. III./3 received orders to advance simultaneously with II./3, but as its advance was along the narrow crest and against a narrow front, a different formation from that employed by the II./3 was adopted.

III./3 received similar orders to II./3, and advanced on its left. The battalion had its four companies complete, and two of them were placed in first line, one on each side of the narrow ridge on the steep slopes. Each of the leading companies advanced with one section deployed in rank entire, followed at about 50 yards' distance by the two other sections in column of fours. About 100 yards behind the latter the remaining two companies followed, also in columns of fours, thus:—



This formation was adopted on account of the conformation of the ground and the narrow front on which the battalion had to move.

52. When the leading sections arrived within from 50 yards to 100 yards of the enemy, they were ordered to open fire, and the remainder of the battalion lay down. After a while the cease-fire was sounded, and the whole of the two companies was deployed in first line. They then advanced again, and when within 40 yards of the enemy, heard whistles sounded. Thereupon they all lay down quickly, and returned his fire when he opened it.

The commander then reinforced each wing with one section from the companies in second line so as to overlap and envelop the enemy's flanks. The rifle flashes and hand-grenades showed his position, which it was too dark to make out otherwise.

Continuing the advance, the battalion lost many men through rifle fire in the next twenty yards, but after the two wings had been reinforced again they charged along the crest. On getting up to the position they had a sharp hand-to-hand fight, and the men snatched many Russian rifles from their owners' hands, or pulled the bayonets off them—an easy trick if one can get under the muzzle of the rifle of a man firing.

The Russians retreated, and the bulk of III./3 was shifted to the western side of the crest, and it pursued in conjunction with II./3. When it reached "a," two companies were detached to pursue towards the north-west. When day broke the men rested and had some food. The record of the losses of III./3 is not available, but they were much less than those of II./3.

53. After the action Major-General Watanabe and his adjutant counted between 50 and 60 Russians dead along the crest, but later a staff officer from Divisional Head-Quarters examined the ground carefully and found 108 dead on the upper slopes, while down in the valley, on the western side of the ridge, the Brigade Adjutant counted no less than 300 corpses, so the Russians lost 400 killed in this action.

54. I had ridden out early from Army Head-Quarters with three other attachés to the Guard Division, and reached the scene of the night attack during the morning, meeting the companies returning from the pursuit. As previously mentioned, the ridge is a razor-back with tremendously steep slopes covered with slippery, dry grass, or short, thick scrub; there is a rocky outcrop along portions of the crest, and equally narrow spurs with equally steep sides spring out below the crest at intervals. The spur crossed by II./3 in its advance is of similar formation.


The position held by the Russians at "b" ran along the main crest, and at a little knoll 400 yards from 238, their right flank was thrown back some 30 or 40 yards along the crest of a spur running west. The entrenchments were crude, and consisted merely of a few of the usual lying-down shelter-pits scraped behind the crest. Where the rock cropped out it was made to do duty as a breastwork.

II./3 attacked on a front of about 200 yards, and the hand-to-hand fighting of both battalions must have been desperate. Close to the crest on its west side lay 50 or 60 Russians dead, while on its east side 70 or 80 Japanese dead lay along and just below the crest. A more or less clearly defined ten paces separated the lines of dead. A big Russian and a small Japanese lay transfixed by each other's bayonet; many dead on both sides still grasped their rifles from which the bayonets had been pulled off; one Russian had a deep sword-cut right across his face. This last was, of course, the handiwork of an officer. Most of the Russian dead had been shot through the head. As usual, the heaviest losses had taken place during retirement, the Russian dead lying thickest on the lower western slopes. The small Japanese in khaki, and with rolled cloaks, looked mere children beside the big Russians they had routed; the latter wore their long grey cloaks, leather belts outside the cloaks, and black bushies.

After clearing the enemy off Watanabe-yama, the 3rd Regiment assembled at Pa-chia-tzu, as ordered, between 9 and 10 a.m.

55. The night advance of the 4th Regiment was thus described to me:—

"The 4th Regiment was ordered to advance at 2.20 a.m., and began it shortly after that hour. Its objective was the east end of Pa-chia-tzu (B 3) and the spur to the east of it, which it was ordered to capture before dawn. The colonel anticipated that the 3rd Regiment would have a hard fight, and not wishing to get drawn into it, he ordered his regiment to advance by the track on the east side of the main road to Pa-chia-tzu, and thence along the spur L (B 3, south-east). He therefore sent some patrols down into the valley on the left, and, on reaching the col at M, formed his regiment (two battalions only) for night attack. It was a very difficult and cramped position to deploy on, and as the enemy was on the left and in front at L, great caution was necessary. The formation adopted was this:—




"Orders were issued that there was to be no firing whatsoever, as it was possible the regiment might meet the 3rd Regiment in the dark near Pa-chia-tzu, and naturally did not want to fire on them."

56. When the advance was begun, firing was already going on in front of the 3rd Regiment. It was very dark indeed, but many bullets came the way of the 4th, and some of the men were wounded. A detachment of the enemy was still occupying the knoll at L, but the leading battalion was ordered to get there as quickly as possible, and on its approach the Russians left the knoll after firing a few shots.

The spur had looked easy-going by daylight, but at night the ground was found trappy, and it was with difficulty that the formation was retained while crossing it. As the regiment advanced along the spur, it heard severe fighting going on on Watanabe-yama, and expected every moment to have to take to the bayonet, but it reached the end of it without opposition, and could make out the whereabouts of Pa-chia-tzu from a few camp fires burning at its western end. The commander therefore changed direction half left, and descended into the valley, in which the going was as easy as the Aoyama parade ground at Tokio.

57. On leaving the spur, three companies of the rear battalion were brought up on the left of the leading one, and advanced across the open, level valley, in this formation—



This formation was adopted because signs of approaching dawn were seen, and it was thought that it would be light before the village was reached, where it was known the enemy had some guns, and probably some infantry in position on the adjacent high ground. Even when the advance across the level was begun the men could dimly distinguish their comrades on the sky-line near Hachimaki-yama (B 3).

58. On nearing Pa-chia-tzu (B 3), which was held by about one company of the enemy, their approach was discovered, and about fifty Russians charged out shouting, with fixed bayonets. Day was just about to break, and as it was expected to meet the enemy's infantry here, the line was directed towards the long spur north-east of the village. On perceiving the strength of

the Japanese, the fifty Russians, when within twenty yards of them, turned and ran; the Japanese in their turn chasing them with shouts and fixed bayonets. This rush carried them to the foot of the ridge, still in the formation described. Day then broke, and they could see about two hundred Russians holding the ridge above them. They did not reply to the fire opened on them, but charged the hill with the bayonet.

59. The company on the left flank, for which there was no room on the ridge, had advanced to the south-east corner of the village, and on arrival there reported a field battery advancing from the west.

The company was ordered to open fire, and fired rapid independent fire at the battery at ranges of 800 yards and over. This caused the battery, with its escort of fifty cavalry, to retire up the valley north-east of Shang Liu-ho (B 3), leaving behind one ammunition wagon, one medical stores wagon, and a cooking-wagon, the teams of which had been shot.*

60. When the two battalions at last took the ridge the commander was able to get a clear idea of the situation from it, and, though he had only been ordered to go as far as the ridge, he considered it essential to push on towards Shang Liu-ho (B 3), so as to get nearer the enemy's line of retreat, which was beyond effective range of the ridge. So he advanced to a line running north-east and south-west across the Shang Liu-ho road, and about two hundred yards short of that village all eight companies deployed in the open. The Russians were then retiring hurriedly from Hachimaki-yama and, though their officers made many attempts to rally them, the Japanese continued firing at them at from 1,300 yards to 1,500 yards range, and kept them in confusion, killing many. They first began retreating in a north-east direction, but the Japanese advance stopped that; and, joined by others from San-cheng-tzu Shan, they retired north-west past the west end of Shang Liu-ho on Hsia Liu-ho (A 3). About a brigade altogether got away.

61. The Japanese were in high spirits, shouting, and firing, and to add to the excitement some patrols sent up north-east into the hills returned through Pa-chia-tzu, and, finding a number of Russians hidden in the houses a series of individual combats took place in the village behind us.

The divisional reserves were then seen advancing on Pa-chia-tzu along the east side of Watanabe-yama, and as the 3rd Regiment was driving the few remaining Russians off Hachimaki-yama, the colonel of the 4th Regiment determined to try and cut the enemy's line of retreat.

He therefore advanced towards the hills east of Tu-men-tzu, but they were held by about a battalion of the enemy, and a

* I gathered from the account of an officer of the Divisional Staff that, but for the order against firing, some of the guns would probably have been captured in a similar manner. As it was, they got away, and the rear vehicles only were taken.—C. H.

Russian battery appeared on the saddle north of Tu-men-tzu and opened fire on the regiment when it reached the foot of the spur north-east of Shang Liu-ho.

He could also see the Russian batteries west of Tu-men-tzu exchanging fire with the 2nd Division batteries near San-cheng-tzu Shan, and therefore concluded that the 2nd Division (3rd Brigade) had not yet crossed the valley, so he occupied the crest of this spur with his right battalion and put his left battalion behind the spur in the left rear of the former. The remaining battalion of the regiment was in divisional reserve north of Pa-chia-tzu. The 4th did not advance any further that day, but the artillery of the division gradually came into position in the valley and engaged the Russian artillery. This ends the narrative of the 4th Regiment.

62. The plan of the commander of the left column had therefore worked out all right. The 4th Regiment had reached Pa-chia-tzu practically unopposed, and its presence there at dawn must have materially contributed to the success of the attack of the 3rd Regiment by threatening the line of retreat of the Russians on Hachimaki-yama.

63. The artillery had been ordered to advance at dawn, and at 8 a.m. three batteries came into action in the valley bottom south-east of Pa-chia-tzu, against the enemy's batteries in position on the hills west of Tu-men-tzu. The range was too great, so two batteries were brought into action on the spur just above Pa-chia-tzu.

64. To summarize the situation at 10 a.m. on the 12th October:—

The right column was advancing from San-cheng-tzu Ling (C 3) towards Ma-erh Shan (C 2), out of touch with the left column and the commander of the Guard Division.

Of the left column the 3rd Regiment was in and about Pa-chia-tzu, the 4th Regiment on the west end of the spur north-east of Shang Liu-ho (B 3).

Of the artillery, two batteries were in action on the spur above Pa-chia-tzu.

As regards the cavalry, to protect the very exposed right flank of the Guard Division, General Kuroki had, on the previous evening (11th), sent two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to combine with two squadrons of the Guard Cavalry, the whole under the orders of the commander of the Guard Cavalry. In the morning the four squadrons advanced to Yin-chiang-pu (C 3) watching the rear of the division.

Divisional Head-Quarters and the reserve were at Pa-chia-tzu.

The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division was still on the south side of the valley.

65. It was at this moment that, with four other attachés, I reached a low hill a little east of Watanabe-yama (B 3), whence I had a good view of Pa-chia-tzu. The two batteries in position above Pa-chia-tzu were in epaulments just below the crest of a rounded, cultivated spur, the battery on the right being very crowded. Three wagons were close up behind each battery, the remainder of the wagons and the limbers were further to the rear in the open, too close for safety, but perhaps the long ranges had been taken into account. The teams were all unhooked and concealed. Two other batteries were in position in the valley, one of them right out in the open, the other preparing to open indirect fire from an admirable position behind a low spur which ran down into the valley from the hill we were on.

There was no firing of any sort going on with the exception of an occasional shrapnel fired at the battery in the open valley. These shrapnel came from west of Tu-men-tzu, and were evidently fired beyond time-shrapnel range, as they all burst on impact. At 10.15 a.m. the two batteries above Pa-chia-tzu opened fire, and at 10.45 a.m. the battery behind the spur on the south side of the valley followed suit. A desultory and innocuous exchange of long-range artillery fire continued for some time.

When these batteries opened fire we moved on to Watanabe-yama, where, after seeing the scene of the night attack, we took up our station on the commanding knoll (Hachimaki-yama) at the north end of the ridge.

66. *Right Column.*—During the morning a strong force of Russian cavalry, with some infantry, appeared at Ta-tzu-pu (C 2) and Wai-tou-shan-pu (D 2) in the Sha Ho valley, and as the commander of the division did not know where the right column was, nor whether it was advancing, he sent as a protection to its right flank, a detachment of the 3rd Regiment (two companies under a battalion commander) north-east from Pa-chia-tzu to the southern slopes of Hua-kou-ling Shan (C 3). The advance of the right column had been easy, and only opposed by a small detachment of the enemy; so at 11.30 a.m. it occupied a line from Ma-erh Shan (C 2) to Chung Kao-li-kou (B 3), and was able, from the former hill, to open a hot fire on the enemy, who, with one battery, was retiring from the valley east of Shang Hei-niu-tun (B 3).

Eventually the enemy occupied Chien Shan (B 2) and the hills to the east of it, and, opening fire, made a stand against the right column.

67. *Left Column.*—As explained, the left column was pinned down to its position near Shang Liu-ho (B 3). The line of hills east of Tu-men-tzu (B 3) had been given as the objective of the division, and was occupied by Russian infantry and artillery, while the batteries west of Tu-men-tzu swept the Kao-li-kou valley (B 3), yet this would have been no hindrance to an

attack if the general had only known where the 3rd Brigade was, and what it was doing.

68. *The Artillery.*—The two batteries on the ridge above Pa-chia-tzu produced but little effect, so three other batteries were sent forward to Shang Liu-ho (B 3). This was a difficult operation, as they had to cross 800 yards of open ground between Pa-chia-tzu and Shang Liu-ho under shrapnel fire from the Russian guns west of Tu-men-tzu. The guns and wagons were sent across at long intervals, and, though heavily shelled, all got safely under cover in Shang Liu-ho by 3 p.m., with very few casualties.

I watched this exciting incident from Hakimachi-yama (B 3). The three batteries took up a position on the west and north-west edge of the village, one battery digging its shelter in the low river bank, the others behind the low mud walls round the village gardens. I do not think they opened fire till the following morning. The engineer battalion covered this change of position, and remained in Shang Liu-ho as escort to the guns. H.F.A. (Hijikata's battery) had had a hard fight the previous day, and lost several horses, and, with its heavy Russian guns, did not reach Pa-chia-tzu till between 3 and 4 p.m., and, I think, took no part in the fight that day.

69. From our post on Hachimaki-yama (B 3) we watched the course of events. The two Russian batteries which devoted their attention to the Guard were posted, No. 1 west of, and No. 2 on the ridge east of Tu-men-tzu (B 3). No. 1 fired at the two batteries above Pa-chia-tzu, and at any troops crossing the valley to that village. I do not think it had any effect on the former target, as the range was a very long one, and any shrapnel which burst were set too long. It scattered some detachments of baggage which tried to get to Pa-chia-tzu direct by the main road, but when its limitations were recognized, any troops crossing the valley were sent *via* Mien-hua-pu (C 3), out of range.

This shelling by No. 1 of the batteries crossing from Pa-chia-tzu to Shang Liu-ho, although it produced but little effect, was a very pretty bit of gunnery, as it ranged on a point on the road, and received each vehicle at that point with an accurate *rafale*. It might, however, have ranged on a point nearer Pa-chia-tzu, which would have enabled it to have fired two *rafales* at each vehicle, for as the spot chosen was only 80 yards outside shelter, it had only time for one.

At about 2 p.m., No. 1 fired for 15 minutes at Pa-chia-tzu itself, with very considerable effect, as the village at that time was full of infantry, artillery, and baggage.

70. No. 2 battery, east of Tu-men-tzu, fired at intervals at Shang Liu-ho (B 3) itself, and at any target that presented itself in the vicinity. When it first forced itself on our attention its flashes were visible on the crest of the ridge, but later it withdrew behind the crest and fired indirectly.

At 3 p.m. a company of the Guard moved west along the valley, south of Shang Liu-ho, in the open, probably with the intention of linking up with the 2nd Division. The company moved in line of sections, each section in file, the formation adopted when advancing under distant shrapnel fire. In this instance No. 2's fire caught the company in flank, and a very few well-aimed shrapnel scattered it to the winds, every man disappearing, as if by magic, into handy nullahs and folds of the ground.

71. From our point of vantage we could see Japanese infantrymen occupying the crest of the hill north of Shang Kao-li-kou (B 3). I guessed, at the time, that they were part of the right column, but I could not understand why they should be so far to the front. They made the division face north-west with its right flank pointing in the direction where the enemy might be expected to be.

72. At 11 a.m. we saw the 3rd Brigade advance from the east side of San-cheng-tzu Shan (A 3) across the open valley against the hills west of Tu-men-tzu. It advanced in attack formation, driving a few scattered detachments of Russians in front of it.

73. So the fighting went on, and in the evening a strong force of Russians appeared on the right flank of the Guard. The Chief of Staff, First Army, had sent to inform the general that about one regiment of infantry was advancing, apparently against the right flank of the division, and the commander of the Guard Cavalry also reported that the enemy was in strength, at least 10,000 (natives said 20,000) between Wai-tou-shan-pu (D 2) and Pien-niu-lu-pu,* in the Sha Ho valley.

The 12th Division was now a long way behind the right of the Guard, and the four squadrons at Yin-chiang-pu (C 3) formed only protection to the right rear of the division.

74. It was not till the evening that Lieut.-General Asada knew the 2nd Division had got to Hsiao Ta-kou,† but he did not know if it was advancing, and though the right column had pushed on so far ahead, he could not with safety advance his left. So he despatched two more companies of the 3rd Regiment to reinforce those already sent to Hua-kou-ling Shan (C 3), and so to protect his right flank. The remainder of the division bivouacked where it stood.‡

That evening Major-General Matsunaga was sent with his brigade (the 3rd) to Yao-chien Ling,§ and marched along the Pa-chia-tzu valley in rear of the division, leaving only a

* Not on Map 44; is in square H 3 on Map 41, 3 miles east of Wai-tou-shan-pu.

† Not on Map 44; is in square F 3 (south) on Map 41, 1½ miles south-west of Tu-men-tzu (B 3 on Map 44).

‡ Although the right of the right column is shown on Ma-erh Shan, the actual hill was not yet taken. The plan shows the right flank too far advanced.—C. H.

§ Not on Map 44; is on square H/J 5 on Map 41.

battalion on Hsiao Ta-kou.* His mission was to fill a dangerous gap caused by the extension of front, and the desperate fighting at Pen-hsi-hu,† but his destination was too far away to have any effect in protecting the right of the Guard.

75. Late at night, orders were received from General Kuroki that the division was to advance the following day to the line Hsing-lung-tun (A 2)—Feng-chi-pu (B 1)—Shang-chia-wen (C 2). Hsing-lung-tun was shown about 2,000 yards south of its proper position on the faulty maps available. The problem for the commander of the Guard Division was—should he advance his right, or pivot on it and throw forward his left? He decided on the latter course, and at 11 p.m. issued the following orders:—

- (1) *The Watanabe Detachment*‡ (3rd Regiment and one battery), to occupy the line Hua-kou-ling Shan (C 3) Yen-lung Shan (C 3), to protect the right flank of the division. The detachment would be recalled directly the situation admitted it.
- (2) *Right column* (six battalions) to advance at 6 a.m. and attack Ma-erh Shan (C 2) with a detachment and Chien Shan (B 2) with its main force.
- (3) *Left column* (one battalion 4th Regiment) to advance in line with the right column against the enemy on the hills east of Tu-men-tzu.
- (4) *Artillery* to assist this latter attack from its present positions.
- (5) *Divisional reserve* (two battalions 4th Regiment under Colonel Iida, commanding 4th Regiment) near Shang Liu-ho (B 3).
- (6) Divisional Head-Quarters at Pa-chia-tzu.

76. *Right Column*.—The commander of the right column **13th Oct.** resolved to hold the enemy in front and attack his left, so he sent I/1 to occupy Ma-erh Shan (C 2) and protect his right flank, and at daybreak two battalions 1st Regiment and one battalion 2nd Regiment opened fire on the enemy at Chien Shan (B 2) from the position occupied the previous evening. At the same time two battalions 2nd Regiment, under the commander of the 2nd Regiment, advanced on their right against the east side of Chien Shan to attack the Russian left. The Russians on Chien Shan returned the fire, while their guns posted near Hsia Hei-niu-tun (B 3) also opened fire. The leading battalion reached the col between the Ma-erh Shan and Chien Shan without serious resistance, but could get no further owing to frontal fire from Chien Shan, and flanking fire from near Fei-shan-tun (B 2), and the cross-fire of the enemy's artillery.

* Not on Map 44; is on square F 3 (south) on Map 41, 1½ miles south-west of Tu-men-tzu (B 3 on Map 44).

† Not on Map 44; is on square H J 5 on Map 41.

‡ The remainder of the 3rd Regiment was sent to reinforce the four companies already out on the exposed right. The commander of the left column had been placed in command.—C. H.

When the attack began a force of the enemy advanced southwards from about Hsia Hei-niu-tun (B 3) against the left column, and to check this advance the commander of the right column sent III./1 towards that village.

In co-operation with the 4th Regiment a desperate fight took place. The commander of the III./1 and all his company commanders were wounded, and a lieutenant took command of the battalion. The fight began at dawn and lasted till night.

77. The right column could receive no artillery support in the very mountainous tract it was engaged in, so its attack made no headway. The enemy advanced against it from Ma-erh-shan-pu-tzu (C 2) and Hou-chia-tun (C 2) while a battery opened on it from Wu-chia-kou (C 2). The troops on Ma-erh Shan and the Chien Shan column were therefore enfiladed, and the position became so precarious that the commander of the right column, under orders received at 2 p.m. from Lieut.-General Asada, swung back his right to the position shown on plan.* The battalion which had reached the Chien Shan col was withdrawn with but few casualties. During the night the enemy reoccupied Ma-erh Shan, but there was no fighting. During the day's fighting the right column had considerable losses; the total casualties in the 1st Brigade during the five days' fighting were 380 killed and wounded, and most of them occurred on the 13th.

78. *Left Column.*—II./4, which formed the left column, also began advancing at daybreak, its line of advance being from Hsia Kao-li-kou towards Hsia Hei-niu-tun. As it advanced, Russian infantry opened fire on it from the hills north of Tu-men-tzu, west of the main road; the enemy's strength appeared to be about two companies, and II./4 advanced to within 700 yards of them. But continual reinforcements came up, and extended the Russian line eastwards to the hill north-east of the village. So the advance of II./4 was stopped, and it entrenched and remained in position. Till this moment it had been acting independently as the left column, and there was a gap between it and the left of the right column. Shortly before 8 a.m., however, the enemy began to occupy the knoll† afterwards called Iida-yama (B 3) by the men, in the centre of the gap, and Lieut.-General Asada, seeing the danger, placed II./4 under the command of Colonel Iida, and ordered him to attack the line of hills east of Tu-men-tzu with II./4, III./4, and half of I./4, the remaining two companies of I./4 being retained as divisional reserve at Shang Liu-ho. The artillery supported the attack from Shang Liu-ho and the spur north of Pa-chia-tzu.

79. As the foreign attachés did not see this attack, I will give an account of it as related to me by Japanese officers.

The distance that III./4 had to advance before reaching the foot of the hills to be attacked was about 1,800 yards, 1,500 yards of which was across the open valley. The formation

* Hatched red on Map 44.

† It was this advance of the Russians to Iida-yama that the commander of the right column sent III./1 to oppose.—O. H.

adopted to cross the open was the same as that adopted by II./4:—



In front line there were three companies extended at from three to five paces interval; in the second line, one company similarly extended, 250 yards behind the front line. The two companies of I./4 in the third line formed the regimental reserve, and did not leave the cover of the ridge until III./4 had reached the foot of the hills on the north side of the valley; when they moved, they did so in the formation adopted under artillery fire, *i.e.*, line of sections, each section in files, 15 yards to 20 yards between sections.

80. The advance across the open was made in company rushes of from 40 yards to 80 yards, and it took the battalion from 20 to 25 minutes to cover the 1,500 yards, during which time it did not fire. When within 600 yards of the hills the Russians opened fire, but the Japanese moved on to the hills without replying.

The casualties in crossing the open were only 2 killed and 4 wounded. On reaching the foot of the hills the column commenced the attack. On its right the right column was attacking Ma-erh Shan and Chien Shan, while on its left the battalion left by Major-General Matsunaga was attacking west of Tu-men-tzu.

81. The Russian position was a very strong natural one, and as the enemy was continually receiving reinforcements, the extreme right had to be reinforced with both the reserve companies. When they reached the front, the right company was engaged in a very hot fight with knoll "x"* at a range of about 400 yards, though the nearest of the enemy's riflemen were only 150 yards off. This company had lost all its four officers, and Colonel Iida ordered the reserve companies on reaching it to join it in delivering a hot fire, after which the

* On Iida-yama (B 3). The single large knoll shown as Iida-yama on Map 44 has on it three smaller knolls called in this account counting northwards "x," "y" and Iida-yama.

three companies were to charge together. This was successful, and knoll "x" was captured between 2 and 2.30 p.m. at the point of the bayonet. Another charge carried knoll "y" at 3 p.m. Beyond "y" was a third and higher knoll, Iida yama, and this the enemy held till dark. The Japanese did their best to capture it, but in crossing the col to attack it they lost heavily, receiving fire from the knoll itself, from their right front, and from the enemy's guns south-west of Hsia Hei-niu-tun. A company was transferred from the left to the right, so there were seven companies attacking the Iida-yama spur.

The whole slope below this last knoll was covered with Japanese dead and wounded. At night the Russians retired. The regiment lost 470 men, of whom 132 were killed. Iida-yama was held by about a battalion, which was, however, being continually reinforced. During the day the regiment fired 354,447 rounds. The fighting was so severe that men could not be spared to bring up ammunition, so the transport men with the ammunition ponies had to be used for the purpose, and many of them were killed or wounded.

82. I only saw this fight from a long distance, being with all the attachés on Temple Hill,* watching the capture of Okasaki-yama (Lien-hua Shan (F 3)),* but I could see the north slope of Iida-yama, the Russians lying along the crest of the ridge, and the reinforcements continually climbing the hill from Hsia Hei-niu-tun.

The ridge formed a very strong position; the lower spurs were fairly entrenched, but the only entrenchments on the upper ridge, which the Russians held on to so stubbornly, were the usual lying-down shelters scraped in the crest. The ridge was a curious mixture of rounded knolls, the steep slopes below which were cut up by deep nullahs which gave excellent cover.

83. *Artillery.*—The artillery opened fire at daybreak. Three batteries opened from Pa-chia-tzu against the hills west of Tu-men-tzu to assist the advance of the 2nd Division, while three batteries from Shang Liu-ho assisted the advance of the left column. When the attack on Iida-yama began, all the batteries co-operated to support it. Colonel Iida begged the guns to continue firing to the utmost limit of safety, and they kept it up till only fifty yards separated the attacking lines. The configuration of the ground and good training enabled them to do this. From time to time Russian guns replied, but it was hard for the gunners to say whence the fire came.

When the attack on Iida-yama came to a standstill, some of the guns continued shelling the reverse slopes of that hill, while others supported the advance of the 2nd Division. At Pa-chia-tzu were three batteries (the captured Russian and two field

* Not on Map 44. See Map 41. Temple Hill is Tera-yama, about 1½ miles W. of Hsia Liu-ho (B 3).

batteries), and at 10 a.m. one of the field batteries was advanced to the spur north-east of Shang Liu-ho, whence it fired at Okasaki-yama*; towards evening two of its guns advanced to the hill east of Hsia Kao-li-kou and shelled Ma-erh Shan (C 2). One battery was with the Watanabe Detachment.

84. *The Watanabe Detachment* was engaged on the 13th, but not seriously, and was not attacked, though there was a big force of the enemy still moving between Ta-tzu-pu (C 2) and Pien-niu-lu-pu,† higher up the Sha Ho valley. At the same time, an officer of the 3rd Regiment whom I afterwards met told me of a very nice piece of work done by II./3, which probably went very far towards averting the disaster which the exposed right flank of the division courted.

His story was to the effect that on the 13th, II./3, which formed part of the Watanabe Detachment, occupied Hua-kouling Shan (C 3), and found a whole Russian division deployed and entrenched in the valley west of Wai-tou Shan (C 2), with a strong force of artillery in position on Te-te Shan (C 2). In this situation, the commander of the II./3 made up his mind to fulfil his duty of protecting the flank of the division, or perish in the attempt. He therefore extended his battalion along a front of 3,000 yards, and put a bold face on the matter. The commander of the 3rd Regiment sent to ask him to withdraw from the mountain, but he refused and succeeded in maintaining his position.

The Russian officers seemed unable to get their men to advance from the trenches against the steep open slopes held by II./3, the commander of the battalion having ordered that marksmen should be told off to pick off the officers, while the remainder made the men in the trenches keep their heads down. During the morning a body of Russian cavalry worked right up to the foot of the hills, and, on being fired on, took refuge in the ravines. Later, this cavalry made up its mind to ride for safety, but on approaching their own line were taken for Japanese cavalry, and severely handled by their friends.

85. The situation of the Guard Division in the evening was as described. On its right, the 3rd Brigade was engaged with a superior force of the enemy at Yao-chien Ling,‡ and as the remainder of the 2nd Division on its left had not advanced. General Asada determined to bivouac where he was. Okasaki's attack on Okasaki-yama§ had been successful, but as the portion of the 2nd Division nearest the Guard Division had

* Not on Map 44; it is on square F 3 on Map 41, 1½ miles west of Tu-men-tzu (B 3 on Map 42).

† Not on Map 44; it is on square H 3 on Map 41, 3 miles east of Wai-tou-san-pu (D 2 on Map 44).

‡ Not on Map 44; it is on square G 4 on Map 41.

§ Not on Map 44; it is on square F 3 on Map 41.

been checked, the latter could not advance without exposing its left flank. The cavalry at Yin-chiang-pu (C 3) kept touch with the 3rd Brigade and reconnoitred to its front. At 10 p.m., therefore, Lieut.-General Asada ordered :—

- (1) The Guard Division will remain in its present position, and await an opportunity to advance.
- (2) The troops will bivouac on the line occupied, but will be ready to move at a moment's notice.

The orders were simple, but the general knew that part of the enemy's line at all events was in retreat, and he did not want to lose touch.

86. A glance at the map will show the curious change of position the day's fighting had imposed on the division. On the 12th it had occupied a fairly straight and compact line facing north-west with its right flank dangerously exposed. On the 13th the danger of this presentation of a flank to the enemy was made manifest, and the pressure brought to bear on it turned the Guard's line into a widely extended semicircle with its ends resting on Shang Liu-ho (B 3) and Mien-hua-pu (C 3), in which position it offered the Russians a fine opportunity for a counter-stroke. They were not, however, in a position to avail themselves of this chance. Both the 12th and 13th were anxious days at First Army Head-Quarters.

87. Later in the evening the following orders were received from Army Head-Quarters :—

- (1) The Army will continue its advance to-morrow.
- (2) The Guard Division will advance northwards with its left on the Tu-men-tzu-Feng-chi-pu (B 1) road, in touch with the 2nd Division.
- (3) A part of the Army reserve will be sent to replace the Watanabe Detachment, which will then again be at the disposal of the commander of the Guard Division.

These orders necessitated no alteration in those issued by Lieut.-General Asada, who could not tell when the Watanabe Detachment, which was occupying the line Hua-kou-ling Shan-Yen-lung Shan (C 3) would be available.

14th Oct.

88. The enemy in front of the right column had begun retiring at midnight, and in the morning there was nothing in front of that flank. So the commander of the right column occupied Ma-erb Shan with a battalion and sent reconnoitring parties out to front and flanks. In front of the left column the enemy had also begun retiring since midnight. In front of the Watanabe Detachment the enemy still remained in position at Wai-tou Shan and Hou-chia-tun (C 2).

89. At 8.30 a.m. Lieut.-General Asada, from his post on the ridge north-east of Shang Liu-ho (B 3), gave these orders:—

- (1) The Guard Division will pursue.
- (2) The 1st Brigade will leave Shang Hei-niu-tun (B 3) at 11 a.m., occupy the line Fei-shan-tun—Chin-chung Shan (B 2), reconnoitre towards Feng-chi-pu (B 1), and watch the right flank. It will leave one battalion at Hsia Hei-niu-tun (B 3) as divisional reserve.
- (3) One battalion 4th Regiment will leave Tu-men-tzu at 10.30 a.m., and prolong the line of the 1st Brigade to the left from Chin-chung Shan (B 2) to the road.
- (4) One battalion 4th Regiment,* the Engineer Battalion and the artillery will follow the leading battalion 4th Regiment.
- (5) When the Watanabe Detachment has been replaced by the Army reserve, it will follow and rejoin the division as rapidly as possible.

There is no mention of cavalry in these orders, as the Guard Cavalry Regiment was still combined with the 2nd Regiment, and acting under the orders of Army Head-Quarters. The division therefore only had a few orderlies, and the want of mounted reconnoitrers made its advance slow.

90. *The 4th Regiment*, leaving as ordered, and pushing back hostile patrols, occupied Chin-chung Shan (B 2) at 1 p.m., its main body south of the hill, and prepared to attack Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (B 2), which the enemy was holding.

The Artillery, about 2.30, occupied a position west of Chin-chung Shan about Ta Ying-shou-tun (B 2), and fired at the enemy's four battalions on Ma-chuan-tzu Shan (B 2), and at three other battalions at Tung Wa-shang-kou (A 2) in front of the 2nd Division.

The 1st Brigade moved as ordered, but during its advance perceived that a large force of the enemy was still in the Sha Ho valley in its front, part of it holding Te-te Shan (C 2). This force had to be driven off, which took some time, as the enemy offered some resistance, and it was not till a little before 5 p.m. that the brigade arrived at Ta Kuan-tun (B 2), and, connecting with the 4th Regiment, began to attack Ma-chuan-tzu Shan.

91. To assist the attack, one gun from the right group of batteries had been hoisted on to the top of Chin-chung Shan (B 2), and its effect on the enemy was very marked. The Russians held on stubbornly, and only retired as the division advanced to the assault. The Japanese occupied the hill in the dark, and so dark was it that it was impossible to see which

* The remaining battalion 4th Regiment is not referred to, but it was probably also in divisional reserve.—C. H.

way the enemy had gone, so the division could not pursue. In the afternoon there had been some rain, but as the Japanese advanced to attack the hill such a shower fell that the surroundings were blotted out. Losses were insignificant, the action being merely a rear guard affair, which the Russians generally manage extremely well.

92. Lieut.-General Asada therefore sent orderly officers to each section of the division, and ordered:—

- (1) 1st Brigade to watch the line Chin-chung Shan-Ma-chuan-tzu Shan with its main force at Ta Ying-shou-tun (B 2), and to connect with the left of the 2nd Division.
- (2) 4th Regiment to watch the line from Chin-chung Shan in front of Chien Shan (B 2), with its main body at Chin-chung-shan.
- (3) One company from the reserve to watch the col between Chien Shan and Ma-erh-shan-pu-tzu (C 2).
- (4) Artillery to bivouac in its present position.
- (5) Remaining troops to bivouac about Hsia Hei-niu-tun (B 3).

That night the Russians retired across the Sha Ho, and though on the 15th there were small affairs of outposts, the battle was over.

(37) Battle of the Sha Ho. First Japanese Army.
Operations of the 12th Division, Umezawa
Brigade, and 2nd Cavalry Brigade from
the 2nd to the 15th October 1904.

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers,
Yen-tai Colliery, 3rd February 1905.

Plates.

General map - - - - - Map 41
View of the extreme right of the Japanese
position at Pen-hsi-hu from the Russian side Panorama 7

The positions of the three divisions of the First Army and the Umezawa Brigade before the Russian advance, which led to the battle of the Sha Ho, were as follows* :—

The left was virtually at the Yen-tai Colliery (E 4). Major-General Umezawa's Head-Quarters were at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3). Nine of his battalions were at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), and three companies of infantry and one troop of cavalry were at Pen-hsi-hu. In other words, there were no troops between the Colliery Hills (E 4) and Ping-tai-tzu (H 3). The 12th Division was more or less in reserve at Ta-yao (E F 5), a village lying between the Colliery Hills (E 4) and Wu-hsien Shan (E F 5), while the other two divisions, the 2nd with its head-quarters at a village 2½ miles south of Yen-tai Colliery station, and the Guard with its head-quarters at Ta Ta-lien-kou (E 5, north), formed the front line, the former being on the right and the latter on the left. On the left of the Guard was the Second Army.

Indications of the activity of the Russians on the Japanese right flank became clear about the 2nd October, their scouts gradually increasing in number in front of Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), where were some seven battalions of the Umezawa Brigade. On the 6th October the enemy's numbers in front of that place 6th Oct. made it clear that a large Russian movement was in progress. This idea was strengthened by the fact that spies described all the Russian forces on the northern bank of the Hun Ho between Mukden and Fu-shun† as having crossed that river on the 3rd and 4th. Everything pointed to the organization of a movement by Kuropatkin to turn the Japanese right, and an attempt at seizing Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) and Chiao-tou.‡

On the night of the 6th October orders were given§ to the First Army and the Umezawa Brigade to hold the line Pen-hsi-

* See Map 41.

† 25 miles east of Mukden.

‡ Not on Map 41; it is 17 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu.

§ General Umezawa, at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3), received these orders early on the 7th.—J. B. J.

hu (H/J 5)—Ta Ling (H 4)—Tu-men Ling (H 4)—Yen-tai Colliery (E 4). Major-General Umezawa was ordered to retire his force from Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) to the Tu-men Ling (H 4), and hold that place and the line from it to Pen-hsi-hu.

7th Oct.

A glance at the map will show what a difficult duty this was with the force he had at command. Major-General Umezawa had evidently held his ground at Ping-tai-tzu (H 3) quite long enough, for, judging it too risky to retire by daylight in the face of such ever-increasing numbers of the enemy, he withdrew quietly and without hindrance during the night of the 7th, and disposed his troops in the best way he could along the Tu-men Ling (H 4)—Pen-hsi-hu line. He himself took up his position at Yu-shu-te-hsia (H 5), south of the Ta Ling (H 4). As the Japanese extreme right was practically on the defensive throughout the battle, I will attempt to describe the events that took place along the line, section by section.

The Japanese extreme right may be considered as having run from Pen-hsi-hu (H/J 5) to Tu-men Ling (H 4) and west of it along a chain of hills by no means as well defined as would appear by looking at the map. A fair road runs in rear of and parallel to this defensive line (*i.e.*, south of it), a factor that contributed very largely to the Japanese success, for it was by this road that reinforcements were brought up so promptly from the 12th Division. This division's head-quarters quitted Ta-yao (E/F 5) at noon on 7th October, leaving behind them at that place two battalions 29th Reserve Infantry Regiment and one battalion 39th Reserve Infantry Regiment, which in September had been added to the 12th Division. These were to form the First Army reserve.*

The Tu-men Ling Section.—The country is mountainous and intersected with small valleys, few exceeding half a mile in width, the majority being less. They are cultivated, but at this time of the year all the crops had been cut and most of them collected. Here and there is a nullah, dry at this season, but in the rainy season containing water. These nullahs are practically the only cover the valleys afford, for their bottoms are very level. The sides of the valleys are steep climbing as a rule, and although there is a certain amount of vegetation, it is of low growth, affording only a limited amount of cover from view.

On the other hand the folds on the ground on the slopes, and the narrow tops of the ridges, afford much assistance to attacking infantry if properly led. Rocks occur occasionally on

* The mountainous high ground north of Kao-chia-pu-tzu (G 5) was the most western position taken up by the troops of the 12th Division after it moved eastwards from Ta-yao (E/F 5). Here were placed 4 battalions and 1 battery. As days wore on and the enemy were found so vigorous on the Pen-hsi-hu side, all were moved east except 1 battalion. This battalion was heavily attacked by the enemy on the 12th October, but in the night the enemy withdrew, and the cavalry of the 2nd and Guard Divisions were able to advance and occupy Mien-hua-pu (G 4).—J. B. J.


the hill and ridge tops, but not in sufficient size and number to warrant the defenders, when occupying such places, utilizing this natural cover in lieu of making trenches. The hills on which the Japanese took up their positions dominated, to a certain extent, the ground in front, but the country is so uneven that the line of trenches cannot be described as having been drawn along any well-defined feature, such as a range or ridge. Viewed from the north side (that of the enemy's approach), it would appear that this might be done, but such was not the case in reality.

For the disposal of troops and planning of the trenches, in order to hold a position securely in such a country, a trained eye and mind are a necessity. Both disposal and planning were left entirely to battalion commanders and their officers. The choice of the ground on which to locate each trench is all-important, of course, and it was interesting to observe how often one great advantage was deliberately rejected to obtain another which, at that particular spot, was, for the moment, in the eyes of the defenders, even more important. To give an example: On part of the front slope of the hill forming the advanced position I saw a trench had been drawn back from the crest, in order to afford attackers by night no means of determining when they had actually reached it, and of ascertaining beforehand the presence of abattis ten feet in front of it. On the other hand, its selected position entailed there being dead ground immediately in front of it for three hundred and fifty yards or more, and also, as was found in the actual fighting in the darkness that the enemy was able, by retiring for only a few yards, to get under cover and take a breather between the bayonet charges. In other words, a good field of fire was rejected in order to obtain a position more difficult for the enemy to attack by night. It must be added, however, that if the trench had been on the edge of the crest or down the slope, its occupants would have been more exposed to shrapnel and long-range rifle fire.

The intersected nature of the country must have greatly hindered the effective action of the Japanese guns, handicapped as they were by a great numerical inferiority, and labouring under the usual drawbacks of inferior power, range, and rapidity of fire. The Russian howitzers did good work, as might be expected in a country singularly adapted to such artillery. The enemy's field guns took full advantage, as usual, of their superiority in range, but, owing to their weight, could not apparently obtain really good positions in a country essentially adapted to mountain artillery. To sum up, this section of the Japanese line of defence was extremely well taken up, and the best made of a difficult task, for the ground undoubtedly favoured the attack to a degree unwonted in this war, so far as my personal experience goes. At the same time, it must be mentioned that in some places the steepness of the ascent

to the trenches, up to which the attackers must climb, was very great.

The advanced post was the weakest part of the defence.* The ground had to be held, but being in the form of an inverted L in front of the main line, was both difficult to hold and not easily reinforced :—



A and B were points somewhat higher than the ground between them, and faced directly towards the enemy. They were about 900 feet above the village of Kao-chia-pu-tzu (H 4) in the valley to the front. A C was a narrow ridge connecting with the main line of defence (D E). A B was 20 feet to 30 feet higher than D E, and 750 yards from it. Continuous trenches on A B and some on A C, but the latter were practically unoccupied by day. B commanded A slightly. The number of men on A B was as many as the ground could suitably hold. A C sloped down from A to C, and being narrow and exposed, could not be traversed by reinforcements in the daytime without heavy loss. A C was the only means of communication with the advanced trenches on A B. This advanced post lay about 1,000 yards north-east of the Tu-men Ling (H 4) itself, across which lay the line of defence. The left (west) of the defensive line was prolonged from the pass into the steep and difficult mountains to the west, lying south-east of the Yao-chien Ling (G 4). This flank was practically "in the air," and was not really secure until the arrival of the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division on the evening of the 12th October. The right of this section of the defensive line was prolonged from the pass eastwards, and joined up with the Ta Ling (H 4) section 700 yards or so from the Tu-men Ling (H 4). Before the arrival of the 12th Division reinforcements, the ground occupied, roughly speaking, 2,800 yards in length; after their arrival, 3,200 yards. The field of fire for the rifles of the defenders varied very much everywhere. Owing to the intersected nature of the country, it could only be described as good in few places. The tops of the hills being devoid of much space, the ridges narrow, and the slopes to the rear somewhat steep, there was very fair cover for the supports to the firing line, in spite of the presence of Russian howitzers, which ought to have undoubtedly done better work than they did.

9th Oct.

The Japanese had 2 mountain guns in position. These were increased to a battery (6 guns) on the arrival of the

* See square H 4 on Map 41.

12th Division. West of the pass were 4 companies (of the Umezawa Brigade), while east of it was 1 company. During the day and the night of 9th October two sections occupied the advanced post. On the evening of the 9th the 12th Division arrived, and the reinforcements from it made up the total to 10 companies and 6 guns. On the 11th 3 more companies reinforced, making on that date and afterwards 13 companies on this section of the defensive line. At midday on 9th October scouts gave warning of the approach from the north and north-east of 3 battalions of the enemy. No fighting took place this day or night.

There was no fighting on the 10th October, and the enemy **10th Oct.** made no movement except to send a section of infantry forward dressed in what appeared to be Chinese clothes, who reconnoitred the advanced post and then retired.

At 9 a.m. on the 11th the enemy's guns (16 field guns in **11th Oct.** position due north, near Kao-chia-pu-tzu (H 4)), at a range of 4,500 yards, began shelling the advanced post, still occupied by the two sections of infantry and the Japanese mountain guns, which on their part devoted their attention entirely to the advancing Russian infantry. The enemy's advance began at 10 a.m., one battalion moving to attack the north-west side of the advanced position and another the north-east side of the high eastern point of it (B).^{*} On the enemy's approach, a section of Japanese infantry occupying the end of a spur running out north from the advanced position fell back. At 1 p.m., after a continuous exchange of rifle fire, the Russians occupied the hilly ground 900 yards, more or less, in front of the advanced position. At about 2 p.m. the attacking line against the high eastern front of the advanced position was reinforced by two battalions, and that against the north side of the advanced position was reinforced by one battalion, the movement being supported by heavy artillery fire. The two detachments of the enemy were 600 to 800 yards apart, and heavy musketry was going on round the advanced position. From 2 p.m. till dark the advanced position was slowly reinforced by the major who was in command there, until its garrison amounted to two companies and one section—all that the place could hold. At dusk the firing died away and the Russians stayed where they were—600 yards from the trenches. The Japanese spent the night entrenching.

The Japanese force this morning amounted to 1½ battalions **12th Oct.** of the 12th Division and 2 companies of the Umezawa Brigade. At 4 a.m. the enemy in force (about 2 battalions) attacked the whole advanced position with the bayonet. Fighting lasted two hours, during which the enemy time after time tried to rush the trenches, but were driven down the slope into the dead

^{*} See diagram on opposite page.

ground. Bombs were used by the Russians and stones by the Japanese, both with great effect. In the dawn of the morning, the enemy managed to get a footing on the west end (A), and drove a section of the Japanese out of the trench on that side, but they could not hold it long. The eastern high point, 80 yards away, dominated them, and a heavy rifle fire being brought to bear on them from it, they were in a few minutes forced to evacuate the trench and retire down the slope. When it was daylight a battalion of the enemy came up to assist, and brought, from 600 yards off, a heavy fire to bear on the advanced post trenches. The enemy down the slopes remained quiet and took full advantage of the dead ground just below the Japanese trenches.

At 2 p.m. the Russians down the slopes, a few at a time, began to retire, taking advantage of whatever cover there was, about 800 yards, where they threw up shelter trenches, but at nightfall there were still some of the enemy left who had been unable to get away. As on the 11th, the Russian guns fired all day on the Japanese guns, and the latter on the attacking infantry. The Japanese officers described the effect of their own shells as being most telling. On this day there were 32 Russian guns in action; 24 were posted due north, 6 or 8 to the east, and the remainder, howitzers, about 500 yards south-west of Kao-chia-pu-tzu (H 4). The advanced position was the enemy's main objective, but firing went on all day, more or less, along the line. 133 Russian dead were found in front of the trenches, including 3 officers, one of whom was the commanding officer of a battalion.

13th Oct.


Firing went on more or less during the night of the 12-13th, and at 2 a.m. on the 13th, two bodies of the enemy moved forward to the attack, one up a valley from the north-west and another up a valley from the south-east. The latter valley lies somewhat in rear of the high eastern point of the advanced post (B). Both were driven back by rifle fire, and a storm completed their discomfiture. Neither column got much within three hundred yards of the trenches. During the day there was not much musketry, but the enemy's guns shelled heavily. The Japanese on the 12th and 13th could not show their heads above the trenches, but the casualties from shell fire were few: 3 men killed on the east front of the advanced post, 3 or 4 men wounded on the west front of the advanced post, and one officer killed by a shell.

14th Oct.

In the morning on the 14th at dawn it was discovered that all the enemy, except a large body of Cossacks, had retired. When these withdrew later a Japanese squadron (all that was available) followed and kept touch with them. The Japanese infantry did not advance until the afternoon, by which time the Russians had already crossed the Sha Ho, and were most of them occupying the high ground on the north side of it.

The enemy left behind 300 rifles and 800 rounds of small-arm ammunition.

The Ta Ling Section.—Much of what I have written regarding the Tu-men Ling (H 4) section applies to that of the Ta Ling (H 4). The ground is much the same, i.e., Alps in miniature, but in that part of this section adjacent to the pass itself the hills and valleys are on a still smaller scale. Commencing from the right of the Tu-men Ling (H 4) section, the line of defence passed through and across the Ta Ling (H 4), and was prolonged beyond it for 3,000 yards, taking a south-easterly direction. The right of the line rested on a ridge of frowning cliffs, which, forming part of the defensive line throughout the fighting, required the presence of only a few scouts to guard them. The pass itself was the lowest point of the defence, and with the ground for one hundred yards or more on each side of it, is in reality hardly more than level with the hilly ground to its immediate front. As at the Tu-men Ling (H 4), there was an advanced post on a hill north-east of it, 500 yards away, which dominated the main line of defence; it was Table Mountain shaped with a top 50 yards by 8 yards. The few rocks on the top afforded little or no cover, so a trench was dug on the crest. It was occupied by one company. This advanced post (named Gunki-yama (H 4), or "Standard Hill" by the men after the fighting) was 200 yards in front of and 20 feet higher than the main line of defence. Like the advanced post at Tu-men Ling (H 4), it was connected with the main position by a narrow neck on which the Japanese had dug somewhat hasty trenches facing east, in which direction the slope was a gentle one and convex. An inverted L, curiously enough, again represents the ground on which this advanced post's trenches were situated, but here the angle of the L pointed north-east:—



F G = table-shaped top of Gunki-yama. G H = neck. J K = main line of defence. G H could be swept by rifle fire from J K. Abattis was laid ten feet in front of the trench G H to prevent the easy approach at night of the enemy charging up the slope, and to entangle him while using bayonet and rifle. There was not any abattis on Gunki-yama itself, but a hundred yards in front of the pass and across the road the approach was blocked by thick abattis. The convex shape of the neck precluded the enemy from locating the whereabouts of the trench in the dark, and a good field of fire was not necessary, as the slope was under fire from H K. The Japanese guns were on a hill 250 yards west of the pass, which gave them a very fair field of fire in spite of the intersected ground in front. This

hill dominates Gunki-yama at a range of 700 yards. The whole position cannot be described as a strong one, for it laboured under the same disadvantages as that at Tu-men Ling (H 4) and to a somewhat greater extent.

The number of troops defending the Ta Ling (H 4) section was three reserve battalions; one battalion covered 2,500 yards of ground west of the pass, the other two battalions 2,500 east of the pass. Four mountain guns were in position, as said above, west of the pass, but they were always brought down at nightfall to the pass itself. Major-General Umezawa's position throughout the fighting was on the road between Yu-shu-te-hsia (H 5) and the pass. Lieut.-General Inouye, who commanded the 12th Division, on arrival assumed command of the three sections of the defensive line, *i.e.*, Tu-men Ling (H 4), Ta Ling (H 4), and Pen-hsi-hu. His head-quarters were at Yu-shu-te-hsia (H 5) throughout the fighting.

9th Oct. On the 9th October two companies of the 24th Regiment (12th Division) were posted in reserve at Hsiao Lien-chai (H 5). Small parties of the enemy all day attempted reconnaissances, and exchanged fire occasionally with the defence. Trenches were improved and abattis constructed.

10th Oct. On the 10th October there was no change in the situation.

11th Oct. On the 11th October there was no change in the situation, except that the number of the enemy in front seemed to be increasing very much.

12th Oct. At 3 a.m. on the 12th October a large body of the enemy (estimated at a regiment) advanced up the road to the pass. Not a shot was fired by the Japanese, but when the enemy arrived within 450 yards the guns (on the pass) opened on him at that range, with apparently great effect, for he retired at once. On this, both companies of the 24th Regiment were brought up to reinforce the firing line. At 5 a.m. a regiment (probably the same) of the enemy attacked Gunki-yama (H 4). After about an hour's fighting the Russians took it, driving off what remained of the Japanese company holding it, which retreated more or less to the main line of defence. The majority of the men of this company were casualties before the hill was taken. Day was now dawning, and such being the state of affairs, the colonel commanding the regiment determined to retake the hill at all costs. Meanwhile the greater part of the defensive line was engaged with the enemy, but the latter was making no progress. In the dim light, under cover of the guns, which were back again in position 250 yards west of the pass, the colonel, carrying the standard himself, led on two companies which had been in support, together with the remains of the company that had been driven off it, against Gunki-yama from the rear of the pass. They had not gone far when the colonel was shot through the leg and chest, after which he

received two more wounds. The battalion major then took the standard, but being wounded in his turn, he handed it to the adjutant, who was shot almost at once. Finally a private seized it, and succeeded in planting it on the top of the hill shortly before 7 a.m.


During this counter-attack the enemy held, as well as the hill and ground in rear, a ridge 600 yards to the east of the hill, but the Russian infantry on it were engaged by the 3rd Company holding the eastern side of the pass. Meanwhile the mountain guns had been raking Gunki-yama at a range of 700 yards, and when it was quite daylight and the enemy's artillery opened, they paid no attention to it. The Japanese guns had a good target at a very easy range. On this account, the retaking of the hill did not cause much loss to the Japanese who made the counter-attack, while the Russians lost heavily. Their dead amounting to 129, including two lieutenant-colonels, lay on the hill and the ground north of it. Examination afterwards proved that most of the Russians had been killed by shrapnel. The Japanese casualties were 270, of which 70 were killed. The colonel recovered from his wounds.

In the afternoon musketry was intermittent along the line, but there was no severe fighting, as the Russians did not press home their attack. During the night very little fighting took place, except a small skirmish on the road in front of the pass.

On the 13th October the Russian artillery (28 guns with 15-cm. (5·9-inch) howitzers) shelled the whole line of the defence all day, but only two Japanese were wounded. The defenders were careful to keep under cover. The Japanese guns in face of such a force of artillery remained silent and escaped all casualties. Officers describe the shooting of the Russian guns as most erratic. The Russians made no further advance. This night was very quiet. **13th Oct.**

Dawn on the 14th October disclosed the fact that the enemy had retreated. In the evening the Japanese advanced to Ku-chia-pu-tzu (H 4), while an advanced guard pushed on to Hsiang-shan-tzu (H 4, east), and a troop of cavalry was sent on to Shang Shih-chiao-tzu (H 4, north-east). **14th Oct.**

It is difficult to understand why the Russian commander selected Gunki-yama as the point to drive home his attack, when reconnaissance should have informed him of the position of the Japanese guns. His plan at the start must have been to rush the pass with the bayonet, but being foiled in this, and pressed by time, as daylight was not far off, perhaps the commander of the column determined to seize a point that lay close to him. He was probably actuated, in coming to this decision, by the fact that even in the darkness so clear and simple an objective would not demand any of those complicated orders which are so difficult to carry out on such occasions.



The Pen-hsi-hu section.—The Japanese line ran from the point at which the precipitous cliffs on the right of the Ta Ling section end, through Shih Shan (J 5) and Ming Shan (J 5), and was then refused, *i.e.*, it turned in a south-westerly direction along the heights overlooking the right (north) bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. The ground from Shih Shan (J 5) to Ming Shan (J 5) was termed by the soldiers Rakuda-yama,* and is clearly delineated in Captain Vincent's sketch.† The drawing having been done from the lowest ground over which the Russians advanced to the attack, the position appears, perhaps, more formidable than it actually was, for though a watershed, the ridge between these two mountains is very irregular.

The Japanese artillery position was about the centre of this ridge. It had a very fair field of fire. On visiting the Japanese trenches between Shih Shan (J 5) and Ming Shan (J 5), the manner in which they had been disposed in order to obtain the greatest fire effect with the limited number of men available in the early part of the battle of the Sha Ho, in this section of the defence, struck me as most remarkable. For instance, sometimes quite sixty yards or more of ground on the line of the defences was left without an entrenchment, but the ground in front of such a gap was always under fire from a neighbouring trench. The slopes in rear of the trenches were, as a rule, steep enough to give fair cover from shrapnel to the reserves, whose numbers at first were insignificant. They were always posted at night, more or less in rear of, and close up to, the above-mentioned gaps.

The tops of the hills composing the range between Shih Shan (J 5) and Ming Shan (J 5), on which ran the Japanese line, were convex, and, as is usual in such a case, the question of where to site the trenches was a difficult one. As at the Ta Ling, the expectation of night attacks much influenced the Japanese officers, and so in many places the trenches were drawn back from the crest for nine yards or so, to prevent the enemy locating them accurately in the darkness. In such a case the field of fire in the immediate front of the trench might be a bad one, *i.e.*, perhaps there might be dead ground for one hundred yards or more; but if possible (I myself, as a matter of fact, saw no case of its being impossible) the fire from a neighbouring trench, so situated as to be able to sweep this dead ground, obviated this disadvantage.

In addition to this, communication with the rear was more easy in the case of a trench situated somewhat in rear of the crest, whereas good communication with a trench down the front slope meant time and labour in digging, which could not be given. Owing to the difficult nature of the soil, the Japanese entrenchments were slight at first, but of course improvements were made as the hours passed. Generally speaking, the entrenchments, on being improved, took the form of breastworks with a

* Rakuda-yama = Camel Mount.

† See Panorama 7.

very shallow trench, revetted with stones, of which there were plenty lying about, and sods. The top was sodded to prevent splinters. None of the entrenchments, however, can be described as being of sufficient strength for the work that had to be done. Owing to the total lack of trees in the vicinity, no abattis was employed, in fact the Japanese used no obstacles of any kind whatsoever. I may mention that the responsibility for the situation of the entrenchments lay entirely in the hands of the regimental officers, a remarkable fact that in itself bears witness to the excellent training and capability of the Japanese infantry officer. The two weak points of the line taken up by the Japanese were the hills Shih Shan and Ming Shan, both of which dominated the surrounding country. Had these two points been capable of being easily held, and had there been space on them for a sufficient number of men, this section of the defending line would have been a fairly strong one. But they were both like Majuba in form, and in the case of Ming Shan there was merely room for a handful of men on the top, who were practically cut off from help, and incidentally had practically no way of retreat. The field of fire from the top of each was bad, but the craggy and steep slopes meant the use of both hands and feet to reach the defenders.

On visiting the ground on which the Japanese defensive line was taken up, a major who commanded one of the two battalions at the commencement of the fighting, and had been responsible for the siting, asked me what I thought of it, and if he should have done otherwise. The map, I hope, will show that his plan was the only one possible, when one considers the small number of the Japanese at Pen-hsi-hu in the early stages of the fighting, the quality of the infantry, both Japanese and Russian, and the fact that reinforcements were hurrying up to the assistance of the defenders. In occupying Ming Shan the Japanese made the best of a bad business. It had to be done. They could not possibly expect to hold it long, but the longer it was held, the longer the Russian attacking lines would be delayed, and the nearer would be the approach of the reinforcements. I think one must, in such cases, judge chiefly by results. As will be mentioned further on in this report, the top of Ming Shan was held all day on the 9th October (the first day of the Russian attack), until 5 p.m. An attempt to take the offensive was out of the question, but the defence had served the only purpose possible under the circumstances, *i.e.*, it had to a great extent delayed the execution of the enemy's plans. If one omits Ming Shan from one's calculations, and the fact that the defending force was quite inadequate for the first three days, the position may be described as a strong one. No obstacles were used throughout the Pen-hsi-hu section of the line of defence.

The Japanese force at Pen-hsi-hu at the commencement of the battle of the Sha Ho was 3 companies reserve infantry, 1 troop and 2 mountain guns, less 70 men on detachment at

Chiao-tou,* the whole number under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Hirada, acting under the orders of Major-General Umezawa.

On the 6th and 7th October Russian cavalry appeared some miles east of Wei-ning-ying (K 5), and was observed to be hourly increasing and moving on that village. On the 7th October a detachment of Japanese infantry in two parties—one of one company and the other of 120 men—occupied the hills overlooking Wei-ning-ying (K 5). In the early part of the night of the 7-8th the commanding officer of the little force burned his stores and withdrew from Pen-hsi-hu, but receiving news of the reinforcements that actually arrived in the morning, he returned while it was still dark and took up his position again.

8th Oct. Not long after daybreak 2 battalions and 2 guns despatched by Major-General Umezawa arrived. At 7 a.m. some Russian scouts (cavalry) were observed in Wei-ning-ying (K 5). This village is composed of about seventy houses, and lies on a plain close to the right banks of the Tai-tzu. Shortly afterwards 1,500 Cossacks, under Lieut.-General Rennenkampff, arrived at the village, having come from Ho-chia-pu-tzu (J/K 4), and passed through Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4). The situation, as far as the Russians were concerned, remained the same until 10 a.m., but meanwhile the detachment of Japanese infantry had moved forward from the defensive line and part of it had occupied the hill close to Ho-ti-kou (J 5), while the other part occupied the hill between Wei-ning-ying (K 5) and Ming Shan (J 5), where they entrenched. The first party consisted of 1 company, the second of 120 men, as on 7th October. At 10 a.m. Russian infantry and guns appeared from the east, and arrived at Wei-ning-ying (K 5), whereupon the Cossacks crossed the Tai-tzu Ho to the left bank and moved west, cutting the wire between Chiao-tou* and Pen-hsi-hu. At 3.30 p.m. the Russian guns (1 battery), from a position on the slope of the hills north-east of Wei-ning-ying (K 5), opened fire on the position held by the 120 men, which was roughly 600 feet above the plain. Simultaneously the enemy's infantry began to advance on both parts of the detachment, attempting to outflank the company near Ho-ti-kou (J 5) by getting round their left. The detachment slowly retired on the defensive position. The Japanese casualties were six. The major commanding lost his horse, which was shot.

The night was quiet. The enemy occupied Wei-ning-ying (K 5) with four battalions, while at Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4) he had a brigade.

9th Oct. Shortly after dawn on the 9th the enemy's infantry, which had seized the position occupied by the detachment yesterday, advanced on Ming Shan (called by the Japanese

* 17 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu.

soldiers Kaboto-yama, or Helmet Hill), on the top of which were 30 Japanese infantry, holding it more or less as an advanced post. One battalion attacked from the side next the river, while another, descending from the hill occupied by the 120 Japanese infantry the day before, crossed the intervening valley and attacked it from that side. Some Russian cavalry, with two guns and three companies of infantry, crossing the Tai-tzu, shelled Ming Shan from the sandy flat on the south bank. Occasionally these two guns shelled the refused flank south-west of Ming Shan. Not long after the Russian infantry had begun their advance, the reserves from Wei-ning-ying (K 5) occupied the hill their attack had started from. In the meantime lines of the enemy's infantry were also moving towards the other parts of the line of the defence, though very slowly. At 8 a.m. the attack was general all along the line. The Japanese had practically no reserves, as the line they had to hold was so long in comparison with the men available. In the course of the morning the enemy's battery (6 guns) that had fired from the east of Wei-ning-ying yesterday took up a fresh position on a rise close to Ho-ti-kou (J 5) and opened fire. Shortly after 2 p.m., while it was seen that large bodies of the enemy were moving on Shih Shan from Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4), a reinforcement of seven companies and two guns arrived from Major-General Umezawa. By this time the enemy's infantry had worked its way for some distance up the slopes of Ming Shan, which run down towards the river, and were also within 600 yards of the Japanese trenches west of the mountain. All day the 30 infantrymen on Ming Shan summit put up a great fight against overwhelming odds, and it was not until 5 p.m. that the Russians attained their object. Only seven men (all wounded) managed to get away at the end, the remainder were killed. Surely the Lacedæmonians at Thermopylæ were not braver than these men.

Consequent on the loss of Ming Shan, the Japanese trenches for some distance north-west of it had to be evacuated, as they came under a severe plunging fire.

In the meantime the fighting round Shih Shan had been very severe, and towards nightfall the Japanese (less than a company) were driven off it. The Russians attacking Shih Shan and the trenches on the left and right of it amounted to a brigade, with their reserves at Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4).

In the course of the afternoon the 1,500 Russian cavalry had moved on towards Chiao-tou,* but the three companies of infantry, before mentioned, had taken up a position on the low but hilly ground south of the lines, so the Japanese position

* 17 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu. The garrison of the place was 70 infantrymen, but the commander armed his military coolies with Russian rifles and thus increased his force to 250. A staff officer also collected 300 men (drafts marching north from Lien-shan-kuan), and putting himself at their head, brought them to Chiao-tou.—J. R. J.

was being rapidly outflanked. In the evening the enemy's main body with General Stakelberg, who commanded the Russian forces in the neighbourhood of Pen-hsi-hu, was at Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4), while an infantry brigade was in Wei-ning-ying (K 5) as reserve to the enemy's left.

It will thus be seen that by the time darkness set in the Russians had greatly increased their forces, and had seized two most important and commanding points in the line of defence. It was reasonable to suppose that the opportunity of securing the whole of the Japanese defensive line as soon as it was dark would not be missed. At 8 p.m. reinforcements, consisting of the 26th Regiment and one battery mountain artillery (belonging to the 12th Division) arrived. They were at once thrown into the line of defence, and the tired troops were withdrawn to rest.

There was, however, no attack during the night, and all was quiet.

10th Oct.

Fortunately for the Japanese, there was an exceptionally thick mist in the morning of the 10th October. It cleared, however, now and again, and when it did so the enemy opened fire, but received no reply. Just before the mist began to clear away, about 11 o'clock, three companies of Japanese infantry attacked Shih Shan and drove the Russians off it after a most severe struggle. It is noticeable here that Stakelberg had apparently made no arrangements for the reinforcement of his men on Shih Shan, for they received none. When the mist had quite cleared away the main body of the enemy from Kao-tai-tzu (J/K 4) crossed the ridge into the Ho-ti-kou valley (J 5) and engaged the Japanese centre. The whole of the Japanese line was now engaged. Stakelberg's position, it is believed, was with the brigade in reserve in rear of the left of the attack close to the river. At noon the Russian troops south of the river made a movement down stream as if to threaten the Japanese rear. By 2 p.m. Stakelberg had thrown many more men (from Wei-ning-ying) into the firing line in and about Ming Shan and south of it, where the situation was most critical for the Japanese, but although the musketry was very heavy on both sides, the Russians did not succeed in closing with the defence.

Lieut-Colonel Hirada, in command of the two reserve battalions, was wounded severely during this fighting, and his place was taken by Major Honda, who in his turn was severely wounded on the 11th.

All day the Japanese just managed to maintain their position. As an instance of how well the Japanese held their ground, I will mention the slight trenches held by Major Honda's battalion. These were north-west of Ming Shan, and under a plunging fire from the top of it at 900 yards. After one's experience in South Africa, on visiting the spot, one could not believe that men could have lived on the little hill, now

termed Honda-yama (J 5). No doubt the Japanese losses were great, and the Russians are proverbially bad shots, but still the matter seems inexplicable.

About 4 p.m. the Russian firing lines from Ho-ti-kou (J 5), amounting with their reserves to one division, attempted to advance closer, but at nightfall no rifleman had succeeded in getting much within three hundred yards of the entrenchments.

When darkness set in the enemy remained on the ground which he had succeeded in reaching. During the night various Russian patrols approached the Japanese line, but were invariably detected and driven back.

Early in the morning on the 11th October the Russians **11th Oct.** heavily attacked the trenches on and near Honda-yama (J 5), where firing went on at very close ranges. They made repeated attempts to close with the Japanese, but were always driven back by fire. Elsewhere along the line fighting went on as on the 10th, and the Russians lost heavily. The Japanese losses, too, were severe, for one-third of Major Honda's battalion were casualties, its losses being chiefly due to the plunging fire from Ming Shan.

At 8 a.m. a Japanese battalion crossed the river to the south bank of the Tai-tzu Ho by the Pen-hsi-hu ford. The three Russian companies had been reinforced before then by an unknown quantity of infantry and two guns. These latter, with the two guns before mentioned, opened on the Japanese crossing the river at 2,000 yards, but did not cause a single casualty. On reaching the left bank the battalion encountered some Cossacks, of whom they killed about 50, and occupied some high ground.

At 4 p.m. two companies of engineers reinforced Honda-yama (J 5), and at one time firing—the Russian firing line was only 250 yards away—and at another building, completed a strong but low parapet of stones, well sodded on the top, just a few minutes before 4 a.m. next morning. The engineers were also under a plunging fire from Ming Shan until dark. On the evening of this day the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, under Prince Kannin, arrived at Chiao-tou. At this place the original garrison of 70 men had, by pressing every one into the service, been increased to 359, under an infantry captain.

The enemies passed the night in the positions they were in at nightfall.

On the morning of 12th October there were at Pen-hsi-hu the **12th Oct.** bulk of the 12th Division and Umezawa Brigade, and a reserve regiment, of which 4 battalions and 2 batteries were on the position itself. At 4 a.m., not many minutes after the breastworks on Honda-yama, mentioned before, had been completed, a battalion of the enemy in column or mass formation charged the hill with the bayonet, and at the same time firing became general along the line. The Russians apparently selected Honda-yama for special

attack as the slope to the front was gentler than elsewhere. Again and again the Russian officers, who fought in their shirts, led their men on, but each time they were driven back by the two companies holding the hill. An officer of the battalion, who was in the fight, described it to me on the spot most vividly. I asked him if there was much shouting in the *mêlée*, and he told me there was none whatever, even the usual Russian band was absent. "The fighting was most grim and determined on both sides, the enemy using the bayonet almost entirely, his leading men only firing occasionally, while the Japanese used bullets, bayonets, and stones. Six Russians only succeeded in getting over the parapet. They did not return."

This combat lasted an hour, during which, of course, there were intervals of rest between the bouts, the enemy being finally repulsed with, as was discovered later on, about 300 casualties. This number must include the casualties of the previous day. The Japanese losses were 40, including two out of the three officers of one of the engineer companies; one was killed, the other was wounded. No doubt the breastwork is responsible for the comparatively small Japanese casualties.

At dawn the enemy's guns opened fire, and laying somewhat wildly, hit many of his own men. It was seen at daylight that the Russians had fallen back at least one hundred yards everywhere from their positions of the previous evening; they showed no signs of retirement at first, however, and intermittent rifle fire and shelling continued.

At 10 a.m. the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with 6 machine guns under Prince Kannin, which had previously made a rapid march to Chiao-tou, suddenly appeared in pursuit of Rennenkampf's 1,500 Cossacks, who were falling back on Wei-ning-ying (K 5) along the Pen-hsi-hu-Chiao-tou road south of the Tai-tzu Ho. The cavalry brigade was followed by a battalion which had also previously arrived at Chiao-tou. At 11.30 a.m., Prince Kannin, quietly bringing up his machine guns on to a rise south of the river, opened on two Russian battalions in close formation north of it at a range of 1,500 yards. This he was enabled to do as Rennenkampf's cavalry had fallen back up stream and uncovered the left flank of their infantry. The account of this action is given in a special report.* It is sufficient to say that from this moment Stakelberg began to retreat, and by 2.30 p.m. the whole of his left had withdrawn towards Wei-ning-ying (K 5). The night passed quietly.

13th Oct. Just as day was dawning a company of the enemy's infantry was observed close to a cottage west of Ho-ti-kou (J 5). Apparently it had stopped behind to find and take away the bodies of three officers which were lying in the vicinity. This company proved to be the last of the Russians, for by 7 a.m. all

* See page 664.

the enemy were out of sight. Two officers' patrols were then sent out by the Japanese, one to Hsiao Yu-pu-tzu (J K 5) and the other to Ho-ti-kou (J 5). By 10 a.m. all the Japanese troops had advanced and occupied the ridges one-and-a-half miles in front of the line of defence. Up till dark the enemy's rear guard held the hills north and east of Wei-ning-ying (K 5).

The enemy's dead found south of the Tai-tzu Ho amounted to 350; north of the Tai-tzu Ho, in front of the Pen-hsi-hu section, to 1,500; the Chinese state the Russians took away 800 dead.

The Japanese casualties in the Pen-hsi-hu section numbered 1,000.

The force which the enemy employed against Pen-hsi-hu was the Third East Siberian Army Corps, with General Rennenkampf's 1,500 cavalry. These troops were, however, reinforced from time to time by the First East Siberian Army Corps (of 3 divisions), which also attacked Tu-men Ling (H 4) and Ta Ling (H 4).

**(38) Battle of the Sha Ho.—First Japanese Army.
Operations of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, from
the 9th to the 16th October 1904.**

REPORT by Captain J. B. JARDINE, D.S.O., 5th Lancers, Yen-tai Colliery, 21st November 1904; with remarks by Lieut.-General Sir IAN HAMILTON, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Plates.

Action of 2nd Cavalry Brigade on			
12th October 1904 -	-	-	Map 45, Sketch 1.
Action of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on			
13th, 14th, and 15th October 1904		„	2.
Action of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on			
16th October 1904 -	-	-	„ 3.

Remarks of Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.

This brief and clear report, with its excellent maps, which I have the honour to forward herewith, speaks for itself, and needs but little comment from me.

2. Although the vertical intervals of the contours are given, it may be as well to emphasize the fact that all the hills shown are steep, rocky, and difficult to climb or work over, especially in the case of mounted troops. The Tai-tzu Ho is rapid and deep, being impassable by ordinary troops, although some Japanese infantry did manage to cross it.

3. The point of the ridge five hundred yards east to To-chia-tun* was an outpost position of vital importance to the Russian forces attacking Pen-hsi-hu. It was on the dangerous flank, just along the road along which Japanese reinforcements were most likely to arrive, and it was within easy rifle range of the Russian reserves and trenches.

4. It is natural, before criticizing, to pause and indulge in some heart-searching reflection as to whether British mounted troops under such circumstances would have done better than the Cossacks. In this case the answer is most clearly and emphatically in the affirmative.

The Tirah campaign first taught the British Army the absolute necessity of piqueting all heights within three thousand yards of the valley along which the infantry and baggage usually

* See Map 45, Sketch 1.

advanced or retired. This lesson was so constantly enforced in South Africa, that I may make bold to say no British commander of any experience in falling back from the Chien-chin Ling would have neglected either—

- (1) to make every preparation to defend the ridge running parallel and one thousand yards east of the Chien-chin Ling—Pen-hsi-hu road, and to defend it stubbornly; or
- (2) to send immediate warning to the commander of the force and to the troops about Yao-chia-pang-tzu that the latter must withdraw to a point out of range from the ridge east of To-chia-tun.

5. Instead of this, the commander of the Cossacks, who is said to have been General Rennenkampf himself, seems to have thought only of his own mounted troops, and being afraid very possibly that the Japanese mountain guns might open on him from Pen-hsi-hu, he fell back and uncovered the flank of the infantry.

6. There are two points which might be urged, not in excuse, but in extenuation of the commander of the mounted troops. The first is, that as the Russians appear to have no signalling arrangements, it was found impossible to communicate with the troops on the other bank of the river. As, however, it is not over two hundred yards wide, the message could have been shouted across had this brilliant idea occurred to anyone. The probability, however, is that no one troubled their heads about the matter, the reason for this being contained in the second plea, which is that neither side in this war appears to realize or act upon the long range of the modern rifle. No one ever hears of officers being picked out at over a mile, nor is there any equivalent here to the hawk-eyed Afridi, who at two thousand eight hundred yards puts every bullet within a yard or two of his man. One thousand yards appears to be ordinarily regarded as the range of the rifle, and the fact that the Japanese machine guns are only sighted to two thousand yards, whereas on a suitable target they are dangerous at three thousand, speaks for itself.

7. The Japanese did splendidly on this occasion, which was one which would have made the eyes of the leader of a Boer commando sparkle with delight. In that case some five hundred rifles would suddenly have opened on the Russian reserves and trenches from the rocks along the southern river bank, and they would have lost even more heavily than they did from the **Maxims**. This is not the first occasion on which it has struck me that the Russians would have failed just as completely against the Boers as they are now failing against the Japanese, though in quite another manner and sense.

Report of Captain J. B. Jardine.

On 8th October, 1,500 Cossacks, with one battery horse artillery, under General Rennenkampf, had appeared at Wei-ning-ying* at 7 a.m.

Wei-ning-ying* is between four and five miles east of Pen-hsi-hu by road, the latter being the extreme right of the Japanese defensive line during the battle of the Sha Ho.

Without halting at Wei-ning-ying,* the Cossacks crossed the Tai-tzu river to the south bank, and moved west, presumably on Chiao-tou.† This place only contained a garrison of 70 infantrymen, and was a supply dépôt.

On the 9th October, at mid-day, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under Major-General Prince Kannin, received orders to march at 2 p.m. for Chiao-tou. At this time its head-quarters were at Hui-yao‡ (a few miles east of Yen-tai Colliery). Two squadrons were this day out on reconnaissance, but were quickly called in, and the brigade started not long after the time ordered. The strength of the brigade was 8 squadrons, with a battery of 6 Hotchkiss machine guns.

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade duly arrived at Chiao-tou and anticipated the projected Cossack raid: the dilatoriness and want of enterprise of the Cossacks is very noticeable, they apparently waited for the situation at Pen-hsi-hu to be decided before venturing to raid Chiao-tou, less than 17 miles away.

12th Oct.

The brigade left Chiao-tou at 3 a.m. on the 12th October. At the Chien-chin Ling the advanced patrols got in touch with the enemy, who, after a short fight, fell back along the Pen-hsi-hu road.

Following in rear of the brigade was a battalion that had also just arrived at Chiao-tou.

In the meantime, during the same night, the 11-12th, some fighting had been going on at Pen-hsi-hu, the Russians made repeated attempts to carry the position with the bayonet, but by daylight their repulse was assured although their infantry were still within three hundred yards of the trenches in many places. The extreme left of the Russian attack was as shown on the sketch,* the reserves having their backs to the river and being on the slopes running down to the north bank of it.

At 10 a.m. on the 12th October Prince Kannin's cavalry arrived in front of Pen-hsi-hu, and Rennenkampf's Cossacks took up a position as marked on sketch.* Their horse artillery shelled the Japanese trenches on the north bank. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with the battalion which came up a little later, by hard marching occupied a position as marked on the sketch.

* See Map 45, Sketch 1.

† About 17 miles south of Pen-hsi-hu.

‡ In square F 5 on Map 41.

At 11.30 a.m. the machine guns of the brigade, which had been unostentatiously got into position, opened at a range of 1,500 yards on two battalions of Russian infantry (the reserves of the extreme left, with a firing line on the north bank of Tai-tzu Ho), who were in close order eating their midday meal. They were dispersed in confusion, and suffered heavy losses during the three minutes the guns were turned on them. The attacking lines of the enemy next claimed the guns' attention, and they were swept by fire from left to right as far as could be reached. The Japanese Hotchkiss guns are only sighted to 2,200 yards.

This successful operation immediately resulted in the retirement of the Russian left, and was the commencement of Stakelberg's eventual retreat. The comment here on the tactics of the Cossacks is obvious. Such plums rarely dropped into the mouths of our cavalry in South Africa. When all is said and done, the Japanese merely took advantage of a very obvious opportunity and incurred no risk whatever.

The machine guns inflicted great loss, judging by the Russian dead left on the ground.

By 2.30 p.m. the whole of the enemy's infantry on the left (four regiments) had retired from the positions it had been occupying, and the Cossacks and guns on the south bank withdrew to another position in rear (eastwards), where they were reinforced by some infantry from Wei-ning-ying. Here they remained until dark. Prince Kannin's force followed them up closely, and a mountain battery crossing the river from Pen-hsi-hu came into action at 3 p.m. against the enemy in his second position.

Fighting ceased at 6.30 p.m., when Prince Kannin's force retired to the Chiao-tou-Pen-hsi-hu road, leaving a detachment of two squadrons as outposts for the night.*

During the night of the 12th October, part of Rennenkampf's cavalry and infantry retired from their position up stream (south bank).

On the 13th October, between 10 and 11 a.m., the Russian rear guard, three battalions and two or three squadrons, retired to a position opposite San-chia-tzu,† the Japanese at once occupying the position the Russians had held during the night. **13th Oct.**

The enemy held the hills north and east of Wei-ning-ying until dark, and Rennenkampf's force still remained in position south of San-chia-tzu. The whole of Stakelberg's force was now in retreat.

14th October.—In the morning it was seen that Rennenkampf had left 300 Cossacks as rear guard in the position occupied during the night, so the brigade attacked, and driving them eastwards occupied it at 11.0 a.m. Two squadrons of Japanese **14th Oct.**

* See Map 45, Sketch 1.

† See Map 45, Sketch 2.

then crossed the river to the north bank at San-chia-tzu with some infantry, and took up positions as marked on the sketch,* facing towards Kao-kuan-sai, where was the main body of Stakelberg's force.

Rennenkampf's main rear guard (3 battalions and 3 squadrons) retired past Pien Ling and eventually crossed the Tai-tzu Ho to the north bank at Kao-li-chi† about four miles east of that place. The situation was unchanged when night fell.

15th Oct. At 7 a.m. on the 15th October the squadrons north of the river were increased to three and the infantry to one company, while the main advanced guard (of cavalry and one battalion of infantry) remained in the position south of San-chia-tzu all day. At noon another battalion coming by way of Chiao-tou reinforced Prince Kannin at Yin-hsin-tai. Rennenkampf's rear guard to-day was still east of Pien Ling and on the south bank.

16th Oct. It was reported on the morning of the 16th October that Stakelberg's rear guard had retired, but on advancing, Prince Kannin's advanced guard found the enemy in position at 10 a.m., north of Kao-kuan-sai.‡ His force was three or four squadrons, with two horse artillery guns. After an hour of desultory fighting they fell back on a second position, where it was seen their forces amounted to about seven squadrons (two or three of them were mounted infantry), two battalions, and a horse artillery battery. The Japanese attacked, and fighting went on till dark. The country is composed of high and steep hills, most difficult for horses.

The Japanese casualties were 30, the infantry suffering the most.

17th Oct. Next day, 17th October, Prince Kannin's force ceased to be a separate unit. He handed over the command of the brigade to Major-General Tamura and joined Manchurian Army Headquarters.

* See Map 45, Sketch 2.

† Not on Map 45.

‡ See Map 45, Sketch 3.

(39) First Japanese Army.—The Capture of Wai-tou Shan on the Sha Ho by the Umezawa Brigade, on the 27th October 1904.

REPORT by Lieut.-Colonel C. V. HUME, D.S.O., Royal Artillery,
Tokio, 30th May 1905.

Plate.

General Map - - - - Map 46.

1. Wai-tou Shan is a long razor-backed hill in the Sha Ho valley, south of the river. At its north end it rises abruptly from the valley to a height of about 400 feet, and thence its crest-line runs back, practically level, for about 800 yards due south. From the south end of the crest it slopes rapidly down to the low col which links it to the main line of heights which run along the south side of the Sha Ho valley. The actual sole of the valley is here flat and bare, and three-quarters of a mile to one mile wide. From the north side of Wai-tou Shan to the Russian batteries on the north side of the valley the ranges were from 3,500 to 4,500 yards. The slopes of the hill are everywhere steep, and, in parts, precipitous. The ridge and upper western slopes of the north half of the hill are covered with oak and hazel scrub, and scattered lean mountain oaks, seldom over fifteen feet high; the rest of the hill is covered with short grass, through which the stones crop out. The patches of wood shown on the sketch are clumps of firs. On the knoll at the north point of the hill are the ruins of a temple, surrounded by an ancient stone-revetted entrenchment.

2. A glance at the map will show that the three hills, Ma-erh Shan, Hua-kou-ling Shan and Hsiao-liu-yu Shan form a wide re-entrant, into which Wai-tou Shan juts from the north. At the close of the battle of the Sha Ho on the 14th October, a portion of the First Army occupied the line denoted by the above three hills. The main Russian forces retired to the north side of the river, but for a long time, in fact as long as they could, they held on to points on the south side of the valley. Among others they held Wai-tou Shan, which was one of those debatable points about which professors of tactics are fond of setting questions as to whether they should be included in a defensive position or not. Its chief value to the Russians was as an observation station, as it looked into the Japanese line between Ma-erh Shan and Hsiao-liu-yu Shan, but it was far in front of their main position, difficult of access and, owing to the openness of the valley, it was impracticable to reinforce it in daylight. On the other hand, though it was disagreeable for

the Japanese to be thus overlooked, they did not wish to push their line of defence so far out into the valley, anyhow at first, and they could always sweep the hill with artillery fire.

3. The history of the occupation of Wai-tou Shan is as follows:—

It was in Russian occupation on the 14th October, but when the main body retired across the Sha Ho in the evening, a small observation post was all that was left on it. On the 15th it was "no man's land," though the Russians had observers on it. On the 16th the Japanese occupied it with a handful of infantry and two troops of cavalry, but this the Russians could not stand, so, the same afternoon, they stormed it with a regiment of infantry and one of Cossacks, supported by a heavy artillery fire. From that date they held it with a strong detachment of infantry, variously estimated at from two to four companies, or even more, which strongly entrenched the crest. A, B, C, D, E, are the prominent entrenched points on the hill, and their approximate distances apart are, A to B, 200 yards, B to C, 70 yards, C to D, 200 yards. When the Japanese had established themselves in their positions on the three hills to the south, they arrived at the conclusion that it was not well that the Russians should continue to look into the rear of their line over the low ridges and valleys which separated the high points in it. They therefore determined to take and occupy Wai-tou Shan themselves, though it meant that the troops told off to hold it would always be within effective range of the Russian guns across the valley.

4. The 27th October was the day fixed for the attack, and for three or four days previously the Japanese, who usually fired a few shell whenever a tempting target appeared, left the hill severely alone and lulled the occupants into a false feeling of rest and security. The guns were then put in position as shown in the map, and all was ready. The battery of little 9·5 cm. (3·74-inch) howitzers was hidden in epaulments in a small valley, and I did not know till afterwards that they had taken part in the firing, though I watched it all day. The remaining batteries had an easy task, as none of their ranges exceeded 3,500 yards, and they were out of reach of the Russian guns, which, however, tried to reach them with percussion shell at intervals during the day.

5. The attack began by the twenty-eight guns opening fire simultaneously at 8 a.m. The Russians were taken completely by surprise: some were cooking in the open, some were sleeping, and they all ran to cover. The guns employed consisted of four captured Russian guns, six field guns, twelve mountain guns, and six 9·5-cm. howitzers. The remaining two Russian guns fired occasionally from a ridge west of Ma-erh Shan, but the range was too great for them to be of any use. The defenders being well entrenched, a large number of high-explosive shell were used. The firing was slow and deliberate, with an occasional

half-battery salvo; it was concentrated on the entrenched knolls successively; it was very accurate, and very few shells were wasted. About midday the fire died down to an occasional shell, but, later, during the infantry attack, the artillery fired continuously and, when the situation demanded it, rapidly.

6. Hitherto not a single infantryman had put in an appearance, the Japanese wishing the Russians to think that nothing beyond the bombardment was intended, but shortly before 1 p.m. a company of infantry (1/29th R.*) appeared and the leading section occupied trench (*n*). The other two sections advanced past the trench, and the whole company then deployed for the attack, two sections in firing line, one in support. At 1.20 p.m. the company advanced along the bare ridge towards the col at the south end of Wai-tou Shan, the firing line in rank entire advancing by rushes of alternate sections, the supporting section, also in rank entire, following in quick time. After covering four hundred yards without being fired at, the firing line reached a nullah and lay down for a few minutes, the support closing up.

7. The company then advanced past the foot of the hill and along the upper western slope, the firing line extending and resting its right on the crest, beyond which it could not go without exposing itself to fire from F and from the Russian guns. As it extended for advance along the hill side, another company (2/29th R.) filed out of the copse G, where it had laid concealed, and deployed on the left of 1/29th R. The two firing lines then advanced together in extended order (intervals, two to five paces) along the steep, open, slippery hill side. In this advance the firing line became a series of loose groups, and when at 1.30 p.m. the first shot was fired down on it, the advance thenceforward was made by rushes, the groups lying down and firing from behind such scant cover as the formation of the ground or an occasional outcrop of rock afforded.

8. As it advanced, the attack divided itself automatically into two groups, influenced thereto by the conformation of the ground and the necessity of obtaining cover. 1/29th R. keeping its right on the crest, 2/29th R. advancing below and in front of it on easier ground. 1/29th R. was then reinforced from its supports, and advancing beyond 2/29th R., lay down; the latter was then also reinforced, came up in line with 1/29th R., and lay down. By this time the firing lines had contracted in length and were pretty thick. The supports, following at a distance of one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards, also lay down in the deadiest ground they could find, in loose rank entire. 1/29th R. then brought up its left shoulders and 2/29th R. followed suit, the supports closing to about eighty yards. At 1.45 p.m. the whole firing line rose and, closing in on its right, advanced rapidly in a swarm with its right on the

* The 1st Company 29th Reserve Regiment.

crest. Five minutes later it arrived close under A and lay down. One man then advanced cautiously towards the trench, followed immediately by an officer and then gradually by other men. The trench was deserted, and the swarm advanced and lay down in a mass behind its low parapet and the upper end of the spur or rib which ran down the hill from A.

9. When A was reached, fifteen or twenty Russians dribbled out of B and doubled along the crest under a smart shrapnel fire, their long cloaks flapping round their legs. A few of them stopped at C, the remainder disappeared over the crest at D. After reaching A, the leading Japanese quickly pushed on to B, the swarm following slowly and in any order. B was about two hundred yards from A, and was reached at 2 p.m. It was empty, and the Japanese lay down in a mass behind the parapets of the trenches. C, the next point to be attacked, was only seventy yards from B, and was a low rough knoll thinly wooded with seraggy oaks, eight or nine inches in diameter; it had two tiers of trenches, the lower end of which ran down the western slope of the hill for 30 yards. There was a little cover behind the knoll, and as it mounted two machine guns, it formed a sort of rough field work barring the passage along the crest. The two companies at B opened a rapid fire on it, but even with the assistance of the artillery, which concentrated a fire of shrapnel and high-explosive shell on it, little effect was produced.

10. In the meantime Major-General Umezawa had ordered the two remaining companies of I./29th R. to reinforce the companies on the hill, but finding that a battalion of the left wing (I./1st G.R.)* had already started to do so on its own initiative, the two companies of I./29th R. followed slowly in rear as reserve. At 2.20 p.m. two weak companies of I./1st G.R. had advanced along the lower slopes of the hill. Ribs ran down the hillside from A and B, and the hollow between them was covered from the fire from C. These two companies advanced in three irregular groups, the leading one of which extended and lay down along rib B, its right thirty or forty feet below the cluster on the crest. The second group lay down behind the first, and the third group in the bottom of the hollow between ribs A and B. The firing line was then gradually reinforced, thickened, and extended until its right touched the companies of I./29th R. on the crest. A quarter of an hour later, at 2.35 p.m., two more companies of I./1st G.R. advanced along the base of the hill, also in three groups, and after collecting in the hollow behind rib B, extended the firing line still more to the left. So, shortly after 3 p.m., the six companies were disposed as shown in the map, the left thrown slightly forward along a subsidiary rib and firing straight up hill. There were three supports of about the strength of a

* The 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Reserve Regiment.

section each, one of which was behind the two companies on the crest, one behind the centre in the hollow, and the third one hundred and fifty yards behind the left, under cover of rib A. At 2.55 p.m. the two remaining companies of I./29th R. had emerged from G, and were lying down in a hollow some four hundred yards in rear of the left support (they are shown too far forward in the sketch). They were seen by the Russian gunners, who gave them a short sharp dose of shrapnel.

11. In the meantime the defenders of C and D were showing signs of wavering. At 2.30 p.m. a dozen or more of them doubled back from C to, and beyond, D, while a few also slipped away from the trenches at D, and disappeared over the crest. Some of these were rallied and brought back and put into the trenches at D again. At 3 p.m. a brave handful of fourteen Japanese on the extreme right of the line, on the crest, ran forward to the front trench at C, and began firing down into it from the parapet. The defenders at once began streaming out of the trenches, and doubling to the rear along the crest, but before many had got clear of the knoll, a gallant officer stood up on the top of it, and waving his sword, rallied the men and brought them back to the front of the knoll. There they stood up, and fired down on the Japanese, who wavered, broke, and then doubled back to the firing line, leaving half their number on the ground. After this the Japanese line lay and fired for another hour at C, while the artillery increased the severity of its fire at C and D.

12. This produced the desired effect, for after 3.30 p.m. between twenty and thirty Russians retired from C in dribblets along the crest, and disappeared down the far side of the hill at D. Then at 3.50 p.m., finding the fire had died down, the two companies of Japanese at B rose and streamed along the crest, right over C, and along to D without meeting any opposition, and at 4 p.m. a Japanese officer planted the national flag on the ruins at E. The remainder of the attackers followed along the crest, a number of them halting near D, and firing down the hill at the retreating Russians. The defenders had slipped away from the trenches at D and E during the fighting, and after the Japanese began their final advance only half a dozen men were left at D, and these could be seen disappearing singly over the crest. Then, at 4.10 p.m., when the hill top was clear of the Russians, two or three Russian batteries opened a tremendous shrapnel fire on the crest and upper slopes of the hill, but owing to the steepness of the hill sides, cover was easily obtainable and the Japanese only had ten or twelve casualties from it.

13. Thus ended the engagement. During the night engineers were sent up to assist in entrenching the hill against the Russian guns, and a battalion of infantry was firmly established on the hill. On the night of the 28-29th the Russians made

an unsuccessful attempt to recapture the hill with a couple of battalions, and the following night they tried again with one battalion. In this last attack about twenty of the leading Russians got to within twenty feet of the top and were driven down with stones and hand-grenades. After that the enemy contented himself with shelling the hill every day, but after a time gave this up also. The Japanese held the hill thenceforth with a battalion, which was relieved every three days; they also mounted three machine guns, one of which had been captured in the attack. The short Russian official telegram describing the action, which I saw in the papers some weeks later, stated that the garrison of Wai-tou Shan had been attacked and forced off the hill by a superior force of Japanese, but that subsequently the Russian field guns had opened a heavy fire and driven the Japanese off the mountain again. During the action the ridges on both sides of the Sha Ho valley were crowned with lines of spectators from the respective armies.

14. According to Major-General Umezawa's information, there were four or five companies of Russians on the hill, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, the remainder of the regiment (the 18th) being in reserve down in the valley. It is difficult to judge the strength of an entrenched force, but all I can be certain of is that there were in the morning a handful of men at A, and another at B, while the original garrison of C consisted of about one hundred men and two machine guns. The Japanese got to within seventy yards of C at 2 p.m., and were held up by it for two hours, before the end of which time the last detachment of the garrison, twenty or thirty men, had left. C was a place that could hardly be reinforced owing to the Japanese artillery fire, but it was the only place where there was really any resistance. The attacking infantry consisted entirely of reserve men of the Umezawa Brigade, which had lost so severely in its gallant defence round Pen-hsi-hu during the first stage of the battle of the Sha Ho. They fired about 80 rounds per rifle during the action.

15. The 28 guns in action fired 1,186 rounds, an average of 42 rounds per gun. Of these, 631 were shrapnel and 555 high-explosive shell. All common shell are filled with high-explosive, even those of the little 9.5 cm. howitzers. The fire was very deliberate till the attack on C began, when a hot fire was concentrated on that point. It looked as if nothing could have lived there, the shrapnel and high-explosive shell burst all over the knoll, and I saw one of the latter hit a stout oak and, bursting, hoist the tree high in the air. And yet, after all this cannonade combined with an infantry attack, only 30 Russian bodies were found on the hill. I do not think any dead were removed, or I should have seen them being carried away. This is another instance of the small losses well

entrenched infantry suffer from artillery, even when the fire of the latter is concentrated.

16. The Japanese losses were:—Officers, 4 killed and 7 wounded; non-commissioned officers and men, 52 killed and 127 wounded. In addition to the 30 dead left on the hill, the Russians lost many in their retreat down the hill, but as their gunners never allowed the Japanese to go down and examine the slopes, their number could not be ascertained. The Japanese took 3 prisoners and captured 2 Maxims, one of which was smashed by a shell, 157 rifles, 70,500 rounds of small arm ammunition and a company colour.

17. This attack furnished another instance of what happens to an infantry attack in mountains, examples of which we have so often seen. When the hills to be attacked are reached, the general distribution of the attack is all that can be adhered to. It is the ground then that dictates actual formations and local distribution, and in nine cases out of ten the attacking line resolves itself into thick clusters which cling to bits of dead ground in the hill sides, and push forward firing lines on to the crest above, in which as many rifles as possible are maintained. Further advance depends on local successes, in the attainment of which the conformation of the ground continues to play a preponderating part.

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